QUESTION: Rebbi Eliezer states that a husband may annul the Nedarim of his wife even before she makes them. The Gemara questions how such a Hafarah works. Does it prevent the Neder from taking effect in the first place, or does it immediately annul the Neder once the Neder has taken effect for one moment?

The Gemara cites a Beraisa which seems to provide conflicting evidence. In the Reisha of the Beraisa, the Chachamim attempt to disprove Rebbi Eliezer from the case of "Mikvah." Although a Mikvah can be Metaher an object which is Tamei, it cannot prevent an object from becoming Tamei in the future. Similarly, although a husband can annul his wife's Nedarim when they exist, he cannot annul them before they exist to prevent them from taking effect. The Chachamim's argument against Rebbi Eliezer implies that Rebbi Eliezer himself maintains that when the husband annuls his wife's Nedarim before they are made, his Hafarah prevents the Nedarim from taking effect.

In the Seifa of the Beraisa, however, the Chachamim present a different argument against Rebbi Eliezer from the case of "Kli." Although one can immerse a Kli which is Tamei in order to make it Tahor, one cannot immerse a Kli while it is Tahor so that when it becomes Tamei it will become Tahor immediately. Similarly, although a husband can annul his wife's Nedarim with Hafarah once they exist, he cannot do Hafarah before they exist in order to annul them immediately once they take effect. This implies that according to Rebbi Eliezer, when the husband annuls his wife's Nedarim before they are made, the Nedarim do take effect for one moment before the Hafarah annuls them.

The Gemara resolves the contradiction by saying that the Chachamim themselves are unsure about the opinion of Rebbi Eliezer, and thus they present two different arguments against his ruling. If he maintains that the Neder does not take effect in the first place, they refute his view from the case of "Mikvah." If he means that the Neder takes effect but is immediately revoked, they refute his view from the case of "Kli."

Why, though, do the Chachamim phrase each argument differently? They should prove both of their points from the case of "Mikvah" regardless of what Rebbi Eliezer maintains. They should ask that although a Mikvah is Metaher a Tamei object, it cannot prevent an object from becoming Tamei. This argument would refute Rebbi Eliezer's opinion if his logic is that the Hafarah prevents the wife's Neder from taking effect at all. Moreover, a Mikvah cannot make an object which is presently Tahor become Tahor as soon as it becomes Tamei. This argument would refute Rebbi Eliezer's opinion if his logic is that the Hafarah annuls the wife's Neder only the moment after it takes effect.

Alternatively, they should prove both points from the case of "Kli." One cannot prevent a Kli from ever becoming Tamei by immersing it when it is Tahor, and one cannot immerse a Kli which is Tahor so that when it becomes Tamei, it will become Tahor right away. Why do the Chachamim present two different cases to disprove Rebbi Eliezer? They should present a single case which would suffice to disprove Rebbi Eliezer's opinion regardless of which line of logic he follows.

(a) TOSFOS and the ROSH ask this question. They suggest (according to one Girsa of the Gemara; see RAN) that the Chachamim's argument is valid only if Rebbi Eliezer maintains that the wife's Neder does not take effect at all. The Chachamim support their first proof (from "Mikvah") with a Kal v'Chomer from the law of "Belu'ah" which states that an object which a person swallows does not become Tamei. The Chachamim cannot use this proof against Rebbi Eliezer if Rebbi Eliezer maintains that the wife's Neder takes effect and becomes annulled immediately afterwards. The Chachamim assert (according to this Girsa) that the law is that if a person swallows a Tahor object, the object cannot become Tamei, but if he swallows an object which is Tamei, it does not become Tahor. However, a Mikvah -- which does make an object which is Tamei become Tahor -- does not prevent objects from becoming Tamei. (The Chachamim present their argument from the perspective of the Mikvah, and not from the perspective of the Kli, so that the case will parallel the way a person's body prevents an object from becoming Tamei when it is inside of him. There is no particular act which puts it inside of him which keeps it from becoming Tamei. Rather, it is merely the person's body which surrounds the object which keeps the object from becoming Tamei. This is similar to the way a Mikvah works; it surrounds the object with water, and yet it does not prevent a Kli from becoming Tamei if the Kli touches a Neveilah while it is in the Mikvah.) If Rebbi Eliezer maintains that the Neder takes effect and then becomes annulled, the Chachamim's argument does not refute Rebbi Eliezer. This is why the Chachamim must bring a second proof from the case of immersion of a Kli in a Mikvah (without the Kal v'Chomer from the case of "Belu'ah").

