1)

(a)We ask whether Rebbi Chanina, who ascribes the Din in our Mishnah 'Ein Motzi'in la'Achilas Peiros ... mi'Nechasim Meshu'badim' to the fact that the amount is not fixed, is adding to Ula, who ascribed it to the fact that it is not written or whether he argues with him ...

(b)... in which case the creditor will be permitted to claim from Meshu'abadim, even in the case of an oral loan (see Tosfos DH 'O Dilma').

(c)A girl who has brothers, and whose father has died, is entitled to receive Isur Nechasim either when she attains Bagrus (twelve and a half), or when she gets married.

2)

(a)Rebbi Yochanan rules that in a case where one of two daughters received Isur Nechasim after her father's death, and before the second one had a chance to claim her's, their one brother died, leaving them as heirs the second daughter foregoes her share of Isur Nechasim, and the two girls share the property equally.

(b)Rebbi Chanina disagrees with Rebbi Yochanan. He argues that if, as Chazal have said, a girl may claim Parnasah (Isur Nechasim) from Meshu'abadim, she is certainly entitled to claim it from Bnei Chorin (before dividing the rest of the property).

(c)A daughter may claim Parnasah from Meshu'abadim, but Mezonos, only from Bnei-Chorin because the former is fixed, whereas the latter is not.

(d)Bearing in mind that Parnasah [Isur Nechasim] is not written, it seems that Rebbi Chanina permits claiming even oral debts from Meshu'abadim (thereby resolving our She'eilah, and leaving us with a Kashya on Ula). We refute it however by stressing that Parnasah has a Kol, even though there is no Shtar (because everyone knows that when a man dies, all his daughters are entitled to one tenth of his remaining property), in which case it is considered a written debt, not an oral one.

3)

(a)If a divorcee remarries, and both husbands have undertaken to feed her daughters for five years one of them should feed them directly, and the other one gives them money to the value of the Mezonos to which she is entitled.

(b)In the event that both husbands subsequently die within the five-year period, the Tana of the Beraisa rules that the wife may claim from Meshu'abadim (because they made a Kinyan when they got married, to reinforce that), whereas the daughters may claim only from Bnei Chorin (because no Kinyan was made on their behalf).

(c)Rav Huna bar Mano'ach attempt at one and the same time, to resolve our She'eilah regarding Rebbi Chanina and pose a Kashya on Ula because the sole difference between the wife and the daughters appears to be that the one is fixed whereas the one is not.

(d)We refute Rav Huna bar Mano'ach's proof, by establishing the case where a Kinyan was made with the Almanah (reinforcing her claim), but not with the daughters.

4)

(a)We initially explain the Tana making such a presumptuous distinction between the wife and the daughters by pointing out that when they first married, the daughters were not yet born, in which case the Kinyan that he made with his wife would not effect them.

(b)We refute this reasoning however on the grounds that the Tana does not preclude a case where the man remarried his wife, in which case, the daughters may well have been born at the time of the second marriage.

(c)In that case, they should not even need a Kinyan, because Mezonos ha'Bas is a Tenai Beis-Din! Nevertheless, they may only claim from Bnei-Chorin (in spite of the Kinyan) because we are afraid that, due to the fact that it is a Tenai Beis-Din, her father may have set aside Metaltelin to reinforce those very rights (see Tosfos DH 'Eimar').

5)

(a)Rebbi Nasan in a Beraisa qualifies the Din of 'Ein Motzi'in la'Achilas Peiros mi'Nechasim Meshuba'dim' to when the second purchaser bought the Meshuba'dim before the Sh'vach grew, but if he bought it after that, then the Shi'abud will have fallen on that field (seeing as the amount is now fixed) and the first purchaser may claim it from him.

(b)We prove from here that Rebbi Chanina ascribes 'Ein Motzi'in' to when the amount is not fixed, but that, when it is, the creditor may claim from Meshuba'dim, even though it is not documented (a Kashya on Ula).

(c)We reconcile Ula with the Beraisa by citing a second Beraisa, where the Machlokes between Ula and Rebbi Chanina is specifically cited as a Machlokes Tana'im.

(d)The opinion in the first Beraisa is that of Rebbi Yosi in the second. The Tana Kama there ascribes the reason that 'Ein Motzi'in la'Achilas Peiros u'le'Mazon ha'Banos' to the fact that it is documented (even in a case where it is fixed like Ula). He refers to it as 'Tikun ha'Olam', because, he argues, nobody will ever buy a field if he knows that any creditor (even of an oral loan, from which he cannot safeguard himself) may come and claim it from him.

