1)

(a)How will ...

1. ... Rav Ada bar Ahavah amend the Beraisa 'Tiknu Mezonos Tachas Ma'aseh Yadehah'?

2. ... Rav and Shmuel amend the Beraisa 'Im Eino Nosen Lah Ma'ah Kesef l'Tzorchehah, Ma'aseh Yadehah she'Lah'?

(b)How can the latter Beraisa pertain to Mosar, when the Tana goes on to state the amount that the woman is obligated to produce?

1)

(a)Rav ...

1. ... Ada bar Ahavah amends the Beraisa 'Tiknu Mezonos Tachas Ma'aseh Yadehah' - to 'Tiknu Mezonos Tachas Mosar Ma'seh Yadehah'.

2. ... and Shmuel amend the Beraisa 'Im Eino Nosen Lah Ma'ah Kesef l'Tzorchehah, Ma'aseh Yadehah Shelah' - to 'Im Eino Nosen Lah Ma'ah Kesef l'Tzorchehah, Mosar Ma'aseh Yadehah Shelah'.

(b)Even though the Tana goes on to state the amount that the woman is obligated to produce, the latter Beraisa can pertain to Mosar - because one needs to know how much the basic Ma'aseh is, in order to now what is considered Mosar.

2)

(a)The Tana Kama in the Mishnah in Kidushin states that if a married woman declares the work of her hands, a Konam, her husband does not need to nullify her Neder. Why not?

(b)On what grounds does Rebbi Akiva maintains that he does?

(c)Shmuel rules like Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri, who rules like Rebbi Akiva, but for a different reason. What is his reason?

(d)Shmuel also rules like Rebbi Yochanan ha'Sandlar in our Mishnah. Considering that, on the previous Amud, Shmuel agreed with Rav (that, when Rebbi Yochanan ha'Sandlar considers the Mosar of a woman whose husband declared the work of her hands Hekdesh, he is referring to the Mosar after her death), why do Shmuel's two rulings appear self-contradictory?

2)

(a)The Tana Kama in the Mishnah in Kidushin states that if a married woman declares the work of her hands a Konam, her husband does not need to nullify her Neder - because, seeing as the work of her hands belong to him, her Neder is ineffective.

(b)Rebbi Akiva maintains that he does - because she might produce Mosar (see Tosfos DH 'Rebbi Akiva').

(c)Shmuel rules like Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri, who rules like Rebbi Akiva - but because we are afraid that her husband may divorce her, in which case her Neder will come into effect, preventing him from ever taking her back (seeing as it is impossible to live with a woman from whose work one is forbidden to benefit).

(d)Shmuel also rules like Rebbi Yochanan ha'Sandlar in our Mishnah. Considering that, on the previous Amud, Shmuel agreed with Rav (that, when Rebbi Yochanan ha'Sandlar considers the Mosar of a woman whose husband declared the work of her hands Hekdesh, he is referring to the Mosar after her death), Shmuel's two rulings appear self-contradictory - because, according to Rav and Shmuel's interpretation, Rebbi Yochanan ha'Sandlar holds 'Ein Adam Makneh Davar she'Lo Ba l'Olam', whereas Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri clearly holds 'Adam Makneh Davar she'Lo Ba l'Olam'.

3)

(a)We try to reconcile Shmuel's two rulings by establishing his ruling like Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri by Ha'adafah (Mosar). Why in fact, does this not really answer the question?

(b)Besides that, we object to this answer because, if that is so, Shmuel should have said 'Halachah k'Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri l'Ha'adafah' (seeing as even Shmuel will agree that Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri himself does not speak exclusively about Ha'adafah). In which other two ways might he have issued his ruling?

(c)Rav Yosef resolves the contradiction in Shmuel's rulings, by pointing out that Konamos (which are the topic discussed by the Mishnah in Kidushin) are different. In what way are Konamos unique, that we should extend their uniqueness to cover 'Davar she'Lo Bo l'Olam'?

(d)How does Abaye refute Rav Yosef's answer? Why might one be able to forbid someone else's things on oneself exclusively, but not a Davar she'Lo Ba l'Olam?

