1)

(a)The Halachah that if ...

1. ... a woman says to a man 'Ten Manah li'Ploni v'Akadesh Ani Lecha', she is Mekudeshes (even though she did not receive anything) is based on the Din of Areiv (a guarantor for a loan) who obligates himself to pay the loan, even though he receives nothing in exchange.

2. ... a man says to a woman 'Heilech Manah, v'Hiskadshi li'Ploni', she is Mekudeshes (even though the Mekadesh has not given anything away) is based on the Din of an Eved Kena'ani, who goes free on the basis of money that others pay on his behalf (as we shall see later in the Perek).

3. ... a woman says to a man 'Ten Manah li'Ploni va'Akadesh Ani Lo', she is Mekudeshes (even though neither did she receive anything, nor did he give anything) is based on the Din of an Areiv and that of an Eved Kena'ani combined.

(b)In the second of the three above-mentioned cases, it is possible for Reuven to betroth a woman on behalf of Shimon, even with his own money if he appointed him a Shali'ach.

2)

(a)Rava asked whether, if the woman gives the man a Manah and says to him 'Heylech Manah va'Akadesh Ani Lecha' and the man, in turn, accepts the money and says 'Hiskadshi Li ... ', the Kidushin will be effective.

(b)Mar Zutra quoting Rav Papa, says 'Mekudeshes'.

(c)We object to this ruling however on the basis of the Mishnah later, which teaches that one can acquire Metaltelin Agav Karka, and not vice-versa, as would appear from Rav Papa.

(d)As a matter of fact, we misunderstood Rav Papa, who is not referring to Kinyan 'Agav' at all. What Rav Papa is referring to is an Adam Chashuv, who gives her a Perutah's worth of pleasure by merely accepting her money (in any event, she gains the Perutah she would be willing to pay someone to get him to accept her money).

3)

(a)Rava, who taught us earlier by Kidushin 'mi'Din Areiv and mi'Din Eved Kena'ani, adds 've'Chen l'Inyan Mamona'. This will apply to ...

1. ... Din Areiv where Reuven says to Shimon 'The Manah that you give to Levi will acquire my field on behalf of Shimon'.

2. ... Din Eved Kena'ani where Levi gives Reuven a Manah and says to him 'Let this Manah acquire your field for Shimon'.

3. ... Din Sheneihem where Reuven says to Levi 'Let the Manah that you give to Shimon acquire my field for him.

(b)Had Rava made his statement (with regard to Din Areiv) by ...

1. ... Kidushin where a woman wants to get married to such an extent, that she will be willing to give herself to a husband even when she receives nothing in exchange (and we have already learned a number of times that the basis of Kinyanim is the Da'as (the genuine consent) of both parties for the transaction to take place, we would not have applied it in the case of a sale where the owner does not really mean to part with his field unless it is he who receives the money.

2. ... Mamona where a person has the authority to forego the money of the sale (and where, as a result, we consider the seller as having given his field to the purchaser as a gift), we would not have applied it to Kidushin where the woman has no authority to forego the money of Kidushin.

(c)We have a principle that the desire of a woman to get married is stronger than that of a man. In fact, based on the motto 'Tav l'Meisav Tan Du mi'le'Meisav Armelu' ('It is better to live with anyone else than to remain a widow [on one's own]'), she is even prepared to marry someone who is not suitable.

4)

(a)Rava maintains that if a man says 'Hiskadshi li l'Chetzyi' the woman is Mekudeshes, whereas if he says 'Chetzyech Mekudeshes Li' she is not.

(b)Based on the words "Ki Yikach Ish 'Ishah", Abaye asked Rava that just as "Ishah" implies "Ishah", 've'Lo Chatzi Ishah', so too, does "Ish" imply "Ish", 've'Lo Chatzi Ish'.

(c)Rava replied that Abaye had misunderstood him, and that it was not from this Pasuk that he learned his Din, but from a Sevara. The reason for his distinction lies in the fact that whereas a woman cannot be married to two men, a man can have two wives.

(d)What the man therefore meant when he said 'Hiskadshi Li l'Chetzyi' was that he reserves the right to marry a second woman.

5)

(a)If someone declares the leg of a Kosher animal Hekdesh the Kedushah spreads to the entire body (which one then brings as a Korban).

(b)Even those who argue here, will concede that the Kedushah would spread were he to declare Hekdesh the heart or any other organ without which the animal could not survive.

(c)We cannot however, apply the same Sevara in the case of 'Chetzyech Mekudeshes Li', and say that the Kidushin automatically spreads to the entire woman rendering her Mekudeshes because the woman herself only agreed to half of her being Mekudeshes, and the Kidushin cannot spread against her will (as opposed to an animal, whose Da'as is not required).

6)

(a)We compare Kidushin to the case cited by Rebbi Yochanan, of the partner who declared his half of the animal Hekdesh. Rebbi Yochanan says that, should he ...

1. ... not buy the second half from his partner the Kedushah will not spread to the other half (because the Da'as of the second partner prevents it from doing so). In fact, seeing as Kedushas ha'Guf is not applicable to half an animal, only Kedushas Damim will take effect (obligating him to pay the value of his half to Hekdesh).

