Answer #3: Alternatively, one can answer that the case there was when it was not Mino. When there is a Kzayis of the prohibited item in the mixture that would be eaten b'Kdei Achilas Peras (of the mixture), it is deemed that the taste and physical presence of the item are present. Where there is not a Kayis that would be eaten b'Kdei Achilas Peras, it is considered as if there is taste, but not physical presence.

Opinion #1: Rebbi Yosef from Orleans explained that even though we say Ta'am k'Ikar according to Torah law, one does not receive lashes for taste even if it is not mixed with its type.

Opinion #1 (cont.): This is because Rebbi Yochanan holds like Rebbi Akiva who derives Ta'am k'Ikar from the (Torah requirement of) scalding of pots that were used by Nochrim. There is only a positive commandment (not a negative commandment that would mandate lashes) of "Taviru b'Aish" that requires kashering through fire and scalding.

Opinion #2: Rabeinu Tam replied to him that we can say that the prohibition returns.

Proof: This is as the Mishnah says in Bechoros (15b) that if a person shears or works, meaning with Pesulei ha'Mukdashin, he receives lashes. This is despite the fact that we only derive this prohibition from "you should sacrifice - and not shear" (a positive commandment). The reason this is true is because it translates back into a negative commandment of "you should not work/shear."

Question: However, this is not very similar, as the Gemara there clearly indicates that the prohibition returns. The Gemara means, "you should slaughter - I only permitted you to slaughter Kodshim that received a blemish (after they are redeemed), not to shear them."

Implied Question: The Yerushalmi in Orlah says that Rebbi Yochanan says that all things that give taste do not receive lashes unless it is regarding the prohibition of Nazir. (This implies that Rebbi Yochanan indeed holds that lashes are generally not given due to Ta'am k'Ikar.)

Answer: Rebbi Yochanan is discussing permitted items combining with forbidden items (for the amount required to receive lashes).

Answer (cont.): This is as the Gemara says in Pesachim (43b) and Nazir (35b) that Rebbi Avahu says in the name of Rebbi Yochanan that regarding all of the prohibitions in the Torah we do not find that permitted items combine with forbidden items, besides for the prohibition of Nazir. The Yerushalmi calls this "giving taste" (despite the fact that it is more accurately described as a permitted item combining with a forbidden item for the amount required to receive lashes).

Question: If Ta'am k'Ikar is a Torah law, what is the question in Pesachim (44a) and Nazir (35b) regarding the case of two boxes, one of Chulin and one of Terumah and before them are two Sa'ah etc.?

Question (cont.): The Gemara there asks from this case that if you say that eating a Kzayis b'Kdei Achilas Peras of a forbidden item makes one liable according to Torah law, why do we have to say, "that I say?" ("I say that the (contents of the) Terumah (grinder) must have fallen into the Terumah (pot) and the Chulin must have fallen into the Chulin.")

Question (cont.): According to what we have said above, even if eating a Kzayis b'Kdei Achilas Peras of a forbidden item was not a Torah requirement (to make one liable), one should still ask why one needs to say "that I say etc." as Ta'am k'Ikar is a Torah law (and this should make one liable)!

Answer: The case there is regarding Min b'Mino.

Proof: This is also implied in Yevamos (82b) where Reish Lakish establishes that this is when the Chulin is more than the Terumah. Regarding Min Shelo b'Mino, it would not make a difference if there was more of one than the other.

Question: If it is referring to a case of Mino, when there is a majority of one item it should nullify the other item even if there is still a Kzayis b'Kdei Achilas Peras!

Answer: Even so, the Gemara asks that if eating a Kzayis b'Kdei Achilas Peras of a forbidden item makes one liable according to Torah law, we should even be stringent regarding Min b'Mino. We should not say, "that I say etc.," since he would receive lashes if it were not the same type.

