Introduction to Proof: And this is also implied in Perek Mitzvas Chalitzah (Yevamos, Daf 103b), where Rav Papi, quoting Rava rules - that a Sandal that is Musgar (the first stage of Tzara'as) may not be used for Chalitzah, but if it was, the Chalitzah is Kasher

Introduction to Proof (cont.): Whereas by a Sandal ha'Muchlat (the final stage of Tzara'as), the Chalitzah is Pasul even Bedi'eved ...

Proof (cont.): And Rashi explains there that one may not perform Chalitzah with a Sandal ha'Musgar due to a decree on account of a Sandal ha'Muchlat, and that it is nevertheless Kasher Bedi'eved since 'Mitzvos are not intended for our (material) benefit'.

Proof (concl.): So we see that a Sandal ha'Muchlat is Asur be'Hana'ah.

Answer: We must therefore say that it is indeed Asur be'Hana'ah ...

Implied Question: And nevertheless, when the Gemara says here that he may claim 'Harei shel'cha Lefanecha' ...

Answer: It speaks when he (the owner) initially said 'Bayis Zeh', because, seeing as it is still standing, he is under no obligation to provide him with another house ...

Answer (cont.): He does however, lose the rental ...

Precedent: Because it is similar to where the animal dies or broke down, about which the Gemara there rules that 'He is obligated to replace it, and Rashi adds 'or he loses the rental'.

Question #1: Here it implies that a Maskir is permitted to declare his house Hekdesh after he has rented it out, even though it is Meshubad to the hirer ...

Question #1 (cont.): Whereas in Perek Af-al-Pi (Kesuvos, Daf 59b & 60a) the Gemara states that ' ... This can only be compared to someone who says 'This field which I gave you as a Mashkon will become Hekdesh when I redeem it", in which case it is Kadosh' ...

Question #1 (concl.): Implying that it is only because he added 'When I redeem it that it is Hekdesh, but that immediately, he cannot declare it Hekdesh ...

Question #1 (concl.): Here too, he should not be able to declare it Hekdesh?

Introduction to Question #2: And in Perek Eizehu Neshech (Bava Metzi'a, Daf 73b & 74a) - 'A Nochri sold the house that he had given Rav Mari bar Rachel as a Mashkon to Rava. The latter waited a year and brought the rental for the house to Rava ...

Introduction to Question #2 (cont.): With the words 'I did not bring you the rental until now, because it was a Mashkon and the Nochri was not permitted to push me away; Now accept the rental (for the forthcoming year' ...

Question #2: Implying that the borrower (the Nochri) is permitted to sell it; so why is he not permitted to declare it Hekdesh immediately?

Answer #1: The Ri answers the Din is that whatever is in excess of the loan he is allowed to declare Hekdesh and to sell immediately ...

Answer #1 (cont.): Consequently, when it says there 'When I redeem it', implying that straightaway he cannot declare it Hekdesh, it speaks where he wants to be Makdish the entire property ...Whereas the case in 'Eizehu Neshech' (Ibid.) is speaking where he sold Rava the excess,

Answer #1 (concl.): And here too, he has the right to be Makdish the excess ...

Implied Question: And the reason that he obligates the one who lives there to pay Hekdesh rent is ...

Answer: Because Hekdesh shares the property with him, and it is impossible to clarify who owns what.

Answer #2: Some commentaries draw a distinction between a Maskir and a borrower , inasmuch as specifically a borrower - who will not get the Mashkon back unless he repays the loan cannot declare it Hekdesh, whereas a Maskir - who after the rental period has expired, gets it back free of charge, is permitted to declare it Hekdesh.

Reservation: This does not however, answer the Kashya on Eizehu Neshech (seeing as the Nochri there was a borrower).

Question: We find in various places, that the Gemara mentions that the borrower was Makdish the Mashkon or that 'he sold it - implying that he has the right to do so (See Avodah Berurah)?

Answer: The creditor however, may claim it from Hekdesh or from thr purchaser when he comes to claim his debt, assuming that there is nowhere else to claim from (See Avodah Berurah).

Precedent: It is similar to 'Someone who designated his Eved as an Apotiki and sold him or declared him Hekdesh - that the creditor can claim him; only as long as he does not claim him, he is Hekdesh or sold.

Answer (cont.): It is also (See Avodah Berurah) implied here that the owner can declare it Hekdesh, and by the same token he is able to render it Asur on the hirer, and this is the Halachah.

Introduction to Question: Here it implies that the hirer is not permitted to declare it Hekdesh, seeing as it asks 'How can the one who lives in the house be Makdish it ...

