Observation: The same is true regarding the rest of the egg if it contains blood, as this causes a problem with the entire egg.

Opinion: It appears that a non kosher egg that is peeled might also prohibit.

Opinion (cont.): When the Yerushalmi discusses cooking eggs, it implies that there is a difference between peeled and non peeled eggs.

Opinion (cont.): Perhaps it is a difference that applies here as well (regarding a non kosher egg).

Implied Question: Our Gemara does not answer that in one case it is peeled and in one case it is not. (Why not?)

Answer: This is because most eggs are presumed cooked in their shell.

Observation: The Gemara here does not ask why it is necessary to say twice "Assuros" - "they are forbidden."

Observation (cont.): In many other places, this question is asked. (See Tosfos Bechoros 31b, DH "Im Kein.")

Opinion #1: The Aruch connects this words with its usage in Sanhedrin (7a), "She sleeps, and her basket is lower." This means that "Dikula" is a basket.

Opinion #1 (cont.): The Teshuvos ha'Gaonim writes that this means that it fell into a big pot that contains the amount of a basketful (of meat).

Question: This is difficult. Since it did not fall into a basket, why would Rav Ashi think to measure it with what a basket would absorb?

Opinion #2: Rashi explains that a Dikula is a pot in which one cooks meat. This is as stated in Bava Basra (74a) that every thirty days Gehinnom turns them over like meat in a pot.

Opinion #2 (cont.): Perhaps this is called a "Dikula" because of the boiling that rises up from inside of it that is called Dikuli.

Proof: This is as stated in Pesachim (39b) that Rav Yosef says that a person should not cook two grains of wheat together on Pesach, as perhaps one will stick to the side of the other, and the "Dikula" - "boiling" of the water will not reach it from all four sides (causing it to become Chametz).

Implied Question: We cannot extrapolate anything from the fact that he did not explicitly state it is permitted if there is sixty and it. (Why not?)

Answer: Perhaps Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi himself was unsure regarding the Halachah in this case.

Question: However, there is a difficulty. Later, Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi says that all prohibited items in the Torah are nullified with sixty equivalent parts of permitted items. This implies that when there are sixty parts that are permitted, such as in a case of a Gid and sixty parts permitted items not including the Gid, it is permitted!

Answer: Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi said that in the name of Bar Kapara. In our Gemara, since he says it is forbidden with sixty, the implication is that when there are sixty parts of permitted items it is still permitted! This is why we can say that Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi himself was unsure of the Halachah in this case.

Explanation: Rashi explains that even though it does not give off any taste, it requires Shishim to permit it.

Implied Question: This does not seem correct. The proof from the Gemara later that he quotes to support his position I will explain later, with the help of Hash-m Yisbarach.

Implied Question: Rashi comments that it is not clear how the term "Besheilah" - "cooked" means "Shleimah" - "whole."

Answer: It appears that "Besheilah" implies "cook it" due to the Lamed having a dot and a Mapik Heh, as if to say "like it has" meaning "as it is" (which is whole).

Explanation: This is because there is no Pasuk that is taken out of its simple meaning.

Observation: However, according to the other version that he cooks it in another pot, according to the Tana Kama the Pasuk is indeed taken out of its simple meaning.

Explanation #1: Rashi explains that this refers to the Tana Kama. When the Pasuk implies whole, it means that it is not cut up into pieces.

Implied Question: Accordingly, the first "Mar Savar" of the first version is unlike the first "Mar Savar" of the alternate version which is Rebbi Shimon.

Explanation #2: It appears that the opinion that says it is cut off and then cooked is Rebbi Shimon ben Yochai. However, the Tana Kama understands that it is cooked and then cut off, meaning it is cooked whole so that the animal remains whole until after it is cooked. Accordingly, the first "Mar Savar" that is Rebbi Shimon ben Yochai is the same according to both versions.

Explanation #2 (cont.): However, according to the second version one must say that whole means that it should not be cut up into pieces.

Observation: This is not a regular Torah derivation teaching that Min b'She'aino Mino is nullified if the taste is not present. Our Gemara's case is Min b'Mino which is nullified by a majority of permitted items according to Torah law!

Observation (cont.): Rather, nullification through sixty or one hundred times the amount of permitted items was a tradition, and they "leaned it" on this Pasuk.

Observation (cont.): Even so, the Gemara is asking a good question from the Beraisa that says this is a permitted item that is coming from a prohibited item. This implies that this is a permitted item that would normally be deemed forbidden.

Question: What is the question? Perhaps this is only regarding the Halachah that one cannot nullify something Lechatchilah, while here it is permitted!

Answer: The phrase, "this is a permitted item that comes from a prohibited item" implies that it is from something that is forbidden to be eaten.

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that we do compare in a stringent manner.

Answer: Since it is possible to establish the Pasuk regarding the blood of the bull as only being relative to the laws of sacrifices as per the opinion of the Rabbanan in Menachos (22b), we should even compare regarding the cooked Zeroa in a lenient manner.

Proof: Indeed, the Gemara later asks, "On the contrary, we should derive from here in a lenient manner." This is because we can establish the Pasuk regarding Chatas and Mishras as regarding a permitted item joining a forbidden item. The Gemara there concludes that all of the Pesukim are necessary, as stated in Nazir (37b).

Question: This is understandable if it is the same type. However, if it is not the same type it should not be nullified, as Ta'am k'Ikar is a Torah law!

Answer #1: This is not an actual derivation, as I have explained.