Question: However, there is a difficulty. The Gemara in Pesachim (43b) and Nazir (35b) is according to Rebbi Yochanan. Rebbi Yochanan establishes in Yevamos (82a) that even if one was not the majority over the other this applies (unlike Reish Lakish above in (f).

Question (cont.): If so, even if one does not have to eat a Kzayis b'Kdei Achilas Peras of a forbidden item to be liable according to Torah law, the Gemara should ask why we say "that I say etc." as being that there is no majority it is a doubt in Torah law (that should be ruled stringently)!

Answer: It could have said, "And according to your reasoning etc." We see this type of style in many places throughout the Gemara.

Question: Rabeinu Tam asks that this Pasuk of Chatas is quoted here regarding Ta'am k'Ikar. However, in Pesachim (45a) it is quoted regarding permitted items combining with prohibited items according to all opinions (there). Ta'am k'Ikar there is derived from Mishras (according to the Rabbanan), or alternatively from kashering pots of Nochri according to Rebbi Akiva. (How can we reconcile the different teachings from this Pasuk?)

Answer #1: Rabeinu Tam understands that the text here is that it is only needed for permitted items combining with forbidden items, as the Torah permitted it. This is even if there is half a Zayis that is extant from the fat of the Zeroa on the piece of the ram that is outside of the sauce.

Answer #1 (cont.): However, the text of the Sefarim (i.e. Gemaros) does not have to be changed, as it is possible to say that the simple derivation was stated. If not for the Pesukim of Mishras and kashering pots of Nochrim that teach Ta'am k'Ikar, I would have said that the Pasuk regarding Chatas teaches Ta'am k'Ikar, and not permitted items combining with forbidden items. We find this in many other places as well (that the Gemara mentions the derivation we would have derived, because it is the original derivation we would have made were it not for other derivations that cause us to alter the actual derivation that is made from this Pasuk).

Answer #2: Alternatively, our Gemara is according to a Gemara in Nazir (37b) where we have the text, "Why don't the Rabbanan derive that permitted items combine with forbidden items from Chatas?" The Gemara answers that the Rabbanan derive Ta'am k'Ikar from there.

Implied Question: Despite the fact that Mishras is also used to teach Ta'am k'Ikar, we require both Pesukim. (Why?)

Answer (cont.): If the Torah would have only written the Pasuk of Chatas, I would have thought we cannot derive Nazir from here, as one does not derive Nazir from Kodshim. If the Torah would have written this regarding Nazir, I would think that we do not derive Chatas from Nazir which is such a stringent prohibition that he cannot even have a grape peel (or some say a grape seed, see Nazir 34b).

Text: Rabeinu Chananel's text is that it should be eaten like the most stringent of the two (in any situation). This implies that there is a stringency regarding a Shelamim that does not apply to Chatas.

Text (cont.): For example, if he cooked yesterday's Shelamim in a pot that today's Chatas was cooked in, it has the stringency of a Chatas that regular Jews, women, and Kenani servants cannot eat it. It also has the stringency of a Shelamim (offered yesterday) that it can only be eaten until the night, while today's Chatas would normally be able to be eaten until the next day.

Explanation: Usually this would be prohibited. For example, if the fetus stuck its arm outside the mother, we derive earlier (68b) that the place where the meat is cut off (and certainly what was born in this fashion) is forbidden. This is evident from the derivation from the Pasuk that if it returned its hoof you are allowed to eat the place where it is cut. This indicates that if it did not return its hoof, you are not allowed to eat where it is cut.

Opinion: It appears that regarding other (parts of) Kodshim such as the chest, thigh, and limbs, even the area where they are cut is permitted. This is evident from the fact that we do not find a Pasuk specifically regarding a Zeroa that is cooked more than we do by other Kodshim. If we would derive from a fetus that the place where its limb would be cut off is forbidden, we should also derive that this applies to the Zeroa!

Opinion (cont.): Rather, regarding all Korbanos the Torah did not forbid the place where the forbidden limb was cut off. The cooked Zeroa, chest, thigh, and limbs are commanded to be taken off, but not the area where they are cut off.

