1)

(a)Rav Hamnuna questions Ula, who holds 'Kedushah Pak'ah Bichdi'. What Kashya does he ask on him from the Din of Kidushin?

(b)According to those who interpret 'Korban' in our Mishnah as Konam, how does Rabeinu Yonah reconcile Rav Hamnuna's Kashya with the Mishnah in ha'Noder min ha'Yerek 'she'At Nehenis Li Ad ha'Pesach Im Telchi l'Veis Avich Ad ha'Chag ... ' where it is clear that Konamos do fall away automatically?

(c)How does Rava answer Rav Hamnuna's Kashya on Ula by differentiating between the case in our Mishnah and Kidushei Ishah?

1)

(a)Rav Hamnuna questions Ula, who holds 'Kedushah Pak'ah Bichdi'. He asks whether if a man betroths a woman for today but not for tomorrow - the Kidushin will also fall away automatically tomorrow (when in reality, we all know that it will not)!

(b)According to those who interpret 'Korban' in our Mishnah as Konam, Rabeinu Yonah reconciles Rav Hamnuna's Kashya with the Mishnah in ha'Noder min ha'Yerek 'she'At Nehenis Li Ad ha'Pesach Im Telchi l'Veis Avich Ad ha'Chag ... ' where it is clear that Konamos do fall away automatically - by restricting the latter to a Konam Prati, but not to a Konam Klali, which has the Din of Hekdesh (according to Rebbi Meir, as we explained earlier).

(c)Rava answers Rav Hamnuna's Kashya on Ula by differentiating between the case in our Mishnah, which is Kedushas Damim (and which can fall away automatically) - and Kidushei Ishah, which is Kedushas ha'Guf (and cannot).

2)

(a)What does the Tana of the Beraisa say about a case where someone declares an ox to be an Olah for thirty days and then a Shelamim?

(b)How does Abaye query Rava's previous answer (and certainly Rav Hamnuna) from this Beraisa?

(c)Does this mean that, according to Abaye, if a man betroths a woman for today but not for tomorrow, the Kidushin will fall away automatically tomorrow?

(d)How does the Rashba prove this?

2)

(a)The Tana of the Beraisa says that in a case where someone declares an ox to be an Olah for thirty days and then a Shelamim - the animal is indeed an Olah for thirty days, and then it becomes a Shelamim.

(b)Abaye, drawing from this Beraisa - proves that even Kedushas ha'Guf can fall away automatically, querying Rava's previous answer (and certainly Rav Hamnuna).

(c)This does not mean however that if a man betroths a woman for today but not for tomorrow, the Kidushin will fall away automatically tomorrow - because, unlike Hekdesh, which has a branch called Kedushas Damim (which can fall away), there is no Kedushas Damim by Kidushei Ishah, in which case even Abaye will agree that it cannot fall away.

(d)The Rashba proves this - from Rav Hamnuna's Kashya 'u'Mah Ilu Amar l'Ishah ha'Yom At Ishti ... ', clearly taking it for granted that the Kidushin will not fall away according to anybody.

3)

(a)How does Rava refute Abaye's Kashya?

(b)Why must the Tana then be speaking about a Ba'al Mum?

(c)Some say that this answer will only conform with Rava, who holds that 'Kedushas Damim Pak'ah Bichdi', but not with bar Pada. Others explain that even bar Pada will explain the Beraisa by Kedushas Damim, and it speaks when he actually redeemed the animal. Then what Chidush is the Beraisa coming to teach us?

(d)On what grounds does the Kedushas Shelamim in fact, take effect?

3)

(a)Rava refutes Abaye's Kashya - by establishing the Beraisa of Olah and Shelamim, where the Noder said 'li'Demei' (turning it into Kedushas Damim).

(b)The Tana must then be speaking about a Ba'al Mum - because it is forbidden to declare an unblemished animal (that is fit to go on the Mizbe'ach) Kedushas Damim.

