Implied Question: [Shmuel himself was the first one to teach that a woman who performs Mi'un has no Kesuvah. How can the Gemara ask that what Shmuel said was already taught beforehand?] The teaching regarding Kesuvah was indeed taught previously.

Answer: As Shmuel (himself) taught that the Mishnah states that a woman who performs Mi'un (has no Kesuvah).

Implied Question: What does Rebbi Eliezer teach us by saying "The rule is etc.?"] We can say that he (Rebbi Eliezer) is teaching us to include that if she is the daughter of a Yisrael who married a Kohen she may not eat Terumah. Similarly, if she is the daughter of a Kohen who married a Yisrael she may continue to eat Terumah.

This is indeed stated in the Mishnah in Yevamos (107b). [The Mishnah states] Rebbi Eliezer says the actions (marriage) of a girl who is a minor are (akin to) nothing. If the daughter of a Yisrael (who is a minor) is married to a Kohen she should not eat Terumah. If the daughter of a Kohen (who is a minor) is married to a Yisrael she may (continue to) eat Terumah.

Implied Question: [Why is nullifiying her vows pertinent? We know that the vows of a minor are generally invalid!] This is when she reaches the age where her vows become valid. Otherwise, her vows are invalid.

Implied Question: Even if you will say that (the concept of) a minor who is close being a man may be able to make a vow according to Torah law, as the Gemara in Nidah (46b) indeed asks about this possibility, it is still understandable that he could nullify her vows (when she is this age). This is despite the fact that their marriage is only Rabbinic in nature.

Answer: This is because any woman who makes a vow does so while taking into account the opinion of her husband (and only wants her vow to be valid if her husband approves).

The Gemara (in Nidah 46b) gives a similar answer there (introducing this concept when asked) about something else.

Implied Question: According to Rabbi Yehoshua you should not ask how her husband can become Tamei to her (if she dies) if he is a Kohen, since their marriage is only Rabbinic in nature (and he is seemingly transgressing the Torah law against a Kohen becoming Tamei to a non-relative).

Answer: It is possible to answer that he can become Tamei to her because she is (essentially) a Meis Mitzvah (someone who has noone to bury them). Being that her inheritors (relatives) do not inherit her (she is like a dead person who a Kohen must bury as), he calls out and noone answers (the call to bury her). [The Torah allows any Kohen, even a Kohen Gadol, to become Tamei to a Mes Mitzvah.]

The Gemara (in Yevamos, 89b) gives a similar answer there (introducing this concept when asked) about something else.

Explanation: This is talking about the clothes that were worn out unfairly, meaning that the principle worth of the clothes is gone.

Proof: If it was where the clothes were worn out by the husband who had a right to do so, how can the Gemara later conclude regarding Aylonis that if the clothes no longer exist the opposite should be true? Why should the husband pay for fruits (i.e. benefit) that he rightfully ate (used)? The Gemara therefore must certainly be discussing where the wearing of the clothing by the husband was improper.

Now we can also understand the Gemara in Yevamos (107a) that says "If you will say that a married girl can perform Mi'un, he (her husband) will take it away and eat it.

So what? He will be obligated to pay that which he did not eat (use) lawfully!

Answer: Rebbi pushed this (proof) aside as she might not find witnesses (that he used up her property unlawfully). However, now (in our case) this is not necessary, as her husband is indeed exempt from paying, as we have explained.

Implied Question: The Mishnah states that a woman who performs Mi'un does not receive "Peiros" - "fruits (benefits)." [What exactly does this mean?]

It is not referring to fruits (benefit) that he has eaten (used), as even if he consumed the principle she does not get it back.[The basic definition is therefore not what the Mishnah is coming to teach us. What is the Mishnah teaching us by saying that she does not receive "fruits?"]

Answer #1: It must be needed to tell us that she does not even get to keep fruits that her husband actually gathered (from her fields), even if they are sitting in their original form in his house.

It is impossible to explain that the fruits of a woman who performs Mi'un (being discussed in the Mishnah) refers to the "decree of fruits," meaning that he would redeem her (if she was taken captive).

What would be the case? If it is that she performed Mi'un and then was taken captive, it is obvious (that he has no obligation to redeem her)! Additionally, a case where she was taken captive and then performed Mi'un when still captive is similarly obvious (in that he has no obligation to redeem her)!

Even a widow in a similar scenario, where she is captured when her husband is alive and her husband then dies, is not obligated to be redeemed by her husband's inheritors as stated in the Gemara earlier (52a). [Certainly in a Rabbinic marriage the husband would have no obligation to redeem her if she performs Mi'un while captive.]

