1)

(a)According to Rav Nachman, the Tana of the Beraisa learns from the Pasuk in Shemos ...

1. ... "Vayo'el Moshe Lasheves es ha'Ish" - that Moshe swore to Yisro that he would not leave Midyan (since "va'Yo'el' is an expression of Shevu'ah).

2. ... "Vayomer Hash-m el Moshe b'Midyan, Lech Shuv Mitzrayim" - that a Mudar Hana'ah is obligated to annul his Neder in the presence of the person from whom he is Mudar.

(b)Some commentaries restrict the above rule to Nedarim that benefit the Mudar - but not to other Nedarim - like we find by Tzidkiyahu, whose Neder was for the benefit of Nevuchadnetzar, as we shall soon see.

(c)This distinction conforms with the reason given by the Yerushalmi (for the basic obligation of annulling a Neder in the presence of the person from whom he is Mudar), that he should feel embarrassed standing in the presence of his friend (for whose benefit he made the Neder in the first place), and decline to annul it. This distinction will not be applicable according to the other reason cited by the Yerushalmi; namely - because his friend will suspect him of contravening his Neder.

2)

(a)The other ramifications of the above Machlokes are - there where the Noder informed the Mudar that he intends to annul the Neder, in which case the reason of suspicion is not applicable (and he may therefore annul it outside his presence), whereas this is not sufficient to cause the necessary embarrassment to induce him to desist from revoking it (and he would still need to annul it in his presence).

(b)Another distinction that we make between a Neder that is for the Mudar's benefit and one that is not (according to all opinions) is - if the Neder was revoked in his presence but against his will, which is permissible when it is not for his benefit, but not when it is.

(c)Some commentaries permit b'Di'eved, a Neder that was revoked not in the presence of the Mudar, and they prove it from Tzidkiyahu and the Sanhedrin (who would not have revoked his Neder if at least b'Di'eved, the nullification would not be considered valid). Others refute this proof - on the basis of the terrible retribution meted out to them by Hash-m at the hand of Nevuchadnetzar, which He would not have done, if annulling the Neder would have been in any way justifiable, even only b'Di'eved.

3)

(a)Tzidkiyahu ha'Melech swore to Nevuchadnetzar - that he would not divulge that he once caught him eating a hare alive.

(b)What made him decide to have it revoked - was his abhorrence of what he had seen, which raged inside him, making him want to speak it out.

(c)When Nevuchadnetzar heard people despising him, and he realized that Tzidkiyahu must have broken his oath - he had Tzidkiyahu and the Sanhedrin brought before him, and proceeded to question them.

4)

(a)Tzidkiyahu explained to Nevuchadnetzar that a Neder can be revoked. Nevuchadnetzar caught him out however - in that the Neder, which was for his (Nevuchadnetzar's) benefit, could only be revoked in his presence.

(b)Rebbi Yitzchak explains the Pasuk "Yeshvu la'Aretz Yidmu Ziknei bas Tziyon" to mean - that the Sanhedrin responded by removing the cushions on which they had been sitting, and sitting on the ground (a sign of defeat).

5)

(a)Rebbi Meir discusses a case which is like 'Nolad' - (a new unanticipated situation), but is not Nolad. 'Nolad' cannot be used as a Pesach (to annul a vow).

(b)He presents a. a case of someone who says 'Konam she'Eini Nosei es Plonis, she'Avihah Ra', and he then learns that he died or did Teshuvah, and b. one concerning someone who said - 'Konam l'Bayis Zeh she'Eini Nichnas, she'Kelev Ra b'Socho, O she'ha'Nachash b'Socho' and he subsequently hears that the dog has died or the snake has been killed (see Tif'eres Yisrael).

(c)Rav Huna interprets 'k'Nolad, v'Einan Nolad' - he means that although this resembles Nolad, it is not in fact Nolad (and the Neder can in fact be nullified), because his Neder implies 'only as long as her father is a Rasha, or the mad dog or the snake is alive', and it is therefore considered as if he had said it (so that it is no longer an unanticipated situation).

(d)The Rabanan say - that, since he did not say so specifically, it is considered Nolad.

6)

(a)Rebbi Yochanan disagrees. He establishes Rebbi Meir - when the father had already died or done Teshuvah before the Noder declared his Neder, in which case it is not a case of Nolad at all, but of Neder Ta'us.

(b)The problem we have with his basic explanation is - why Rebbi Meir then refers to it as 'k'Nolad', seeing as it is not like Nolad at all!

7)

(a)The Mishnah later presents a case of 'Konam she'Eini Nosei es Plonis Ke'urah v'Harei Hi Yafah'. The Tana there does not explain this in the same way as we explain our Mishnah (because the Noder connected the Neder to the woman's looks) - because unlike that of 'she'Avihah Ra v'As'ah Teshuvah' in our Mishnah (where it is feasible that a person dies or does Teshuvah), it is unusual for an ugly woman to become beautiful (in which case, he is unlikely to have had that in mind, even though he did specifically mention her ugliness).

(b)Alternatively, it is because of the Lashon 'Ke'urah v'Na'asis Na'ah' - which does not imply that he connects the marriage with her looks (for that, he ought to have said 'Konam she'Eini Nosei Ishah P'lonis she'Hi Ke'urah' - which is similar to Konam ... she'Avihah Ra').