3)

(a)We try to reconcile Shmuel's two rulings by establishing his ruling like Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri by Ha'adafah (Mosar). In fact, this does this not really answer the question - because the Ha'adafah is no more 'Ba l'Olam' than the Ma'aseh Yadehah (even more so considering that she is not yet divorced).

(b)Besides that, we object to this answer because, if that is so, Shmuel should have said 'Halachah k'Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri l'Ha'adafah' (seeing as Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri himself, even according to Shmuel, does not speak exclusively about Ha'adafah). Or he could have said - 'Ein Halachah k'Tana Kama' (who says 'Ein Tzarich Lehafer') or 'Halachah k'Rebbi Akiva' (who says 'Yafer Shema Ta'adif').

(c)Rav Yosef resolves the contradiction in Shmuel's rulings, by pointing out that Konamos (which are the topic under discussion in the Mishnah in Kidushin) are different. Konamos are unique - inasmuch as (unlike Hekdesh), one can forbid someone else's object exclusively on oneself by means of a Konam. Consequently, he argues, we should be able to extend their uniqueness to cover 'Davar she'Lo Bo l'Olam'.

(d)Abaye refutes Rav Yosef's answer however, on the grounds that - the reason that one can forbid one's friend's object on oneself exclusively is because one can also forbid one's own object on one's friend exclusively; but perhaps one cannot forbid a Davar she'Lo Ba l'Olam any more than one can forbid one's friend's objects on the friend.

4)

(a)So Rav Huna brei d'Rav Yehoshua establishes the Mishnah in Kidushin when she declares Hekdesh, not her Ma'aseh Yadayim, but her hands (with regard to what they produce). What objection do we raise to that?

(b)We also object to the suggestion that she does not declare them Hekdesh now, only after she is divorced, on the grounds that something that one does not want to declare Hekdesh immediately, one cannot declare Hekdesh now for later either. How does Rebbi Yirmeyahu differentiate between this case and that of Rebbi Ila'a, who rules that if someone declares Hekdesh a field that he is about to sell to his friend, but that the Hekdesh should only come into effect after he has bought it back from his friend, the Hekdesh is indeed effective?

(c)What is the Din if someone declares Hekdesh a field that he just sold to his friend for the Hekdesh to take effect the moment he buys it back?

(d)How does Rav Papa differentiate between that case and ours?

4)

(a)So Rav Huna Brei d'Rav Yehoshua establishes the Mishnah in Kidushin when she declares Hekdesh, not her Ma'aseh Yadayim, but her hands (with regard to what they produce). We object to that however - on the grounds that her hands, together with the work that they produce, are Meshubad to her husband, so how can she declare them Hekdesh?

(b)We also object to the suggestion that she does not declare them Hekdesh now, only after she is divorced, on the grounds that something that one does not want to declare Hekdesh immediately, one cannot declare Hekdesh now for later either. Rebbi Yirmeyahu differentiates between this case and that of Rebbi Ila'a, who rules that if someone declares Hekdesh a field that he is about to sell to his friend, but that the Hekdesh should only come into effect after he has bought it back from his friend, the Hekdesh is indeed effective - because there, he could have declared the field Hekdesh immediately, whereas in our case, she could not have done so.

(c)If someone declares Hekdesh a field that he just sold to his friend for the Hekdesh to take effect the moment he buys it back - his declaration is invalid (because he would have been unable to declare it Hekdesh immediately even if he had wanted to).

(d)But that is because he owns neither the field nor the Peiros (the current rights to it), argues Rav Papa - whereas in our case, where the woman owns her hands, maybe her declaration will be valid.

59b----------------------------------------59b

5)

(a)So we try to compare our case to one where a person declares Hekdesh a field that he gave to his friend as collateral for a loan the moment he redeems it. There the Hekdesh is valid. On what grounds ...

1. ... does Rav Shisha Brei d'Rav Idi differentiate between that case and ours?

2. ... do we then differentiate between our case and that of a case similar to the previous one, only when the owner fixed the collateral for ten years time (in which case he cannot redeem it until then)?

(b)We finally establish Shmuel's ruling like Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri, on the grounds that Konamos are different, like Rava says. What does Rava say about Hekdesh?

