1)
(a)We ask exactly the same She'eilah regarding Yad li'Tzedakah as we asked by Pe'ah. On what grounds do some Rishonim contend that this She'eilah presumes 'Yesh Yad l'Pe'ah'. Why might we nevertheless hold 'Ein Yad li'Tzedakah'?
(b)And on what grounds do we reject this contention?
(c)So why do we ask whether 'Yesh Yad li'Tzedakah' after the She'eilah whether 'Yesh Yad l'Pe'ah'?
(d)We learned the Hekesh from Korbanos to Leket, Shichechah and Pe'ah from the Pasuk in Ki-Setzei (in connection with Nidrei Hekdesh "ki Darosh Yidreshenu me'Imach". From where do we learn the Hekesh from Korbanos to Tzedakah?
1)
(a)We ask exactly the same She'eilah regarding Yad li'Tzedakah as we asked by Pe'ah. Some Rishonim contend that this She'eilah presumes 'Yesh Yad l'Pe'ah' - because we think that Pe'ah is more stringent because basic Pe'ah is obligatory, whereas basic Tzedakah (i.e. when there are no poor) is not.
(b)We reject this contention on the grounds that there is the same obligation to give Tzedakah (when there are poor) as there is to give Pe'ah. Alternatively, just as one is not obligated to give more than one's minimum obligation (which comprises the case of Yad), one is not obligated to give more than one's minimum obligation of Pe'ah either.
(c)We ask whether 'Yesh Yad li'Tzedakah' after the She'eilah whether 'Yesh Yad l'Pe'ah' - as two independent She'eilos, not because one is dependent on the other.
(d)We learned the Hekesh from Korbanos to Leket, Shichechah and Pe'ah from the Pasuk in Ki-Setzei (in connection with Nidrei Hekdesh "ki Darosh Yidreshenu m'Imach" - and the Hekesh from Korbanos to Tzedakah from the Pasuk there "Asher Dibarta b'Ficha".
2)
(a)We also ask whether 'Yesh Yad l'Hefker' or not. We might say that just as Yesh Yad li'Tzedakah, Yesh Yad l'Hefker, since usually, when people declare their property Hefker, they do so for the benefit of the poor (Tosfos DH 'Hefker'). Why, on the other hand, might Hefker be different?
(b)Ravina asks whether 'Yesh Yad l'Beis ha'Kisei'. What is the case? What are the ramifications of the She'eilah?
(c)How do we reconcile this She'eilah with Ravina himself, who elsewhere, is unsure as to whether Hazmanah is effective by a bathroom in the first place?
(d)Why did Rav Papa not ask whether 'Yesh Yad li'Shevu'ah'?
2)
(a)We also ask whether 'Yesh Yad l'Hefker' or not. We might say that just as Yesh li'Tzedakah, Yesh Yad l'Hefker, since usually, when people declare their property Hefker, they do so for the benefit of the poor (Tosfos DH 'Hefker'). On the other hand, Hefker might be different - because Hefker, unlike Tzedakah, is fit for the rich as well as for the poor (in which case, it does not incorporate a Mitzvah like Tzedakah does, and is therefore not similar to the Neder of Korbanos).
(b)Ravina asks whether 'Yesh Yad l'Beis ha'Kisei'. The She'eilah is - whether, if someone designates a room as a bathroom and then, regarding another room, he adds 've'ha'Dein' without saying 'Nami', the second room also has the Din of a bathroom as regards Davening there (even before he has actually used it for that purpose).
(c)We reconcile this She'eilah with Ravina himself, who elsewhere, is unsure whether 'Hazmanah' (mere designation) is effective by a bathroom in the first place - by connecting the two She'eilos, inasmuch as, assuming that 'Hazmanah is effective, what will be the Din regarding Yad.
(d)Rav Papa did not ask about Yad li'Shevu'ah - because the Torah explicitly compares it to Nedarim, when it writes in Parshas Matos "Ki Yidor Neder O Hishava Shevu'ah".
3)
(a)By Kidushin, we rule Yesh Yad, l'Chumra (like every Sfeika d'Oraisa). On what grounds do we reject the contention of the Rishonim that by Pe'ah and Tzedakah too, we will go l'Chumra, and say Yesh Yad?
(b)What distinction does the Sugya in Yoma draw between bakers having to separate Safek Ma'aser Rishon and Ma'aser Ani on the one hand, and Ma'aser Sheni on the other?
(c)What will be the Halachah in the case of ...
