1)

(a)We learned in our Mishnah 'Nodrin la'Haragin, la'Charamin ul'Muchsin she'Hi Terumah, Af-al-Pi she'Eino Terumah'. Who are ...

1. ... 'Haragin'?

2. ... 'Charamin'?

3. ... 'Muchsin'?

(b)What distinction do Beis Shamai draw regarding this Halachah, between Nedarim and Shevu'os?

(c)How do Beis Shamai qualify their ruling, even with regard to Neder?

(d)What do Beis Shamai mean when they also forbid extending the Neder beyond what the Haragin ask of him?

1)

(a)We learned in our Mishnah 'Af-al-Pi she'Eino Terumah, Nodrin she'Hi Terumah ...

1. ... la'Haragin - (Jewish robbers who are prepared to kill).

2. ... la'Charamin - (Jewish robbers who are not prepared to kill).

3. ... Muchsin' - (tax-collectors).

(b)Beis Shamai restrict this concession - to Nedarim, but prohibit making a Shevu'ah to these same people.

(c)Beis Shamai qualify their ruling, even with regard to Neder - inasmuch as they forbid making a Neder to them unless they demand it.

(d)When Beis Shamai also forbid extending the Neder beyond what they ask him - they mean that even if they order him to declare 'Konam Ishti Nehenis Li Im ... ', he is not allowed to add 'Ishti u'Banai ... '.

2)

(a)What do Beis Hillel say in each of these cases?

2)

(a)Beis Hillel permit - making a Shevu'ah in this case, making a Neder even without having been asked, and adding 'u'Banai' to their demand of 'Ishti'.

3)

(a)Based on a principle issued by Shmuel, we have a problem with the Tana's insertion of Muchsin in our Mishnah. What did Shmuel say?

(b)Shmuel establishes our Mishnah by a 'Moches she'Ein Lo Kitzvah'. What is a 'Moches she'Ein Lo Kitzvah'? How does that solve the problem?

(c)How does Rebbi Yanai establish the Mishnah to answer the Kashya?

3)

(a)We have a problem with the Tana's insertion of Muchsin in our Mishnah, based on the principle taught by Shmuel - 'Dina d'Malchusa Dina'.

(b)Shmuel establishes our Mishnah by a 'Moches she'Ein Lo Kitzvah' - a tax-collector who claims as much as he pleases (pocketing the difference), to whom his principle does not apply.

(c)Rebbi Yanai answers the Kashya - by establishing the Mishnah by a tax-collector who is self-appointed.

4)

(a)What is the problem with the Din in our Mishnah, should it speak when he said to the Harag ...

1. ... 'Ye'asru Peiros Olam Alai L'olam ... '?

2. ... 'Ye'asru Peiros Olam Alai ... '?

(b)So we establish the Mishnah when he says 'Ye'asru Peiros Olam Alai ha'Yom ... '. What use is that, seeing as the Harag will then not take him seriously, so what will he have gained by saying it?

(c)Why is the fact that he said it silently not considered 'Devarim she'ba'Lev'?

(d)Had he not been forced however, the fact that he said 'ha'Yom silently would not have invalidated the Neder. How does this differ from someone who meant to forbid on himself wheat-bread, and by mistake, he only said 'bread'? Why is it that the Neder there is automatically void because he said wheat-bread in his heart?

4)

(a)The problem with the Din in our Mishnah, should it speak when he said to the Harag ...

1. ... 'Ye'asru Peiros Olam Alai L'olam ... ' is - that the Neder that he made would override the fact that he was forced (because whatever he thought in his heart would be 'Devarim she'ba'Lev').

2. ... 'Ye'asru Peiros Olam Alai ... ' is - again that the Neder would override the fact that he was forced (because 'Ye'asru' Stam implies 'L'olam', even though he did not say it explicitly).

(b)So we establish the Mishnah when he says 'Ye'asru Peiros Olam Alai ... ' - adding 'ha'Yom' silently (in his heart); because otherwise, the Harag would not take him seriously, and he would have gained nothing by saying it.

(c)The fact that he said it silently is not considered 'Devarim she'ba'Lev' - because the fact that he is being forced renders what he is thinking as if he would have actually expressed it aloud.