(c)Some say that this answer will only conform with Rava, who holds that 'Kedushas Damim Pak'ah Bichdi', but not with bar Pada. Others explain that even bar Pada will explain the Beraisa by Kedushas Damim, and it speaks when he actually redeemed the animal. The Chidush of the Beraisa then is - that we might otherwise have thought that since, at the time he declared the animal a Shelamim in thirty days time, it was not fit to become a Shelamim (seeing as it was already an Olah - whose Kedushah does not fall away automatically), it will not become a Shelamim even after he has redeemed it, either.

(d)The Kedushas Shelamim in fact, takes effect - because, seeing as the Kedushas Olah can be redeemed, the Kedushas Shelamim takes effect, hovering in the air as it were, waiting for the Kedushas Olah to be removed.

4)

(a)What does the Seifa of the Beraisa rule, where one reversed the order (placing the Kedushas Shelamim first and the Kedushas Olah in thirty days time)?

(b)What Kashya does Abaye then ask from the Seifa on Rava, who established the Reisha exclusively in a case of Kedushas Damim?

(c)How will Abaye explain the corollary between the Reisha and the Seifa? Why do we need the Seifa?

4)

(a)The Seifa of the Beraisa, where he reversed the order (placing the Kedushas Shelamim first and Kedushas Olah in thirty days time) - rules that there too, the Kedushas Shelamim takes effect immediately, and the Kedushas Olah after thirty days.

(b)Abaye then asks on Rava from the Seifa - because, according to him, why is the Seifa needed at all? If in the Reisha, where he changed from a more stringent Kedushah (an Olah which is Kodshei Kodashim) to a lesser one (a Shelamim, which is only Kodshim Kalim), the second Kedushah nevertheless takes effect, how much more so in the Seifa, where he changed from a lesser Kedushah to a more stringent one?

(c)According to Abaye - we need the Seifa (which speaks in a case of Kedushas Damim) to teach us that the Reisha speaks by Kedushas ha'Guf.

29b----------------------------------------29b

5)

(a)How does Rav Papa explain the Seifa 'l'Achar Sheloshim Yom Olah, u'me'Achshav Shelamim', according to bar Pada?

(b)What is the source for ...

1. ... the first Halachah (in the Seifa of the Beraisa) 'l'Achar Sheloshim Yom, Olah'?

2. ... the second Halachah 'u'me'Achshav Shelamim (v'Lo Olah)'?

(c)We learned the first Limud from Kidushin. How do we answer the Kashya 'Peshita'?

5)

(a)Rav Papa explains the Seifa 'l'Achar Sheloshim Yom Olah, u'me'Achshav Shelamim', according to bar Pada - as if it was two statements, 'l'Achar Sheloshim Yom, Olah' (if he did not add 'u'me'Achshav Shelamim'); 'u'me'Achshav Shelamim (v'Lo Olah)'.

(b)The source for ...

1. ... the first Halachah 'l'Achar Sheloshim Yom Olah' - is the case in Kidushin of a man who betroths a woman now for after thirty days, where the Kidushin is effective, even though the money has all been spent by then.

2. ... the second Halachah 'u'me'Achshav Shelamim (v'Lo Olah)' is - 'Lo Pak'ah Kedushah Bichdi'.

(c)To answer the Kashya on the first Limud (from Kidushin) 'Peshita' - we explain the Chidush to be that even if he wants to retract from the Kedushas Olah before the thirty days are up, he is unable to.

6)

(a)In the case of Kidushin, the woman remains Mekudeshes even though, when the thirty days expire, the money has all been spent. What will the Din be if the man betrothed the woman with a Shtar, and the Shtar tore before the expiry date?

(b)Then why do we ask 'Peshita', seeing as here the Hekdesh took place through mere words, which are no longer in existence at the end of the thirty-day period (and therefore comparable to Kidushei Shtar)?

(c)We conclude that, even according to those who maintain that in the case of Kidushin, the woman can retract during the thirty-day period, she will not be able to do so in our case (of Hekdesh). Why is that?

