1)

(a)We are searching for he source that obligates a Gilgul Shevu'ah even in the case of a Safek.. The case of Gilgul Shevu'ah ...

1. ... ([besides that of Karka) by a Vadai that we know already is -where the defendant denies the claim completely (since min ha'Torah, he would otherwise be Patur from a Shevu'ah).

2. ... by a Safek (that we are currently discussing) is where two partners come to divide the profits, and one of them demands a Shevu'ah from the other (that he did not take more than his share [and the same applies to the owner who demands a Shevu'ah from the share-cropper]).

(b)We cannot learn Safek Mamon from Safek Isur (i.e. Sotah) from the same 'Kal va'Chomer' as we learned Vadai because whereas every Shevu'ah by a Sotah is a Safek, the basic Shevu'ah by Mamon is a Vadai (since min ha'Torah, if the claim is a Safek, there can be no Shevu'ah).

(c)The Rabanan nevertheless obligated a partner (and a share-cropper) to swear at the behest of his partner (and the owner) because they tend to take liberties and give themselves the benefit of the doubt whenever there is a doubt.

2)

(a)When we conclude that we learn 'Shevu'ah ha'Ne'emrah ba'Chutz from Shevu'ah ha'Ne'emrah Bifnim', we mean that we learn the former (the case of Mamon) from the latter (Sotah, which applies in the Beis-Hamikdash) with a 'Mah Matzinu' based on the same word appearing in two places (which is evidently more powerful than a Stam 'Mah Matzinu').

3)

(a)To explain the extent of 'Gilgul Shevu'ah', Rav Yehudah Amar Rav states the case of 'Hishava Li she'Ein Avdi Atah' which we assume refers to Eved Kena'ani.

(b)We object to Rav's statement based on the Beraisa, which states that someone who calls a fellow Jew an Eved is placed in Niduy (so how can Rav possibly obligate the latter to swear).

(c)The Beraisa says that if someone calls his fellow-Jew ...

1. ... a Mamzer he receives Malkus.

2. ... a Rasha the latter is permitted to interfere with his Parnasah (though Beis-Din do not punish him).

4)

(a)We object to Rava's explanation of Rav, that he is speaking where he claimed that the man had been sold to him as an Eved Ivri on the grounds that his claim would then be a perfectly legitimate monetary claim, which would obligate a Shevu'ah even without the Din of Gilgul.

(b)We overrule this objection however, based on another statement of Rava, who says that a master acquires his Eved Ivri with a Kinyan ha'Guf (giving him a Din Karka, like an Eved Kena'ani).

(c)Despite the fact that the Eved Ivri is Karka, and our Mishnah has already taught us that Metaltelin obligate a Shevu'ah on Karka with a Gilgul Shevu'ah, Rav Yehudah Amar Rav is coming to add that, despite the fact that the claim of Eved Ivri (unlike that of Karka, which people sometimes tend to sell discreetly), has a 'Kol', and everybody would have known about it (and since they do not, the claimant appears to be lying, and we ought to dismiss his claim), the 'owner' can make the 'Eved' swear by means of a 'Gilgul Shevu'ah'.

5)

(a)The simple explanation of our Mishnah 'Kol ha'Na'aseh Damim b'Acher, Keivan she'Zachah Zeh, Nischayav Zeh ba'Chalipav' is that even though Kesef does not acquire, it is valid when it is used in the form of Chalipin.

(b)The Tana illustrates this with the example of someone who swaps an ox for a cow or a donkey for an ox, as soon as the one acquires the one, the other becomes responsible for the exchange. and is obligated to pay.

(c)What the Tana means with this is that the second man remains liable to pay the owner for it, even if an Ones occurs, for which he cannot be blamed.

(d)The Kashya that we will later ask from the Seifa on the Reisha is that seeing as we currently understand the Reisha to refer to Chalipin in the form of a coin, the Seifa should have continued 'Keitzad, Hichlif Ma'os b'Parah ... ' (rather than 'Hichlif Shor b'Parah ... ').

