Explanation: The Gemara currently thinks that the reason the father must give the Kohen the money is because he obligated himself to him, and indebted himself through the document (that he wrote). Therefore his son is not redeemed.

The Gemara answers that the case there (Pidyon ha'Ben) is different, as he is obligated to give the Kohen the money according to Torah law.

This means that the only reason that the father can obligate himself through a document is because he is already somewhat indebted (by the Torah's law to redeem a firstborn son). However, where there is no prior debt he cannot be indebted through a document.

Explanation: The obligation is only in this type of case (involving a potential prior obligation).

If this would not be the case, there would be nothing novel in stating that he (a person who writes that he is obligated to give someone five Sela'im) is obligated.

Explanation: This is even discussing a case of "Makirei Kehunah" - "the Kohanim who are known (as being the one who is constantly chosen to receive gifts that the Torah mandates must be given to a Kohen)." This type of Kohen acquires (rights to the money) without having to write a document, as indicated in Gitin (30a).

However, writing is still necessary (even for someone who is in the category of Makirei Kehunah regarding this father), in order that the father should not be able to retract (and give the money to a different Kohen).

Observation: It could have answered that the father wrote him the document in order (to guarantee to the Kohen) that he would not be able to say that he paid, being that it is (like) a regular document. [Tosfos means that the Makirei Kehunah aspect plus the document makes the father unable to say he paid, as the document in the hands of Makirei Kehunah is equal to a regular document of obligation (Pnei Yehoshua).]

Implied Question: The Gemara asks, why does the Beraisa state that the son is not redeemed after the father pays the five Sela'im? How does the Gemara know that this is not the intent of the Beraisa's words "he is obligated to pay him five Sela'im?"

Answer: (If the Beraisa indeed meant that the son would then be redeemed) the Beraisa should have explicitly stated that the son is redeemed when the money reaches the hand of the Kohen.

Granted that before the money reaches the Kohen's hand the son is not redeemed, as his father is only indebted to the Kohen (but has not paid).

In any event, when the money reaches the Kohen's hand why shouldn't his son be redeemed? The Beraisa implies that he is still not redeemed.

Question: If you will ask, Ula clearly does not agree with Rebbi Yochanan who says that he (someone who writes in a document that he is obligated to give someone a certain amount of money) is obligated. This is evident from his need to explain that the son is not redeemed mid'Rabbanan, in order that people should not say that it is possible to redeem using a document.

Answer: It is possible to answer that Ula needed to give his reasoning because he is talking about any possible case (involving a document used for Pidyon ha'Ben), even if he wrote that "I am obligated to give him five Sela'im for the Pidyon (ha'Ben)." [In this last case everyone would agree it is not a new obligation that is unrelated to the Pidyon, as he specifically wrote that it was for the Pidyon.]

Even if the father did not write this ("for the Pidyon"), it is presumed that he is stating this for the Pidyon ha'Ben. Ula certainly holds of Rebbi Yochanan's law.

Explanation: He didn't sign well, rather he just wrote the words "and I am a guarantor" for what was (written) above.

Observation: This implies that a guarantor who signs after the document has already been signed is obligating himself because his signature is considered admittance to his becoming a guarantor when the money was given.

Question: Rebbi has difficulty with this, as it contradicts the implication of a Gemara in Gitin (21a). The Gemara there states that Rami bar Chama asked the following question. A couple was holding onto a tablet that was hers, and the Get was written on that tablet. The woman proceeded to slip away (leaving him holding the Get).

What is the Halachah? Do we say that she had in mind to give him the tablet (for the purpose of divorce and this makes it his), or do we say that she did not (have in mind to actually give him this tablet in order that he should be able to divorce her)?

Rava (ibid.) wanted to answer this question from the law that a guarantor who signs after the document has already been signed can have his possessions that are free of liens collected (if the borrower does not pay). This implies that the guarantor obligated himself when he signed on the document.

This is why Rava was able to answer the question (about Get from the Beraisa about a guarantor). When this document was signed by the guarantor after awhile (after it was written and signed), it had already been given over to the lender.