According to this answer, why do the Chachamim not bring proof from "Kli" to disprove Rebbi Eliezer's logic even if he maintains that the Neder does not take effect? The answer is that the Chachamim apparently want to strengthen their proof by bringing the added Kal v'Chomer from "Belu'ah" (the case of swallowing food) to refute Rebbi Eliezer if he maintains that the Neder does not take effect. If he maintains that the Neder does take effect, this added proof is meaningless, and therefore they instead bring proof just from "Kli."

However, Tosfos and the Rosh do not explain why the proof against Rebbi Eliezer, if he maintains that the Neder takes effect, must be from "Kli." The Chachamim still could disprove Rebbi Eliezer by mentioning that a Mikvah which is Metaher what is now Tamei cannot be Metaher what will become Tamei, making Mikvah the focus of the proof and not Kli. The advantage of bringing the proof from a case of "Mikvah" and not from "Kli" is that the proof would not be limited to the Tevilah of a Kli, but it would apply to the Tevilah of a person as well.

It seems that these Rishonim maintains that it is more appropriate to focus on an action which is done to cause Taharah (the act of immersion the Kli) than to focus on the object which brings about the Taharah (the Mikvah) because, in the case of the Mishnah, no object annuls the Neder. It is the husband's act of Hafarah which annuls the Neder. Another reason for why it is preferable to ask from the act of Tevilah is that there is a Pircha, a logical flaw, in the proof from Mikvah: a Mikvah has the weakness in that if it does not have enough water it cannot be Metaher, while there is no parallel weakness with Hafarah. This might be the reason why the proof from the act of Tevilah is stronger; when the proof is brought from the act of immersing a Kli, there is no need to address the element of the Mikvah (and its weakness) as part of the proof.

(Nevertheless, the Beraisa still should have omitted the word "Kli" so that the proof would have been from the act of immersion of either a Kli or a person. This question is left unanswered. The Rishonim also leave unanswered the first Girsa of the Ran, which does not mention the Kal v'Chomer from "Belu'ah." According to that Girsa, the question remains: why do the Chachamim need two different cases to refute Rebbi Eliezer?)

(b) The PARASHAS NEDARIM suggests that the proof from "Mikvah" is the fact that a Kli or a person inside the Mikvah becomes Tamei if the Kli or person touches a Neveilah. The Mikvah cannot prevent the Kli or person from becoming Tamei. This fact cannot be used to disprove Rebbi Eliezer if he maintains that the Neder does take effect and then becomes annulled, becomes if a person touches a Neveilah while he is inside the Mikvah, the Mikvah indeed is Metaher him immediately after he becomes Tamei (and is no longer touching the Neveilah). This is why the Chachamim bring a different proof from the case of "Kli": when a Kli is immersed and removed from the Mikvah, it does not become Tahor immediately after it touches Tum'ah again.

This answer is similar to that of the Rosh and Tosfos. However, like their answer, this approach does not answer why the Seifa (the disproof of Rebbi Eliezer if he maintains that the Neder takes effect) needs to mention "Kli."