1. ... Yad l'Hefker?
2. ... Yad l'Beis ha'Kisei?
3)
(a)By Kidushin, we rule Yesh Yad, l'Chumra (like every Sfeika d'Oraisa). We reject the contention of the Rishonim that by Pe'ah and Tzedakah too, we go l'Chumra, and say Yesh Yad - on the grounds that they are a Safek Mamon, in which case we will apply the principle 'Safek Mamon l'Kula' ('ha'Motzi m'Chavero, Alav ha'Re'ayah').
(b)The Sugya in Yoma rules that - bakers do not have to separate Safek Ma'aser Rishon and Ma'aser Ani (because of 'Safek Mamon l'Kula'), whereas they are obligated to separate Ma'aser Sheni and take it to Yerushalayim (because it is a Safek Isur).
(c)The Halachah in the case of ...
1. ... Yad l'Hefker - will be that the Yad is not valid, because 'Safek Mamon l'Kula', as we just explained.
2. ... Yad l'Beis ha'Kisei - 'Ein Yad', because even if Zimun would be effective, it would only be mid'Rabanan, and we have a principle 'Sfeika d'Rabanan, l'Kula'.
4)
(a)We learned in our Mishnah 'Menudeh Ani Lach, Rebbi Akiva Hayah Chochech ba'Zeh Lehachmir'. What does 'Chochech' mean?
(b)How does Abaye extrapolate from Rebbi Akiva's words that someone who transgresses will not receive Malkus?
(c)What will Rebbi Akiva say if the Noder ...
1. ... added 'she'Ani Ochal Lach'?
2. ... did not add these words?
(d)Which important principle can we extrapolate from Abaye's statement?
4)
(a)We learned in our Mishnah 'Menudeh Ani Lach, Rebbi Akiva Hayah Chochech ba'Zeh Lehachmir'. 'Chochech' either means - scratched himself (like a person tends to do when he is not sure of something, or it is from the word 'Cheich' (palate), in which case it is a colloquial term meaning that he gave taste to his palate, and ruled stringently.
(b)Abaye extrapolates that someone who transgresses will not receive Malkus - from the fact that Rebbi Akiva's does not say Machmir, but 'Chochech Lehachmir'.
(c)According to Rebbi Akiva, if the Noder ...
1. ... added 'she'Ani Ochal Lach' - he will not receive Malkus, since that is the case over which Rebbi Akiva and the Rabanan argue.
2. ... did not add these words - then even Rebbi Akiva will agree that his Neder is not valid at all (like Shmuel earlier in the Perek)).
(d)We can extrapolate from Abaye's statement - that ordinarily, one does receive Malkus for Yados.
5)
(a)We establish the Machlokes between Rebbi Akiva and the Rabanan by 'Menudeh Ani Lach'. What is the basis of their Machlokes?
(b)What does Rav Papa say they will they both hold by ...
1. ... 'Nedina Minach'? What must one add for this Neder to be valid?
2. ... 'Meshamtana Minach'? What does this statement imply?
(c)Rav Chisda will soon state that nobody contends with Rebbi Akiva's opinion. What is the other reason to rule like the Rabanan?
(d)In that case, which is the sole case of all those in this Sugya where the Neder is valid?
5)
(a)We establish the Machlokes between Rebbi Akiva and the Rabanan by 'Menudeh Ani Lach' - the Rabanan maintain that Menudeh is a Lashon of Niduy exclusively, whereas according to Rebbi Akiva, it can also be an expression of keeping away from someone (incorporating any form of Isur).
(b)Rav Papa explains that they will both hold by ...
1. ... 'Nedina Minach' - that the Neder is valid, provided one adds the Lashon 'she'Ani Ochal Lach', because 'Nedina' implies keeping away from the person.
2. ... 'Meshamtana Minach' - that the Neder is not valid at all, because it implies a Lashon of Shamta exclusively.
(c)Rav Chisda will soon state that nobody contends with Rebbi Akiva's opinion. The other reason to rule like the Rabanan is - the principle 'Halachah k'Rebbi Akiva me'Chavero, v'Lo me'Chaverav'.
(d)Consequently, the sole case of all those in this Sugya where the Neder is valid - is that of 'Nadina Minach, she'lo Ochal Lach'.
7b----------------------------------------7b
6)
(a)Rav Chisda did not learn like Rav Papa. What Neder had the man who came before him made regarding the property of Rav Yirmeyahu bar Aba's son?
(b)What did Rav Chisda rule?
