QUESTION: In the Mishnah, Rebbi Yehudah says that the area enclosed by Pasei Bira'os must not be more than "Beis Se'asayim" (5000 square Amos) in order to be considered a Reshus ha'Yachid. The Rabanan disagree and maintain that only areas that were not originally enclosed for residential purposes ("Hukaf l'Dirah") may not be larger than Beis Se'asayim. An area that was originally enclosed for residential purposes -- such as one enclosed by Pasei Bira'os, an animal corral, a storage area behind houses, and a Chatzer -- may be larger than Beis Se'asayim.

What sort of residential purpose do these areas serve? Do people live in the area enclosed by Pasei Bira'os, or in animal barns, storehouses, and courtyards? What is the definition of an area that was "Hukaf l'Dirah" -- "enclosed for residential purposes," if people do not live in those places?

(a) RASHI (DH l'Ginah and DH v'Chatzer) seems to have more than one way of defining "Hukaf l'Dirah." Rashi considers a cattle barn as enclosed for residential purposes, even though he mentions no residential purpose that such an area serves. However, Rashi also writes that the area within Pasei Bira'os is considered Hukaf l'Dirah because the water of the well is fit for human consumption. Similarly, Rashi later (19b, DH Dir) writes that an animal corral is Hukaf l'Dirah "because the shepherd sleeps there at night."

At the end of the Sugya (22a), Rashi (DH Kol Avir) writes that an area is considered Hukaf l'Dirah as long as "its use is for human activity, for entering and exiting constantly." It appears that Rashi defines Hukaf l'Dirah as any area that was enclosed for consistent and frequent human use. Since men constantly go in and out of animal barns, those barns are considered fenced-in for human use. The RITVA seems to agree with this definition of Hukaf l'Dirah when he writes, "Since the shepherd stands with them (the animals) all the time, the area is considered Hukaf l'Dirah."

According to this definition, it must be that a storehouse ("Muktzah") is considered Hukaf l'Dirah because a person frequently goes in to get the wood that is stored there (BI'UR HALACHAH OC 358:1).

(b) RABEINU YEHONASAN writes that inside the enclosed area used as a cattle barn there is a house in which the shepherd lives.

His words imply that an area is considered Hukaf l'Dirah only if a person actually lives there, and it is not sufficient for a person merely to enter and exit the area frequently.

(c) The RASHBA writes that an animal corral is considered fenced-in for residential purposes because the animals live there. The NODA B'YEHUDAH (OC 2:47) cites the OR CHADASH who also says that an animal's dwelling is considered a residential area. (See BI'UR HALACHAH OC 358:1, DH l'Dirah.)

QUESTION: The Gemara teaches in the name of Rebbi Avahu that Hash-m originally intended to create two humans, but then He made only one. However, He then made the one into two, Adam and Chavah.

How are we to understand this Gemara? How can we say that Hash-m changed His mind?

(a) The RASHBA (TESHUVOS HA'RASHBA 1:60) explains that when the Gemara says that Hash-m "thought about creating two" and then He created one, it means that He carefully planned and considered with His infinite wisdom whether to create them as one or as two. It does not mean that He changed His mind, but rather that His creation was done with thorough consideration.

Why, then, did He eventually make two humans?

The two that were eventually created were not the same two of His original plan. Originally, Hash-m considered the implications of creating man and woman as two completely separate species that would not propagate together or serve as counterparts to each other. Hash-m decided not to create two types of humans but instead to create one being, meaning one species of human beings, which included both man and woman.

Alternatively, Hash-m originally considered creating man and woman from the outset as two individual entities (of the same species), but in the end He decided that both man and woman should come from one body. The reason for this decision was that man and woman would feel eternally bonded to each other. When they would later come together, they would feel like a single unit, aware of the common root from which their Neshamah came. Again, Hash-m never changed His mind, so to speak. Rather, His infinite wisdom pondered all of the possible ways to create the human being before He decided to do it one way.

(b) The VILNA GA'ON (Berachos 61a) explains that when the Gemara says that Hash-m initially "thought to create two," it means that when He created one, He already had in mind to eventually make two out of that one. The goal and purpose of Hash-m's creation is always the first and the beginning of His thoughts. "Hash-m thought to create two" means that His original thought was actualized later when He took two out of one. (The term "Alah b'Machshavah" refers to the ultimate purpose of Creation, for "Sof Ma'aseh, b'Machashavah Techilah"). If man and woman were created as one, it would not have been possible for a person to fulfill his ultimate purpose of toiling in Hash-m's Torah and serving Hash-m, because his worldly responsibilities would have been too great. Therefore, Hash-m created man and woman separately so that they could share the responsibilities and enable each other to accomplish their respective goals. The creation of one initial being was just an intermediate step to get to the final two (for the reason given by the Rashba above).

QUESTION: Rav Nachman says that Mano'ach was an Am ha'Aretz, because "he walked after his wife" (Shoftim 13:11). Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak refutes Rav Nachman's assertion. When the verse says that Mano'ach "walked after his wife," it means that he followed his wife's advice, just as we find that "Elkanah walked after his wife" and "Elisha walked after [a woman]." These great Tzadikim certainly would not have walked behind a woman. Rather, the verses mean that they followed the advice of women.