6)

(a)Rebbi Yitzchak says that if the owner claims that the finder found ...

1. ... two purses tied together, whilst the finder counters that he found only one he must make a Shevu'ah (like every 'Modeh b'Miktzas').

2. ... two oxen tied together, whilst the finder counters that he found only one he is Patur from a Shevu'ah.

(b)The grounds for this distinction are the fact that whereas the two purses could not have come untied by themselves, in which case the owner's claim is a Vadai, the two oxen (who move and rub against each other) could well have done so, and his claim is only a Safek.

(c)Rebbi Yitzchak says in a case where the owner claims that the finder found two oxen that were tied and the finder counters that he found two and returned one that the finder is obligated to make a Shevu'ah, because here, the owner's claim is a Vadai (seeing as the finder admits that he found two oxen).

7)

(a)We query Rebbi Yitzchak's first statement from our Mishnah which exempts someone who finds a lost article from making a Shevu'ah, because of Tikun ha'Olam.

(b)Rebbi Yitzchak argues with our Mishnah because he follows the opinion of Rebbi Eliezer ben Yakov in a Beraisa, which we are about to discuss.

8)

(a)When Rebbi Eliezer ben Yakov says 'Pe'amim she'Adam Nishba Al Ta'anas Atzmo' he means that if Reuven admits to Shimon that the latter's father lent him a Manah, but claims that he already paid back half, he has to swear (like any other 'Modeh b'Miktzas').

(b)The Chachamim say that this is considered 'Meshiv Aveidah' (returning a lost article), for which one is exempt from swearing.

9)

(a)We take for granted that a genuine Meshiv Aveidah is Patur from a Shevu'ah because otherwise, nobody would ever return a lost article.

(b)Initially, we therefore establish Rebbi Eliezer ben Yakov where Shimon, who was a Katan, claimed from him.

(c)The problem with that is that the Mishnah in Shevu'os exempts a person from swearing on the claim of a Chashu (Cheresh, Shoteh v'Katan).

(d)We therefore interpret 'Katan' as a Gadol, who is considered a Katan with regard to his father's property (since he is not conversant with his father's affairs).

10)

(a)We reject this explanation of Rebbi Eliezer ben Yakov's statement because he should then not have referred to it as 'Ta'anas Atzmo'.

(b)Nor can he have meant 'Ta'anas Acheirim v'Hoda'as Atzmo' since that would then be no different than any other case of a claimant and a defendant (so why would the Chachamim exempt him from swearing).

11)

(a)We therefore establish the Machlokes between Rebbi Eliezer ben Yakov and the Rabanan, where a Katan is claiming from him that he owed his father a hundred Zuz and he admitted fifty, and they argue over a statement of Rabah who attributes the Torah's ruling 'Modeh b'Miktzas ha'Ta'anah Yishava' to the principle 'Ein Adam Me'iz Panav bi'Fenei Ba'al Chovo' (a person does not have the audacity to totally deny the claim of his creditor [who did him such a big favor]). Consequently, he only admits to half the claim because he has no choice (in which case his admission is no indication that he is telling the truth).

(b)Based on Rabah's Sevara, we finally establish the Machlokes Tana'im as to whether we extend the above principle ...

1. ... to the creditor's son (Rebbi Eliezer ben Yakov, who maintains that he would not lie in front of the creditor's son either, in which case he cannot be considered a 'Meshiv Aveidah', and is obligated to swear ...

2. ... or not (the Rabanan, who hold that he would not be embarrassed to lie in front of the creditor's son [to whom he is not indebted]. Consequently, his admission even in part, is considered Meshiv Aveidah, and he is Patur from a Shevu'ah).

(c)The problem with this is how we can then allow him to swear; why we do not apply the principle 'Migo d'Chashid a'Mamona Chashid a'Shevu'asa' [someone who is suspect in money matters, is also suspect on swearing falsely] See also Tosfos DH 'u've'Chuli').

(d)We conclude however, that, even according to Rebbi Eliezer ben Yakov, he does not really want to deny the entire claim. In fact, now that he is standing in front of his creditor, he really wants to admit the entire claim. Only due to the fact that he does not have the money right now, he denies half the claim, with the intention of admitting and paying up as soon as he is able to. That is why the Torah makes him swear.