Answer #2: However, it is possible to explains that the case is where she was captured, and subsequently borrowed money and redeemed herself. She then performed Mi'un. In this type of case we say that she is not entitled to food support, as explained later (107b). [It is therefore possible that the Mishnah would inform us that he is not entitled to redeem her in this case, as it is not an obvious conclusion like the other possibilities that were negated above.]

Explanation: This means that she receives a fine that she will not collect her Nichsei Mi'loog, and he receives a fine that he should pay for the Nichsei Tzoan Barzel that are in his possession.

Question: This is difficult. What kind of fine is this? All people who divorce their wives have to pay (the original evaluation) for Nichsei Tzoan Barzel!

Answer: The fine is that he thought he could profit and cannot.

Implied Question: [The reason that the Mishnah has to say that her husband must also support her, even though it is obvious that a husband is always obligated to provide his wife with food support, is because] one would have thought that her husband is not obligated (to give her food support, in this case).

Answer: Since once she has food from someone else (her stepfather), it is as if her husband married her on the condition that she has no claim of food support. The Mishnah therefore teaches us (that he is obligated to provide his wife with food).

Implied Question: [Why would we think that her past and present stepfather do not have to keep giving her food support, to the point that the Mishnah has to tell us that they must keep giving her this support?] It is necessary to teach this Halachah.

Answer: One might think that (their intent was that) they only committed to supporting her as long as she did not get married. [The Mishnah therefore states that they are obligated to continue supporting her.]

Implied Question: The Gemara earlier (51b) quoted a Beraisa stating that five people collect (only) from possessions that do not have liens on them, one of them being someone who accepts upon himself to give food to his stepdaughter. [This does not contradict our Mishnah that says she can even collect from possessions that do have liens on them.]

Answer #1: According to the opinion in Gitin (51a) that only debts of a set amount can be collected (from possessions that have a lien on them) there is no question, as here there indeed is a set amount (of five years).

Answer #2: According to the opinion (in Gitin ibid.) that the possessions must be as if they are written (in a document in order to be able to collect from possessions that already have a lien on them), the case must be that a Kinyan was done to this effect.

Question: If you will ask, according to the opinion that a debt of a set amount even if it is not written down (can be collected from possessions with a lien), why isn't the general supporting of girls considered to be a set amount? It is only until they reach maturity (and therefore is a set amount)!

Answer: However, there is no real question on a father (that his support should be considered a set amount). This is because he has no idea how many daughters he is going to have. Therefore, the amount of support (he will end up having to pay for his daughters) is not a set amount.

However, the brothers who are indebted at that time (when their father dies) should indeed be obligated to pay a set amount (from their estate) until their sisters reach maturity.

Implied Question: [The Gemara implies that Rebbi Yochanan would not have a valid reason to say that someone who simply tells his friend he owes him a Manah is obligated to pay him. Why would he be exempt from paying?] The answer is that Rebbi Yochanan should have said he is exempt from paying for the following reasons.

Answer: Either because he can claim "I was merely fooling around with you" (see Yevamos 106a), or because a person will not usually make himself take a vow.

Implied Question: The reason that this case gives Rebbi Yochanan more reason to say that he should be obligated to pay is because] according to Rebbi Yochanan, saying that he owes the money in a document is a strong statement.

Answer: And it is is equivalent to a valid admission, even though he did not say "you are my witnesses."

This is not talking about a case where he wrote, "I am obligated to (pay) you a Manah" and he signed his name underneath. This would be a case where the owner of the document takes out a document with the defendant's own handwritten admission, and everyone would therefore agree that he could collect from possessions that do not have a lien.

It is also not discussing a case where he wrote "I, Ploni, am obligated to (pay) you a Manah," as this would also be a case of handwritten admission.

Implied Question: Although the Gemara in Bava Basra (167a) proves that one can sign their name on the top of a document, and we do not suspect that an unsavory character will find it and write whatever he wants, (if someone would write "I, Ploni, am obligated to (pay) you a manah" it would still be a valid admission).

Answer: There he certainly wouldn't collect anything, since his (authentically) written name at the top of the document is clearly not part of the continuation of the sentence "...am obligated to give you a Manah" which this unsavory character wrote. [The combination of two different styles of handwriting in the same sentence shows it is not authentic. However, if someone signs at the bottom of a page his signature obligates him to whatever is stated at the top of the page, even if the handwriting is different.]

Implied Question: [The reason that the Gemara thinks that we are discussing a case in which an abnormal document was used is because] if a regular document had been used...

Answer: ...what is being taught by stating that he is obligated (to fulfill what he signed on? Of course he must fulfill what he signed on in a legal document!)

Implied Question: Even though this is not a regular document, she (the daughter) could still collect from possessions that have a lien on them. [Why indeed does it have the power to collect from possessions that have a lien?]

Answer: This is because it (the document) has a "voice" (it becomes known to people, which is the reasoning why debts in a regular document can be collected from possessions with a lien).