1)

(a)If a man claims that he betrothed a woman and she denies it, our Mishnah permits the woman to marry his relatives. It forbids him to marry hers however due to the principle 'Shavyah Anafsheih Chatichah d'Isura' (his admission, turns her into a piece of Isur).

(b)The same will apply in the reverse case. However, where the woman denies the man's claims, but counters that he betrothed her daughter, the Tana permits him to marry the daughter's relatives (who are not also close relatives of her mother), and vice-versa because the Torah does not grant a mother the right to testify regarding her daughter's status) like it does, a father.

(c)He is not required to give her a Get either (because if he was, he would no longer be permitted to marry her relatives).

(d)In the reverse case, where the man claimed that he betrothed the daughter, and the mother counters that it was her whom he betrothed and not her daughter then the man is forbidden to marry the daughter's relatives, and the woman, his relatives, exclusively.

2)

(a)Having taught us ...

1. ... that the man is not believed to forbid his relatives on the woman he claims he betrothed, the Tana nevertheless finds it necessary to repeat this Halachah in the case of the woman because we would otherwise have thought that, in the Reisha, she is not forbidden to his relatives only because, seeing as he does not have much to lose by claiming that he betrothed her, we suspect him of lying. She on the other hand, who becomes forbidden to the whole world, would not make such a claim, unless it was true. Consequently, if not for the Seifa, we would have forbidden him on her relatives, too.

2. ... these two cases, the Tana finds it necessary to repeat this Halachah in the case of the daughter to teach us that the Chachamim did not even issue a decree, believing the mother regarding her daughter (like the Torah believed the father).

3. ... these three cases, the Tana teaches us the final case ('Kidashti Es Bitech, v'Hi Omeres Lo Kidashta Ela Osi') only because of the others (since it would otherwise be the only case omitted by the Tana), even though it does not come to teach us anything.

3)

(a)With reference to the second case (of 'Hi Omeres Kidashtani ... '), Shmuel says that we ask him to give her a Get (to enable her to marry). The problem with Rav, who says that we force him to do so is that seeing as by doing so, he will become forbidden to all her relatives, it is illogical for Chazal to issue such a decree.

(b)Consequently, when Rav said 'Kofin', he was really complementing Shmuel's statement and what he really said was that in the event that he gave the Get of his own accord, then we force him to give her a Kesuvah.

(c)When Rav Acha quoted him as saying 'Kofin u'Mevakshin' they meant that initially we ask him to give he a Get, but that if he gave it without being asked, then 'Kofin' (to pay her Kesuvah [because the fact that he gave her a Get without being asked indicates that he really did betroth her]).

4)

(a)Rav Yehudah ruled that in a case where a man betrothed a woman in front of one witness 'Ein Chosheshin l'Kidushav'.

(b)They asked him what the Din will be if the couple admit to the single witness that the Kidushin took place. The Kidushin might ...

1. ... be valid because the reason that she is not betrothed when there is only one witness is because they deny it.

2. ... not be valid because we learn "Davar" "Davar" from Mamon that two witnesses are required to validate the Kidushin.

(c)Rav Yehudah wavered answering once 'yes' and once 'no' ...

(d)... because he himself, was not certain which ruling is the correct one.

5)

(a)Rav Nachman Amar Shmuel added to Rav Nachman's initial ruling 'va'Afilu Sheneihem Modim'.

(b)Rava attempts to refute Rav Nachman's ruling from our Mishnah, where the Tana forbids the woman's relatives on the man (and vice-versa). He assumes that the Tana must be speaking about Kidushin that took place with one witness because if there were two, she ought to be forbidden to his relatives; whereas if there were no witnesses, he ought to be permitted to hers. So the Reisha of the Mishnah must be speaking when there is one witness with whom the man concurs and the woman does not.

(c)We reject this proof however, by establishing the Mishnah that according to the man, there were really two witnesses, whom we cannot call because they have gone away and cannot be contacted.

6)

(a)According to Beis-Shamai in the Mishnah in Eduyos, if a man who divorced his wife, stays with her overnight in a hotel, she does not require a second Get. According to Beis Hillel she does.

(b)We assume that the Tana must be speaking when there is one witness (a Kashya on Rav Nachman Amar Shmuel) because, if there were two witnesses, why would Beis Shamai not require a Get, and if there were none, why would Beis Hillel require one?

7)

(a)The Tana says there in the Seifa, that if they were divorced from the Erusin even Beis Hillel will concede that no Get is necessary.

(b)Based on this Seifa, we refute the Kashya on Rav Nachman Amar Shmuel because, if there was one witness (and his testimony was acceptable), what difference would it make whether they were divorced after the marriage or after the betrothal?

(c)So we establish the Mishnah in Eduyos when there were Eidei Yichud (but no Eidei Bi'ah). Beis Shamai hold that Eidei Yichud are not synonymous with Eidei Bi'ah, whereas according to Beis Hillel, they are.

