Implied Question: The Gemara could have asked that Rebbi Shimon does not hold of Issur Chal Al Issur even when the Issur is inclusive, and even when a stringent prohibition is added onto a lenient prohibition such as in the case of one who eats a Neveilah on Yom Kippur. (Why didn't the Gemara say this?)

Answer: In any event, the Gemara asked a good question.

Explanation: When the animal becomes a Neveilah, it is an "Issur Kollel"-- "more inclusive prohibition."

Question: Isn't it an "Issur Mosif" - "added prohibition?" Since a prohibition is added against using the Gid for Kodshim (now that it is Neveilah), it is also added regarding it being eaten by a regular person!

Answer: He holds like the opinion earlier (90a) that a Gid is also forbidden for Kodshim.

Implied Question: When the Gemara says in Kerisus (14a) that if he was Makdish it, since it has "an added prohibition of being forbidden from benefit etc." it does not mean by "added" that this is an Issur Mosif, as our Gemara calls this an Issur Kollel. (What does it mean if not that it is an Issur Mosif, which by definition means "added?")

Answer: Rather, it means that it has an added stringency and therefore is an Issur Kollel.

Implied Question: Do not say that when our Gemara discusses an Issur Kollel it does not really mean an Issur Kollel, but rather that being forbidden from benefit is considered an Issur Mosif since originally it was permitted to benefit from it. (Why not?)

Answer #1: If so, we should not have quoted Rebbi Yosi ha'Glili. We only know that Rebbi Yosi ha'Glili holds that an Issur Kollel does not apply regarding a more lenient prohibition. However, we do not know that he holds it applies regarding a stringent prohibition, and only assume that this is true.

Answer #1 (cont.): We presume that if we do not know that he says otherwise this is the way he should hold, just as we understand Rebbi Shimon's position regarding someone who eats Neveilah on Yom Kippur.

Answer #1 (cont.): Accordingly (if our Gemara meant Issur Kollel and not Issur Mosif), we should have instead quoted Rebbi Yosi who clearly states in Yevamos (32a) that if a woman is married and she then becomes his mother-in-law she is only considered married, as he does not hold that an Issur Kollel applies. We say there that Rebbi Yosi admits that when there is an Issur Mosif it applies.

Answer #2: Additionally, if an added prohibition from benefit is considered an Issur Mosif, why does the Gemara ask later, "Even if Rebbi Yosi ha'Glili does not hold of an Issur Kollel, a stringent prohibition should take effect on an already existing lenient prohibition?" Perhaps Rebbi Yosi does not hold an Issur Kollel takes effect even if it is a more stringent prohibition, as opposed to an Issur Mosif that does! Rather, it must be that he does not consider a prohibition from benefit an Issur Mosif, but rather considers it a more stringent prohibition.

Observation: This is also how we must explain the Gemara later (113b) regarding the question, "Does Shmuel hold Issur Chal Al Issur?"

Explanation: They knew that the case was not where his friend stuck it in his mouth, as is apparent from their reply to him.

Explanation: The prohibition does not go away.

Text: We do not have the text, "As this is an Issur Mosif" as the Gemara here is not trying to say he should be liable for two prohibitions, but rather that he should be liable to bring a Chatas due to his impurity.

Implied Question: The Rabbanan said to him, "since he touched it he made it impure." (This implies the focus is on the obligation due to the impure meat).

Answer: The Rabbanan thought that Rebbi Yosi ha'Glili said he is exempt because it is already unholy (i.e. impure). He derives from Terumah that an impure person should be exempt, as the Gemara explicitly states later (113b) that if an impure person eats impure Terumah he is exempt. This is because the Pasuk says, "And they will die due to it because he will make it unholy" excluding something that is already defiled. (The Rabbanan's statement is therefore trying to prove it is unlike Terumah.)

Question: According to the Rabbanan who ask from the fact that when he touches the meat it becomes impure, when is there ever a case of an impure person who eats Terumah where he is liable to be put to death) as stated by the Torah)? Once he touches the Terumah it becomes impure!

Answer #1: For example, if his friend stuck it into his throat, he would be liable. The Rabbanan only ask their question because they know that Rebbi Yosi was not discussing this case, as we stated earlier (DH "Shapir").

Answer #2: Alternatively, he would be liable if it was not made able to become impure yet or if it was kneaded with fruit juice (which also makes it unable to become impure).

Answer #3: Truthfully, even if it would be able to receive impurity the case would be where his body became impure and only then the Terumah became impure, as we state here. The Pasuk saying that Terumah that was impure is exempt is discussing a case where it became impure before the person became impure.

Answer #3 (cont.): The Pasuk is also needed to teach in general that Ain Issur Chal Al Issur. According to the opinion that holds Issur Chal Al Issur, the Pasuk regarding Terumah is an isolated case where this rule is not applied. This is also implied later (ibid.). [See Tosfos in Sanhedrin 83b, DH "Perat."]

Opinion #1: Rashi explains that even though these two prohibitions come at the same time, the opinion that does not hold of Issur Kollel does not hold of prohibitions applying because they come at the same time.

Question: This does not appear to be correct according to the Ri, as in Yevamos (33b) the Gemara asks that if one is liable for two prohibitions due to Issur Kollel, isn't it clear he will be liable for these prohibitions that come at the same time? This indicates that even the opinion that does not hold of Issur Kollel may hold of two prohibitions that arrive at the same time (both being valid)!