(d)Had he not been forced however, the fact that he said 'ha'Yom silently would not have invalidated the Neder - because, due to the circumstances, he actually meant to say 'Ye'asru Peiros Olam Alai ... ' (which he knew implied 'L'olam'); whereas if someone meant to forbid on himself wheat-bread, and by mistake, he declared a Neder forbidding 'bread', his Neder is automatically void - because he meant to say wheat-bread and not bread (in which case [unlike our case] it is not 'Piv v'Libo Shavin').

5)

(a)Rav Huna cites a Beraisa 'Beis Shamai Omrim, Lo Yiftach Lo bi'Shevu'ah'. Besides the fact that Beis Shamai have prohibited even a Neder if one opens the proceedings (before having been asked by the Harag), what else is difficult with this statement?

(b)What do we mean when we answer that our Mishnah tells us how far Beis Shamai go, and the Beraisa, Beis Hillel?

(c)According to Rav Ashi, the Beraisa does not pertain to the Din of Haragin at all. Then to what does it pertain? What are Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel then arguing about?

5)

(a)Rav Huna cites a Beraisa 'Beis Shamai Omrim, Lo Yiftach Lo bi'Shevu'ah'. Besides the fact that Beis Shamai have prohibited even a Neder if one opens the proceedings (before having been asked by the Harag), the difficulty with this statement is - the implication that if the Harag had ordered him to make a Shevu'ah, then he would be allowed to do so. But Beis Shamai have already forbidden making a Shevu'ah categorically!?

(b)When we answer that our Mishnah tells us how far Beis Shamai go, and the Beraisa, Beis Hillel, what we mean is - that the Beraisa is not written for its implications (like we thought it was), but to teach us the extent of Beis Hillel's opinion (that one may even open the proceedings with a Shevu'ah), whereas our Mishnah teaches us the extent of Beis Shamai's (that opening the proceedings is forbidden even with a Neder).

(c)According to Rav Ashi, the Beraisa does not pertain to the Din of Haragin at all - but to whether one can annul a Shevu'ah at all; Beis Shamai forbid, Beis Hillel permit.

6)

(a)What does the Tana of our Mishnah say about a case of ...

1. ... 'Harei Neti'os ha'Eilu Korban Im Einan Niktzazos' and 'Talis Zu Korban Im Einah Nisrefes'?

2. ... 'Harei Neti'os ha'Eilu Korban ad she'Yikatzetzu' and 'Talis Zu Korban ad she'Tisaref'?

(b)The fact that redemption is required in the Reisha suggests that the Tana is speaking about the value of the plants or of the cloak being used for the purchase of a Korban. What else might 'Korban' mean?

(c)In that case, why would they need to be redeemed? Why should a Konam require redemption at all?

(d)What does Rebbi Meir (in the next Perek) say to differentiate between someone who says 'Konam Kikar Zu' and someone who says 'Kikar Zu Alai Hekdesh'?

6)

(a)The Tana of our Mishnah says that in a case of ...

1. ... 'Harei Neti'os ha'Eilu Korban Im Einan Niktzazos' and 'Talis Zu Korban Im Einah Nisrefes' - they can be redeemed; whereas ...

2. ... 'Harei Neti'os ha'Eilu Korban ad she'Yikatzetzu' and 'Talis Zu Korban ad she'Tisaref' - cannot.

(b)The fact that redemption is required in the Reisha suggests that the Tana is speaking about the value of the plants or of the cloak being used for the purchase of a Korban. But 'Korban might also mean - 'k'Korban', pertaining to an ordinary Konam.

(c)They nevertheless require redemption - because the author of our Mishnah is Rebbi Meir, who considers a Konam Klali (a general Konam forbidding an object to the world at large) as if it was a real Korban.

(d)Rebbi Meir (in the next Perek) - rules that if someone says 'Konam Kikar Zu', then whoever eats it is guilty of Me'ilah, in which case, the loaf requires redemption; whereas if he says 'Kikar Zu Alai Hekdesh', he is Chayav Me'ilah, but not anybody else. Consequently, the loaf cannot be redeemed.

28b----------------------------------------28b

7)

(a)What do we mean when we ask 'v'Lisni Kedoshos'?

(b)What is wrong with the wording ' ... Kedoshos v'Einan Kedoshos'?

(c)According to those who interpret 'Korban' to mean Konam, how do we indeed know that the Chidush of 'Kedoshos' is not that a Konam Klali requires Pidyon, like Rebbi Meir (negating the Kashya)?

(d)How do we resolve the original Kashya 'v'Lisni Kedoshos'?