Implied Question: We say here that the area is generally prohibited. (This implies it is always forbidden, unlike what we have just said.)

Answer: This is only regarding (the area cut off from) a limb that sticks out, while it (that area) is permitted regarding all Kodshim. This is why the Gemara does not ask, "What did you see that you derived etc." as we asked earlier (98b).

Explanation: Rashi explains that we require one hundred and one parts when the prohibited item is extant. However, when it is no longer extant we do not require one hundred and one.

Explanation (cont.): According to his explanation, it must be that our case is where he took away the barley from the lentils. If it would be impossible to take them away as he would not be able to identify them, but yet they would still be physically present, he would require one hundred and one parts.

Question: There is a difficulty according to Rashi's explanation. Why did the first part of the Mishnah say, "Barley sourdough that fell into a dough of wheat etc.?" This is a case of Min b'Mino. Even in a case of Aino Mino we would require one hundred and one parts if the prohibited item is extant!

Answer #1: Min b'Mino is stated to teach that even if the sourdough is removed afterwards, one hundred and one parts is still required to nullify. However, Shelo b'Mino would not require one hundred and one parts.

Answer #2: It appears that one does not have to give this forced answer. Aino Mino is nullified with sixty parts like other prohibitions even if the prohibited item is extant, since he cannot identify the prohibited item. In a case of Min b'Mino we require one hundred and one parts, as when the Sifri derives from the Pasuk, "what is holy from it" that what fell into it is caused to become holy, it is discussing Mino.

Question: The reason why it is nullified here is because the Kohen tasted it. It would be nullified with even less than sixty if the Kohen tasted it and found that the Terumah did not give any taste. This is unlike Rashi stated earlier.

Question (cont.): However, generally (without the Kohen tasting it) one hundred and one parts would be required to nullify. This is evident from the first part of the Mishnah that states that if there is taste given it would be forbidden, even if it is possible that it would be permitted through one hundred and one permitted parts. It therefore must be talking about a case where the Kohen tasted it! (If the Kohen tasted it, sixty parts is irrelevant as explained above!)

Answer: It is deducing this from an extra Mishnah. The second part of the Mishnah should have stated only, "if it does not give taste, it is permitted." I would understand that this is whether there is one hundred and one parts or not, as it is addressing the first part of the Mishnah. Rather, it must be that the reason the Tana said this again was to teach us that it is possible for taste to be nullified by a certain amount of permitted item that is less than one hundred and one parts (i.e. sixty parts).

Explanation #1: Rashi explains that the Gemara means it does have one hundred and one parts of permitted item, but it has one hundred parts permitted item aside from the forbidden item and is permitted.

Explanation #1 (cont.): The Gemara asks, the first case of the Mishnah is regarding Min b'Mino where we are always stringent, and even so it is nullified with one hundred parts permitted item when there is not taste.

Explanation #1 (cont.): This is as the Mishnah states, "If there is not enough...or if there is not enough to cause it to ferment, it is forbidden." We originally thought that this means that there are one hundred and one parts together with the prohibited item, meaning that it is nullified with one hundred parts of the permitted item.

Explanation #1 (cont.): This implies that the second part of the Mishnah is discussing sixty parts. The difference between them is that one does not require one hundred and one parts when taste is not given, and one does.

Question #1: This explanation is extremely forced. Why would the editor of the Gemara think that the terminology of the Mishnah would change from the first part of the Mishnah to the second part of the Mishnah?

Question #1 (cont.): Since he explained that the one hundred and one of the second half of the Mishnah is one hundred and one parts of permitted item, why shouldn't the one hundred and one parts discussed in the first part of the Mishnah regarding a case of Min b'Mino similarly be one hundred and one parts of permitted item as is indeed the conclusion of the Gemara? The editor should not have made such a mistake!

Question #2: Additionally, the Gemara asks why it isn't nullified with one hundred and one parts. What made him require one hundred and one parts of permitted item?