How is it possible that the possessions of the guarantor are indebted in this (loan) document? Don't we need the document to be a "Sefer Makneh" - "a document of acquisition?" [The Gemara in Gitin (ibid.) explains that the one giving something must be the one writing the document.] It must therefore be that the lender gave the guarantor the document (making it the guarantor's document to a certain extent), and the guarantor then signed and gave it back to the lender. [Similarly, the woman does not have to give over the tablet as a real present, just to the extent that he can use it to divorce her.]

If the reason (that the lender can collect from the guarantor) is because (it is like) the guarantor admitted owing him money, then the document would not have to be given over first to the guarantor (before he would sign). [It therefore seems that it is not because of the guarantor's admission.]

Answer: Rebbi says that the reason (that the lender can collect from the guarantor) is because (it is like) the guarantor admitted owing him money (through his signature).

This is how Rava answers the question (regarding the tablet with the Get). If you will say that a person (the husband) normally acquires the document in this case, it is understandable why the admission of a guarantor is valid, as the document is strong and thereby his admission is valid.

However, if you say that a husband usually cannot be considered as acquiring the document in this way (see Tosfos ha'Rosh), if so the document should not be considered strong, and the signature of the guarantor should not be considered an admission.

Explanation: Rebbi Yochanan cannot hold like Ben Nanas.

Question: This is difficult to the Ri. Being that we have established that Ben Nanas argues on Rebbi Yochanan that this is not considered admission, how does Rebbi Yochanan know that Rebbi Yishmael shares his opinion?

At the end of Bava Basra (176a), Rebbi Yochanan himself says that Rebbi Yishmael himself argued on the case where the person is being strangled.

Perhaps only in the case of strangling Rebbi Yishmael argues (with Ben Nanas). Rebbi Yishmael (possibly) holds that a person obligates himself, and Ben Nanas holds that in the case of strangling a person does not obligate himself (and he just wants to save the victim from strangulation). However, in a case of admission they do not argue. Rebbi Yishmael (very possibly) admits that this is not an admission.

Answer: It appears to me that one can deduce (the answer to this question) from the fact that the first part of the Beraisa states the case of a guarantor who only signed the document after it had already been signed (and witnessed).

If Rebbi Yishmael would argue in this case, it should not have stated this case. It should have said that a guarantor can obligate himself even when the money is not being given (over for the loan).

Rather this is what the Beraisa is teaching us. Even if you will say that the guarantor in this case should not be obligated because he has not obligated himself when the money was given, even so he should be obligated because of his admission.

Question: If you will say, how do we know that they argue in a case of strangulation? Perhaps they only argue regarding the case of the guarantor.

Answer: The answer to this can be deduced from the fact that Rebbi Yishmael asked Ben Nanas why (he ruled that the lender cannot collect from the guarantor). Ben Nanas answered "If someone was being strangled etc."

If you will say that Rebbi Yishmael admits that (the person who obligates himself to save) someone who is being strangled is not obligated, if so, how could Rebbi Yishmael ask Ben Nanas why the guarantor should not be obligated due to his admission? Additionally, what was Ben Nanas' answer when he replied "If someone was being strangled etc?" The cases are incomparable.

It is therefore certain that they also argue regarding the case of strangulation. This is what Rebbi Yishmael is asking Ben Nanas: "Why shouldn't the guarantor be obligated, as he is obligating himself from the time of his signature (to pay if the borrower defaults)?"

I later heard from Rebbi what I have just explained.

Explanation: Rabeinu Tam explains the entire Gemara (starting from the original argument between Rebbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish) without admission, as the person who might be obligated did not have a prior obligation (before he gave someone a document saying he is obligated to give him a Manah). [Accordingly, how can we call this admission? What is he admitting to?]

This that he said "I am obligated to give you a Manah" in the document means that he wrote a real document that was signed properly indicating that he wants to obligate himself and to be indebted to give him a Manah through this document.

They (Rebbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish) are arguing in the following manner. Rebbi Yochanan holds that this document is strong enough to cause the recipient to acquire the debt stated as if there would have been an admission before witnesses.

The comparison (that this document is as strong as saying "you are my witnesses") is not good. However, being that beforehand the Gemara had thought the case was possibly where the person said "you are witnesses (that I owe this person a Manah)," here it also said that the document is like an admission of "you are witnesses" (even though the two cases are incomparable).

Question: One cannot ask how a person can obligate himself through this document, as possessions can be given over through a document.