7)

(a)When we ask 'v'Lisni Kedoshos' - we mean to ask why the Tana needs to say 'Yesh Lahen Pidyon' in the Reisha. Why did he not just say 'Kedoshos', seeing as his principle Chidush is the fact that the Kedushah is effective, in spite of the Noder's conviction that it will not lead to that?

(b)What is wrong with the wording ' ... Kedoshos v'Einan Kedoshos' is - the fact that in the Seifa, the Tana could not possibly have said 'Einan Kedoshos', seeing as the Kedushah there also takes effect.

(c)Even according to those who interpret 'Korban' to mean Konam, the principle Chidush of 'Kedoshos' cannot be that a Konam Klali requires Pidyon, like Rebbi Meir - because (based on the fact that he chose to present this Din in connection with 'Im Einan Niktzatzos'), the Tana should first have informed us that the Kedushah is effective, and then added that they require Pidyon.

(d)We resolve the original Kashya 'v'Lisni Kedoshos' - by answering that the Tana wrote 'Yesh Lahen Pidyon' in the Reisha, to balance the Seifa, where he had to write 'Ein Lahen Pidyon'.

8)

(a)Seeing as the plants are bound to be detached at some stage, we have to amend the Mishnah to read 'Harei Neti'os ha'Eilu Korban, Im Einan Niktzatzos ha'Yom'. What is then the problem with the Mishnah?

(b)How does it help to answer that there is a storm wind blowing?

(c)How do we then establish the case of 'Talis Zu Korban Im Einah Nisrefes'?

8)

(a)Seeing as the plants are bound to be detached at some stage, we have to amend the Mishnah to read 'Harei Neti'os ha'Eilu Korban, Im Einan Niktzatzos ha'Yom'. The problem with the Mishnah is then - that there is no Chidush (seeing as there is no reason for the Neder not to take effect).

(b)It helps to answer that there is a storm wind blowing - because then, it might have been possible to say that the Noder declared the Neder only because he did not expect the plants to survive the storm (in which case the Neder would not take effect).

(c)In similar fashion - we establish the case of 'Talis Zu Korban Im Einah Nisrefes' - when there was a raging fire in the vicinity of the Talis.

9)

(a)What do we mean when we ask 'u'L'olam'?

(b)bar Pada explains that 'Ein Lahen Pidyon' in the Seifa means only until they have been detached (or the garment until it has been burned). What is then the meaning of 'Ein Lahen Pidyon'?

(c)And what will then be the difference between before they have been detached and after, according to bar Pada?

(d)According to Ula, once they have been detached, they do not even require Pidyon. What is their basic Machlokes?

9)

(a)When we ask 'u'L'olam' - we are querying the Seifa of the Mishnah. Does the Tana really mean that the plants can never be redeemed (even after they have been detached).

(b)Bar Pada explains that 'Ein Lahen Pidyon' in the Seifa means only until they have been detached (or until the garment has been burned). 'Ein Lahen Pidyon' now means - permanent Pidyon (because although the Pidyon is valid, the Kedushah immediately returns).

(c)The difference between before they have been detached and after, according to bar Pada will be - that once they have been detached, the redemption will be permanent.

(d)According to Ula, once they have been detached, they do not even require Pidyon - because in his opinion, the Kedushah of an object, can under certain circumstances, fall away; whereas according to bar Pada, this is not possible (due to the principle 'Kedushah Lo Pak'ah Bichdi').

10)

(a)According to the Rashba, Ula only argues with bar Pada with regard to after the plants have been detached (as is implied by his Lashon), though he concedes to his Din of 'Podan, Chozros v'Kodshos'. What does the Rashba extrapolate from here with regard to someone who invites his friend to acquire a field with Chazakah' until he goes to Yerushalayim (adding me'Achshav)'?

(b)What is the significance of 'me'Achshav' here?

(c)Would the Din be the same if ...

1. ... they had used a Kinyan Kesef to acquire the field rather than Chazakah?

2. ... it was not the original owner who acquired the field (or the plants in our Mishnah), but a third person?

10)

(a)According to the Rashba, Ula only argues with bar Pada with regard to after the plants have been detached (as is implied by his Lashon). And he extrapolates from here that, if someone instructs his friend to acquire a field with Chazakah' until he goes to Yerushalayim (adding m'Achshav)' - his friend will continue to acquire the field, even if the owner buys it back from him, until he arrives in Yerushalayim

(b)The significance of 'm'Achshav' here is - that, without it, he would not be able to re-acquire the field, seeing as the Chazakah is no longer in evidence.

