Suggestion: Perhaps we can say "four or five years", like people say, and even more!

Rejection: It connotes that it taught specifically until five, since we ask from the case of a bundle on his shoulders, and answer "these are the same Shi'ur."

Implied question: Why didn't we ask "if until five is permitted, we need not teach four!"?

Answer: It mentions four for a strong child, and five for a weak child.

Explanation: This is like we expound in Bechoros (6b) from "v'Es ha'Gamal."

Citation: In Toras Kohanim, the text says [one might have thought that the Torah forbids human] "meat" in place of [what it says in our Sugya] "blood"! It answers that "Zeh" teaches that this is not so.

Citation (cont.) Suggestion: Perhaps we exclude milk, which does not apply to all, i.e. milk of Tahor animals is permitted, and we do not exclude meat, which applies to all! Even meat is Tahor animals is forbidden, if it separated when the animal was alive.

Citation (cont.) Rejection: It says "Zeh Tamei" - a Lav forbids eating this (Tamei animals), but not human meat...

Explanation (Ri): Both according to our Seforim, which expound the Heter of milk and blood from "Hu", and the Toras Kohanim, which expounds from "Zeh", this is fine;

We can exclude milk, meat and blood from one verse, like we find in several places that we exclude several things from one [extra matter in a] verse;

We find in Me'ilah (18b) several times it says that "Tim'ol Ma'al" includes [a matter].

Observation: [Our Sugya] argues with the Beraisa in Kerisus (20b), which excludes human blood from "la'Of vela'Behemah."

Alternate text: Some texts exclude milk from "Hu", and blood from "Zeh".

Question (Ri): What is the source to establish [the exclusion] for blood? It is logical to establish it for meat, and permit [human] flesh more than blood;

The Isur of meat applies to all [animals] only while they are alive, but the Isur of blood applies to all, both alive and dead!

Answer (Ri): If the text in our Sugya says "meat" in place of "blood", this is fine. From "Zeh" and "Hu" we exclude milk and meat, and from the verse [brought] in Kerisus ("la'Of vela'Behemah") we exclude blood.

Question: Since we exclude blood from the verse in Kerisus, why do we need a verse to permit milk? If blood is permitted, all the more so milk is!

Answer: We could not totally permit blood from the verse in Kerisus. We exclude it only from the Isur of blood, but not from the Isur of [something from a] Tamei species;

Since it is excluded from the Isur of blood, now blood and milk are the same.

Suggestion: This is when there is danger.

Rejection: If so, why do we permit only because it is Mefarek k'Leacher Yad (unskillfully)? Even a Torah Melachah is permitted in a situation of danger!

Question (R. Tam): It says in Yevamos (114a) that Aba Sha'ul says that we used to suckle, i.e. from a Tahor animal on Yom Tov;

Citation (114a) Question: If there is danger, we should permit even on Shabbos! If there is no danger [even Yom Tov should be forbidden]!

1. Citation (cont.) Answer: The case is, there is pain. [Suckling] is Mefarek k'Leacher Yad. On Shabbos, there is Skilah [for Melachah done skillfully], so we decreed [to forbid k'Leacher Yad]. On Yom Tov, there is only a Lav for Melachah, so Rabanan did not decree.

Answer #1 (R. Tam): There, there is pain of hunger. Here, there is pain of illness, which is close to danger. Chachamim did not decree about this [even] on Shabbos.

Objection (Ri): The Gemara asked there "if there is danger, we should permit even on Shabbos!"

[According to R. Tam] it should have asked "even if there is no danger, if he is sick, even Shabbos [should be permitted]!"

Answer #2 (Ri): The Beraisa there argues with the Beraisa here.

Support: Since we say here that the Halachah follows R. Merinus, this implies that others argue with him.

Question: Even if it is not k'Leacher Yad, Dishah (extracting) applies [mid'Oraisa] only to Gidulei Karka (things that grow from the ground), like it says in Shabbos (75a) about wounding the Chilazon!

Suggestion: Even though the Chilazon is not considered Gidulei Karka, an animal is considered Gidulei Karka, like we say in Eruvin (27b);

Citation (27b): We exclude fish (one opinion forbids buying them with Kesef Ma'aser) because just like the Peratim (cattle, flock, wine and beer) are Gidulei Karka...