Answer: It is possible to answer that since he actually bothered writing a document to this effect he must have really obligated himself. We know that even with words alone it is possible to make acquisitions, as we will mention shortly.

Additionally, we see that Rebbi Yochanan in Bava Metzia (49a) states that if someone gives a small present to his friend, his friend acquires it even though he has not yet actually received the present. This is because the giver has already firmly decided to give over the object. Here too, being that he is giving over a document stating that he owes money, in such a case he has clearly decided to give the money over.

Opinion #1 (Rabeinu Tam): The Gemara concludes that this is an argument among the Tanaim. In a case where the guarantor signed after the loan document had already been signed and witnessed, he signed himself clearly "I Ploni, the son of Ploni, am a guarantor." He obligated himself from the time of the signing.

Opinion #2 (Rashi): However, according to Rashi that the reasoning is based on admission, he only wrote "and I am a guarantor," and gave him the document in front of witnesses. Rebbi Yishmael and Ben Nanas argue whether or not this is called an admission.

Question: If you will ask, why isn't the obligation of this document like witnesses who witness a transaction?

Answer: It is possible to answer that this document is not important enough to be used to obligate, as it does not contain the name of the guarantor, only his handwriting. Being that it is not obvious from the words that he gave it over he cannot obligate himself through it.

Question: If you will ask, why is the case given specifically after the document was already signed and witnessed? It would seem they should argue even before the document was signed and witnessed!

Answer: It is possible to answer that the case was specifically after the document was signed, as before such a document is signed it is not normal to write such weak phraseology ("I am a guarantor"). However, after the document has already been signed and witnessed, it is somewhat normal that an addition to the document will be done in a weak manner, as the loan itself has already taken place.

Implied Question: According to Rabeinu Tam that the case (of Reish Lakish and Rebbi Yochanan) is when a regular document is used, it is impossible to say that the reason the case of a guarantor is stated as after the document was already signed is as follows. [One might think that] before it was signed and witnessed, everyone would agree that the borrower could collect from the guarantor, even if the money was not being given over at that point.

This is (impossible) because Ben Nanas holds like Reish Lakish, and according to him one cannot obligate himself through this type of document.

Answer: It says that the case of the guarantor was after the signing, as then it is obvious that (the signing of the guarantor was) after the giving of the money. However, before the signing it is obvious that it is considered before the giving of the money. In such a case Ben Nanas would agree that the signing of the guarantor is binding.

However, after the signing they argue, as it is obvious after the signing that the money was already given. If it was before the giving of the money, although they should have done the signatures first, it must be that they were unable to do so.

Question: One might say that there is no proof that they did not make the signatures early in order to stop collection from possessions with a lien.

Answer#1: If the money had not been given over yet, he (the guarantor) should have explicitly stated (this condition).

Answer#2: Alternatively, they should have just written the guarantor without a "Vav" ("Ani Areiv" instead of "va'Ani Areiv"). Whenever there is no "Vav" the signature of the witnesses on the loan is not deemed to include their witnessing the guarantor. In such a case the guarantor is considered to be making a separate statement, as the Gemara concludes in Bava Basra (176a).

Question: There is a difficulty with the explanation of Rabeinu Tam. Being that Rabeinu Tam established that the case of the guarantor is where the guarantor obligated himself through signing a regular document, when he gives the document to the lender with witnesses he should be obligating himself. This obligation should be like anyone who obligates himself to something and makes a lien on his possessions, just like someone borrows money in front of witnessed who see the money being given over. The witnesses let it be known that he has borrowed (and therefore people buy his properties at the known risk that the seller's creditor's might seize them in case of default), as is apparent in many places.

Proof: Rabeinu Tam brought proof to his explanation from the Yerushalmi, where Rebbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish say in such a situation (see below) that there was no prior obligation (and the obligation itself was weak that there is no obligation at all, even if there were witnesses).

The Yerushalmi there asks, how can we obligate this person to support his stepdaughter? Didn't Rebbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish say that if someone writes a document that says he owes money to his friend because he thinks this is correct, and he is later found out not to owe money, that he does not have to pay at all?

Even though according to this Yerushalmi there is now a contradiction in the opinion of Rebbi Yochanan, there is no reason to be concerned, as in many places the (quotes in the) Yerushalmi argues with (quotes in) our Gemara.

