Explanation: This implies that if an animal is not meant for its limbs the prohibition of Treifah would be before Aiver Min ha'Chai, and therefore Aiver Min ha'Chai would not take effect despite the fact that it is an Issur Mosif because it is also forbidden to Nochrim.

Question: This is difficult. In Shevuos (21b) and Yoma (73b), regarding a person who swears that he will not eat Neveilos and Treifos, Rebbi Yochanan says that when one includes permitted items in his oath along with items that are already forbidden to him that the oath is valid. This implies that he does hold of Issur Kollel. If so, certainly he should hold of Issur Mosif, as is apparent from the Gemara in Yevamos (32b that if one holds of Issur Kollel he certainly holds of Issur Mosif as well).

Answer: It is possible to say that even though Rebbi Yochanan explains the Mishnah there as referring to an Issur Kollel, he himself does not hold of Issur Kollel.

Question: Who does he hold like? If he holds like Rebbi Elazar who says earlier (102a), "If you are commanded regarding its blood, you are commanded regarding its limbs" he should also be liable for the Aiver Min ha'Chai of this Treifah!

Question (cont.): If he holds like the Rabbanan (ibid.) who say, "Any whose flesh is permitted etc." why does he need the reason that an animal is not for its limbs?

Answer: We derive any type whose flesh is permitted etc.

Explanation: Rashi explains that when it is born the prohibition of Cheilev takes effect, as the Cheilev of a fetus is permitted from the Pasuk, "From all that is in an animal you should eat."

Question: This is difficult, as Rebbi Yochanan says (75a) that if a person tore off a piece of Cheilev from a living nine month old fetus, its Cheilev is like the Cheilev of an animal. If so, we see that the prohibition of Cheilev is before the other prohibitions!

Answer: The prohibition against Treifah and Aiver Min ha'Chai take effect on the prohibition against Cheilev which is more lenient, as it is permitted in certain circumstances (i.e. the same fat of an undomesticated animal is permitted).

Implied Question: The Gemara said, "they all take effect at the same time." (If Cheilev is indeed before the others and the others merely take effect afterwards, why did the Gemara say, "they all take effect at the same time?")

Answer: This was only stated due to Treifah and Aiver Min ha'Chai which indeed take effect together.

Question: However, this is difficult. The Gemara in Kerisus (23b) says Issur Chal Al Issur regarding Kodshim, as the Pasuk states, "All Cheilev is for Hash-m." The Gemara derives that this includes the limbs of Kodshim Kalim in the prohibition of Meilah (usurping Hekdesh). This shows that the prohibition of Meilah takes effect on the prohibition of Cheilev.

Question (cont.): The Gemara asks that according to the opinion that we do not say Issur Chal Al Issur regarding Kodshim, why does the Pasuk say "All Cheilev?" The Gemara answers that it is for offspring of Kodshim animals, and it teaches us that they have the holiness of their parent, and that the prohibitions (of Meilah and Cheilev) come together. According to Rebbi Yochanan, the prohibition of Cheilev should be first, as it takes effect when it is in its mother's womb!

Answer: The explanation seems to be that he specifically discussed tearing off a piece of Cheilev and taking it out of the mother. This is called Cheilev.

Implied Question: The Gemara says that the months cause it to become Cheilev, not it being in the air (of the world, i.e. outside its mother). (This is unlike what we are saying!)

Answer: The Gemara means that being outside its mother does not cause it to be Cheilev, but once it is Cheilev it does need to be outside the mother. Now it is understandable that the prohibitions arrive together.

Implied Question: Even though the Gemara says that the case is when it became a Treifah when most of it came out of the mother, it could also have said the case was when it became a Treifah inside the mother. In such a case he would not be liable due to Treifah until it is born, just like he is not liable for Cheilev until this point. (Why, then, does it say a case where most of it came out?)

Answer: Rather, it wanted to exclude a case where it became a Treifah after most of it came out.

Question: Rava said earlier that the case, for example, is if someone detached a limb from it and caused it to be a Treifah by doing so. The animal is not meant for its limbs, and therefore the prohibitions arrive at the same time.

Question (cont.): This implies that if it became a Treifah before the limb was ripped off, the prohibition of Aiver Min ha'Chai would not take effect on the prohibition of Treifah.

Question (cont.): If so, how can we find three prohibitions here according to Rebbi Yochanan who holds that an animal is not meant for its limbs and that the prohibition of Aiver Min ha'Chai should not take effect on the prohibition of Treifah?

Answer: The case would be where he ripped off a limb and caused it to become a Treifah, as since the prohibition of Treifah is taking effect on the prohibition of Cheilev, the prohibition of Aiver Min ha'Chai also takes effect.

Answer (cont.): The opinion that holds there are only two prohibitions does not hold that such logic applies. Rather, only the prohibition of Treifah which the Pasuk reveals takes effect indeed takes effect, not the prohibition of Aiver Min ha'Chai.