Reason Introduction to Question: When the Torah writes "A man who is Makdish his house" - 'just as his house is in his domain, so too, whatever is in his domain ... ' ...

Question: Whereas the Tosefta learns rules that 'If the hirer declares it Hekdesh, the Hekdesh takes effect'?

Answer: Here too, the hirer is permitted to declare it Hekdesh as long as it is in his domain; so too is he able to render it forbidden on everybody for the duration of the rental ...

Implied Question: And when the Gemara asks 'How can he be Makdish it?' ...

Answer: It means to ask how he can he do so to the extent that he pays rental to Hekdesh (and not to the Maskir) - seeing as it is not in his domain?

Question: Here it implies that the Maskir is permitted to declare it Hekdesh, whilst the Tosefta specifically states that it is not Mekudeshes'? ...

Tosefta: 'If someone who hires a field from his friend, and rents it out to a third party, the owner can say to him "I won't have dealings with anyone else but you" ...

Tosefta: Should the owner get up and sell it - they (the hirer and the purchaser) only reckon with the owner (See Avodah Berurah) - and if he declares it Hekdesh, it is not Hekdesh until it is returned to him.

Tosefta: But whatever he benefits from it, is Hekdesh (i.e. he must pay Hekdesh).

Tosefta: If the hirer is Makdish it, it is Hekdesh until it leaves his domain, and he must pay Hekdesh the rental (until here is the wording of the Tosefta).

Answer: When the Tosefta rules that the Maskir cannot be Makdish it, it speaks where the hirer already paid the rental up front; whereas here it is speaking where he has not yet paid.

Support: And so it says in the Yerushalmi (Pesachim, Perek 4) 'Someone who rents a house to his friend, and then declares it Hekdesh, the Hekdesh is effective - provided the hirer has not yet paid the rental; but if he has, he may live in the house free of charge'.

Text: The is the text in the majority of Sefarim.

Authentic Explanation: And it means 'Since he is Mo'el' - the rental for the house goes out to Chulin ...

Reason: Since his friend rented him the house without knowing (that it is Hekdesh), he is Mo'el when he lives in it, and the rental goes out to Chulin via Me'ilah.

Refuted Explanation: But one cannot explain that, seeing as he is Mo'el, the house goes out to Chulin, like Rashi does.

Authentic Explanation (cont.): There is now a Kashya from the Tosefta in Me'ilah (Perek 2) - 'If one chopped with an axe belonging to Hekdesh, and his friend then comes and chops with it, and his friend ... , they are all Mo'el' ...

Authentic Explanation (cont.): And in Perek ha'Neheneh (Me'ilah, Daf 19b) the Mishnah rules that 'There is no Mo'el achar Mo'el by Kodshim except for by animals and K'lei Shareis ...

Authentic Explanation (cont.): Meaning that Kedushas ha'Guf does not go out to Chulin via Me'ilah like Kedushas Damim ...

Authentic Explanation (concl.): And an axe is not considered a K'li Shareis but Kedushas ha'Guf ...

Reason: The reason that it is not considered a K'li Shareis due to the fact that if it brings others to Kedushas ha'Guf, how much more so should it bring itself to Kedushas ha'Guf (See Avodah Berurah).

Reason (cont.): Because that is the reason that other K'lei Shareis are considered Kedushas ha'Guf.

Clarification: Even though he did not spoil it, he is Mo'el ...

Source: As the Mishnah states at the beginning of Perek ha'Neheneh (Daf 18a) 'ha'Neheneh min ha'Hekdesh, Shaveh P'rutah, Af-al-Pi she'Lo Pagam, Ma'al'.

Implied Question: And even though 'What is attached to the ground is not subject to Me'ilah' ...

Source: As the Gemara states in Perek ha'Neheneh min ha'Hekdesh (Ibid. Amud Beis) ...

Answer: We will have to say that this Sugya goes according to Rav, who holds that 'What is initially detached and is subsequently attached is considered detached' ...

Source: As he says (in Me'ilah 20a) 'Someone who prostrates himself to a house renders it forbidden'.

Support: And in Perek ha'Neheneh too, (Daf 20a & 20b) the Gemara cites the Din of Rav, when it says 'When he builds them however, he is Mo'el, and suggests that it is a support for Rav?'

Conclusion: And even though the Gemara pushes it off, it is merely a Dichuy.

Question: How does the Metaretz know that Shmuel argues with Ula? Why does he not establish Shmuel at the time of Kaparah, and the Beraisa speaks at the time of Hafrashah (separation), in which case he will not argue with Ula?