Explanation: A regular Kinyan is normally written down. This could be why it is called "given over to be written down," because it is as if he acquired it from his hand (not just with words).

Question: This is difficult. What is the Gemara's question from the fact that documents of betrothal and marriage are only written with the knowledge of both parties involved that the deal is finished, implying that if both parties agree to the deal the document can be written?

Perhaps this means that if both agree to write a document, when one of them instructs it should be written down it can be written down, otherwise it cannot be written down?

Answer: Rebbi explained that the Gemara understands that "it cannot be written fhave finished the deal.

However, they (one of the parties) didn't know about the document being written. This is like the case earlier where one is allowed to write a loan document for a borrower even though the lender is not with him, meaning that the lender has no idea about this loan.

Similarly, a document can be written for a seller even though the buyer is not presently with him, meaning even if the seller doesn't know about the deal at all.

Documents of betrothal cannot be written unless both parties agree, meaning that they both have to agree the deal is done. This implies that if they both agree to the deal the document can be written, even if one of them does not know it is going to be written. [The Yavetz explains that this means, for example, that a man who gave a woman Kiddushin can have a document drawn up to this effect without the knowledge of the woman. Tosfos' answer is essentially that the Gemara made this deduction, and not the deduction suggested in the question, because the Gemara assumed that the case should be similar to the other cases mentioned in this vein.]

Implied Question: [Although the Gemara did not answer that the case is where her husband had written her a document to this effect], it could have just as well answered that the case is where her husband had written her a document to this effect.

Explanation: Rabeinu Chananel and Rabeinu Tam explain (that the question whether or not this type of acquisition is supposed to be written down means the following). Is this supposed to be collected only if it is written down, or is not supposed to be written down because even if it is not written down the acquisition is still effective?

[Rabeinu Tam and Rabeinu Chananel now continue to explain much of our Gemara. The Gemara asks from the following Mishnah.] The Mishnah states that the smart one would write down etc. Being that it says they would write down, this implies that it needed to be written down, and with words alone without writing it down it was not deemed a real Kinyan.

[The Gemara's question from marriage is similar.] When the Beraisa states that betrothal or wedding documents cannot be written etc., the Gemara is asking that because it says they are written this implies that they must be written, and they are not acquired with words alone that are not written down.

Accordingly, we do not have the text "this implies that if both agree the document can be written." This does not appear in most texts of the Gemara.

The Gemara continues to ask from a Mishnah (101b) that says that the stepdaughter is supported from possessions that have a lien. This implies that this is written down, as if it was not written down, how could she collect from possessions that have a lien? The Gemara at this stage understands that it must be normal to write this type of document.

The Gemara answers that the case is where there was a Kinyan. This means that without writing it down one could collect from possessions without a lien. In this particular case it happened to be that it was written down (and she therefore could even collect from possessions with a lien).

Question: This is difficult. According to Ravina who says that she is betrothed, the Gemara should have said that the Beraisa above that stated that documents of betrothal are not written unless they have both finalized the deal is referring to a Tna'im document (conditions, how much each side pledges, etc.).

Accordingly, why did he (Ravina) ask earlier whether or not these things are given over to be written? He should have proven himself that they can be written (as long as the deal has been finalized). [See Mitzpeh Eisan who quotes a Rashba who answers that these are two different Ravinas who lived at different times.]

Question: This is difficult. Why didn't the Gemara first quote this part of the Mishnah (regarding what happens if the fathers die) before citing (the Mishnah's quote about) what the smart people do? This part of the Mishnah is stated earlier in the Mishnah (than the quote about the smart people, and the Gemara usually asks from earlier parts of the Mishnah first)?

Answer: It is possible to answer that this is the normal style of the Gemara. If it would first quote this part (regarding the fathers) of the Mishnah first and it would answer that the case is where there was a Kinyan, the Gemara could no longer ask from the smart people, as it could also say the case was when there was a Kinyan.

Observation: In Gitin (51a), the Gemara establishes that this case as well is when there was a Kinyan. The case in Bava Metzia dealing with someone who obligated himself to support his stepson and stepdaughter is when there was no Kinyan.