(c)Which kind of Hekdesh is he referring to?

(d)Why is this not considered stealing from the creditor?

5)

(a)So we try to compare our case to one where a person declares Hekdesh a field that he gave to his friend as collateral for a loan the moment he redeems it. There the Hekdesh is valid. Nevertheless ...

1. ... Rav Shisha Brei d'Rav Idi differentiates between that case and ours - on the grounds that there, he is able to redeem the field, whereas the woman is not able to obtain a divorce on her volition.

2. ... we differentiate between our case and that of a case similar to the previous one, only when the owner fixed the collateral for ten years time (in which case he cannot redeem it until then) - on the grounds that there, he will at least be able to redeem the field in ten year's time, whereas the woman will never be able to obtain a divorce.

(b)We finally establish Shmuel's ruling like Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri, on the grounds that Konamos are different, like Rava - who says that Hekdesh negates a creditor's Shibud (right of claim).

(c)He is referring specifically to Hekdesh of Kedushas ha'Guf (such as an ox that he declared a Korban and which had previously been Meshubad to his creditor); but not to Kedushas Damim (such as Bedek ha'Bayis - Hekdesh's repair fund).

(d)This is not considered stealing from the creditor - seeing as the article does not belong to him. It is no more than a collateral, and now that he has lost it, he retains the right to claim from other sources.

6)

(a)Which other two cases have the power to remove the Shibud?

(b)If that is Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri's reasoning, why did he say that the Konam takes effect only after the woman is divorced? Why not immediately?

6)

(a)The other two cases which have the power to remove the Shibud - are 1. 'Chametz' (where someone who designates his Chametz as collateral for a Nochri, without actually placing it in his domain, becomes obligated to destroy it on Erev Pesach); 2. Shichrur (where someone sets free his slave after designating him as collateral).

(b)That is indeed Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri's reasoning. Nevertheless, he maintains that the Konam takes effect only after the woman is divorced - because Chazal reinforced the husband's rights over his wife's property, giving him the Din of a buyer rather than a creditor.

7)

(a)What does our Mishnah say about the Melachos of grinding, baking, washing clothes, cooking and feeding one's baby? What do they have in common?

(b)Which other two Melachos belong to this list?

(c)From which three Melachos is she exempt in the event that she brings a Shifchah Cana'anis into the marriage?

(d)If she brings in two Shefachos, she is also exempt from cooking and feeding her baby. What happens if she brings in ...

1. ... three?

2. ... four?

7)

(a)Our Mishnah rules that grinding, baking, washing clothes, cooking and feeding one's baby - are all Melachos that a woman is obligated to perform for her husband (the latter to save him the expense of hiring a wet-nurse).

(b)The other two Melachos that belong in this list are - making her husband's bed and manufacturing woolen clothes.

(c)In the event that she brings a Shifchah Kena'anis into the marriage, she becomes exempt from - grinding, baking and washing his clothes.

(d)If she brings in two Shefachos, she is also exempt from cooking and personally feeding her baby. If she brings in ...

1. ... three - she is also exempt from - making his bed and manufacturing woolen clothes.

2. ... four - she can relax all day (and is not even obligated to carry his things up to the attic).

8)

(a)According to Rebbi Eliezer, she is never exempt from manufacturing woolen clothes (even if she brings in a hundred Shefachos). Why is that?

(b)What does Rebbi Shimon ben Gamliel say about someone who makes a Neder forbidding his wife from working?

8)

(a)According to Rebbi Eliezer, she is never exempt from manufacturing woolen clothes (even if she brings in a hundred Shefachos) - because idleness leads to immorality.

(b)Rebbi Shimon ben Gamliel says that someone who makes a Neder forbidding his wife from working - is obligated to divorce her and to pay her Kesuvah, because idleness leads to senility.

9)

(a)The word 'Tochenes' used by the Tana for 'grinding', appears to be incorrect, because it is not the woman who actually grinds, but the water which turns the wheel, which in turn, operates the mill. So how do we amend the Lashon 'Tochenes'?

(b)What does 'Matchenes comprise?

