12th Cycle Dedication

ERCHIN 6-9 - Two weeks of study material have been dedicated by Mrs. Estanne Abraham Fawer to honor the twelfth Yahrzeit of her father, Rav Mordechai ben Eliezer Zvi (Rabbi Morton Weiner) Z'L, who passed away on 18 Teves 5760. May the merit of supporting and advancing Dafyomi study -- which was so important to him -- during the weeks of his Yahrzeit serve as an Iluy for his Neshamah.

1)

(a)Others cite the Machlokes between Rav Yosef and Rabah with regard to the following Beraisa. Everyone agrees that someone who wounds a Yotzei Lehareg (be'Dinei Yisrael) is Patur from paying. If however the Yotzei Lehareg wounds someone else, the Tana Kama holds that he is Chayav. What does Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar say?

(b)Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar gives as his reason 'she'Lo Nitan la'Chazaras Amidas Beis-Din'. What does he mean by that?

(c)What problem do we have with this reason?

(d)Rav Yosef therefore, bases their Machlokes on whether Milveh-al-Peh Govah min ha'Yorshin (Tana Kama) or not (Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar). What does Rabah say?

1)

(a)Others cite the Machlokes between Rav Yosef and Rabah with regard to the following Beraisa. Everyone agrees that someone who wounds a Yotzei Lehareg (be'Dinei Yisrael) is Patur from paying. If however the Yotzei Lehareg wounds someone else, the Tana Kama holds that he is Chayav - whereas according to Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar, he is Patur.

(b)Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar gives as his reason 'she'Lo Nitan la'Chazaras Amidas Beis-Din', by which he means that - the Yotzei Lehareg cannot be recalled to the Beis-Din to be judged, due to Inuy ha'Din, (the La'av of delaying carrying out the death-sentence).

(c)The problem with this reason is that - the Tana Kama, who obligates him to pay, would then have to hold that we do delay the death-sentence, which clashes with the Din that forbids it.

(d)Rav Yosef therefore bases their Machlokes on whether Milveh-al-Peh Govah min ha'Yorshin (Tana Kama) or not (Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar). Whereas according to Rabah - it is based on whether Milveh ha'Kesuvah ba'Torah ki'Chesuvah be'Beis-Din Dami or not, as we already explained.

2)

(a)We query Rabah in the first Lashon from a Beraisa, which exempts the owner of an ox that falls on top of someone who is digging a pit in the street and kills him. What does the Tana rule in a case where the ox, as well as the digger, died?

(b)What can we extrapolate from there?

(c)What is now the Kashya on Rabah?

(d)Why can the Kashya not pertain to Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar (who holds in the previous Beraisa, that a Yotzei Lehareg who wounds someone is Patur)?

2)

(a)We query Rabah in the first Lashon from a Beraisa, which exempts the owner of an ox that falls on top of someone who is digging a pit in the street and kills him. The Tana there, in a case where the ox, as well as the digger died, rules that - the heirs of the owner of the pit are Chayav to pay ...

(b)... which leaves us with a S'tam Mishnah that holds Milveh ha'Kesuvah ba'Torah ki'Chesuvah bi'Sh'tar Dami ...

(c)... a Kashya on Rabah in the first Lashon, according to whom the Tana Kama (who is mentioned S'tam) holds La'av ki'Chesuvah bi'Sh'tar Dami.

(d)It cannot be a Kashya on Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar (who holds in the previous Beraisa, that a Yotzei Lehareg who wounds someone is Patur) - because one cannot ask such a Kashya on a Tana, who has the authority to argue with another Tana.

3)

(a)Rav Ila Amar Rav suggests that the Tana is speaking where the Beis-Din had already obligated the owner of the pit to pay before he died. So what if they had? How would that solve the problem?

(b)On what grounds do we reject ...

1. ... Rav Ila's suggestion?

2. ... Rav Ada bar Ahavah's suggestion that 'Hargo' means (not that) the ox (actually killed him outright, but that it) made the owner of the pit a T'reifah, and he died after the Beis-Din's ruling? What did Rav Nachman quote the Tana as saying that negates it?