Answer: It appears that Rashi had to explain that it was talking about one hundred and one parts of permitted item because of the Gemara's question that if there is one hundred and one parts of permitted item, what reason is there that it should not be nullified?

Explanation #2: When the Gemara says, "no, with one hundred" it appears to mean one hundred together with the prohibited item. The questioner thought that this means one hundred without the prohibited amount.

Explanation #2 (cont.): He therefore asked that the first part of the Mishnah says that one hundred and one does not nullify, meaning there are one hundred parts of permitted item and one part that is not permitted.

Proof: This is like in any situation such as Terumah, where Terumah is nullified with one hundred parts Chulin and one part Terumah. This is as we derive, "from it - that it fell in it, it makes holy like it."

Explanation #2 (cont.): Accordingly, the second part of the Mishnah must be discussing sixty parts. If it would be discussing one hundred and one parts, what is the stringency of Min b'Mino over Aino Mino. They both would only be nullified with one hundred and one parts, not less!

Explanation #2 (cont.): The Gemara answers that the first half of the Mishnah is discussing one hundred and one parts including the prohibited part, whereas the second half of the Mishnah is discussing one hundred parts together with the prohibited part. When both the first and second half of the Mishnah discuss nullification with one hundred and one parts, it means including the prohibited part.

Explanation #2 (cont.): When the Gemara asks, if there is enough to cause (the wheat) it to become leaven with one hundred and one parts why isn't it nullified, it is a new question that is unrelated to the previous answer.

Explanation #2 (cont.): Since causing dough to become leaven is not exactly giving it taste like a normal transfer of taste, the Gemara does not understand why it is not nullified with one hundred and one parts. It should be similar to milk that stays (in the skin of the abomasum from a kosher animal).

Explanation #2 (cont.): This is as the Mishnah states later (116a) that if someone puts milk in the skin of the abomasum, if the skin gives taste to the milk it is prohibited. This implies that if it would not give taste, it would be permitted even though the milk was put there (to be turned into cheese). This is because leaving milk to sit in this skin is not automatically considered transfer of taste. The same applies to causing dough to leaven. The Gemara answers, sourdough is different as it has a significant impact on the dough (and therefore needs more permitted parts to nullify it).

Question: Rabeinu Tam asked, why doesn't the Gemara answer that one is his opinion and one is the opinion of his Rebbi in the name of Rabban Gamliel, as the Gemara answers in Zevachim (79a)?

Answer: The Gemara here has a better answer.

Question: Brine generally has water, as stated in Bechoros (22a) that if someone buys brine from an Am ha'Aretz he should connect it to water (of a Mikvah) and it is pure. If so, you should say that its type is taken away as if it is not present, and what is not its type is more than it and therefore nullifies it!

Answer #1: The Gemara here is discussing brine that does not contain water. This is as the first part of the Mishnah (Terumos 10:8) discusses a case of an unkosher fish that is pickled together with a kosher fish. It says that the brine in any barrel that contains two Sa'ah and has the weight of ten Zuzim (or Selaim) in Yehudah, which is five Zuzim in Galil, of unkosher fish is forbidden. This means that the brine of an unkosher fish is forbidden, and one does not put water in the barrel of fish lest the fish become ruined.

Answer #2: Alternatively, it is possible that being that it said an amount that is close to one two hundredth of the barrel, it must be that all two hundred would nullify the Revi'is (of unkosher brine). If they would not nullify and there is water present, it would not be close to two hundred parts (required for nullification).

Explanation: This is only forbidden according to Rabbinic law. However, consuming brine of Sheratzim is a Torah prohibition. This is as the Beraisa states later (120a) that "that are impure" forbids their brine, sauce, and gravy. This is a Torah derivation, as the Gemara there states, "and this is needed, as if the Torah stated Sheratzim etc."

