1)

(a)The Beraisa extrapolates from the Pasuk in B'har (in connection with an Eved Ivri) "mi'Kesef Miknaso" 'be'Kesef Hu Nikneh, v'Eino Nikneh bi'Tevu'ah v'Kelim'.

(b)This cannot mean that ...

1. ... an Eved Ivri cannot be acquired with produce or vessels, because from the Pasuk "Yashiv Ge'ulaso" we learn the principle 'Shaveh Kesef k'Kesef'.

2. ... he cannot be acquired with produce or vessels that are worth less than a Perutah because then it would not be necessary to teach us this Chidush by 'Tevu'ah v'Kelim' (Shaveh Kesef), seeing as the same will apply even to Kesef.

(c)Rav Yosef therefore interprets the Beraisa to mean that even though the Tevu'ah and the 'Kelim' are certainly worth a Perutah, one cannot purchase an Eved Ivri (or anything else) with them as long as they have not been assessed whereas Rabah interprets it to mean that an Eved Ivri can be acquired with money ('be'Toras Kesef') but not with Chalipin ('be'Toras Tevu'ah v'Kelim').

2)

(a)According to Rav Nachman one cannot use Peiros for Chalipin.

(b)In that case, Rav Nachman cannot learn like Rabah's interpretation of the Beraisa because since one cannot use produce as Chalipin to acquire anything, why would the Tana need to preclude specifically the Kinyan of an Eved Ivri using Tevu'ah.

(c)To avoid establishing Rav Nachman like Rav Yosef, we establish the Beraisa to mean 'Kesef v'Kelim' that are worth less than a Perutah. We resolve the problem that we had with this earlier (that in this case, what is the Chidush of Kesef v'Kelim) by pointing out that whereas less than a Perutah is worthless, Tevu'ah and Kelim give immediate benefit, and the Tana needs to inform us that, in spite of this, they cannot acquire.

3)

(a)According to the Beraisa, if someone says to a Kohen ...

1. ... 'Egel Zeh l'Pidyon Beni; Talis Zeh l'Pidyon Beni' his son is not redeemed; whereas if he says ...

2. ... 'Egel Zeh b'Chamesh Sela'im l'Pidyon Beni; Talis Zeh b'Chamesh Sela'im l'Pidyon Beni' he is.

(b)Rav Yosef explains the Reisha of the Beraisa to mean that even though the calf or the cloak is worth five Sela'im, his son is not redeemed because it was not first assessed, a proof for his opinion that one cannot acquire with an object that has not been assessed.

(c)He declines to explain the Beraisa to mean that the calf or the cloak are really worth less than five Sela'im, but the father considers them to be worth that amount because it is obvious that a father does not have a mandate to fix his own price-tag to objects.

4)

(a)Rabah establishes the Beraisa when the Kohen accepted the calf or the cloak for five Sela'im, even though it was not really worth that amount.

(b)We prove this interpretation to be correct from Rav Kahana, who once said, after receiving a Sudar (a special head-gear worn by Talmidei-Chachamim) as Pidyon ha'Ben (see Tosfos DH 'Rav Kahana') that to him, it was worth five Sela'im.

(c)Rav Ashi qualifies this Halachah confining it to cases such as a Sudar and Talmidei-Chachamim, to whom a Sudar was particularly precious.

(d)We bear this out with an episode with Mar bar Rav Ashi, who paid for a Sudar worth ten Zuz far more than it was really worth. For the Sudar that he bought from the mother of Rava from Kubi, he paid thirteen Zuz.

5)

(a)Rebbi Elazar ruled that if someone betrothed a woman for a Manah, and at the time of the Kidushin, he gave her a Dinar, she is Mekudeshes provided he makes up the difference.

(b)The reason for this is because, since she accepted it, it is as if he said 'Al-Menas' (on condition that he gives her a Manah), and Rav Huna Amar Rebbi has taught that 'Al-Menas' is akin to 'Me'achshav'.

(c)The Beraisa says that if someone was counting out the Manah that he promised to give a woman as Kidushin either of them may retract, right up to the last Dinar.

(d)We reconcile this with Rebbi Elazar (who considers her Mekudeshes immediately) by establishing the Beraisa where he specifically betrothed her 'with this Manah', in which case it is clear that they both intend the Kidushin to take effect only after the entire sum has been paid.

6)

(a)The Seifa of the previous Beraisa states that in a case where he said 'Manah Zu', and the Manah was subsequently found to contain ...

1. ... a Dinar short or one copper Dinar (instead of the standard solver one) the Kidushin is invalid.

2. ... a poor-quality Dinar the Kidushin is valid.

(b)Despite the fact that the Seifa speaks about 'Manah Zu' this does not necessarily imply that the Reisha speaks about a 'Manah Stam' (reinstating the Kashya on Rebbi Elazar), because it is possible to explain that the Seifa merely explains the Reisha (which therefore refers to Manah Zu as well).

7)

(a)We try and prove that the Reisha as well as the Seifa must be speaking about 'Manah Zu', because otherwise, having taught us that 'Manah Stam' the Kidushin is not valid, then 'Kal va'Chomer' 'Manah Zu' and the Seifa would not be necessary thereby turning the Beraisa into a proof for R. Elazar.

(b)We refute this proof however by explaining that the Seifa comes to indicate that the Reisha speaks about 'Stam', so that we should not establish the Reisha by Manah Zu, and extrapolate that by Manah Stam, the Kidushin would be effective.