3)

(a)Rav Ila Amar Rav suggests that the Tana is speaking where the Beis-Din had already obligated the owner of the pit to pay before he died - and a ruling that is fixed by Beis-Din has the status of a Milveh bi'Sh'tar.

(b)We reject ...

1. ... Rav Ila's suggestion however - because, since the ox killed him, the suggestion is not practically possible.

2. ... Rav Ada bar Ahavah's suggestion that Hargo means (not that) the ox (actually killed him outright, but that it) made the owner of the pit a T'reifah, and he died after the Beis-Din's ruling, due to Rav Nachman, who quoted the Tana as saying that - the ox killed him and, by loosening a clump of earth, it buried him too.

4)

(a)How do we finally establish the Beraisa in a way that solves the above problems?

(b)What does another Beraisa say about a Yotzei Lehareg who has a Chatas or an Asham waiting to be brought?

(c)On the other hand, the Tana exempts him from paying for damages that he causes at that stage. What reason does Rav Yosef give for that?

(d)How do we answer Abaye's Kashya that, if so, the Reisha too, entails delaying the death sentence until the animal has been Shechted?

(e)But surely, if the Reisha is speaking where the Korban has already been Shechted, then, rather than cite a different case (where he sinned at that moment), the Seifa should have referred to a case where the animal had not yet been Shechted?

4)

(a)We finally establish the Beraisa - where the Dayanim were sitting at the mouth of the pit as it all happened, and they were therefore able to issue a ruling on the spot.

(b)Another Beraisa rules that if a Yotzei Lehareg who has a Chatas or an Asham waiting to be brought - then we quickly bring it on his behalf and sprinkle the blood before he dies.

(c)On the other hand, the Tana exempts him from paying for damages that he causes at that stage, because, as Rav Yosef explains - 'Ein Me'anin es Dino' (as we explained earlier).

(d)We answer Abaye's Kashya that, if so, the Reisha too, entails delaying the death sentence until the animal has been Shechted - by simply establishing the case where the Korban had already been Shechted before the death-sentence was pronounced.

(e)And when the Seifa refers to where he sinned at that moment, the Tana is not citing a new case, but means to say that - if the animal had not been Shechted, then it would be as if he had sinned at that moment (when it is obvious that we do not open a case against him then).

5)

(a)Our Mishnah rules that if a pregnant woman is sentenced to death, she is killed together with her baby. Why is that?

(b)Under which circumstances do we nevertheless wait for her to give birth?

(c)The Tana permits deriving benefit from the hair of a woman who has been put to death. What does he say about an animal that has been put to death?

(d)What is the source for this?

5)

(a)Our Mishnah rules that if a pregnant woman is sentenced to death, she is killed together with her baby - because the baby is considered part of her.

(b)We do however, wait for the birth - if she was already sitting on the birth-stool' (the contractions have begun in earnest), before the Beis-Din issued their final ruling, because once the baby has moved, it becomes an independent entity.

(c)The Tana permits deriving benefit from the hair of a woman who has been put to death - but forbids deriving benefit from an animal that has been put to death by the Beis-Din ...

(d)... because the Pasuk says in Mishpatim (in connection with an animal that is sentenced to death for killing a person) "u'Ba'al ha'Shor Naki".

6)

(a)Why is it not obvious that we kill the baby together with the mother, seeing as they are considered one body? Why might we have thought otherwise?

(b)Which Pasuk in Ki Seitzei (in connection with our case) does Rebbi Avahu cite to explain why we do not wait for the woman to give birth before putting her to death? In that case, why do the father's rights not override Inuy ha'Din?

(c)But do we not need the Pasuk "Sheneihem" to teach us that if one of the defendants is a Katan, neither of them is sentenced to death?

6)

(a)It is not at all obvious that we kill the baby together with the mother, despite the fact that they are considered one body - because the Torah in Mishpatim writes "Ka'asher Yashis alav Ba'al ha'Ishah", thereby declaring an unborn fetus the property of the father, whose ownership ought to override the prohibition of Inuy ha'Din.

