Explanation: And then he became an Eid Zomem (though this is Tosfos' conclusion, which is why some commentaries omit it).

Suggestion: It initially appears that when he says this ('I testified falsely'), he is obligated to pay his share, because he now admits that he tried to cause one of the litigants to lose via his testimony.

Refutation: This is not correct however, because the obligation to pay for testifying falsely is confined to where two witnesses testify 'Imanu Hayisem'.

Correct explanation: The correct explanation therefore is that after the witness claimed that he testified falsely (thereby negating his own testimony, rendering him ineligible to become an Eid Zomem), two witnesses declared him and his co-witness Zom'min, which his friend becomes, but he does not.

The Gemara's Refutation: The Gemara refutes this explanation however, by asking (based on the principle 'that once a witness has testified, he is not permitted to retract') 'Does he have the power to do this'? Consequently, both witnesses will be Zom'min.

Clarification: ... the rights that the husband has in his wife's Kesuvah whilst she is still under his jurisdiction, more than he would have if she was divorced. His rights can be understood in two ways: 1. If he sells the rights that he has in the Kesuvah (based on the fact that if his wife dies he will inherit her). 2. If acquires from his wife her rights (assuming that he will either die before her or divorce her), which she will sell him for a minimal amount.

The difference between the two ways: 1. His rights in the second way exceed those of the first way, in that, given that her Kesubah is worth a hundred Zuz, we can assume that he will be able to sell his rights in it for fifty.

The difference between the two ways: 2. Whereas if she were to sell her current rights in the Kesubah to him, he would benefit as much as sixty Zuz, since she would only be able to charge him (or anybody else) forty Zuz. There are two reasons for the fact that his rights exceed hers; firstly, because he is currently Muchzak in the Kesubah, and secondly, because he is permitted to eat the fruit of the land that is designated for the Kesubah and not her.

The Gemara's She'eilah: The Gemara therefore asks whether we go after how much a man would pay for her rights (the forty Zuz that she would be willing to sell it for as we explained, and because the Eidim Zom'min testified that she is divorced, they tried to cause him a loss of sixty Zuz); or whether, due to the fact that she may not have been willing to sell the Kesubah, we go after his rights and they only pay him fifty Zuz.

Implied Question: How can we present the second side of the She'eilah (his rights), seeing as the Mishnah says 'Omdin Kamah Adam Rotzeh Litein she'Im Nis'armelah O Nisgarshah' (implying her rights)?

Answer: What the Mishnah therefore means (according to the second side) is (not that we assess her rights. What the Mishnah means is that we assess how much a person would be willing to pay for the Kesubah of this woman, who is not sure whether she will become a widow or divorced (in which case she will claim her Kesubah), or whether she will die first, and her husband will inherit her. Consequently, Beis-Din assess his rights in the Kesubah, which the Eidim Zom'min must pay him.

Question: Bearing in mind that, according to their testimony, the woman would have lost her marital rights She'er (food) and K'sus (clothes), why are the Eidim Zom'min not obligated to pay them to the woman.

Answer #1: The Tana is speaking where the work that the woman produces is equivalent to the sum total of what she was receiving from her husband

Answer #2: The Tana is speaking where the woman corroborates the witnesses' testimony, and claims that she is divorced (in which case she foregoes the three things).

Implied Question: If that is so, why do we not apply the principle that 'a woman who claims in the presence of her husband that she is divorced is believed'?

Answer: That is only if she does not have the support of witnesses, in which case she would not have the Chutzpah to make such a claim if it was not true. But there where she does (such as in our case), that reason falls away - as the Gemara explains in Kesuvos, in 'ha'Ishah she'Nis'armelah' (Daf 22b)..

Halachah: Rabeinu Tam rules like the latter Lashon, since the Mishnah supports it (constituting a Kashya on the first Lashon).

A Change of Text: In the Azharos (a Piyut), Rabeinu Tam changes the wording 'If one issues a loan for ten years, then he will lose it in half his days', adding the words 'she'Lo ba'Mishpat' (unlawfully).

Explanation: According to Rashi, this refers to a P'ruzbul.

Tosfos Refutation: We refute Rashi's explanation however, based on the Mishnah in Shevi'is, which lists handing over one's documents to Beis-Din and P'ruzbul as two separate issues.

Tosfos' Explanation: Tosfos therefore explains that 'Moser Sh'tarosav le'Beis-Din' is not Meshamet min ha'Torah (whereas P'ruzbul is only a Rabbinical institution).

Question: How can the Gemara compare our case ('al-M'nas she'Lo Tishmeteini Shevi'is') to the case of 'al M'nas she'Ein lach Alai Ona'ah', seeing as the former is definitely 'Masneh al Mah she'Kasuv ba'Torah', whereas the latter is a Safek (as the Gemara explains in Perek ha'Zahav)?

Answer: Shevi'is too, is a Safek, bearing in mind that the Loveh may well pay before Shevi'is.

Explanation: According to Rashi, the seller is assuring the purchaser that the sale is not subject to Ona'ah, when in fact it is, rendering the sale invalid, seeing as he lied to him.

Refutation: But this doesn't seem right, seeing as in the case of 'al-M'nas she'Lo Tishmeteini Shevi'is' too, Shevi'is is Meshamet, even though there the concept of a false sale is not applicable.

Alternative Explanation: The Rashbam therefore explains that the seller is (not assuring but) stipulating that the La'av of Ona'ah should not apply to the sale, something he cannot do, since the Torah says that it does. Had he stipulated however, that the purchaser should forego the Ona'ah and not claim it back, his stipulation would have been valid. By the same token, if the seller had stipulated that Shevi'is should not be Meshamet, his condition would be invalid. Now the two cases are compatible.