Explanation: This means, as we understood earlier (100b) regarding the Gid ha'Nasheh, that for this reason it takes effect on the prohibition of impurity.

Question: Perhaps we derive from here (to Gid ha'Nasheh)?

Answer: One cannot learn from here as it is an Issur Mosif because the prohibition of Aiver Min ha'Chai was added to Bnei Noach. However, Gid ha'Nasheh was only prohibited to Bnei Yisrael, meaning that it is only a stringent prohibition.

Question: If he holds that an animal when it is alive is ready to be split up into different limbs, they are prohibitions that arrive at the same time. Even the opinion that says that a stringent prohibition does not take effect when there is already a lenient prohibition would admit that these prohibitions apply.

Answer: The prohibition against impurity takes effect before the limbs are formed together with the sinews (and the prohibitions therefore are not deemed to take effect at the same time).

Question: Rabeinu Efraim asks that the very first Mishnah in Taharos states that thirteen things were stated regarding the Neveilah of a kosher bird etc. Someone who eats an Aiver Min ha'Chai from it receives lashes, and its Melikah and slaughtering cause a Treifah not to become impure (like a Neveilah). These are the words of Rebbi Meir. (This shows Rebbi Meir explicitly holds Aiver Min ha'Chai applies to birds! How can we resolve this contradiction?)

Answer: "These are the words of Rebbi Meir" is not regarding everything, rather only regarding the slaughtering and Melikah of a Treifah. Rebbi Yehudah in Zevachim (105b) indeed argues on him.

Answer (cont.): Similarly, the Mishnah's statement (ibid.) that a Neveilah of a kosher bird causes impurity of food if it is the size of an egg is also unlike the opinion of Rebbi Meir. We do not say that because the last part of the Mishnah is according to Rebbi Meir, the first part is also according to Rebbi Meir.

Question: However, based on the fact that the Gemara there wants to deduce that if the second part of the Mishnah is Rebbi Meir the first part must also be Rebbi Meir, this is difficult. On the contrary, since the middle case of Aiver Min ha'Chai is not the opinion of Rebbi Meir, the first part of the Mishnah is also not according to Rebbi Meir!

Answer: The Gemara could say that according to you etc. (In other words, there is a difficulty either way as it is also difficult to say that the end of the Mishnah is Rebbi Meir while the beginning is not Rebbi Meir!)

Question: The language of the Gemara there is slight difficult as it says, "Who do we know who is of the opinion that Melikah and Shechitah cause a Treifah bird not to become impure (like a Neveilah)? It is Rebbi Meir." Why does the Mishnah have to "deduce" this (i.e. "who do we know")? The Mishnah clearly says that these are the words of Rebbi Meir!

Explanation: The kosher bird being slaughtered does not permit it to be eaten as long as it is still thrashing around. This is apparent from the Mishnah in Taharos (1:1) that says that slaughtering it takes the Treifah out of the impurity (of Neveilah).

Explanation (cont.): It does not say that its slaughtering does not purify it, as is stated by the second part of the Mishnah (Taharos 1:3 regarding a non kosher bird). The fact that slaughtering takes away impurity is only regarding a kosher animal, as since it is kosher for a Jew it is takes away the prohibition for a Nochri. This is because there is nothing that is permitted for a Jew and forbidden to a Nochri.

Question: This is difficult. One should ask from this Mishnah on Rav Acha bar Yaakov (33a) who is of the opinion that we do not invite a Nochri to partake of intestines (before the animal is dead).

Answer: However, even without this question we established earlier that the Beraisa does not follow his opinion. The question from the Mishnah is not so simple (See Tiferes Yaakov who gives three reasons why it is not a question.)

Explanation: With everything together it must be a Kzayis, and it is not like the small amount mentioned in the second part where it is a Beryah and he only has to eat (total) a small amount.

Explanation #1: Rashi explains that Rebbi holds that Aiver Min ha'Chai does not apply to a whole bird. However, if there is a Kezayis he is liable, as it is not worse than meat from a live animal where he is liable for a Kezayis, as this is also considered meat.

Question: There is difficulty with his explanation. The Gemara says later that if he ate Aiver Min ha'Chai and meat from a Treifah, Rebbi Yochanan says he is liable for two prohibitions while Reish Lakish says he is only liable for one.