Answer: He holds that Shmuel is speaking at the time of Hafrashah ...

Reason: Because he is referring to the Mishnah, which is speaking about the time of Hafrashah ...

Proof: Since the Tana says 'Chayvei Olos Ein Memashk'nin Osan' - which refers to the time of the Hafrashah.

Question: He nevertheless argues, seeing as according to him, it requires knowledge even at the time of Hafrashah, and all the more ar the time of Kaparah, whereas accorcing to Ula, it only needs knowledge at the time of Kaparah, but not at the time of Hafrashah?

Answer: Nonetheless, in the manner that they are currently arguing (i.e. at the time of Kaparah) they would no longer argue.

Clarification (Shmuel): The Ri explains the reasoning of Shmuel and Ula as follows: That Shmuel holds that Olah ans Shelamim require knowledge at the time of Hafrashah - because a person doesn't like to be 'atoned for' with something that is not his ...

Clarification (Shmuel [cont.]): But it is not necessary at the time of Kaparah, since Semichah need not be performed with his knowledge, seeing as they do not come to atone for his sin (Refer to Gilyon) ...

Clarification (Shmuel [concl.]): Whereas Chatas and Asham, which do - and which need his confession whilst Semichah is being performed, require his knowledge at the time of Kaparah.

Clarification (Ula): Ula, on the other hand, holds that even by Olah and Shelamim, he wants to fulfill the Mitzvah of Semichah; Consequently, his knowledge is required even at the time of Kaparah ...

Clarification (Ula [cont.]): But at the time of Hafrashah, it is only by a Chatas (and Asham) that his knowledge is required - since a person does not like being atoned for with something that is not his ...

Clarification (Ula [concl.]): Whereas Olah and Shelamim, which do not come to atone to the same extent (See Avodah Berurah), do not need his knowledge at the time of Hafrashah, and they are nevertheless Kadosh.

Halachah: Consequently, it is customary to negate (See Avodah Berurah) all declarations and declarations of declarations at the time of the writing of the Get and at the time that it is handed over ...

Reason: For fear that he may have cancelled it (the Get).

Question: Why does he mention Yesomim, when, anyone whose property Beis-Din come to claim in order to pay a woman's Kesubah or a creditor his debt, requires the assessment of Beis-Din for thirty days? ...

Source: As the Gemara states in Perek ha'Mafkid (Bava Metzi'a, Daf 35b) 'From when can he (the creditor) eat the fruit? From when the days of announcing have terminated'

Source (cont.): So we see that anybody whose property Beis-Din come to claim require their assessment?

Question (cont.): In that case, why mention Yesomim?

Answer: The Tana mentions Yesomim to teach us a Chidush - because we would otherwise have thought that Yesomim are like Hekdesh, and that they therefore require an assessment by Beis-Din of sixty days ..

Answer (cont.): So it teaches us that they are like everybody else.

Clarification: This means when the workers leave work and when they go out to work , respectively.

Implied Question: This is not the order of the Mishnah, which says 'in the morning and in the evening - since Rav first explains 'the evening' and then 'the morning' ...

Answer: This is because that is the actual order of things ...

Reason: Seeing as, since he (the employer) does not want to stop them from working, he will not ask them to check out the field until the evening ...

proof: Otherwise, why wait until the evening to ask them what they saw - when he is able to ask them throughout the day?

Answer (cont.): Therefore, Rav Yehudah finds it necessary to explain that it is when they leave work that he instructs them to check it out, because then he does not stop them from working ...

Answer (concl.): And the following morning, when he remembers his instructions of the previous evening, he asks them (what they saw).

Refuted Explanation: And that explains why we cannot explain the other way round - 'be'Sha'as Hotza'as ha'Po'alim' - from their houses on their way to work; and 'be'Sha'as Hachnasan' - when they arrive home after they have left work ...

Refutation #1: Because it is not the way it is done, as Tosfos explains.

Refutation #2: Moreover, it does not go with the Lashon (See Avodah Berurah).

Gilyon (See Shitah Mekubetzes 16): Tosfos is very lengthy on this point, and they cite the Gemara at the beginning of ha'Socher es ha'Po'alim (Bava Metzi'a, Daf 83a & 83b), where Resh Lakish says that 'A worker goes to work in his time, and leaves in the time of his employer' (See Avodah Berurah).

Clarification: How much produce and fruit it produces annually and how much it is worth.

Qualification: If however, the creditor is willing to settle for the Beis-Din's assessment, it is no longer necessary to announce it, and one gives it to him immediately.