Opinion #2: The Ri therefore understands that the Gemara currently thinks that these are not prohibitions that arrive at the same time. Rather, Shabbos is considered to be present first because it always arrives every week.

Question: However, there is a difficulty with this. If not for the two prohibitions arriving at the same time, why does the Pasuk say "Shabbos Hee?" Obviously he is liable because Shabbos is first!

Question: What is the question? The case there is different as there is a Pasuk teaching us there that it is different!

Answer: The Gemara is asking that we should learn from it (to the rest of the Torah).

Implied Question: One cannot say that on the contrary, we should derive from Terumah that one is exempt, as we state later (113b) that the Pasuk, "And they will die due to it because he will make it unholy" excludes something that is already defiled (meaning that we do not say Ain Issur Chal Al Issur there). (Why not learn from Terumah?)

Answer: This is because we usually compare from the stringent example, and we should learn from here.

Implied Question: The Gemara there says that Shmuel generally says Ain Issur Chal Al Issur. The case of Basar b'Chalav is different, as the Pasuk revealed to us by saying "Gedi" that this includes forbidden fat and meat from a dead animal. Even so, Shmuel does not derive from Basar b'Chalav stringently (if he did, he would hold Issur Chal Al Issur)!

Answer: This is because the laws of Basar b'Chalav are novel laws (and it is understandable that they are not meat to be applied to other prohibitions).

Proof: There are indeed texts of the Gemara there that ask, "Why don't we derive from Basar b'Chalav? This is because it is a novel law."

Question: According to Rashi's explanation that these are prohibitions that applies at the same time, and that this is indeed the conclusion of the Gemara, this is difficult.

Question (cont.): This is as the Mishnah states in Kerisus (23a) that if a piece of forbidden fat that is Chulin and a piece of forbidden fat that was Kodesh was before a person and he ate one of them by accident and is uncertain which one he ate, he brings a Chatas. Rebbi Akiva says that he also brings an Asham Taluy. This indicates that he holds Issur Chal Al Issur, and certainly that prohibitions are valid when they come at the same time.

Answer: It is possible to answer that Kodshim is different, as we say at the end of that chapter in Kerisus (ibid.) that even the opinion that normally holds Ain Issur Chal Al Issur holds that it does apply to Kodshim.

Question: Rabeinu Shmuel from Vardun asks that the Mishnah (113a) quotes Rebbi Akiva as saying that meat of a kosher undomesticated animal or bird that is cooked with milk is not forbidden according to Torah law. This is as the Pasuk states, "Do not cook a kid" three times. These three Pesukim are three exclusions for the meat of an undomesticated animal, bird, and non kosher animal.

Question (cont.): The Gemara asks (116a), didn't we say these three Pesukim are derived differently as taught by Shmuel (113b)? The Gemara answers, Rebbi Akiva holds Issur Chal Al Issur. Accordingly, forbidden fat and meat from a dead animal does not require a Pasuk. Our Gemara, however, implies that he does not even hold of two prohibitions applying when they arrive at the same time!

Answer: Our Gemara does say "switch the opinions around."

Question #1: However, it is not due to this question (which the Gemara does not seem to be addressing).

Question #2: Additionally, according to what we have explained that the Gemara here asks its question because it thought this was not an Issur where the prohibitions arrived at the same time, according to Rava's conclusion that they are prohibitions that apply at the same time it would not have said that we should switch the opinions around.

Answer: The Gemara there asks is question due to the opinion of Shmuel. If he holds like Rebbi Akiva regarding the meat of an undomesticated animal, bid, and non kosher animal, how does he derive these prohibitions? The Gemara answers that Shmuel holds Issur Chal Al Issur, meaning that he does not require a Pasuk to teach these teachings.

Question: Rebbi Akiva also holds he is exempt, as he is not someone who repents due to his knowledge that he has committed a sin, as he transgresses the very stringent prohibition of Shabbos on purpose for which one is liable to receive stoning!

Answer: Even so, Yom Kippur is considered more stringent to Rebbi Akiva, as it is a day of atonement and forgiveness.

Implied Question: The derivation from the Pasuk "You" that teaches even if you make festivals on the wrong day they are valid does not apply here. (Why wasn't this indeed considered Yom Kippur?)

Answer: This is because Yom Kippur was not instituted that year on the tenth of Tishrei. This derivation only applies if a mistake is made in arranging the days of the month (that causes a day to be a different day of the month than it was supposed to be, see Rosh Hashanah 25a).

Explanation: Rashi explains that this was long after the incident where the angel fought with him. It was when he came to Padan Aram, and Hash-m called him Yisrael.

Explanation (cont.): When the Gemara said earlier that he was not called Yisrael until Har Sinai, it means regarding the obligation of being treated as a Yisrael (versus a Ben Noach).

Explanation (cont.): The Gemara asks, why weren't they forbidden in Gid ha'Nasheh from this time onwards due to the Pasuk, "And Bnei Yisrael carried etc.?" The Gemara answers, this was not the time when the Gid moved, and it was also not Matan Torah.

Text: We do not have the text, "they should be forbidden from this incident" implying from the incident where the Gid moved, just as after the incident refers to the Gid moving.

Text (cont.): If we will say that "after this incident" refers to the blessing given to Yaakov by the angel and that Hash-m agreed to it through the angel, and that this is also what "from that incident it should be forbidden" means, it still does not match the term used earlier in the Gemara. The Gemara said, "this time was not the time of the incident" and that clearly refers to the incident of the moving of the Gid.