This is our text of the Gemara, which is also the text of Rashi. However, as the marginal note in the Vilna Shas points out, TOSFOS in Berachos says that the verse about Elkanah following his wife must be omitted, because there is no such verse.

How does Rashi explain this text? To what verse does the Gemara refer?

ANSWER: RAV ELAZAR MOSHE HA'LEVI HOROWITZ explains the text of Rashi as follows. When Rav Nachman asserted that Mano'ach was an Am ha'Aretz because he walked behind his wife, the Gemara was not sure whether he meant that Mano'ach was an Am ha'Aretz because he literally walked behind his wife, or because he followed the advice of a woman. Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak challenged the assumption that only an Am ha'Aretz follows the advice of women on the grounds that Elkanah followed the advice of his wife with regard to leaving young Shmuel at home for the first two years of his life. It is clear from the actions of Elkanah, who was a prophet, that it is permissible -- and advisable -- to follow the advice of one's wife. While there is no verse that states that Elkanah walked after his wife, there clearly was a decision that Chanah made to which he acquiesced. Hence, "Elkanah walked after his wife."

(RAV YAAKOV D. HOMNICK proposes that there is such a verse. The Navi states, "va'Yelech Elkanah ha'Ramasah Al Beiso" -- "And Elkanah went [back] to Ramah Al Beiso" (Shmuel I 2:11). The words "Al Beiso" (literally, "on his house") are unclear (some commentators explain that these words mean simply "to his house"). More difficult to understand, however, is that the Navi until this point speaks only of Chanah, who brought her son to Shilo, delivered him to the Mishkan, spoke to the Kohen Gadol, and then offered her lengthy prayer (1:24, 26, 2:1). Why does the Navi now say that "Elkanah went back" home when it has made no mention of him until now? Rav Homnick suggests that the words "Al Beiso" mean "on the advice of his wife." The Navi is emphasizing that Elkanah fully relied on the decisions that his wife made in the matter of their son. The Navi specifically uses the word "Bayis" here to refer to Chanah, because the word "Bayis" refers to one's wife who is empowered with the authority over all matters involved with the family and home, as Rashi explains in Gitin (52a, DH l'Ishti Beisi; see also Rashi to Shabbos 118b, DH l'Ishti Beisi). Hence, he "went with his wife" and followed her advise.)

The Gemara continues and shows that Mano'ach also should not be called an Am ha'Aretz. The Gemara quotes a verse which says that Elisha "walked behind a woman," and that verse clearly means that he acquiesced to her request. Similarly, the verse regarding Mano'ach does not mean that he literally walked behind his wife but rather that he followed her advice.

(From the verse regarding Elisha alone we do not see that following the advice of a woman is acceptable, because Elisha was simply requested to come and revive the youth. The woman did not offer him any advice to follow. Elkanah and Mano'ach, though, were given advice by their wives. Therefore, the Gemara proves from Elkanah that it is acceptable to follow the advice of a woman, and then it proves from Elisha that when the verse says that he "followed her" it means that he followed her request or advice, and not that he literally walked behind her.)

QUESTION: Rebbi Yirmeyah ben Elazar teaches that no house in which Divrei Torah are heard at night will be destroyed. He derives this from the verse, "He does not say, 'Where is Hash-m, my Maker, Who gives songs in the night'" (Iyov 35:10). Rebbi Yirmeyah ben Elazar understands "songs" to refer to Divrei Torah, and he expounds the verse to mean, "Whoever learns Torah during the night will not have to ask, 'Where is Hash-m [Who could have saved my house from being destroyed]?'"

We find elsewhere that Divrei Torah are compared to songs. The Gemara in Megilah (32a) teaches that one should sing the words of Torah that he learns, and that it is improper for one to learn Torah without a melody ("ha'Shoneh b'Lo Zimrah").

Similarly, the Gemara in Sanhedrin (99b) quotes Rebbi Akiva who teaches, "Zamer b'Chol Yom." RASHI there explains that this means that a person should constantly review what he has learned, like one who sings a song repetitively. (See also Chagigah 12b and Nedarim 38a.)

These statements seem to contradict the Gemara in Sotah (35a), which says that David ha'Melech was punished for calling Divrei Torah "Zemiros," songs (Tehilim 119:54). According to the Gemara there, Hash-m said to him, "Divrei Torah can be forgotten in the blink of an eye (Mishlei 23:5), and you are calling them 'Zemiros' (that are treated lightly, without concentration)!" Hash-m made David ha'Melech forget an explicit verse as punishment for treating Divrei Torah like Zemiros.

How can the Gemara in all of these places refer to Divrei Torah as "songs" when the Gemara in Sotah explicitly says that it is prohibited to do so?

(a) Perhaps it is permitted to refer to Divrei Torah as "songs" with regard to reviewing what one has already learned. Review involves merely saying over the Divrei Torah repetitively without great concentration. In contrast, Torah that is learned in-depth with deep concentration may not be referred to as "songs."