(d)Beis Hillel will concede that no Get is necessary if they were divorced from the Erusin because, since they have not yet lived together and are not familiar with each other, we cannot assume that the Yichud is necessarily synonymous with Bi'ah.

8)

(a)Various Amora'im agree with Rav Nachman Amar Shmuel ('ha'Mekadesh b'Ed Echad Ein Chosheshin l'Kidushav, va'Afilu Sheneihem Modim'). In the first Lashon, Rabah bar Rav Huna issues this ruling; in the second Lashon, he quotes Rav. Both Leshonos conclude 'Bei Dina Rabah Amri ... ', which, according to ...

1. ... the first Lashon refers to Rav.

2. ... the second Lashon refers to Rebbi.

(b)The Beraisa cites a case where two men arrive from overseas accompanied by a woman and goods, and each man claims the woman to be his wife, the other man, his slave and the goods, his. The woman claims that the goods are hers, and the two men, her slaves.

(c)The Tana rules that she requires two Gitin, and may then claim her Kesuvah from the goods (seeing as, Mah Nafshach, she is entitled to at least that).

(d)Rav Achdevu'i bar Ami tries to prove from here that one witness is effective (because otherwise, why would she require a Get?) And it must be speaking when each man has the support of one witness and not two, because if they had two witnesses, how would she be able to claim that they were her slaves and the goods were hers (see Rashash)?

9)

(a)We refute Rav Achdevu'i bar Ami's interpretation of the Beraisa however on the grounds that, if they each had only one witness, it would be a case of 'Ed Echad b'Hakchasahah' (a clash of two contradictory witnesses) in which case we would disregard both of their testimonies (what's more, even if the woman alone were to contradict one witness, his testimony would be acceptable only to make her swear, and that is not applicable here).

(b)We therefore establish the Din in the Beraisa that in fact, the woman is free to marry even without a Get (on account of the contradictory statements of the two witnesses, as we just explained) and the reason that she requires two Gitin is in order to claim her Kesuvah from the goods.

(c)And the Tana is coming to corroborate the opinion of Rebbi Meir, who holds in Kesuvos that Metaltelin are Meshubad to a woman's Kesuvah (whereas according to the Chachamim, she may only claim Karka).

(d)The rest of the goods are placed on hold until Eliyahu comes.

10)

(a)Rav Kahana (the contemporary of Rav Ashi) holds 'Ein Chosheshin l'Kidushav', because he learns the 'Gezeirah-Shavah "Davar" "Davar" from Mamon; Rav Papa, holds 'Chosheshin'. Rav Ashi asks on Rav Kahana that, if that is the case, we ought to say that, just as (based on the Pasuk "Asher Yomar Ki Hu Zeh") admission in the case of Mamon dispenses with the need for witnesses ('Hoda'as Ba'al-Din, k'Me'ah Edim Dami'), the same should apply by Kidushin, too.

(b)Rav Kahana refutes Rav Ashi's query however on the grounds that 'Hoda'as Ba'al-Din' can only be effective when it does not cause a loss to others, which is not the case here, since both sets of relatives become affected by their admission. Note that, in that case, there where there are no close relatives, such as in the case of a Ger and a Giyores, one witness ought to be believed.

11)

(a)Mar Zutra and Rav Ada Saba divided the property of their father Rav Mari bar Isar without witnesses. They came before Rav Ashi (not because they were disputing the division in fact, their mutual trust was absolute, but) because they wanted to know whether the division was Halachically binding, or whether it was considered no more than arbitrary.

(b)Rav Ashi replied 'Lo Ibru Sahadi Ela l'Shikra' (when it comes to money matters, 'witnesses are only needed to counter whoever denies the transaction'), in which case the division was Halachically binding.

12)

(a)Abaye rules that if one witness testifies that a person ate Chelev (b'Shogeg), and the accused remains silent, he is believed and he is obligated to bring a Chatas.

(b)The reason that ...

1. ... he is believed is because his silence is considered to be admission ('Shesikah k'Hoda'ah Damya', and it is as if he himself had volunteered the information).

2. ... we might otherwise have thought that he is not believed is due to the Pasuk "O Hoda Elav Chataso", from which we extrapolate 've'Lo she'Hodi'uhu Acheirim' (meaning that he does not bring a Chatas on the basis of the testimony of two witnesses, whose claim he denies).

(c)And he proves it from a Mishnah in Kerisus, where the Tana rules, in a case where someone rejects the testimony of one witness, who testifies that he ate Chelev, that he is believed.

(d)Abaye proves his ruling from there by extrapolating that, had he remained silent following the witness' testimony, he would have been obligated to bring a Korban.

13)

(a)Abaye rules, in a case where one witness who testifies that his Tahoros became Tamei, and the owner is silent that the witness is believed ...

(b)... and the owner is obligated to bring a Korban (i.e. due to his silence, it remains within the realm of "O Hoda Elav Chataso").

(c)Abaye extrapolates this ruling too, from a Mishnah in Taharos, where the Tana says that in a case where someone rejects the testimony of one witness, who testifies that his Taharos became Tamei they remain Tahor (but not if he is silent).