QUESTION: The Gemara (end of 46b) says that even though Rebbi Yosi taught in Seder Olam that separating Terumah nowadays is a Chiyuv d'Oraisa, his own personal opinion is that it is only a Chiyuv d'Rabanan. The Gemara supports his view from a Beraisa which states that if yeast of Terumah falls into dough or causes it to ferment, according to Rebbi Yosi one need not separate Chalah from the dough. RASHI (DH Potrin) writes that this is because the Chiyuv to separate Chalah nowadays is only mid'Rabanan, and therefore "Dimu'a" (food of Chulin which became mixed with Terumah) -- which is considered Terumah d'Rabanan -- is exempt from Chalah. (Rashi (DH Chayeves) explains that it is not considered Terumah d'Oraisa because the majority of the mixture is Chulin and, mid'Oraisa, we follow the majority.) There is no obligation to separate Chalah d'Rabanan from Terumah d'Rabanan, just as the Torah does not obligate one to separate Chalah from Terumah d'Oraisa.

The Gemara's statement that Dimu'a is exempt from Chalah apparently contradicts a principle stated by Tosfos in Berachos (15a, end of DH v'Rebbi). Tosfos writes that a minor who ate bread and was satiated may recite Birkas ha'Mazon on behalf of his father who ate only a k'Zayis of bread. In this case, the obligation of both the son and the father to recite Birkas ha'Mazon is mid'Rabanan (the son, because he is a minor, and the father, because he did not eat his full). Tosfos asks, however, that the Mishnah in Megilah (19b) states that a minor may not read the Megilah on Purim to exempt an adult, even though both are obligated only mid'Rabanan. Tosfos answers that in the case of the Megilah, the minor is obligated only as a result of two Mitzvos d'Rabanan: the Mitzvah of Chinuch of a minor is d'Rabanan, and the Mitzvah to read the Megilah itself is d'Rabanan. A person who is obligated because of two Mitzvos d'Rabanan cannot exempt a person who is obligated because of one Mitzvah d'Rabanan.

The principle of Tosfos -- that one who is obligated because of two Mitzvos d'Rabanan cannot exempt one who is obligated because of one Mitzvah d'Rabanan -- seems to conflict with Rebbi Yosi's opinion in the Gemara here. Rebbi Yosi says that Terumah of Dimu'a is exempt from Chalah, even though the Chiyuv of Terumah of Dimu'a is due to two enactments of the Rabanan, while the Chiyuv of Chalah is due to only one enactment of the Rabanan. The obligation to separate Terumah nowadays is only mid'Rabanan, and the obligation to separate Terumah from Dimu'a (even in the times of the Beis ha'Mikdash) is only mid'Rabanan. Those two Mitzvos d'Rabanan should not override the single Mitzvah d'Rabanan to separate Chalah nowadays. How can two Mitzvos d'Rabanan exempt one Mitzvah d'Rabanan?

ANSWER: The CHOCHMAS BETZALEL (in PISCHEI NIDAH) answers that perhaps Rebbi Yosi disagrees with the principle that two Mitzvos d'Rabanan cannot exempt one Mitzvah d'Rabanan. Indeed, we find that Rebbi Yehudah (Berachos 15a, Megilah 19b) disagrees with this principle and maintains that a minor may read the Megilah for an adult. Perhaps Rebbi Yosi follows the view of Rebbi Yehudah.

However, according to this answer, there seems to be a contradiction in the Halachic rulings. The Halachah in the case of Dimu'a follows the view of Rebbi Yosi who says that Dimu'a is exempt from Chalah, while the Halachah in the case of the reading of the Megilah follows the view of the Rabanan who say that a minor may not read the Megilah for an adult!

The Pischei Nidah asserts that there is no contradiction in the Halachah. According to the conclusion of the Gemara here, Rebbi Yosi maintains that Terumah nowadays is mid'Oraisa, and thus it follows that the obligation to separate Terumah from Dimu'a is only one d'Rabanan. Therefore, Dimu'a is exempt from Chalah. In contrast, a minor's obligation to read the Megilah is because of two Mitzvos d'Rabanan, and therefore he cannot read for an adult. (D. BLOOM)

QUESTION: The Gemara cites the Mishnah in Ma'aseros (3:5) which asks, "What is a Chatzer Tzuris that makes all produce that enters it liable for Ma'aser," and proceeds to give several definitions for a Chatzer Tzuris.