Question: According to the version of the Gemara earlier that held that everyone agrees an animal is not meant for its limbs while alive and that Rebbi Yochanan holds the prohibition of Aiver Min ha'Chai takes effect on the prohibition against Treifah, how can it be one is only liable for two prohibitions when he eats Cheilev from a live Treifah?

Answer: The case is that it became a Treifah when most of it came out. While the prohibition of Aiver Min ha'Chai takes effect on the prohibition of Treifah, it does not take effect on the prohibition of Cheilev which is stringent, as one is liable to receive Kares if he transgresses it.

Explanation: Rashi explains that the case is where a Kezayis of Aiver Min ha'Chai was split in half before he put it in his mouth. He ate one half, and then ate the other half. This implies that if he would put both halves in his mouth at the same time and swallowed them at once, he would liable according to everyone.

Question #1: This does not appear to be correct. If so, why does the Gemara ask how Reish Lakish can have a case where one is liable? He can't swallow a Kezayis at one time (i.e. swallow)?!

Proof: We say in Yoma (80a) that the area one uses to swallow can hold a K'Beitzah which is bigger than a big fig. This is apparent from the Gemara in Eiruvin (80b) that says that there are (the amount of) many such big figs in the meal set aside as an Eiruv. A big fig is bigger than a Kezayis, as is apparent in Shabbos (91a). We say in Kerisus (14a) that the area where one swallows does not hold more than two Kezaysim. This indicates that it does hold two Kezaysim.

Question #2: Additionally, just as Rebbi Yochanan would say he is liable even though he split the Kezayis in half and put the halves in his mouth at one time, as he goes after the eating of his mouth which resulted in his throat benefiting from a Kezayis at one time, so too if he swallowed one half and then the other Reish Lakish would say he is liable. This is because he says that one looks at the eating done by the stomach. Since there is a Kezayis at one time in his stomach before it gets digested, as it does not digest that quickly, he is certainly liable as is apparent later.

Explanation #2: It appears that dividing it in half makes one exempt even if he eats it at one time, as we require that the Kezayis should be one attached mass in his mouth when it is being eaten. It has to be considered an Aiver Min ha'Chai while he is eating it, as this is a novel law as Rashi himself explained. The novelty is that usually one is not liable for eating sinews and bones, while he is regarding Aiver Min ha'Chai. Accordingly, we can only say one is liable if he does the exact novel prohibition, which is to have an entire Kezayis of a limb in his mouth.

Explanation #2 (cont.): However, if he chewed it in half in his mouth he is liable, as it is a normal thing to do while chewing. Reish Lakish will say he is exempt even if he chewed it in half while it was in his mouth.

Explanation #2 (cont.): This is why the Gemara asks according to Reish Lakish, how will we find a case where he is liable while eating? The Gemara answers that this can be in a case of a small Grumisa bone (which also has meat etc. amounting to a Kezayis), that a person would not chew but rather would swallow.

Observation: However, according to Rebbi Elazar one would certainly be liable if he split it outside his mouth, as he would even say that if he ate the halves one after the other he would be liable.

Question: This is difficult. The Mishnah does not follow the style of the first Mishnah in the other chapters of Chulin that say the topic applies, "In Eretz Yisrael and outside of it, when there is a Beis Hamikdash and when there is not, both to Chulin and Mukdashin?" The Tosefta indeed states this regarding our chapter as well! (The Maharsha and Tiferes Yaakov understand Tosfos is not asking why our Mishnah does not say the above, as it is obvious and there is no need to say it. The question is, if there is no need to say it, why does the Tosefta bother to say it?) (It should be noted that the Ran and Maharam have a different understanding of Tosfos.)

Answer #1: Perhaps what is left out of the Mishnah is explained in a Beraisa, and the Beraisa (i.e. Tosefta) is teaching us that the prohibition of meat and milk applies to Mukdashin.

Answer #2: The Rashbam explains that this listing is needed in order to state that it applies outside of Eretz Yisrael. One might think it does not because it is compared to Bikurim as the Pasuk says, "The first fruits of your land...do not cook a kid in its mother's milk" (Shemos 23:19).

Observation: According to his explanation the Gemara later (136a) is understandable. The Gemara says that the Pasuk, "your land" regarding Bikurim excludes bringing Bikurim from outside of Eretz Yisrael. Even though it is a Mitzvah that is dependent on the land, it must exclude outside of Eretz Yisrael because it is compared to Basar b'Chalav.

Implied Question: Saying "besides" here is unnecessary, as one is even allowed to cook these things together. (Why, then, does it discuss putting them on the same table when they can even be cooked together?)

Answer: Rather, it is said as an aside to the first part of the Mishnah (which states that all meat cannot be cooked with milk "besides" for the meat of fish etc.).