(c)How does this prove that Rav Chisda argues with Rap Papa?
6)
(a)Rav Chisda did not learn like Rav Papa. The man who came before him had made the Neder - 'Meshamtana mi'Nichsei d'Brei d'Rav Yirmeyahu bar Aba'.
(b)Rav Chisda ruled that nobody contends with the opinion of Rebbi Akiva (and that the Neder was therefore invalid).
(c)This proves that Rav Chisda argues with Rav Papa in the previous Sugya - who maintained that even Rebbi Akiva agreed that Meshamtana was a Lashon of Shamta exclusively.
7)
(a)Rebbi Ila Amar Rav rules that a Niduy that is made in the presence of the Menudeh, can only be released in his presence. We learn the reason from the Yerushalmi. What does the Yerushalmi say about the same Halachah with regard to a Mudar Hana'ah in whose presence the Neder was made?
(b)What reason did we at first offer, based on a Gemara in Gitin, and then reject?
(c)What if b'Di'eved, one released the Niduy not in front of the Menudeh?
(d)Under which circumstances will it be permitted even l'Chatchilah, to release it when the Menudeh is not present?
7)
(a)Rebbi Ila Amar Rav rules that a Niduy that is made in the presence of the Menudeh, can only be released in his presence. We learn the reason from the Yerushalmi - which requires a Neder that was made in the presence of the Mudar Hana'ah to be nullified in his presence because otherwise, the Mudar Hana'ah, not knowing that the Neder has been nullified, will suspect the Madir, who subsequently give him benefit, of having contravened the Neder.
(b)The initial reason that we offered, based on a Gemara in Gitin, and then rejected, was - because it is comparable to something that is undertaken by ten people, which can only be canceled in conjunction with all of them.
(c)However, if b'Di'eved, one released the Niduy not in front of the Menudeh - the Niduy is released.
(d)It will be permitted even l'Chatchilah, to release it even not in the man's presence - if one makes a point of informing him (immediately) that the Niduy has been released (and the same will apply to the Yerushalmi's Din of Neder).
8)
(a)According to Rav Chanin Amar Rav, what should someone do if he hears his friend mention the Name of Hash-m in vain?
(b)And what does he mean when he says that should he fail to do so, then he himself 'will be in Niduy'?
(c)This is tied up with the fact that the unwarranted mention of Hash-m's Name leads to poverty. How do we learn this from the Pasuk in Shemos "Ki Meisu Kol ha'Anashim ha'Mevakshim es Nafshecha"? What has this Pasuk got to do with poverty?
(d)In which connection did Hash-m say this Pasuk? How do we know that it was not one of the other three connotations of death that Hash-m was referring to here? Perhaps they ...
1. ... had become blind?
2. ... had contracted Tzara'as?
3. ... had no children?
8)
(a)According to Rav Chanin Amar Rav, someone who hears his friend mention the Name of Hash-m in vain - should declare a Niduy on him.
(b)And when he says that should he fail to do so, then he himself 'will be in Niduy', he means - that he deserves to be placed in Niduy, but not that a Niduy is automatically effective.
(c)This is tied up with the fact that the unwarranted mention of Hash-m's Name leads to poverty. We learn this from the Pasuk "Ki Meisu Kol ha'Anashim ha'Mevakshim es Nafshecha" - because Misah sometimes refers to poverty.
(d)Hash-m said this Pasuk in connection with Dasan and Aviram - who had become poor, and whose influence with Paroh therefore, no longer posed a threat to Moshe. Hash-m cannot have been referring to one of the three other connotations of death. He cannot have meant ...
1. ... that they were blind - because Dasan and Aviram later said to Moshe 'ha'Einei ha'Anashim Hahem Tenaker' (proving that their eyesight was still intact).
2. ... that they had Tzara'as - because the Torah writes in Devarim (in reference to Dasan and Aviram) 'b'Kerev Kol Yisrael", and had they been Metzora'im, they would have been sent outside the camp.
3. ... that they had no children - because that would not have been a reason for them to have lost their influence with Paroh.
9)
(a)In which other connection do we find poverty compared to death?
(b)How do we reconcile our Sugya, which prescribes Niduy for someone who abuses the Name of Hash-m, with the Yerushalmi, which obligates Niduy for any form of misconduct performed in front of others (indeed we find cases of Niduy for sowing seeds among the vines [in Kidushin], and for hitting one's grown-up son [in Mo'ed Katan])?