(The ME'IRI points out that one of the things that makes ripe produce liable for Ma'aser after one has picked it with intent to bring it home is its entry into a house. Mid'Oraisa, a house or Chatzer makes the produce liable for Ma'aser. A Chatzer Tzuris is a small Chatzer that makes the produce liable only mid'Rabanan. Moreover, the Chatzer Tzuris makes it liable only when the produce is safely inside it and does not appear to be Hefker.)

Rebbi Yishmael says that a Chatzer Tzuris is any courtyard which guards the vessels that are placed there. (This is the Girsa of the Mishnah there, and of Rashi here (DH k'Divrei). The ARUCH LA'NER points out that the correct Girsa is "Rebbi Yishmael," because the Mishnah would not have quoted Rebbi Shimon before Rebbi Akiva, who was his teacher.) Rabah bar bar Chanah explains that such a courtyard is called a "Chatzer Tzuris" because in Tzur (Tyre) it was the practice to place a watchman at the entrance to the courtyard.

Rebbi Akiva says that if the courtyard can be opened by one person and locked by another (i.e. there is no watchman to open and close it), the produce that enters the courtyard is exempt, because such a courtyard does not guard what is in it.

Rebbi Nechemyah maintains that a Chatzer Tzuris is a courtyard in which a person is not embarrassed to eat.

Rebbi Yosi says that a Chatzer Tzuris is the type of courtyard into which a stranger cannot enter without being asked what he is doing there. A courtyard into which a stranger may walk without being asked what he is doing there is not considered a Chatzer to make the produce Chayav for Ma'aser.

Rebbi Yehudah says that when there are two courtyards, one inside the other, produce brought into the inner courtyard is Chayav, but produce brought into the outer courtyard is not Chayav.

Rebbi was asked whom the Halachah follows, and he replied that we must be stringent and follow all of the opinions. RASHI (DH k'Divrei) explains that if any one of the above conditions is fulfilled, the courtyard is considered a Chatzer Tzuris and one must separate Ma'aser from the produce that entered that courtyard.

The RAMBAM (Hilchos Ma'aser 4:8), when he describes the type of courtyard that causes produce to become Chayav for Ma'aser, writes that when a courtyard has two inhabitants or is owned by two partners, and one of them opens and enters and the other comes and enters or leaves and locks up, the produce that enters the courtyard is Chayav.

Why does the Rambam disregard the view of Rebbi Akiva, if Rebbi ruled that we must be stringent and follow all of the opinions?

ANSWER: The KESEF MISHNEH explains that the Rambam does not rule like Rebbi Akiva because Rebbi's statement that we must be stringent and follow all of the opinions includes the opinion of the Rabanan, who disagree with Rebbi Akiva and maintain that a courtyard that is opened and closed by different people and does not have a watchman is still considered guarded. Therefore, the Halachah does not follow the view of Rebbi Akiva.

The Kesef Mishneh adds that even though the Rambam also writes that a courtyard into which a stranger cannot enter without being asked what he is doing there is considered a Chatzer that makes the produce Chayav for Ma'aser (the opinion of Rebbi Yosi), the fact that this opinion was said in the name of Rebbi Yosi does not imply that the Rabanan disagree. This is because there is no opinion that disagrees with Rebbi Yosi; if a stranger can enter a courtyard without being asked what he is doing there, then it is clear that this Chatzer does not guard what is inside it. Only a Chatzer that guards its contents is able to cause produce to become Chayav for Ma'aser.