(c)What alternative explanation do we give, which leaves the Lashon 'Tochenes' intact?

9)

(a)The word 'Tochenes' used by the Tana for 'grinding', appears to be incorrect, because it is not the woman who actually grinds but the water which turns the wheel, which operates the mill, so we amend the Lashon 'Tochenes' to - 'Matcheness' ...

(b)... which implies pouring the grain into the mill and removing the flour.

(c)Alternatively - our Mishnah could be speaking about a hand-mill, in which case, the word 'Tochenes' is appropriate.

10)

(a)The author of our Mishnah cannot be the Tana quoted by Rebbi Chiya in a Beraisa. What does that Tana give as the main objective of a woman that will clash with some of the things mentioned by the Tana of our Mishnah (see Tosfos DH 'Tani')?

(b)Rebbi Chiya lists this objective together with having children. What does he add to the list in a second Beraisa?

(c)If a man wants to enhance his wife's looks, he should dress her in linen clothes (though this, as well as other statements made in this Sugya, are not necessarily true today). What should he do for his daughter (besides feeding her young birds) to make her look prettier?

10)

(a)The author of our Mishnah cannot be the Tana quoted by Rebbi Chiya in a Beraisa - in whose opinion, the main objective of a woman is to look beautiful, since this clashes with some of the Melachos (such as grinding, baking and feeding her baby, which all detract from her beauty).

(b)Rebbi Chiya lists this objective together with having children. In a second Beraisa - he adds the wearing of ornaments.

(c)If a man wants to enhance his wife's looks, he should dress her in linen clothes (though this, as well as other statements made in this Sugya, are not necessarily true today). Besides feeding her young birds - he should give his daughter plenty of milk to drink, as she approaches the age of maturity (Na'arus at twelve).

11)

(a)According to Beis Hillel in a Beraisa, if a woman made a Neder not to feed her baby, we nevertheless force her to do so. What do Beis Shamai say?

(b)Once she is divorced however, Beis Hillel concede that her Neder stands and must be kept.

(c)What if the baby refuses to feed anybody else?

(d)How do we initially establish the basis of the Machlokes?

(e)What do we try to prove from here?

11)

(a)According to Beis Hillel in a Beraisa, if a woman made a Neder not to feed her baby, we nevertheless force her to do so. According to Beis Shamai - we force her to stop even if she is in the middle of feeding.

(b)Once she is divorced however, Beis Hillel concede that her Neder stands and must be kept.

(c)And if the baby refuses to feed from anybody else - we obligate her ex-husband to pay her to feed the baby.

(d)Initially, we establish the basis of the Machlokes - whether a married woman is Meshubad to her husband to feed their babies (Beis Hillel) or not (Beis Shamai), in which case ...

(e)... our Mishnah will go not like Beis Shamai.

12)

(a)We try to establish the Beraisa when the woman made the Neder but her husband upheld it. How would that reconcile our Mishnah with Beis Shamai?

(b)We refute this suggestion however, in that if their bone of contention is really who is responsible for a Neder that the wife made and the husband upheld, then they should have argued in a straight case of Kesubah. What would then have been their Machlokes? What would be the case?

(c)On what other basis do we reject the possibility of establishing our Mishnah like Beis Shamai?

(d)So what do we conclude?

12)

(a)We try to establish the Beraisa when the woman made the Neder but her husband upheld it - which Beis Shamai hold is considered as if he actually made the Neder, releasing his wife's obligation to feed the baby. In principle however, Beis Shamai agree that the woman is obligated to feed the baby for her husband.

(b)We refute this suggestion however, in that if their bone of contention is really who is responsible for a Neder that the wife made and the husband upheld, then they should have argued in a straight case of Kesubah. Their Machlokes would then have been - whether, if the husband upheld his wife's Neder not to provide him with any benefit, she goes out with a Kesubah (Beis Shamai) or without it (Beis Hillel).

(c)We also reject the possibility of establishing our Mishnah like Beis Shamai - on the basis of a Beraisa, where Beis Shamai say 'Einah Menekes' (with or without a Neder) should she not wish to do so.

(d)We therefore conclude - that our Mishnah cannot go like Beis Shamai.

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