9)
(a)We also find poverty compared to death - with regard to the many places in Shas where Chazal 'placed their eyes on somebody', which means either death or poverty.
(b)Even though the Yerushalmi obligates Niduy for any form of misconduct performed in front of others, and we find cases of Niduy for sowing seeds among the vines (in Kidushin), or for hitting one's grown-up son (in Mo'ed Katan) - it is only for the mention of Hash-m's Name, which is a particularly grave sin, that the person who fails to declare a Niduy on the culprit, deserves himself to be placed in Niduy.
10)
(a)What did Rav Huna do when he heard a woman taking Hash-m's Name in vain?
(b)Besides the obligation to place a Niduy on someone who abuses the name of Hash-m, which two other Halachos did Rebbi Aba extrapolate from Rav Huna?
(c)Shmuel in Mo'ed Katan, requires a minimum Niduy of thirty days for brazenness. According to the Rif, this is a dispute between the two Sugyos. How does Tosfos reconcile the discrepancy?
10)
(a)When Rav Huna heard a woman taking Hash-m's Name in vain - he declared a Niduy on her, which he immediately released in her presence.
(b)Besides the obligation to place a Niduy on someone who abuses the name of Hash-m - Rebbi Aba also extrapolated from Rav Huna a. that a Niduy that is declared in the presence of the Menudeh can only be released in his presence, and b. that it can be released immediately.
(c)Shmuel in Mo'ed Katan, requires a minimum Niduy of thirty days for brazenness. According to the Rif, this is a dispute between the two Sugyos. Tosfos reconciles them - by differentiating between the Niduy there, which is a real Niduy (for brazenness), and the Niduy here, which is only meant to serve as a deterrent, to stop the culprit from doing it again (though this seems to clash with what we just explained, that this Niduy is more stringent than all other cases of Niduy).
11)
(a)According to Rav Gidal Amar Rav, a Talmid Chacham who places himself in Niduy is also permitted to release the Niduy. Why might we have thought otherwise?
(b)Mar Zutra the Chasid demonstrated this. What did Mar Zutra used to do?
(c)The Rashba restricts Rav Gidal Amar Rav's ruling to cases like that of Mar Zutra, where the Niduy is only Midas Chasidus. What is the problem with this from the Kashya 'Peshita' (which the Rashba it appears, did not have in his text)? What would have been a more appropriate Kashya to ask?
11)
(a)According to Rav Gidal Amar Rav, a Talmid-Chacham who places himself in Niduy is also permitted to release the Niduy. We might have thought otherwise - because of the principle 'Ein Adam Matir es Atzmo mi'Beis ha'Asurim' (a person cannot release himself from jail).
(b)Mar Zutra the Chasid demonstrated this - when, before placing a Niduy on a Talmid who deserved it, would first place one on himself; then, after releasing the Talmid's Niduy, he would go home and release his own.
(c)The Rashba restricts Rav Gidal Amar Rav's ruling to cases like that of Mar Zutra, where the Niduy is only Midas Chasidus. The problem with this from the Kashya 'Peshita' (which the Rashba it appears, did not have in his text) is - that it would have been more appropriate to ask 'Amai' (Why?, rather than 'Peshita'), seeing as we have not yet cited the case of Mar Zutra (and in most cases, according to him, the Talmid-Chacham is not permitted to release his own Niduy).
12)
(a)Why did Mar Zutra release his Niduy immediately upon arriving home? What can we extrapolate from that?
(b)What distinction does the Ra'avad make between the man's wife and the other members of his family?
(c)Why is there no proof for the Ra'avad from the Sugya in Mo'ed Katan, which asks whether Tashmish ha'Mitah is prohibited to a Menudeh (implying that his wife is certainly permitted to approach him)?
12)
(a)Mar Zutra released his Niduy immediately upon arriving home - so that the members of his family should be permitted to approach him, from which we can extrapolate that members of a Menudeh's family are obligated to adhere to all the stringencies of Niduy that pertain to the Menudeh.
(b)The Ra'avad however, makes a distinction between the man's wife and the other members of his family - inasmuch as a wife, who is like part of himself, is not affected by the Niduy of her husband and is permitted to approach him.
(c)There no proof for the Ra'avad from the Sugya in Mo'ed Katan, which asks whether Tashmish ha'Mitah is prohibited to a Menudeh (implying that his wife is permitted to approach him) - because that She'eilah might be confined to a Menudeh who is only forbidden to people of another town, but not to those of his own (including his wife).