(RAV SHLOMO ZALMAN AUERBACH zt'l explains, in MINCHAS SHLOMO 1:62:4, that although Tosfos in Bava Metzia writes that a Chatzer that does not guard the vessels inside it does make produce liable mid'Rabanan for Ma'aser, the TZELACH in Berachos (35a) writes that this applies only to wine, oil, and the five species of grain, which are normally liable mid'Oraisa for Ma'aser. However, the RAMBAM (Hilchos Ma'aser 4:8) apparently rules that a "Chatzer she'Einah Mishtameres" (a courtyard that does not protect things placed inside it) does not make produce liable for Ma'aser at all, even mid'Rabanan. (This also seems to be the opinion of the Me'iri cited earlier.) The Minchas Shlomo writes that nowadays, since the basic obligation of Ma'aser is only mid'Rabanan, it is possible that we may be lenient and rule that produce that enters a Chatzer she'Einah Mishtameres is not liable for Ma'aser at all.) (D. BLOOM)

QUESTION: The Mishnayos in this chapter discuss the ages that are relevant to various laws, such as the laws of Nidah, Yibum, and Nedarim. Rav rules that these laws apply to their respective ages only when the ages are "me'Es l'Es." RASHI (DH b'Kulei) explains that Rav means that the years must be full, complete years, and we do not apply the concept that one day into the final year is considered like a full year ("Yom Echad b'Shanah Harei Hu k'Shanah").

The Gemara later quotes a Beraisa which lists several cases in which the Torah requires that a certain time period be calculated me'Es l'Es. There, however, Rashi says that me'Es l'Es means that the years mentioned in the Beraisa do not end on Rosh Hashanah, but rather the count of years begins on the moment that the particular event (such as a birth or a sale) occurs, and it ends on that same day on a subsequent year.

Why does Rashi first explain that me'Es l'Es excludes one way of calculating, and then explain that it excludes another way of calculating?

ANSWER: The words of TOSFOS (38a, DH Shipura) imply that these two ways of counting years me'Es l'Es depend on each other. Tosfos explains that the concept of "Yom Echad b'Shanah Harei Hu k'Shanah" (or "Yom Echad b'Chodesh Harei Hu k'Chodesh") applies only for the type of year that begins on a fixed date, like Rosh Hashanah. It does not apply for the type of year that begins from a certain day in a person's life.

Rashi's two statements are based on the same premise. The years mentioned in the Mishnah and Beraisa are calculated me'Es l'Es and do not begin on a fixed date like Rosh Hashanah, and thus the rule of "Yom Echad b'Shanah Harei Hu k'Shanah" does not apply in these cases. (See, however, RASHASH.)

Why, then, does Rashi on the Beraisa mention only that we do not calculate the beginning of the year from Rosh Hashanah? Why does he not mention, as he does earlier, that because the years of the Beraisa are calculated me'Es l'Es, the rule of "Yom Echad b'Shanah Harei Hu k'Shanah" does not apply?

The MAHARAM answers that the Beraisa focuses on laws that involve a single year (such as the age at which a sheep is fit to be a Korban, and the time during which one may redeem a house in a walled city), and not a number of years. In such cases, it is obvious that even if the year is not me'Es l'Es, we cannot count one day into the year as an entire year.

OPINIONS: The Gemara teaches that if a man reaches twenty years of age and he does not have the signs of maturity but he has the signs of a Seris, then he is considered to be an adult, a Gadol. If, however, he has neither the signs of maturity nor the signs of a Seris, then he becomes a Gadol only when "most of his years" pass. At what age is "most of his years" considered to have passed?

The verse in Tehilim (90:10) says, "The days of our years... are seventy years." From this verse the Rishonim derive that "most of his years" means 35 or more years. However, there is a difference of opinion among the Rishonim as to how the 35 years are calculated.

(a) The RAMBAM (Hilchos Ishus 2:4, 2:12) and SHULCHAN ARUCH (EH 155:13) write that when he is 35 years old and one day, most of his years are considered to have passed.

(b) The RIVASH (Teshuvos #465) writes that when he is 35 years and 30 days old, most of his years are considered to have passed.

(c) The RAN and the Shulchan Aruch elsewhere (CM 235:11) write that when he is 36 full years of age, most of his years are considered to have passed.

What is the basis for this difference of opinion?

The Rambam maintains that "most of his years" does not refer literally to a number of years. It means one day past the mid-point of his life.

In contrast, the Rivash maintains that "most of his years" means one year past the mid-point of his years. However, he counts thirty days into a year as a year (as does Rebbi Yosi ben Kiper in the Gemara).

The Ran also maintains that most of the person's years must pass, but he maintains that the thirty-sixth year must be a full year.