Rebbi Akiva in Sanhedrin exhorts a person to review his studies constantly, with Zemer (Rashi DH Zamer). The Gemara in Megilah is also describing a person who reviews his learning ("ha'Shoneh"). Similarly, the Gemara here that discusses learning at night refers to a person who reviews at night that which he learned during the day. Since it is more difficult to concentrate at night (see Sanhedrin 34b, regarding the law that Beis Din convenes only during the daytime), the night is normally designated for reviewing what one learned during the day. When David ha'Melech was criticized for referring to Torah as "Zemiros," it was because of his statement that in-depth study of the Torah provided him with solace during his times of exile, like songs that provide solace. Since he was referring to in-depth study, he should not have referred to the Torah as "Zemiros." (-Based on teachings heard from ha'Ga'on Rav Moshe Shapiro, shlit'a.)

We may ask, however, that we find a number of places in which the Torah is referred to as "Shirah," or "song" (such as Nedarim 38a, Chagigah 12b; this also seems to be the intent of the Gemara in Eruvin (21b) when it comments on the verse "Shiro Chamishah v'Elef" (Melachim I 5:12) and the Gemara in Chulin (133a) when it comments on the verse "Shar b'Shirim Al Lev Ra" (Mishlei 25:20)). These places do not seem to refer specifically to the act of reviewing that which one has learned. They seem to be calling the Torah itself "Shirah."

(b) The DIVREI SHALOM (5:62, see also 5:63-67) suggests, based on the words of the MAHARAL (Sanhedrin 101a), that although calling the Torah a "Zimrah" is disrespectful, calling the Torah a "Shirah" is not. A Zimrah is a lighthearted tune, such as the tune a person hums to himself when he is in a merry mood. A Shirah, though, refers to a musical composition which requires great talent and concentration to compose or perform. Referring to the Torah as "Zimrah" is disrespectful and misleading as it implies that it is not necessary to concentrate on Torah. (See also Insights to Sotah 35:2 and Sanhedrin 99:2.)

This, however, does not answer the question from the words of Rebbi Yirmeyah ben Elazar, who explains the verse, "... Who gives Zemiros at night," as referring to a person who learns Torah at night. Perhaps we may suggest a simple answer to explain why it is acceptable to refer here to Divrei Torah as "Zemiros": The verse in Iyov does not refer to the Torah itself as Zemiros, but rather it refers to the person who learns Torah as one who sings Zemiros (consistent with the way that one is supposed to learn Torah, according to the Gemara in Megilah (32a)). It is only inappropriate to refer to the Torah itself as "Zemiros," but not to the person who learns Torah as "one who sings." (M. KORNFELD)

OPINIONS: Rebbi Yirmeyah ben Elazar teaches that from the time that the Beis ha'Mikdash was destroyed, the world may use only two letters of the Name of Hash-m (Yud and Heh).

In what way was the full Name of Hash-m used before the Churban, and in what way was it no longer used after the Churban?

(a) RASHI explains that the Kohanim in the Beis ha'Mikdash were permitted to pronounce the full Name of Hash-m during Birkas Kohanim. After the Churban, they may no longer use the Name of Hash-m even during Birkas Kohanim. Instead, the Kohanim pronounce the Name of Hash-m the way we pronounce it. We may pronounce only the Name spelled with Yud and Heh, and not the four-letter Tetragrammaton.

(b) The MAHARSHA alludes to the Midrash (that Rashi cites at the end of Parshas Beshalach) that says that when Amalek is in the world, the throne of Hash-m is not complete, and Hash-m's Name is spelled with only the Yud and Heh. When the Beis ha'Mikdash is built, there is a tremendous Giluy ha'Shechinah in the world, as clear miracles occur in the Beis ha'Mikdash and in the world. While the Beis ha'Mikdash is not standing, Amalek overpowers the influence of the Jewish people in the sense that the Name is not complete -- the world does not recognize the full greatness of Hash-m, but rather His greatness is hidden, as the verse says, "Haster Astir" (Devarim 31:18). The full greatness of Hash-m when concealed in the natural course of the world is referred to as the Name being incomplete. The ineffable, four-letter Name of Hash-m represents the greatness of Hash-m when visible to all (as Rashi says at the beginning of Parshas Va'era (Shemos 6:3), "u'Shemi Hash-m Lo Nodati Lahem"). (See Insights to Makos 23:4.)

(c) RAV REUVEN MARGOLIYOS (in HA'MIKRA VEHA'MESORA, #21) suggests a novel interpretation for this Gemara. We often find names in Tanach that end with all of the letters from the Name of Hash-m, such as "Yirmeyahu" and "Yeshayahu." Even though during the time of the Beis ha'Mikdash, names ended with either all the letters Yud, Heh, and Vav, or with the two letters Yud and Heh, after the Churban of the first Beis ha'Mikdash we find that names end only with Yud and Heh (such as "Nechemyah" ben "Chachalyah," "Zecharyah," etc.). Rav Reuven Margoliyos cites dozens of examples to demonstrate the consistency of this approach.