6)

(a)In the case of Kidushin, the woman remains Mekudeshes even though, when the thirty days expire, the money has all been spent, as we explained earlier. Had the man betrothed the woman with a Shtar, and the Shtar tore before the expiry-date - then the betrothal would not be valid.

(b)We nevertheless ask 'Peshita', despite the fact that the Hekdesh took place through mere words, which are no longer in existence at the end of the thirty-day period (and therefore comparable to Kidushei Shtar) - because in this regard we are already aware of the fact that Hekdesh is different because of the principle 'Amiraso li'Gevo'ah k'Mesiraso l'Hedyot' (a declaration of words has the power of a Kinyan).

(c)We conclude that, even according to those who maintain that in the case of Kidushin, the woman can retract during the thirty-day period, she will not be able to do so in our case (of Hekdesh) - because the principle 'Amiraso li'Gevo'ah k'Mesiraso l'Hedyot' is effective even in this regard too.

7)

(a)Why, in the Seifa, does the Tana switch cases, placing Shelamim before Olah?

(b)What other Chidush can we learn from the sequence in the Seifa?

(c)How far might we have carried the initial contention?

(d)And why does the Tana invert the case, placing 'l'Achar Sheloshim Olah before 'u'me'Achshav Shelamim'?

7)

(a)The Tana switches cases in the Seifa, placing Shelamim before Olah - to teach us that 'Lo Pak'ah Kedushah Bichdi' extends even to Kodshim Kalim.

(b)We can also learn from the sequence in the Seifa - that 'Lo Pak'ah Kedushah Bichdi' applies, not only in a straight case of an Olah or a Shelamim that one is Makdish for thirty days, but even if the current Kedushah is a lesser one and there is a more stringent Kedushah waiting to take effect (even though one may have thought that this is not considered 'Bichdi', but an extension of the initial Kedushah).

(c)We might even have gone so far as to say - that the Shelamim should not take effect now, so as to leave room for the Olah to take effect in thirty days time.

(d)And the Tana inverts the case, placing 'l'Achar Sheloshim Olah before 'u'me'Achshav Shelamim' - to teach us that, even then, the Shelamim takes effect immediately, and the principle of 'Lo Pak'ah Kedushah Bichdi' applies.

8)

(a)Even taking into account the principle 'Amiraso li'Gevo'ah ki'Mesiraso l'Hedyot', why can the Noder not retract before the thirty day expiry-date, seeing as he specified that the Hekdesh is to take place only in thirty days time?

(b)What practical application does this explanation have with regard to Tzedakah?

(c)According to the Rashba, the current Sugya goes only according to Bar Pada, but not according to Abaye and Rava. In which major issue will they then argue with bar Pada?

(d)How does the Rashba suggest reconciling Rava with the Beraisa, even if the Reisha and the Seifa speak about Kedushas Damim?

8)

(a)The Noder cannot retract before the thirty day expiry-date, despite the fact that he specified that the Hekdesh is to take place only in thirty days time - because 'Amiraso li'Gevo'ah k'Mesiraso l'Hedyot' does not just mean that the Hekdesh takes place later, as per specification (as we believed until now), but that it takes place from now as if he had said 'me'Achshav'.

(b)This explanation has a practical application with regard to Tzedakah - because now, someone who dedicates a Sela to Tzedakah in thirty days time, is not permitted to retract even before the thirty days have expired.

(c)According to the Rashba, the current Sugya goes only according to Bar Pada, but not according to Abaye and Rava - in whose opinion 'Amiraso li'Gevo'ah ki'Mesiraso l'Hedyot' means only from the specified date and not me'Achshav (just as we learned until now), in which case, the Noder can retract within the thirty days.

(d)The Rashba suggests reconciling Rava with the Beraisa, even if the Reisha and the Seifa speak about Kedushas Damim - because, even though the Reisha constitutes a bigger Chidush than the Seifa, the Tana is making use of the (not so popular) principle 'Zu, v'Ein Tzarich Lomar Zu'.

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