(b)To explain why it does not, Rebbi Avahu Amar Rebbi Yochanan cites the Pasuk in Ki Seitzei (in connection with our case) - "u'Meisu Gam Sheneihem", which teaches us that the baby must be killed together with its mother.

(c)We do indeed need the Pasuk "Sheneihem" to teach us that if one of the defendants is a Katan, neither of them is sentenced to death - and it is therefore not from "Sheneihem" that we learn the death of the baby, but from the word "Gam".

7)

(a)Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel says that before putting a pregnant woman to death, Beis-Din strike her on the womb. Why do they do that?

(b)What does the fact that this is necessary imply?

(c)We query this however from a Mishnah in Nidah, 'Tinok ben Yomo Nochel u'Manchil'. How does Rav Sheishes explain this statement?

(d)What can we extrapolate from there that poses a Kashya on Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel?

7)

(a)Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel says that before putting a pregnant woman to death, Beis-Din strike her on the womb - to ensure that the baby does not outlive the mother, and create a disgusting scene by emerging after the mother's death.

(b)This implies that - if we did not do that, the mother would be the one to die first.

(c)We query this however from a Mishnah in Nidah, 'Tinok ben Yomo Nochel u'Manchil', which Rav Sheishes explains to mean that - the newborn baby inherits his deceased mother, even if he dies on the same day (but after her), to pass on the inheritance to his paternal brothers).

(d)We can extrapolate from there that - if the fetus has not yet been born, he will be the one to die first, which explains why Rav Sheishes confines the Mishnah to where the baby has already been born (a Kashya on Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel).

8)

(a)How do we reconcile Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel with the Mishnah in Nidah?

(b)And how do we then explain an incident where the fetus convulsed after the mother had died?

8)

(a)To reconcile Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel with the Mishnah in Nidah - we differentiate between a woman who dies (where the Mal'ach ha'Maves will get to the fetus (whose life is frail to begin with) first, and one who is killed, where the mother is bound to die first, since she is the one who has been struck the death-blow.

(b)And the incident where the fetus convulsed after the mother had died does not prove anything - since a fetus will convulse even after it has died (just like a lizard's tail).

9)

(a)What does Rav Nachman Amar Shmuel say about a woman who dies on Shabbos after her contractions have already begun?

(b)Why can he not be coming to teach us the concession of cutting her open?

(c)Then what is he coming to teach us?

(d)We ask why we do not know this already from the Mishnah in Yoma. What does the Mishnah there say about someone who has been buried alive underneath a rickety wall that fell on him on Shabbos?

(e)Why can we in fact, not learn our case from there?

9)

(a)Rav Nachman Amar Shmuel rules that if a woman dies on Shabbos after her contractions have already begun - we fetch a knife and cut her stomach open in order to take out the baby.

(b)He cannot be coming to teach us the concession of cutting the woman open - since (min ha'Torah) this is no more forbidden than cutting a piece of meat, and it is obvious that (even if there is an Isur de'Rabbanan involved), it is permitted in order to save the baby.

(c)What he is therefore coming to teach us is that - one is permitted to bring the knife, even if it means carrying it through the R'shus ha'Rabim.

(d)We ask why we do not know this already from the Mishnah in Yoma, which rules that - one is permitted to dig away the rubble from on top of someone who has been buried alive underneath a rickety wall that fell on him on Shabbos.

(e)We cannot in fact, learn our case from there - because whereas there, the buried man, who is Safek Chai, Safek Meis, Safek Yisrael Safek Cana'ani, has a Chezkas Chai, the baby in our case, does not.

7b----------------------------------------7b

10)

(a)What problem do we have with ...

1. ... our Mishnah's ruling, permitting the hair of a woman who has been killed?

2. ... Rav's answer that before the woman died, she asked for her hair to be given to her daughter?

(b)So Rav solves the problem by establishing his previous answer by a Pe'ah Nochris. What is a Pe'ah Nochris?

(c)We query Rav from Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Chanina's She'eilah regarding whether the hair of the righteous women of an Ir ha'Nidachas must be burned of not. What sort of hair is he talking about?

(d)What is the She'eilah? What happens to their other belongings?

10)

(a)The problem with ...