(c) The OR SAME'ACH (Hilchos Mikva'os 1:8) writes that the proof from the Seifa that the Neder should not become annulled as soon as it takes effect is a weak proof. Perhaps the Hafarah works for a Neder after the Neder takes effect because that is the husband's intent; he intends for his Hafarah to take effect only after his wife makes the Neder. In contrast, when one immerses a Kli in a Mikvah, there is no reason to associate that act of Tevilah with a Tum'ah which the Kli acquires in the future. This is why the Chachamim (in the Seifa) are careful to bring proof from the case of one who immerses a Kli with intent to make it Tahor when it later becomes Tamei. They refer to a Kli which is Tamei as a Sheni l'Tum'ah (i.e. it became Tamei through Mashkin), a Tum'ah which is relevant only for Terumah. The Mishnah in Chagigah (18b) teaches that when one immerses a Tamei object in order to make it fit for use with Terumah, one must have intention (Kavanah) that the Tevilah make it Tahor for Terumah. In the Reisha, however, the Chachamim refer to Tevilah for the sake of using the Kli for Chulin. This Tevilah works even without Kavanah. (Although it is possible for a person also to be a Sheni l'Tum'ah, such as one who eats a food with is a Sheni l'Tum'ah or one who has Mayim She'uvim poured over him (Shabbos 15a), nevertheless it is more common for a Kli to be a Sheni l'Tum'ah. It is not clear, however, why the Beraisa needs to mention a case of a Kli that is a Sheni l'Tum'ah, when it could mention a case of a Kli that is a Rishon l'Tum'ah which a person simply wants to use for Terumah, in which case he also needs to have Kavanah when he immerses it. The Beraisa could have disproved Rebbi Eliezer from the case of any Kli which one is immerses for Terumah, since he must have Kavanah when he immerses it.)

QUESTION: Rebbi Eliezer states that a husband may annul the Nedarim of his wife even before she makes them. The Gemara questions how such a Hafarah works. Does it prevent the Neder from taking effect in the first place, or does it immediately annul the Neder once the Neder has taken effect for one moment? The Gemara attempts to prove from Rebbi Eliezer's words that he maintains that Hafarah prevents the Neder from taking effect in the first place. Rebbi Eliezer cites as support for his view the law in the case of seeds ("Zera'im") that are sown in the ground. Rebbi Eliezer says that although the Torah states that seeds become Tahor from Tum'ah only when they are sown in the ground, everyone agrees that once they have been planted they remain Tahor even if Tum'ah then touches them. The Gemara understands from his words that just as the sowing prevents the seeds from becoming Tamei, the Hafarah prevents the Neder from taking effect.

How does the Gemara prove that Rebbi Eliezer maintains that the Neder does not take effect? Perhaps the Neder does take effect, and Hafarah removes it only after it takes effect. In the case of sowing seeds, when the seeds are sown in the ground perhaps they can become Tamei when an object of Tum'ah touches them, but they become Tahor immediately afterwards! How does the Gemara know that what is already planted in the ground does not become Tamei?

(a) The ROSH apparently understands that the Gemara's proof is from the Halachah that a plant which is attached to the ground cannot become Tamei at all, even when a source of Tum'ah touches it.

(b) The RAN, however, writes that seeds in the ground certainly do not become Tamei, because if they do become Tamei, nothing happens to them to remove their Tum'ah.

What does the Ran mean? The Gemara assumes that according to Rebbi Eliezer the husband's Hafarah which precedes the wife's Neder annuls the Neder after it takes effect (because of the Kal v'Chomer). Similarly, when seeds are planted in the ground they can become Tamei, but the planting done earlier will make them become Tahor as soon as they become Tamei!

1. The OR SAME'ACH (see previous Insight) explains that Hafarah can remove a Neder made later because the husband intends for his Hafarah to take effect on that Neder. The act of Hafarah is done with Kavanah. It is the Kavanah which effects the annulment, and his Kavanah can be applied to any future Neder. In contrast, when a person plants seeds, the Taharah does not come about through any particular Kavanah that the person has in mind, but merely through the fact that the seeds became attached to the ground. It is the act itself which is Metaher, and not the Kavanah. Therefore, the act of attaching it to the ground cannot remove a Tum'ah that may affect the seeds at a later time. (This approach is debatable. Since the sowing of the seeds accomplishes the attachment of the seeds to the ground, perhaps anything which happens while the plant is attached to the ground should be affected by that initial act of planting.)