The implication of the Gemara in Gitin (ibid.) is that the opinion that only requires a set amount (of obligation, see Tosfos earlier DH "v'Hi") can hold that the stepdaughter in our case can collect from possessions with a lien even if no Kinyan was made.

According to this implication, we can say that the case of five people who collect from possessions without a lien is when there is no known set amount.

Question: Rebbi finds this difficult. In Gitin (48b) the Mishnah states that we do not take away money from possessions that have a lien in order to pay for the eating of fruit and the improvement of land (see Rashi ibid. DH "Ain Motzi'in" for the exact case), or for the food support of a woman and daughters because of the good of the world.

Reish Lakish there (50b) explains that this is because these debts are not written down (and one therefore cannot collect because of them possessions that have a lien). This is also the reason he states there for the law that food support can be collected from these possessions. Here, however, he says that the reasoning is because we suspect that she already seized monies to pay for the support!

Answer: The reasoning that the debts are not written down is needed in a case where the father himself admits that he certainly did not leave them any monies for support.

Question: An additional difficulty that Rebbi has is that in our Gemara the implication is that a minor might indeed seize monies and then claim she never got any money for support.

The Gemara later (107a) quotes Shmuel as saying that food support is not given to a woman whose husband went overseas. Why? Rav Zvid explains that this is because we suspect that she seized the money that was supposed to be for her food (and hid it, asking for more). Rav Papa says that we suspect that her husband had perhaps agreed with her that she can keep any money from her earnings instead of him having to give her food support.

[The Gemara there asks,] What is the difference between these opinions? The Gemara answers that the difference is a case where the wife is a minor and she indeed makes enough to support herself. This means that according to Rav Zvid there is no suspicion in such a case, as a person does not usually give a minor money to support herself when he is away (he would probably give such money to a caretaker or some other adult). [Why, then, does our Gemara imply that there is a suspicion that a minor will seize funds?]

Answer (#1): Rebbi answers that certainly when it comes to seizing possessions without a lien (as in 107a) we do not suspect that she seized her monies in order to demand more. However, here we would say it to prevent her from collecting possessions that have a lien.

Answer (#2): He additionally answered that when a man goes overseas he does not think to give his wife money for support. He thinks that (if she does not have enough money) she will simply borrow from others to eat, and when he comes back he will pay the loan. However, in a case where he dies there is a suspicion that she will seize monies.

Question: Rebbi has an additional difficulty (with this Gemara). Being that the reason the daughters cannot collect from possessions with a lien on them because their monies are stated in a condition of Beis Din, and we therefore suspect they might seize monies on their own, why should we allow a woman to collect her Kesuvah from such possessions (and not suspect that she already seized the money)?

Answer: Rebbi answered that there is more reason to think a person will set aside money for his daughter for her support. This is in line with our previous Gemara (43a), that his daughter takes precedence to him over his wife regarding support.

Implied Question: I said before Rebbi that the Gemara is implying that a stepdaughter, if she would collect with a condition of Beis Din, would not collect from possessions with a lien because we would suspect she seized her support monies (see (d) above). This is despite the fact that the stepfather is not so happy about supporting her. [Does this mean that the main reason she would not collect from possessions with a lien is because we generally suspect she seized monies, and not because of a condition of Beis Din?]

Answer (#1): Rebbi said that certainly it is logical to say that a person is not generally happy to support his stepdaughter while he is happy to support his biological daughter.

However, the reasoning of a condition of Beis Din is still needed, because if she made a condition that he would support her daughter while he was alive, she would not be eating due to a condition of Beis Din.

Answer (#2): Alternatively, after he would die and she would mature she would be able to collect from possessions with a lien. This is because we only suspect she seized monies when there are two reasons to suspect this: Both that she ate based on a condition of Beis Din and that the father clearly wanted her to be supported.

This answer also answers the question from the Gemara later (107a) where it implies that a minor does not seize monies.

Answer (#3): He additionally answered that this is what our Gemara means to say. "Since there is a condition of Beis Din," meaning that the condition that he made for her is so strong, even though it is included in a condition of Beis Din there is still reason to suspect that she seized monies.

This answer would completely answer all of the questions we had before: from Gitin (48b), from a minor (on 107a), and from Kesuvah (the reason we let a woman collect her Kesuvah and do not suspect she seized monies).