6)

(a)The basic problem with the simple explanation of our Mishnah is that it clashes with the traditional principle that a coin cannot be used as Chalipin.

(b)Rav Yehudah explains that what the Tana means to say is 'Kol ha'Nishum Damim b'Acher ... ' meaning that whatever needs to be assessed when used as payment, is eligible for Chalipin (incorporating all forms of Metaltelin except money).

(c)The Tana is then coming to teach us that although the Pasuk lists only a shoe, this does not confine Chalipin to a Kli, but extends to all Metaltelin (which are known as 'Peiros').

(d)And Rav Yehudah goes on to prove this from the Seifa where the Tana presents a case (not of money, but) of animals, which fall under the category of Peiros (and not Kelim).

7)

(a)We just proved from the Seifa that, when the Tana says in the Reisha 'Kol ha'Nishum Damim b'Acher ... ', he means that whatever needs to be assessed when used as payment, is eligible for Chalipin. According to the simple explanation of the Reisha that we first adopted (that it refers to Chalipei Kesef, we will explain the Seifa by first adding 'Peiros Nami Avdi Chalipin (and that is then the case described in the Seifa).

(b)'Peiros' incorporates any Metaltelin that does not fall under the heading of 'Kelim' (with the exception of money).

(c)We change here from 'Hichlif Shor b'Parah' to 'Hichlif B'sar Shor b'Parah' (not because the transaction will not be valid if he exchanged an ox for a cow, but) because it is less similar to Kelim, and is therefore a bigger Chidush.

(d)This interpretation of the Mishnah is acceptable according to Rav Sheshes, but not according to Rav Nachman who holds 'Peiros Lo Avdi Chalipin'.

8)

(a)Rav Nachman rejects Rav Yehudah's interpretation of the Mishnah ('Kol ha'Nishum Damim b'Acher') because Metaltelin either fall under the category of Kelim or under the category of Peiros, and an animal is considered Peiros, which, in Rav Nachman's opinion, cannot be used for Chalipin.

(b)According to him therefore, 'Kol ha'Na'aseh Damim b'Acher' pertains (not to Chalipin, but) to a specific case of Damim (Kinyan Kesef).

(c)The case is where Reuven sold Shimon an ox for a Manah, and Shimon made a Meshichah on the ox, for which the money is still owing. Then they agreed that Shimon would give Reuven a cow worth a Manah or a Pras (half a Manah) and that the Kinyan would take effect by means of the Manah that he still owed him. Our Mishnah teaches us that the Manah acquires in the capacity of Kinyan Kesef.

(d)In view of the principle that money cannot acquire, this case can only be an exception, due to the fact that Rav Nachman holds like Rebbi Yochanan who says that money acquires min ha'Torah, and that (for a reason that will now be specified) the Rabbinical decree negating Kinyan Kesef does not apply here.

9)

(a)The Chachamim negated Kinyan Kesef due to the fear that the seller will allow the sold article (that is no longer his, and for which he is not responsible) to burn, without bothering to save it (as we learned above).

(b)What makes the case in our Mishnah different, according to Rav Nachman, is the fact that it is most unusual to use money that the seller has already received as a Kinyan (and Chazal tend not to apply their decrees in unusual cases).

(c)According to Reish Lakish money does not acquire min ha'Torah, in which case it will not acquire in the case of Rav Nachman either.

(d)Reish Lakish must follow the opinion of Rav Sheshes, who holds that Peiros are eligible for Chalipin because otherwise, since he cannot learn like Rav Nachman (as we just explained), how will he explain our Mishnah?

10)

(a)When the Tana of our Mishnah says ...

1. ... 'Reshus ha'Gavohah b'Kesef' he means that Hekdesh acquires with Kesef.

2. ... 'u'Reshus Hedyot ba'Chazakah' that a Hedyot requires Meshichah in order to acquire Metaltelin.

3. ... 'Amiraso li'Gevohah Ki'Mesiraso l'Hedyot' he means that if someone declares his ox or his house Hekdesh, even if it is at the other end of the world, Hekdesh acquires it.