1)

(a)We suggest that the Machlokes between Rav & Shmuel (regarding Mi'un) is equivalent to a Machlokes between Rebbi Eliezer and Rebbi Yehoshua in a Beraisa. The sole regard in which Rebbi Eliezer considers the marriage of a Ketanah (married off by her mother or brothers) valid - is that she requires Mi'un.

(b)Rebbi Yehoshua rules that her husband acquires all the rights that he would have had she been a Gedolah: he acquires - her findings and what she produces, he has the right to nullify her vows, he inherits her upon her death and is obligated to bury her (though not if he is a Kohen - unless she is a Mes Mitzvah, since nobody else will want to do it).

(c)In fact, the sole area in which she is not his full-fledged wife is - that Mi'un is effective.

(d)Initially, we establish their Machlokes, by connecting it to that of Rav and Shmuel - Rebbi Eliezer holds that the marriage of a Ketanah who is married off by her mother or brothers is not valid (like Rav); whereas Rebbi Yehoshua holds that it is (like Shmuel).

2)

(a)We conclude however, that, according to Rebbi Eliezer, everyone agrees - meaning that even Shmuel has to concede that, according to Rebbi Eliezer, the marriage of a Ketanah who is married off by her mother or brothers is not valid (like Rav). Because, if the marriage is invalid with regard to the rights that go from the woman to the man, then how much more with regard to the rights that go from the man to the woman.

(b)This is because the initial Takanah of girl's mother and brothers marrying her off, was for her benefit, and not for the man whom she marries.

(c)In fact, Rav and Shmuel are arguing about how to interpret Rebbi Yehoshua. Shmuel, who holds that the marriage of a Ketanah who goes out with a Get is valid, will certainly hold like Rebbi Yehoshua. But even Rav, who holds that it is not, will explain that it is only with regard to the rights that go from the woman to the man that Rebbi Yehoshua validates her marriage, but when it comes to the rights that go from the man to the woman, he will agree that her marriage is ineffective, like Rav himself maintains.

3)

(a)'Nichsei Tzon Barzel' is called by that name - because they are like sheep (which are generally considered a lucrative business) of iron (which is long-lasting), which in turn, is because the husband takes responsibility for them.

(b)Rav Huna bar Chiya cites Rav Kahana in the name of Shmuel regarding the worn-out clothes, which, according to the Tana of our Mishnah, the three women do not receive. That he says, pertains to Nichsei mi'Lug but not to Nichsei Tzon Barzel, which she does receive.

(c)Rav Papa queries this however. Shmuel's ruling cannot refer to the case of Mema'enes when the clothes ...

1. ... are available - because then, either way, she ought to receive them, seeing as there is no reason to penalize her.

2. ... are not available - because hen, she ought not to receive them in the case of ... Nichsei Tzon Barzel either - because, since he married her legally, he was entitled to wear the clothes.

3. ... Nichsei Milug - because the husband can argue that, until she dies, he is not obligated to return them until he divorces her, seeing as she may die first, in which case, he will inherit her.

(d)Neither can it refer to the case of Aylonis (given that, if the clothes are available, she would receive them in either case since there is no reason to penalize her) when they no longer available - because then, the reverse should be the case (the Nichsei Milug, which are in her possession, she ought to receive, whereas the Nichsei Tzon Barzel, which are in his, she ought not to receive.

4)

(a)We therefore conclude that Rav Kahana in the name of Shmuel was referring to the case of a Sheniyah 've'Kansu Rabanan l'Didei b'Didah, u'le'Didah b'Didei' - which means that Chazal penalized her with what should have been claimed from him (the Kesubah, Mezonos and the worn-out clothes), and him with what should have been claimed from her (Nichsei Tzon Barzel).

(b)Rav Shimi bar Ashi extrapolates from Rav Kahana's Din that a coat is considered the principle (and not Peiros) - that it is only a Sheniyah (who sinned), who cannot claim the worn-out clothes that are no longer available, but that a Kasher woman can (which would not be the case if wearing the clothes was considered Peiros).

(c)Practically speaking, this means - that the husband may not wear the garments of Nichsei Milug, but is obligated to sell them and to buy Karka whose fruit he subsequently eats.

(d)Rav Nachman, who considers a coat Peiros (in which case, the husband is permitted to wear it) - disagrees with Rav Shimi bar Ashi.

5)

(a)Shmuel, qualifying our Mishnah says - that the three women in our Mishnah only lose Manah or Masayim, but not the Tosefes.

(b)The Beraisa substantiates Shmuel, when the Tana rules that women about whom Chazal said ...

1. ... 'Ein Lahen Kesubah' - do not lose the Tosefes.

2. ... 'Yotz'os she'Lo bi'Kesubah' - do.

(c)The latter category comprises - women who transgressed 'Das Moshe v'Yehudis' (as the Mishnah explained above in 'ha'Madir').