2. The Ran's intention might be to prove his point from the second time the seed becomes Tamei, or from the case of a seed that was Tamei at the time it was planted. If the act of planting makes a seed Tahor only after it becomes Tamei, that act should be effective (to make the seed Tahor) only once (either when it was planted while it was Tamei, or the first time Tum'ah touches it). The Taharah effect of the act of planting should be "used up" on the first Taharah, and yet the seed actually becomes (or remains) Tahor no matter how many times Tum'ah touches it. It must be that the planting prevents it from becoming Tamei in the first place. Accordingly, the planting does not act against any particular Tum'ah, but rather it changes the nature of the seed and makes it the type of object which cannot become Tamei (and thus it makes no difference how many times it is touched by a source of Tum'ah). (M. Kornfeld)

3. Perhaps the Ran means what the Rosh says. When the Ran says that nothing happens to remove the Tum'ah, he means that there is nothing to remove the Tum'ah from another object which touches the plant at the same time a Neveilah touches the plant. (This explanation, however, necessitates emendation in the text of the Ran.)

QUESTION: Rebbi Eliezer states that a husband may annul the Nedarim of his wife even before she makes them. He reasons that if the husband's Hafarah annuls a Neder when it is already in force, certainly it should be able to annul a Neder before the Neder takes effect. The Gemara concludes that the Chachamim agree in principle with Rebbi Eliezer's Kal v'Chomer. However, they argue with his ruling and say that the husband cannot annul his wife's Nedarim before she makes them because of the Derashah from the verse, "Ishah Yekimenu v'Ishah Yefeirenu" (Bamidbar 30:14).

If the Chachamim agree in principle with the Kal v'Chomer, why do they not apply the Kal v'Chomer in the case of a Mikvah, wherever there is no conflicting Derashah? They should apply the Kal v'Chomer and say that if a Mikvah can be Metaher an object which is Tamei, then certainly it should be Metaher an object which is presently Tahor for when it later becomes Tamei.

The RAN answers that there is a verse which counters the Kal v'Chomer in the case of Mikvah as well. The verse teaches that even a person who is immersed in a Mikvah can become Tamei if he touches a source of Tum'ah.

The Gemara's conclusion seems problematic. The Gemara says that the Chachamim agree with the Kal v'Chomer of Rebbi Eliezer wherever there is no conflicting verse. However, in all cases where the Kal v'Chomer might apply, the verse in the case of Mikvah should teach that it does not apply! Why do the Chachamim agree with the Kal v'Chomer if a verse refutes it? Moreover, why does Rebbi Eliezer himself defend the Kal v'Chomer, if the verse in the case of Mikvah serves as a Pircha for all cases in which the Kal v'Chomer might apply? Rebbi Eliezer's use of the Kal v'Chomer in the case of Hafaras Nedarim should be refuted by the fact that the Torah teaches not to make such a Kal v'Chomer in the similar case of Mikvah, where the Torah teaches that a Mikvah can make an object Tahor but it cannot prevent an object from becoming Tamei. (See MITZPEH EISAN and PORAS YOSEF who ask a similar question.)

(a) The SHITAH MEKUBETZES answers that the case of Mikvah is not a Pircha because the verse which teaches not to apply the Kal v'Chomer there is a Gezeiras ha'Kasuv.

What does this mean? Why should the verse not be a Pircha on the Kal v'Chomer simply because it is a Gezeiras ha'Kasuv? On the contrary, every Pircha on a Kal v'Chomer is from a Gezeiras ha'Kasuv; it is the Gezeiras ha'Kasuv which teaches that the Kal v'Chomer should not apply.

Perhaps the Shitah Mekubetzes means that there are two types of Kal v'Chomer. The first type is a Kal v'Chomer based purely on logic. The second type is a Kal v'Chomer based on certain Kulos and Chumros (leniencies and stringencies) which the Torah gives to a certain matter. The second type of Kal v'Chomer is immediately rejected if there is another case in which the Torah applies the Kulos and Chumros differently without applying the Kal v'Chomer. In contrast, a Kal v'Chomer based purely on logic cannot be rejected simply because of a single exception that the Torah makes. Rather, the Kal v'Chomer is assumed to be the rule while the single, unique case in the Torah is the exception.

(b) TOSFOS (76a, DH Shema Minah) and the RITVA (cited by the Shitah Mekubetzes) explain that the Kal v'Chomer of Rebbi Eliezer cannot be disproved from the case of the Mikvah. The case of the Mikvah has a point of weakness which the case of Hafaras Nedarim (or the case of seeds that were planted) does not have: the Mikvah is Metaher only when it contains the required minimum amount of water. If it contains even one drop less than forty Se'ah, it cannot be Metaher. This weakness of a Mikvah might be the reason why it cannot prevent an object from becoming Tamei. In contrast, Hafaras Nedarim (or planting seeds in the ground) does not have this weakness and therefore it can prevent a Neder from taking effect in the future (and planting seeds can prevent them from becoming Tamei while they are planted).