1. ... our Mishnah's ruling permitting the hair of a woman who has been killed - is that it part of a Meis, which is Asur be'Hana'ah.

2. ... Rav's answer that before the woman died, she asked for her hair to be given to her daughter is - why should this be any different than if she had asked for her hand to be given to her daughter (a request that we would obviously have ignored).

(b)So Rav solves the problem by establishing his previous answer by a Pe'ah Nochris - which is a wig made of another woman's hair, which women with sparse hair used to wear.

(c)We query Rav from Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Chanina's She'eilah regarding whether the hair - with reference to the wig, of the righteous women of an Ir ha'Nidachas must be burned or not.

(d)The She'eilah is that - in view of the fact that all their other belongings are burned (even their clothes), whether their wigs are different, inasmuch as they are considered part of their bodies, of not.

11)

(a)How do we extrapolate from Rav's previous ruling that a wig is considered part of the woman's body, thereby resolving Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Chanina's She'eilah?

(b)And how do we refute this proof? How do we establish the two respective cases?

11)

(a)We extrapolate from Rav's previous ruling that a wig is considered part of the woman's body (thereby resolving Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Chanina's She'eilah) - in that had the woman not asked for her wig to be given to her daughter, it would have been forbidden.

(b)And we refute this proof - by establishing that case by a wig that the woman was actually wearing at the time that she died, whereas Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Chanina is referring to a wig that is hanging on a peg, which may well not be considered part of the woman (even though whilst she wears it, it is).

12)

(a)Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak queries Rav further from the Mishnah's contrast between the woman's hair and that of an animal. What is the problem?

(b)How does Rav Nachman therefore explain the difference between the case of the woman and the case of the animal? What is it that renders the animal's hair Asur and the woman's Mutar?

(c)Which opinion enjoys the support of a Beraisa?

(d)How do we know that, when the Tana of Rav's Beraisa says 'T'nu Sa'ari le'Biti ... Meisah, Ein Nosnin, Mipnei she'ha'Meis Asur be'Hana'ah', he is referring to the woman's wig, and not to her natural hair?

12)

(a)Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak queries Rav further from the Mishnah's contrast between the woman's hair and that of an animal - implying that like the hair of the animal, the hair of the woman is her own hair and not a Pe'ah Nochris.

(b)Rav Nachman therefore explains that - whereas in the case of the woman, it is her death that renders her Asur be'Hana'ah (and her hair, which continues to grow, is not subject to death), the animal, on the other hand, is Asur be'Hana'ah due to the G'mar Din (the final ruling of Beis-Din), which incorporates its hair no less than the rest of its body.

(c)In fact (despite the Kashya that we asked on Rav) - both opinions enjoys the support of a Beraisa.

(d)We know that, when the Tana of Rav's Beraisa says 'T'nu Sa'ari le'Biti ... Meisah, Ein Nosnin, Mipnei she'ha'Meis Asur be'Hana'ah', he is referring to the woman's wig (and not to her natural hair - because in the latter case, the final phrase ('Mipnei she'ha'Meis Asur be'Hana'ah') would be redundant, since that is obvious.

Hadran alach 'ha'Kol Ma'arichin'

Perek Ein Ne'erachin

13)

(a)What does our Mishnah present as ...

1. ... the smallest Erech?

2. ... the largest Erech?

(b)What does the Tana therefore say about a case of a poor man ...

1. ... who pays a Sela and who then becomes wealthy?

2. ... who pays less than a Sela and who then becomes wealthy?

(c)According to Rebbi Meir, a man who has only five Sela'im need only give one of them to the Kohen. What do the Chachamim say?

(d)What do we learn from the Pasuk in Bechukosai "ve'Chol Erk'cha Yih'yeh be'Shekel ha'Kodesh"?

13)

(a)Our Mishnah presents as ...

1. ... the smallest Erech - a Sela (with regard to Heseg Yad, which we have already discussed).

2. ... the largest Erech - fifty Sela'im (with regard to a man between the ages of twenty and sixty).

(b)The Tana therefore rules that a poor man ...

1. ... who gives a Sela and who then becomes wealthy - is exempt from paying any more.