6)

(a)The Tana of the Beraisa (as well as Rav Huna) rules that a woman who goes out because she committed adultery - may take the Nichsei mi'Lug that are still available.

(b)When a Beraisa expert citing a Beraisa, ruled 'Zinsah, Hifsidah Bela'osehah Kayamin' - Rav Nachman corrected him on the grounds that even if the woman sinned, her clothes did not. So the Beraisa must be amended to read 'Zinsah, Lo Hifsidah Bela'osehah Kayamin'.

(c)Rabah bar bar Chanah Amar Rebbi Yochanan (who agrees in principle with the current opinion) nevertheless establishes the Beraisa as it stands, like Rebbi Menachem Stimta'ah - which means that many of his opinions appear in Stam Mishnahs and Beraisos.

(d)Rabah bar bar Chanah Amar Rebbi Yochanan concludes - 'Aval Chachamim Omrim, Zinsah, Hifsidah Bela'osehah Kayamin'.

7)

(a)When Rav Huna referred to an Aylonis as an 'Ishah v'Einah Ishah', and an Almanah as an 'Ishah Gemurah', he meant to say - that whereas an Aylonis only receives a Kesubah if her husband knew when he married her that she was an Aylonis, an Almanah receives a Kesubah (of a Manah) whether he knew that she was an Almanah, or not.

(b)According to Rav Yehudah - an Almanah, like an Aylonis, only receives a Kesubah if her husband knew when he married her, that she was an Almanah.

8)

(a)When the Tana of the Beraisa says 'Kansah b'Chezkas she'Hi Chen, v'Hi Chen, Yesh Lah Kesubah' - he means to say that an Almanah receives a Kesubah if her husband knew that she was an Almanah when he married her.

(b)We can infer from there - that if he did not know, she does not receive a Kesubah (a Kashya on Rav Huna).

(c)We cannot answer by changing the inference to 'Ha Kansah b'Chezkas she'Einah Chen (that they told him that she was a Besulah) v'Nimtzeis she'Hi Chen (an Almanah), Ein Lah Kesubah' (but Stam, she does) - because then, the Tana should have rather presented the case of 'Kansah Stam ... ' (rather than that of 'Kansah b'Chezkas she'Hi Chen ... ').

9)

(a)We also have another Beraisa, which specifically states 'Kansah Stam, Ein Lah Kesubah', proving Rav Huna wrong. What prompted Rav Huna's mistake - is the fact that when the Tana of our Mishnah stated 'Nas'ah l'Shem Aylonis, Yesh Lah Kesubah' (from which we can infer 'Ha Stam, Ein Lah Kesubah'), he did not include Almanah in that statement.

(b)In fact, we know that the same distinction that applies to Aylonis, applies to Almanah - because immediately afterwards, he begins to talk about an Almanah, hinting that the same Din that applies to an Aylonis also applies to an Almanah.

10)

(a)A husband undertakes to feed his wife's daughter for five years. He then divorces her within the five-year period, she remarries and her second husband makes the same undertaking. The first husband - remains obligated to fulfill his undertaking.

(b)If the mother and daughter live far away - the onus of transportation lies on the husband.

(c)The two husbands - are not permitted to take turns to feed her, one month the one, and one month, the other. Both obligations apply in full force.

(d)What they do ...

1. ... under the current circumstances is - that one of them feeds her, whilst the other one, gives her money.

2. ... in the event that the daughter then marries (still within the five-year period) is - that her husband provides her with Mezonos, whilst the two husbands of her mother give her money.

11)

(a)To avoid the problem of having to provide his wife's daughter with Mezonos should they move to another town after the divorce - an astute husband would add the words 'Kol Zeman she'At Imi'.

(b)Should both husbands die - their own daughter is fed from Bnei Chorin, and her daughter, from Meshubadim.

(c)This is because the latter, who has a Shtar of claim, is like a creditor, whereas their daughter does not.

12)

(a)If someone admits that he owes his friend money in the presence of two ...

1. ... designated witnesses - he is obligated to pay.

2. ... witnesses whom he did not designate - he is not.

(b)Rebbi Yochanan (who says that if someone admits to owing his friend a Manah, he is Chayav) and Resh Lakish (who says that he is not), argue - in a case where he does not designate witnesses, but where, the debtor issues the creditor with a Shtar stating that he owes him money.

(c)Rebbi Yochanan permits him to claim - only from Bnei Chorin.

(d)To reconcile Resh Lakish's opinion with the Mishnah in ha'Ishah she'Nisarmelah 'Hotzi Alav Kesav Yado she'Hu Chayav Lo, Govah mi'Nechasim Bnei Chorin' (which seems to support the opinion of Rebbi Yochanan) - we establish it where the debtor signed his name at the foot of the Shtar, whereas the Machlokes between Rebbi Yochanan and Resh Lakish is referring to an unsigned I.O.U.