(c)This latter Mishnah poses a Kashya on Rebbi Yochanan as to - why the Tana needs two Mishnahs to teach us the Din regarding Nidrei Ta'us.

(d)This is not a Kashya according to Rav Huna - because our Mishnah speaks about someone who links his Neder on to certain facts, and the latter Mishnah, about Nidrei Ta'us.

8)

(a)"Lo Sikom", "Lo Sitor", "Lo Sisna es Achicha bi'Levavecha", "v'Ahavta l'Re'acha Kamocha" and "v'Chei Achicha Imach" are mentioned in our Mishnah - as examples of a Pesach Charatah to annul Nedarim (Had he known that he would contravene any of them by forbidding himself from someone, he would not have made the Neder).

(b)The difference between all of these and the Sugya in 'Arba'ah Nedarim', where we prohibited using threats (such as the Beraisa of Rebbi Nasan 'Kol ha'Noder, Ke'ilu Banah Bamah') as a Pesach Charatah - is that the latter are more severe, and people will therefore be embarrassed to deny that they knew about it and made the Neder anyway; whereas they do not take the list in our Mishnah quite as seriously (and will therefore be honest about it).

(c)Our Mishnah cites the Pesach as 'Shema Ye'ani, v'Ein Ata Yachol Lefarneso'. Rav Huna (or Rav Chana) bar Rav Ketina queries this on the grounds that the Noder is not obligated to help a poor man single-handed. There would there be nothing wrong for the Noder to donate funds together with everybody else on behalf of the Mudar - by giving money to the Gabai of Tzedakah, since the Gabai has the right to then give it whichever poor man he pleases.

(d)The Rabanan answer Rav Huna bar Rav Ketina - that a poor man tends to go first to his friends and relatives. Consequently, the Noder, who has created the situation whereby he is unable to help, should the need arise, will have transgressed "v'Chei Achicha Imach".

9)

(a)The Tana Kama of our Mishnah says 'Poschin l'Adam bi'Kesuvas Ishto'. Rebbi Akiva (who supports the Tana Kama's opinion) ruled with regard to that man who made a Neder forbidding himself to have Hana'ah from his wife - that he was obligated to pay her full Kesuvah (of four hundred Zuz).

(b)The Noder protested - that his father had left eight hundred Zuz, of which his brother received four hundred and himself four hundred. Why could his wife not take two hundred and leave him with two hundred (he presumably thought that, like by Erchin, he would be Patur from paying the rest because now he was poor, as is intimated later)?

(c)When Rebbi Akiva nevertheless insisted that he pay the four hundred Zuz of his wife's Kesuvah (even if it meant selling the hair of his head to obtain the money) - he retorted that, had he known that, he would never have declared such a Neder in the first place.

(d)Rebbi Akiva reacted - by annulling the Neder.

10)

(a)Abaye rejects the proof from Rebbi Akiva, who obligated the Noder to give four hundred Zuz to pay his wife's Kesuvah, that Metaltelin [movable goods] are Meshubad (ear-marked) for a woman's Kesuvah - by interpreting 'eight hundred Zuz' in the Mishnah as referring to land to the value of eight hundred Zuz.

(b)On the other hand, if we rule that they are not, then what Rebbi Akiva meant when he told the Noder that he must even sell the hair of his head (which is Metaltelin) was - that even if after paying her Kesuvah, he had nothing left for himself, and had to sell the hair of his head to sustain himself, then he was still obligated to pay her the full amount of her Kesuvah.

(c)We conclude that Metaltelin is not Meshubad for a woman's Kesuvah. This Din is even weaker than that of a creditor, who is not permitted to claim from Metaltelin (according to the Rabanan of Rebbi Meir) either - inasmuch as he is at least permitted to claim from the Metaltelin of the debtor himself (only not from that of the Yesomim); whereas a woman cannot even claim from the Metaltelin of her husband either.

(d)According to Rebbi Meir, the difference works in the reverse direction - because, in his opinion, even though the Metaltelin of the Yesomim are not Meshubad to the creditor, they are Meshubad to their mother's Kesuvah.

11)

(a)Our Mishnah appears to hold 'Ein Mesadrin l'Ba'al Chov' - meaning that the debtor is obligated to pay his creditor everything that he owns in order to settle his debt.

(b)The problem with this is that - this issue is a Machlokes Amora'im in Bava Metzi'a, in which case there cannot possibly be a clear-cut Mishnah to that effect (because if there was, there would be no room for dispute).

(c)Those who hold 'Mesadrin' say that one leaves him basic furniture, food for thirty says and clothes for a year (see Rashash).

(d)We therefore repudiate the implication from our Mishnah - by explaining that min ha'Din, we hold 'Mesadrin l'Ba'al Chov'. What Rebbi Akiva was telling the Noder was, that even if he wanted to be stringent and give her everything that he owned, he should not think that anything still outstanding will be canceled (like it is in the case of Erchin, where a poor man who, after paying his one Sela for his Erech (instead of fifty), then became rich, he is Patur from the rest, because even though we do learn Sidur of a Ba'al-Chov from Erchin, it is not in this regard.