Question (cont.): We establish the case as regarding one animal which became a Treifah once most of it came out of its mother. Reish Lakish holds that an animal is not looked at as being meant for its parts, and therefore the prohibition of Aiver Min ha'Chai does not take effect on the prohibition of Treifah. According to Rashi's explanation, why shouldn't he be liable for two prohibitions due to Treifah and meat from a live animal, as these two prohibitions arrive at the same time?

Answer: One can push this question aside by saying that the case is where this limb does not have a Kezayis of meat, and he is therefore not liable due to meat from a live animal. He is only liable for Treifah because he took meat from another Treifah and combined it with this meat to form a Kezayis.

Question: This is a slightly forced answer. Additionally, why doesn't the prohibition of Aiver Min ha'Chai take effect, as there is only half of a Shiur from the Treifah?

Question (cont.): In Yoma (73b) and Shevuos (21b), the Beraisa states that if someone swears he will not eat Treifos, Neveilos, Shekatzim, and Remasim he is liable. Reish Lakish explains that this is when he states he will not eat half the amount for which one is liable to receive punishment. This implies that even though the oath does not take effect on a whole Kezayis because he is already sworn from Har Sinai not to eat it, it does take effect on half a Kezayis.

Explanation #2: It appears that just as an animal (when it is alive) is not for limbs, so too it is not for the meat that is cut off of it.

Implied Question: The Tosefta says, "a bird that does not have a Kezayis." (According to this explanation, the same should be true according to Rebbi if it was the size of a Kezayis! Why, then, is the case that there is not a Kezayis?)

Answer: This comes to emphasize the opinion of Rebbi Elazar that even so he says one is liable.

Explanation #3: The Ri understands that even according to the opinion that an animal is meant for its limbs when it is alive, it is not meant to be pieces of meat while alive.

Proof: This is as Rebbi Yochanan says later that if a person ate forbidden fat from a Treifah he is liable for transgressing three prohibitions. The case is when it became a Treifah when most of it was born, and Rebbi Yochanan holds that an animal is meant for its limbs (even while alive). The prohibition of Treifah, Cheilev, and Aiver Min ha'Chai all arrive at the same time.

Proof (cont.): Why does the Gemara say it was a Treifah? Even without the prohibition of Treifah there are three prohibitions: Aiver Min ha'Chai, Basar Min ha'Chai, and Cheilev! Rather, an animal while it is alive is not meant to be a piece of meat, and therefore the prohibition of Basar Min ha'Chai does not take effect on the other prohibitions.

Explanation: Since the Pasuk says, "And meat" he derives that this implies the meat moved from its natural place.

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that this Pasuk is required to teach us regarding meat that went out of its designated area, as stated earlier (68b). (How can both laws be derived from the same Pasuk?)

Answer: Both laws can be derived from it (see Tiferes Yaakov for explanation).

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that one does not receive lashes for transgressing a Lav she'bi'Chlalos (negative prohibition that prohibits more than one type of prohibition). (How, then, can one receive lashes for this prohibition?)

Answer: This is only true when the prohibition is not explicitly stated in the Pasuk. This applies to Pesukim such as, "Do not eat from it unless it is roasted by fire" (Shemos 12:9 regarding Korban Pesach) and "And from all that is made from the wine grape" (Bamidbar 6:4 regarding Nazir).

Answer (cont.): However, the Pasuk, "And meat in the field that is Treifah" that we explain as referring to meat and Treifah is not considered a Lav she'bi'Chlalos. They are like "raw and cooked," and "Chartzan and Zag" that are specified in the continuation of the Pesukim above (regarding Korban Pesach and Nazir) where someone who transgresses them does receive lashes. This is similar to a Kohen Gadol who marries a widow or a Kohen that marries a divorcee, as they also receive lashes.

Explanation: This is because they are derived from one Pasuk.

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that regarding something that is considered both raw and cooked (in liquid) one receives two sets of lashes (even thought they are derived from the same Pasuk). (What is the difference between the two cases?)

Answers: The case there is different as it is stated with a Vav, "And cooked" which refers back to the prohibition of "Do not eat."

Answer (cont.): Similarly, if the Pasuk would say "in the field and Treifah do not eat" he would receive two sets of lashes according to Rebbi Yochanan, one due to Basar Min ha'Chai and one due to Basar Min ha'Treifah.