(c)Rav Ashi establishes the Reisha by 'Manah Stam' reconciling Rebbi Elazar with the Beraisa by differentiating between Rebbi Elazar's case and that of the Beraisa, where he is actually counting out the coins, and where even Rebbi Elazar will agree that the woman does not intend the Kidushin to take effect until the last Perutah has been counted.

8)

(a)The Tana invalidated the Kidushin, if one Dinar was found to be a copper one. And the reason that she did not see it (in which case she would be Mekudeshes, because she would then have accepted it) is either because the Tana is speaking at night-time, or that it was jumbled together with the other coins in a way that she failed to notice it.

(b)He validates the Kidushin if one of the Dinarim was found to be a poor-quality one because, it is possible to spend it, since, it is still official currency, whereas a copper one is not.

9)

(a)Rava quoting Rav Nachman rule that if a man says to a woman 'Hiskadshi Li b'Manah', and leaves her a Mashkon (collateral), she is not Mekudeshes because 'Manah Ein Ka'an, Mashkon Ein Ka'an' (he did not give her the Manah, and the Mashkon, which is not a gift, cannot replace it).

(b)We reconcile this with the Beraisa which says 'Kidshah b'Mashkon, Mekudeshes', by citing Rebbi Yitzchak, who says that a creditor acquires the Mashkon given which he receives from the debtor.

(c)He extrapolates this from the Pasuk in Ki Setzei (in connection with returning collateral each day, should the debtor need it) "u'Lecha Tihyeh Tzedakah" by pointing out that from the fact that the Torah considers this to be Tzedakah (and not an obligation to return the object to its rightful owner), it is clear that the creditor must have acquired the Mashkon.

(d)Rebbi Yitzchak's statement enables us to answer Rava's Kashya on Rav Nachman from the Beraisa because we can now establish the Beraisa by a Mashkon which the man received from his debtor (whereas Rav Nachman is referring to an article of his own which he gives to the woman of his own volition as a Mashkon, which there is no reason for her to acquire.

10)

(a)The sons of Rav Chiya bar Avin had no money with which to pay for the Shifchah they had purchased. As a Mashkon they gave the seller a piece of silver.

(b)The seller subsequently retracted because the price of slaves went up.

(c)When they tried to stop him from retracting Rebbi Ami ruled 'Manah Ein Ka'an, Mashkon Ein Ka'an', validating the retraction.

11)

(a)The Beraisa rules that a woman who took the money that a man gave her for Kidushin and threw it into the sea or into the fire ... she is not Mekudeshes (in which case, she will be obligated to replace the money).

(b)We cannot extrapolate from there that had she thrown it back at him, she would be Mekudeshes because in that case, it would be even more obvious that she is not Mekudeshes.

(c)What the Beraisa is therefore coming to teach us is that even here, where we might have thought that really she accepted the Kidushin, and that she only threw the money into the sea in order to test his degree of self-control, she is nevertheless not Mekudeshes.

12)

(a)The Beraisa says that if a woman ...

1. ... instructed the man who offered her Kidushin money, to hand it to her or his father she is not Mekudeshes (because it is a form of rejection. It is like saying 'do not give it to me, give it to somebody else!').

2. ... who added 'Al-Menas she'Yekablum Li' she is Mekudeshes.

(b)The Tana needs to mention both her father and his father; It mentions ...

1. ... her father to teach us that even then, she is not Mekudeshes in the Reisha.

2. ... his father to teach us that she is nevertheless Mekudeshes in the Seifa.

(c)Another Beraisa draws the same distinction between 'T'neim' and ' ... Al Menas', but when she instructs the man to give the money to a third person. The Tana needs to repeat the Chidush both by 'Aba v'Avicha' and by 'Ploni'. It mentions it ...

1. ... by 'Ploni', because we would otherwise have thought that it is only by 'Aba v'Avicha' that she is Mekudeshes in the Seifa, because she can rely on them to perform this Shelichus on her behalf (even without having asked them), but not a stranger.

2. ... by 'Aba and Avicha', because we would otherwise have thought that it is in the case of 'Ploni' that she is not Mekudeshes in the Reisha, because there is no reason for her to want to give a stranger a gift, whereas by 'Aba and Avicha', she may wish to give them a gift, in which case she will be Mekudeshes from the Din of Areiv.

13)

(a)The Beraisa rules that if the woman responds with instructions to place the Manah of Kidushin on a rock she is not Mekudeshes. She is however, Mekudeshes in the event that the rock belongs to her because, as we have learned before, her Chatzer acquires it on her behalf.

(b)Rav Bibi asks whether she will be Mekudeshes if the rock belongs to both of them. This She'eilah remains unanswered.

(c)If she responds with instructions to give the loaf of Kidushin to a dog, she is not Mekudeshes; though she will be Mekudeshes if the dog is hers.

(d)Rav Mari asks what the Din will be if a dog is chasing her, and she asks him to throw the loaf to the dog to save her. This She'eilah too, remains unanswered. Despite the fact that she definitely benefits from the man's response, she might nevertheless not be Mekudeshes because she can argue that he was obligated to save her by Torah law anyway (as the Torah writes in Kedoshim "Lo Sa'amod Al Dam Re'eicha"), in which case he merely fulfilled his duty, and did not really give here anything of his own volition.

14)

(a)If she told him to give the loaf of bread to a poor man she is not Mekudeshes, because he is obligated to feed him anyway.

(b)And the same applies even if the poor man is generally supported by her ...

(c)... because when all's said and done, the man is no less obligated to feed the poor man than she is.