2. ... who gives less than a Sela and who then becomes wealthy - is obligated to pay fifty Sela'im (like the regular Din of a poor man who becomes wealthy before paying his Erech).

(c)According to Rebbi Meir, a man who has only five Sela'im need only give one of them to the Kohen. The Rabbanan - obligate him to give them all.

(d)We learn from the Pasuk in Bechukosai "ve'Chol Erk'cha Yih'yeh be'Shekel ha'Kodesh" that - the minimum Erech is one Shekel (which, with regard to Kodshim, is equivalent to one Sela).

14)

(a)Rebbi Meir learns from the fact that the Torah writes on the one hand "Chamishim Sela", and on the other, "Sela", that a man gives either the one or the other. How do the Rabbanan counter that? What do they learn from the Pasuk?

(b)How does Rebbi Meir counter the Rabbanan's proof "al-Pi asher Tasig Yad ha'Noder", that a poor man must give as much as he can afford? What does he learn from there?

(c)And what do the Rabbanan say to that?

14)

(a)Rebbi Meir learns from the fact that the Torah writes on the one hand "Chamishim Sela", and on the other, "Sela", that a man gives either the one or the other. The Rabbanan learn from there that - the smallest Erech is one Sela, and the largest, fifty Sela'im.

(b)Rebbi Meir counters the Rabbanan's proof with the Pasuk "al-Pi asher Tasig Yad ha'Noder", which teaches us that the Kohen assesses a poor man according to his own financial situation, and not according to that of the Nidar (the man whose Erech he has promised to give).

(c)The Rabbanan agree that - we learn this from 'Yad ha'Noder', nevertheless the words "al-Pi zsher Tasig" implies that he must pay as much as he can afford (and not just a Sela).

15)

(a)What does Rav Ada bar Ahavah rule (according to the Rabbanan), in a case where a poor man declared two Erchin, and the Kohen obligated him to pay four out of the five Shekalim that he owned for the second Erech, and the remaining one, for the first?

(b)On what principle is this ruling based?

(c)Why did the Kohen not obligate him to pay all five Shekalim for the second Neder?

(d)If, on the other hand, the Kohen obligated him to pay four Shekalim for his first Neder and one for the second, he would be Yotzei the second Neder, but not the first. Why is that?

15)

(a)Rav Ada bar Ahavah rules (according to the Rabbanan), that if a poor man declared two Erchin, and the Kohen obligated him to pay four out of the five Shekalim that he owned for the second Erech, and the remaining one, for the first, that he is Yotzei.

(b)This ruling is based on the principle that - If a latter Ba'al-Chov (creditor) claims his debt first, his claim is valid (and he is not obligated to hand the money over to the creditor that preceded him).

(c)The Kohen did not obligate him to pay all five Shekalim for the second Neder - because he was already Meshubad for the first one at that time.

(d)If, on the other hand, the Kohen obligated him to pay four Shekalim for his first Neder and one for the second, he would be Yotzei the second Neder, but not the first - because the Kohen should have assessed him for all five Shekalim for the first Neder.

16)

(a)Rav Ada bar Ahavah asks what the Din will be if the Noder declares 'Sh'nei Erki alai'. Other than paying two and a half Sela'im for each Neder, what might the Din be?

(b)What is the outcome of the She'eilah?

(c)Our Mishnah concludes 'Ein be'Erchin Pachos mi'Sela, ve'Lo Yeser al Chamishim Sela'. What is the Tana coming to teach us?

16)

(a)Rav Ada bar Ahavah asks what the Din will be if the Noder declares 'Sh'nei Erki alai'. Other than paying two and a half Sela'im for each Neder - he might be Chayav to pay five Shekalim for each Neder (so he pays the five Shekalim, and remains Chayav the other five).

(b)The outcome of the She'eilah is - Teiku.

(c)Our Mishnah concludes 'Ein be'Erchin Pachos mi'Sela, ve'Lo Yeser al Chamishim Sela', from which we can extrapolate that - it is possible to pay an Erech that is more than a Sela and less than fifty Sela'im (a S'tam Mishnah like the Rabbanan).

OTHER D.A.F. RESOURCES
ON THIS DAF