Answer #1 (cont.): Regarding Min b'Mino we derive stringently, and regarding Aino Mino one opinion holds that more than sixty parts (permitted item) causes nullification of the taste, while the other holds one hundred parts are required for nullification of the taste. This is "leaned" on this Pasuk.

Answer #2: Additionally, sometimes it (the taste) stops with less than sixty or one hundred. If so, when we derive that until there are sixty or one hundred parts it is forbidden, this is a stringent derivation.

Explanation #1: Rashi explains that this excludes other Kodshim. However, we can derive Chulin from it regarding one hundred and sixty, as according to Torah law it is nullified with a majority. The stringency of this derivation is that even so it should only be nullified with one hundred or sixty. (In other words, Rava holds that Ta'am k'Ikar is not a Torah law, but rather a Rabbinic stringency.)

Explanation #1 (cont.): This implies that Rashi means that when our Gemara discusses Ta'am k'Ikar it does not mean actual (i.e. strong) taste, as it is nullified with one hundred or sixty. Rather, it means a small (i.e. weak) amount of taste.

Explanation #1 (cont.): It also must be that in this situation it would be forbidden for Kodshim, despite the fact that it is only a small taste. When the Gemara asks that we should derive from this, it means that we should permit even meat of Kodshim to be nullified in one hundred or sixty times its amount like a Zeroa cooked (together with the rest of the ram, as discussed earlier).

Question #1: This is difficult, as we are not discussing actual taste but rather small taste. Accordingly, who forced Rashi to explain that Rava holds Ta'am k'Ikar regarding Chulin is not a Torah law? Our Gemara is not discussing a real taste, but rather a small taste! (Of course Rava holds Ta'am k'Ikar is a Torah law regarding actual taste!)

Question #2: There is an additional difficulty. Obviously a small amount does not cause something to be forbidden regarding Kodshim, as only Olos can become forbidden in this manner according to the Rabbanan, and only Min b'Mino can be forbidden in this manner according to Rebbi Yehudah in the Gemara in Menachos (22-3a).

Proof #1: Similarly, Reish Lakish says in Zevachim (78a) that a person who mixes Pigul, Nosar, and Tamei and eats them is exempt (from offering a sacrifice). The Gemara says, this proves that giving taste to a majority (even though the majority is not this item) is not a Torah law (that this is considered like that prohibited item). This implies that even giving taste is not forbidden with its type, and the cooked Zeroa and the Chatas in our Gemara are discussing Mino.

Proof #2: Similarly, the Gemara in Menachos (23b) says that two Menachos that each had a Kometz taken from them but later became mixed up are nullified by majority according to the Rabbanan who says that Min b'Mino is nullified. This shows that there is no prohibition of a small amount forbidding in Kodshim. This is evident in many places.

Explanation #2: It appears that our Gemara is discussing an actual taste, which is forbidden in Kodshim due to the Pasuk of "Chatas" (Vayikra 16:18) and which is forbidden in Chulin due to the Pasuk of "Mishras" (Bamidbar 6:3, see Pesachim 45a).

Explanation #2 (cont.): Rather, Kodshim is stated because we are discussing the cooked Zeroa and the rest of the ram is deemed permitted. This is because there are times when the Zeroa and part of the ram are outside the sauce, and the Zeroa gives a taste to the rest of the meat that is outside the sauce. Sometimes, the fattiness of the Zeroa will be much more than the rest of the meat, until the rest of the meat will not be a majority that will able to nullify the Zeroa. Even so, the Pasuk said the rest of the meat is permitted.

Explanation #2 (cont.): Rava does not argue on Rebbi Yochanan regarding the teaching of "Mishras" (that Ta'am k'Ikar is a Torah law), and agrees it is a real derivation and not an Asmachta.

Proof: This is because from the position of Rebbi Akiva we can understand the position of the Rabbanan. Rebbi Akiva derives Mishras as allowing permitted items to combine with forbidden items to cause a person to be liable for lashes. The Rabbanan who says the Pasuk teaches Ta'am k'Ikar will also say such a person receives lashes.

Implied Question: Abaye says later (108a) that we see from here that taste without physical presence is a Torah prohibition. The Gemara asks, if it would be a Rabbinic prohibition, why don't we derive it from Basar b'Chalav? The Gemara answers, it is a novel law. The Gemara asks, if it is a novel law, even if it would not give taste it should be prohibited! Rava answers, the Torah only forbade it through cooking. This means that in fact Rava holds Ta'am k'Ikar is Rabbinic in nature (unlike what we have just said)!

Answer: Rava is merely pushing aside the proof, meaning that there is no proof from Basar b'Chalav (not saying that he actually holds Ta'am k'Ikar is Rabbinic in nature).

Implied Question: In Avodah Zarah (67a), Rebbi Yochanan says that taste without physical presence is forbidden, but one does not receive lashes for this. (We see clearly that Ta'am k'Ikar is not necessarily a Torah law!)

Answer: This is regarding Mino, as according to Torah law it is nullified with a majority (and therefore one cannot receive lashes due to taste alone when the physical presence of the taste is nullified according to Torah law). When he says that taste with physical presence receives lashes, he means that the prohibited item is clearly extant (on its own) and identifiable.

Implied Question: Rebbi Yochanan says taste without physical presence does not receive lashes. (Why doesn't he say this regarding physical presence that is nullified if he held one possibly is not liable for physical presence of the prohibited item?)

Answer #1: He agrees that one does not even receive lashes if there is physical presence of the prohibited item, as long as it is mixed up so that it is not recognizable. He said a case where it is not physically present in order to be able to make a general statement.

Answer #2: Alternatively, he said that there is no physical presence in order to show that even so it will still be prohibited to eat it.