(c) The RAMBAM (Hilchos Avos ha'Tum'ah 6:16) writes that if a person touches an Av ha'Tum'ah while he is immersed in a Mikvah, he becomes Tamei, "and when he leaves the Mikvah he becomes Tahor." The KESEF MISHNEH infers from the Rambam's words that a Mikvah is Metaher a person who is Tamei at the moment that the person leaves the Mikvah (and being in the Mikvah is not what is Metaher the person). He explains that the Rambam apparently infers this from the Sifri which states that a person can become Tamei while in a Mikvah by touching a Neveilah.

The ruling of the Rambam answers the question on the Chachamim and Rebbi Eliezer. The Halachah that a person can become Tamei in a Mikvah does not contradict the Kal v'Chomer (that if a Mikvah is Metaher an object which is Tamei, then certainly it should be Metaher an object which is presently Tahor for when it later becomes Tamei), because the act of entering (or being in) a Mikvah does not make the person Tahor; he becomes Tahor at the moment he leaves the Mikvah. Accordingly, there is no basis for a Kal v'Chomer to teach that going into a Mikvah should prevent him from becoming Tamei later.

However, the Kal v'Chomer still should apply with regard to leaving the Mikvah. Since, according to the Rambam, leaving the Mikvah is Metaher a person who is Tamei, certainly it should prevent him from becoming Tamei later!

The PARASHAS NEDARIM mentions an important point about the Sugya here which that answers this question. He explains that the Kal v'Chomer from the case of "Kli" (i.e. if immersion of a Kli which is Tamei makes it Tahor, then certainly immersion of a Kli which is Tahor should make it Tahor when it later touches a source of Tum'ah) is not a valid Kal v'Chomer, because in the case of "Kli" the act of Tevilah is already finished and nothing is left of the Tevilah after the object is removed from the Mikvah. Hence, at that point, it can become Tamei again.

In contrast, when Rebbi Eliezer makes his Kal v'Chomer from the case of seeds, he does not say that even after the seeds are removed from the ground they cannot become Tamei; they certainly can become Tamei at that point. Rather, he says that while the act of planting still affects the seeds (that is, while they are still attached to the ground) the planting can prevent them from becoming Tamei. The same is true for Hafaras Nedarim. The husband's Hafarah remains present throughout the rest of the day, as the Gemara earlier (73a and Ran there) teaches in the case of a person who says, "I want this Hafarah to take effect only after a certain amount of time," in which case the Hafarah is able to take effect (see Insights there). The same applies to the case of "Amah Ivriyah."

Hence, when the Kli is removed from the Mikvah there is no reason why Tevilah should prevent it from becoming Tamei in the future.

However, according to the Kesef Mishneh's interpretation of the Rambam, it is difficult to understand why the Chachamim ask a question on Rebbi Eliezer from the case of "Mikvah" in the first place. The Kal v'Chomer should not apply in the case of "Mikvah" at all, since it is not the act of entering the Mikvah which is Metaher, but it is the act of leaving the Mikvah that is Metaher!

It seems, therefore, more probable that the Rambam does not mean (as the Kesef Mishneh suggests) that only the act of leaving the Mikvah is Metaher. Rather, the Rambam means that entering or leaving the Mikvah is Metaher, excluding simply being in the Mikvah which is not Metaher. One needs to perform an act to be Metaher (such as entering or leaving the Mikvah); merely being in the Mikvah is not an act.

However, if this is the intention of the Rambam, the original question returns. According to the Rambam, the Chachamim should apply the Kal v'Chomer to teach that if immersion in the Mikvah is Metaher a person who is Tamei, then it certainly should prevent one from becoming Tamei while he is in the Mikvah!

Consequently, it is necessary to rely on one of the previous approaches to answer this question.