Implied Question: In Bechoros (6b), the Gemara asks that the reason that the milk of a non kosher animal is forbidden is either because of the Gezeirah Shaveh "Gamal - Gamal" or according to Rebbi Shimon it is the Pasuk "Es ha'Gamal." Otherwise, I would think that the milk of a non kosher animal is permitted.

Implied Question (cont.): However, doesn't the Beraisa state, "the impure ones" excludes their brine, sauce, etc.? This is despite the fact that the Toras Kohanim also derives regarding fish from the word "Sheketz" that their brine, sauce, and gravy is prohibited.(Accordingly, how can we say that fish brine is a Rabbinic prohibition?)

Answer: It is only an Asmachta.

Implied Question: The Gemara asks a question later (112b) according to Rav who forbids slaughtered meat that was salted together with non kosher meat from "the impure ones" which excludes their brine etc. It asks from the Mishnah in Terumos (10:8) regarding a kosher fish that was salted together with non kosher fish which is permitted. (How can it ask this question if we have established that this is only a Rabbinic prohibition?)

Answer: It still is a good question from fish on meat, as fish brine is at least forbidden according to Rabbinic law. It must be that when we say that it is permitted (and not forbidden mid'Rabbanan) when they are salted together, it is because they do not absorb from each other. (Accordingly, the meat should also be permitted!)

Question: This is a slight difficulty. A Pasuk is needed (to forbid brine etc.) regarding a Sheretz. There is a derivation regarding a non kosher animal in Toras Kohanim due to the fact that it is says, "They are impure for you." Regarding fish, which do not have a Pasuk, there is no Torah prohibition. If so, how can Rava there bring a proof from "the impure ones" to prohibit the brine of a Treifah? (It seems each category requires its own separate derivation, or it is not forbidden!)

Explanation #1: Rashi understands this means the vegetable part of the turnip (plant).

Explanation #2: The Gemara in Sanhedrin implies (19b) when it says that his flesh became like the heads of "Liftos" that this refers to the roots of the turnip that are in the ground. Similarly, the Gemara in Shabbos (118b) says that one can honor him with heads of garlic (that are in the ground) and big fish.

Opinion: According to our Halachic ruling that there is no flavor in the Gid ha'Nasheh, it is forbidden from benefit.

Proof: This is explained in Pesachim (22a), where the Gemara asks a question on the opinion of Rebbi Avahu that whenever the Torah prohibits eating something etc. it also means that it is forbidden from benefit.

Proof (cont.): The Gemara asks, Gid ha'Nasheh etc. (one is allowed to send to a Nochri as part of a gift of a thigh of meat). It answers that when Neveilah was permitted for benefit, it was permitted along with its Gid (i.e. every Gid, even not in a Neveilah). The Gemara concludes that according to the opinion that there is no taste in Gidin, it would be prohibited from benefit as well.

Implied Question: One should not have difficulty with the fact that people sell meat that needs to have the Gid taken out even though the Gid is mixed in with it. (Isn't it prohibited from benefit?)

Answer: The Nochri does not pay for the parts of the meat that have no taste, among them the Gid. (Accordingly, the seller is not benefiting from the Gid.)

Opinion: However, it is forbidden to send a whole thigh to a Nochri if he is honored by the fact that it is an entire thigh (as the fact that the Gid is included is part of the specialty of this whole thigh).

Implied Question: The Mishnah (93b) states that a person may send an entire thigh etc. (Isn't this unlike what we have just stated?)

Answer: The Gemara there establishes this Mishnah as being unlike Rebbi Shimon who says that Gidin have no taste and are prohibited from benefit.

Opinion #1: Rashi explains that this is specifically regarding the Gid itself. However, its fat does have taste. If the fat is not taken away, it is prohibited.

Opinion #2: Earlier (97a, DH "Shani"), I explained regarding the Gemara's answer that "fat is different as it bubbles" (up, see ibid.) in the name of Rabeinu Meir that they were no more stringent regarding the fat than they were regarding the Gid. (See Tosfos ibid. at length.)