(c)The Din would not be the same if...

1. ... they had used a Kinyan Kesef - which is Koneh after thirty days, even though the money is no longer in existence (due to the fact that money as a Kinyan creates per se a counter-obligation, whereas Chazakah per se does not) ...

2. ... or if it had not been the original owner who acquired the field (or the plants in our Mishnah), but a third person - because he breaks the sequence.

11)

(a)Rebbi Moshe Kartavi disagrees with the Rashba. According to him, bar Pada's ruling of 'Kedoshos v'Chozros u'Kedoshos' is based directly on the fact that he holds 'Kedushah Lo Pak'ah Bichdi'. Why must that be the case?

(b)Why does it therefore follow that Ula, who holds 'Kedushah Pak'ah Bichdi' disagrees with the concept of 'Kedoshos v'Chozros u'Kedoshos'?

(c)Then why did Ula not specifically argue with bar Pada with regard to 'Kedoshos v'Chozros u'Kedoshos'?

(d)Rebbi Moshe Kartabi proves his point from a Yerushalmi. Assuming that we follow the opinion of bar Pada (as it would appear from that Yerushalmi), does he also argue with the Rashba regarding someone who invites his friend to acquire a field with Chazakah' until he goes to Yerushalayim (adding me'Achshav)'? Will we be able to learn that from Hekdesh?

11)

(a)Rebbi Moshe Kartavi disagrees with the Rashba. According to him, bar Pada's ruling of 'Kedoshos v'Chozros u'Kedoshos' is based directly on the fact that he holds 'Kedushah Lo Pak'ah Bichdi' - because otherwise, why would the Noder need to add 'Ad she'Tikatzetzu' (seeing as, since he holds 'Kedushah Lo Pak'ah Bichdi' it cannot be in order that the Kedushah should fall away automatically after they have been detached).

(b)It therefore follows that Ula, who holds 'Kedushah Pak'ah Bichdi' disagrees with the concept of 'Kedoshos v'Chozros u'Kedoshos' - since, according to him, the Noder added 'Ad she'Yikatzetzu', so that then, the Kedushah should fall away automatically).

(c)Ula did not specifically argue with bar Pada with regard to 'Kedoshos v'Chozros u'Kedoshos' - because it was not necessary, seeing as, since he holds 'Kedushah Pak'ah Bichdi', it is obvious that he does not hold 'Kedoshos v'Chozros u'Kedoshos' (as we just explained).

(d)Rebbi Moshe Kartabi proves his point from a Yerushalmi. Assuming that we follow the opinion of bar Pada (as it would appear from the Yerushalmi), he also argues with the Rashba regarding someone who invites his friend to acquire a field with Chazakah' until he goes to Yerushalayim (adding m'Achshav)' - because unlike Kedushah, 'Mamon Pak'ah Bichdi', and even bar Pada will therefore agree that the donor added 'Ad she'Avo li'Yerushalayim' so that the recipient's rights will automatically cease then.

12)

(a)The Rashba for his part, had second thoughts about his proof regarding someone who invites his friend to acquire a field with Chazakah' until he goes to Yerushalayim (adding me'Achshav)' from Hekdesh. On what grounds does he now feel inclined to say that, although in the Seifa of the Mishnah, Ula agrees that 'Kedoshos v'Chozros u'Kedoshos', he will not apply the same Sevara in the above case?

(b)What will he say in the case of someone who says 'Karka Zeh la'Aniyim Ad she'E'eleh li'Yerushalayim'?

12)

(a)The Rashba for his part, had second thoughts about his proof regarding someone who invites his friend to acquire a field with Chazakah' until he goes to Yerushalayim (adding m'Achshav)' from Hekdesh. He now feels inclined to say that, although in the Seifa of the Mishnah, Ula agrees that 'Kedoshos v'Chozros u'Kedoshos', he will not apply the same Sevara in the above case - because unlike by Hekdesh, where a word alone effects the Kinyan, a monetary transaction requires a proper Kinyan (Kesef, Shtar or Chazakah). Consequently, once the donor buys the field back, the initial Kinyan terminates, and there is no way for it to be reinstated without a new Kinyan.

(b)If someone says 'Karka Zeh la'Aniyim Ad she'E'eleh li'Yerushalayim', the Rashba will hold - that it will have the same Din as Hekdesh, since with Tzedakah, like with Hekdesh, a word alone effects the Kinyan.

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