What, though, is the Rambam's source for his ruling (according to the abovementioned, alternative explanation of the Rambam)? His source might be the Gemara here:

The PARASHAS NEDARIM's point leaves an important question in the Sugya unanswered. In the Seifa of the Beraisa, the Chachamim assert that if Rebbi Eliezer maintains that the Neder takes effect first and then the Hafarah annuls it, his view can be disproved from the case of "Kli." When a Kli that is Tahor is immersed in a Mikvah, the Mikvah -- according to Rebbi Eliezer's reasoning -- should be able to be Metaher the Kli for when it becomes Tamei at a later time. The Chachamim's question cannot be that the Kli should be Tahor when it touches an object of Tum'ah while it is in the Mikvah and then stops touching the object of Tum'ah, because everyone agrees that the Halachah in that case is that it does become Tahor. The Chachamim's question must be that if the Kli becomes Tamei after it leaves the Mikvah, its original immersion should make it Tahor again. However, as the Parashas Nedarim points out, this is not a valid Kal v'Chomer because the Tevilah is no longer present once the Kli leaves the Mikvah!

This question may be the source for the Rambam's ruling. The Rambam answers this question when he writes that when a Kli in the Mikvah touches a Neveilah it does not becomes Tahor as soon as it is no longer touching the Neveilah, but rather it becomes when it leaves the Mikvah. Accordingly, the Chachamim have an excellent question on Rebbi Eliezer: if Tevilah is Metaher the Kli when it enters or leaves the Mikvah, then while it is in the Mikvah certainly it should become Tahor if it touches an object of Tum'ah and then stops touching the object! Accordingly, the Gemara here is the source for the Rambam's ruling that a Kli, while it is in the Mikvah, becomes Tamei and remain so until it leaves the Mikvah.

However, none of the other Rishonim seem to accept the ruling of the Rambam. They all assume that being in a Mikvah makes an object Tahor the moment it stops touching the source of Tum'ah. How do they answer the question on the Chachamim's argument against Rebbi Eliezer? Why, according to Rebbi Eliezer's reasoning (the Kal v'Chomer), should a Kli become Tahor after it leaves the Mikvah as a result of the Tevilah, if the act of Tevilah is no longer present?

Perhaps the answer is that there is a difference between how the Kal v'Chomer functions if Rebbi Eliezer maintains that the Neder never takes effect, and how it functions if Rebbi Eliezer maintains that it takes effect but becomes annulled immediately. If the Neder does not take effect at all, the Kal v'Chomer teaches that the state of being which can remove Tum'ah or a Neder can also prevent Tum'ah or a Neder from taking effect. The Kal v'Chomer teaches a detail about the state of the object. Hence, it is applicable only when the item is still in that state (such as a Kli in the Mikvah, or seeds planted in the ground).

However, if Rebbi Eliezer maintains that the Neder takes effect for a moment and then becomes annulled, the Kal v'Chomer teaches that an act (and not a state) which causes Taharah for an object which is presently Tamei, or Hafarah for a Neder which is presently in force, certainly causes Taharah or Hafarah for a Tum'ah or a Neder which has not yet come into existence. If it is the act which causes Taharah, be a one-time act, teaching that the Tevilah can cause Taharah once, either for the object at present if it is Tamei now, or for the first time in the future that it becomes Tamei. It makes no difference whether the Tevilah is still present and evident on the object or not, since it is the act of Tevilah which serves as the Metaher, and not the change in the state of the object, and the act of Tevilah will be able to effect a Taharah at any time, present or future.

QUESTION: The Mishnah teaches that Hafaras Nedarim may be performed throughout the entire day on which the husband hears the Neder, "both to be lenient and to be stringent." The Mishnah explains that the leniency (Kula) is that if the wife makes a Neder (and her husband hears it) on Friday night, the husband may annul it during that night and during the entire day of Shabbos. The stringency (Chumra) is that if she makes the Neder at the end of the day on Shabbos, he may annul it only until nightfall.

The Mishnah means that this Kula is a leniency relative to the other opinion about when a husband may annul the Neder of his wife. That opinion maintains that the husband has 24 hours from the time he hears of the Neder to annul it, regardless of what time of day he heard it.