Rejection: Granted, animals are considered Gidulei Karka. In any case, since we learn [Dash] from the ingredients (used for the Ketores), we require that it truly grows from the ground, just like the ingredients;

Compared to the ingredients, an animal is not considered to be Gidulei Karka, like is proven in Bava Metzi'a (89a);

Citation (89a - Beraisa): "Dayish" - just like threshing, [we must let an animal eat] at the time it works [and it involves Gidulei Karka]... we exclude milking, making cheese, and churning (milk to make butter), which are not [with] Gidulei Karka. A worker may not eat [while doing them].

Inference: Compared to what truly grows from the ground, an animal is not considered to be Gidulei Karka.

Answer: Here, the reason we must say that it is Mefarek k'Le'acher Yad is because R. Yehudah holds that Dishah applies even not to Gidulei Karka. He holds that one who wounds the Chilazon is liable also for Dash. (See Tosfos Shabbos 73b.)

Question: It was said that whenever Chachamim forbid due to Mar'is ha'Ayin, it is forbidden even in an inner room (where no one else sees)!

Answer: That is when [he can be suspected of] a Torah Isur, e.g. he spreads out [clothes that became wet] in the sun to dry, but not where people will see;

If they would see, they will think that he laundered them on Shabbos.

However, here they will see only a Melachah k'Le'acher Yad, which is mid'Rabanan. Chachamim did not forbid in an inner room. (See Tosfos Mo'ed Katan 8b.)

Explanation (Aruch): We do not discuss Stam eggs, for there is no Am ha'Aretz who does not know that they are permitted with milk;

Rather, we discuss one who slaughtered a hen and found finished eggs inside. One may eat them with milk, like a Beraisa in Beitzah (6b) says.

Question: Why is it permitted to eat them with milk? Why is it different than an egg found in a Neveilah, which Beis Hillel forbid, even if such eggs [as developed as it is] are sold in the market, like the Mishnah in Idiyos (1:5) says? (Since we forbid, this shows that it is considered to be part of the bird!)

Answer #1 (Bahag): Regarding the Isur Neveilah, Chachamim were stringent, for it is severe;

However, regarding fowl with milk, which is mid'Rabanan, Chachamim were lenient.

Question: Why does it say even an egg with Kutach (a dairy dip)?

There is an opinion (Chulin 113a) that forbids fowl with milk mid'Oraisa. According to him, it is forbidden, just like an egg of a Neveilah!

Answer #1: In any case, it says even because [in practice] everyone permits this.

Answer #2 (to both questions - R. Tam): Chachamim were stringent about an egg in a Neveilah, because Neveilah is an [intrinsic] Isur;

They were not stringent about meat and milk, which is Heter, for each is permitted by itself.

Explanation: The difference [between the two reasons] is when the Rebbi pardons his honor. One may [rule in front of him];

Even so, one should not rule, for he will not succeed (rule correctly), since his Rebbi is there.

Suggestion: We decree when the baby died due to when he did not die, and when she gave her son [to a wet nurse] to nurse him due to when she did not give him to nurse, and when she weaned him due to when she did not wean him.

Rejection: If so, how did Rav Nachman permit the Reish Galusa's house?!

Explanation: Rather, we decree when he died lest she kill him, and when she gave her son to nurse him lest the wet nurse retract, and when she weaned him lest she wean him when he still needs to nurse.

Opinion #1 (R. Shimshon ha'Zaken): A divorcee may marry;

She is not obligated to nurse, like the Beraisa above (59b) says "if she was divorced, he cannot force her, for she is not Meshubad to him."

Opinion #2 (R. Tam): She may not marry, for a Beraisa in Yevamos (42a) forbids marrying Meinekes u'Me'uberes Chavero (someone pregnant with or nursing another man's baby);

The Beraisa taught Stam. It did not distinguish whether she was widowed or divorced.

Also there it explains that the reason is because a Stam pregnant woman is destined to nurse, i.e. the same reason applies to both of them;

Based on the initial explanation there, the reason why a pregnant woman may not remarry (lest Bi'ah damage the fetus) applies to a divorcee just like to a widow;

Even though we retracted from that reason, we do not retract from the law itself, i.e. it applies even to a divorcee.

Also, also a widow is not Meshubad once she demands her Kesuvah or wants to remarry.