2. ... buy his partner out and declare the second half of the animal Hekdesh then the entire animal will be Hekdesh Kedushas Damim but cannot be brought as a Korban.

(b)If he then declares another animal a Temurah on this one his declaration is effective ...

(c)... but the Temurah, whose Kedushah came only from a rejected Kedushah is Kedushas Damim, and like the original animal, it cannot be brought as a Korban.

7)

(a)We learn three things from Rebbi Yochanan's previous statement. We learn that ...

1. ... 'Ba'alei Chayim Nidachin'; whereas others say that only a Shechted animal can be rejected, but not a live one.

2. ... 'Dichuy Me'ikara Havi Dichuy'; whereas according to others that only something that is initially Kosher, can become permanently rejected.

(b)According to them, the moment the first partner buys out the second one and declared the other half Hekdesh (and perhaps even that is unnecessary [see Me'iri), the entire Kedushah spreads to the other half, and it is brought as a Korban.

(c)Rebbi Yochanan's third Chidush is that even an animal that is initially sanctified only for its value (Kedushas Damim) is also subject to becoming permanently rejected.

8)

(a)Rava asked whether a woman will be betrothed if the man said 'Chetzyech ... b'Chatzi Perutah, v'Chetzyech b'Chatzi Perutah'. She might ...

1. ... not be betrothed because he is trying to effect two transactions with half a Perutah each.

2. ... nevertheless be betrothed because he is counting out two half-Perutos to effect the Kidushin with one Perutah.

(b)Based on the assumption that, in the previous She'eilah, he was counting the half-Perutos (and she is betrothed), Rava asks what the Din will be if the man said 'Chetzyech bi'Perutah, v'Chetzyech bi'Perutah'. Perhaps here, where he specifies a whole Perutah for each half, he thinks that he can acquire her in halves (unlike in the previous case, where everyone knows that one cannot acquire a woman with half a Perutah (even in two lots).

(c)Assuming that whatever he says on the same day is considered counting (and she is betrothed), Rava then asks what the Din will be if he said 'Chetzyech bi'Perutah ha'Yom, v'Chetzyech bi'Perutah l'Machar'. The Kidushin might be effective even though he specifically asks for the second Perutah to take effect the next day because what he may have meant was that the Kidushin should begin today and conclude tomorrow.

(d)Rava's last She'eilah in this set, which ends up with 'Teiku', is 'Shnei Chetzyech bi'Prutah'. In his previous stance, there would have been no question at all that, in this case, where he made the statement in one go, the woman would have been betrothed. Now however, he contends with the possibility that any mention of 'half' will invalidate the betrothal.

9)

(a)In a second set of She'eilos, Rava asks 'Shtei Benosayich li'Shnei Banai bi'Perutah, Mahu?' It was the (grown-up) sons themselves who gave their father the authority to arrange their betrothal, by appointing him a Shali'ach.

(b)The two sisters might ...

1. ... not be betrothed because we go after the ones on whose behalf the money is being given (in which case, seeing as only half a Perutah is being given on behalf of each son to each daughter, the Kidushin is not valid).

2. ... be betrothed because we go after the ones who give and receive the money (in which case the Kidushin will be valid, seeing as the one father has given the other father a Perutah).

10)

(a)Rav Papa asked what the Din will be in the case of 'Bitcha u'Parascha bi'Perutah'. If the man meant to acquire the woman with one half of the Perutah and to pay for the cow with the other half (see Tosfos DH 'Bitcha'), it is obvious that the woman would not be betrothed. The other side of the She'eilah is that he meant to acquire the woman with the 'Perutah and the cow with the Meshichah that he had yet to make (and to pay the going market price for the cow later).

(b)Rav Ashi asks a similar She'eilah regarding acquiring a woman and a piece of land whether he intends to acquire the woman with half a Perutah and the land for the other half, or the woman with the Perutah and the land with the Chazakah that he has yet to make (and to subsequently pay the market price for the piece of land).

(c)The outcome of both She'eilos is 'Teiku'.

11)

(a)In a case where a man betrothed a woman with silks, Rabah did not require their assessment prior to the Kidushin Rav Yosef did.

(b)If the man had specifically stipulated that he is betrothing her with them ...

1. ... irrespective of their value they would both agree that no assessment was necessary.

2. ... provided they were worth fifty Zuz, and they were found to be worth less then even if there had been an assessment, the Kidushin would be Batel.

(c)We therefore establish Rabah and Rav Yosef's dispute when he stipulated that the silks were worth fifty Zuz, and they were subsequently found to be worth fifty Zuz.

(d)Rav Yosef's reasoning (bearing in mind that the silks were worth fifty Zuz) is due to the fact that the woman, who is generally not an expert in assessing, does not rely on the man's assessment, unless it is backed up by official assessors (and whenever there is no Da'as on the part of one of the parties, the Kinyan is Batel).

12)

(a)In the second Lashon, they even argue over a case where he stipulated that he is betrothing her irrespective of how much they were worth. Rav Yosef's reason for invalidating the Kidushin in such a case is because Shaveh Kesef (an object), like Kesef itself, must have a fixed value at the time of Kidushin.

(b)we know that Shaveh Kesef is like Kesef itself from the Pasuk (in connection with damages) "Kesef Yashiv li'Be'alav").