Why is this considered a Kula compared to the other opinion, that the husband has 24 hours to annul the Neder? The opinion that limits Hafaras Nedarim to the end of the day will always be a Chumra when compared to the opinion that he has a full 24 hours!

Moreover, why does the Mishnah specifically mention the case of a woman who makes a Neder on Friday night? Why is this detail -- that she makes the Neder on Shabbos -- relevant to the Halachah that the Mishnah is teaching (the duration of time which the husband has to annul the Neder)?

(a) The RAN writes that the word "l'Hakel" ("to be lenient") in the Mishnah is not precise ("Lav Davka") and means merely that the husband occasionally has more time than others to annul the Neder. Similarly, the mention of Shabbos in the Mishnah is unrelated to the Halachah of Hafarah until the end of the day. It is mentioned only tangentially to teach an unrelated Halachah -- that one is permitted to annul a Neder on Shabbos even when it is not necessary for the sake of Shabbos, as the Gemara concludes.

(b) The ROSH also says that the word "l'Hakel" is "Lav Davka." The mention of Shabbos in the Mishnah is intended to teach that Hafaras Nedarim is practiced "as the night of Shabbos precedes the day" (an expression found in Nidah 36b). This means that the Halachic day, for the purpose of Hafarah, begins with the onset of night.

(c) The ROGATCHOVER GA'ON (Mahadura Tinyana, p. 45a; see "Ishim v'Shitos," 2:9) suggests that "l'Hakel" is written with specific intent, but it does not refer to the Halachah mentioned in the Mishnah. Rather, it refers to a Halachah mentioned in the Yerushalmi. The Yerushalmi (cited by the ROSH on 72a, DH v'Shama Ba'al) states that the Torah does not count time during which the husband or father is unable to do Hafarah towards "Yom Sham'o" (see Insights to 69:1:b). The Yerushalmi adds that this Halachah depends on the argument between the Tana'im whether a husband must do Hafarah before sunset ("Yom Sham'o") or whether he has 24 hours to do Hafarah ("me'Yom El Yom"). If he must annul the Neder on "Yom Sham'o" -- "his" day of hearing, only the time during which he actually was able to do Hafarah (such as when he was not mute) is counted. If he is given 24 hours to do Hafarah, he loses the ability to do Hafarah after that amount of time passes regardless of whether he was able to use the time for Hafarah or not. This is the "leniency" ("l'Hakel") to which the Mishnah refers, according to the opinion which limits the ability to do Hafarah to "Yom Sham'o," as opposed to the opinion which allows Hafarah for a full 24 hours.

(d) According to the Gemara's conclusion (77a), the mention of "l'Hakel" and the mention of Shabbos in the Mishnah are "Davka" and teach very important points. The Gemara says that a man is permitted to do Hafaras Nedarim on Shabbos for any Neder his wife makes (even a Neder that does not curtail the enjoyment of Shabbos). The Ran explains that this is because the husband will lose his opportunity to do Hafarah if he does not do Hafarah before the end of the day. The Gemara adds that according to the opinion that the husband has 24 hours to do Hafarah, he cannot do Hafarah on Shabbos but must wait until after Shabbos, since the opportunity to do Hafarah will remain after Shabbos.

Accordingly, it is proper to call the Halachah which limits Hafarah to the day of the Neder a "Kula" when the husband heard about his wife's Neder at the beginning of Shabbos, since it permits the husband to do Hafarah on Shabbos. He does not need to wait until after Shabbos to do Hafarah during the few remaining minutes until the end of the 24-hour period. The "Chumra" of the end of the Mishnah refers to the Halachah that when the wife makes her Neder towards the end of Shabbos, the husband has only the few remaining minutes in the day to annul it. According to the opinion that gives him 24 hours, although he may not do Hafarah during those few minutes he still has plenty of time after Shabbos in which to do Hafarah! (M. Kornfeld)

(It is not entirely clear why the Ran and others do not explain in this manner. Perhaps they want to offer an explanation of the Mishnah which would make the Mishnah readable even according to the Gemara's original assumption, that a husband may not annul Nedarim which have nothing to do with Shabbos, and that the word "she'Im" in the end of the Mishnah should be interpreted as, "v'Im" (see Beitzah 7b).)