Suggestion: Perhaps the reason is that for a small reason, we should be lenient on orphans not to take money from them.

Limitation: Only there, we say that if one ruled like Rav and Shmuel, it stands, but not elsewhere, like it says there "let us not add to this!"

Implied question: When both are suspected to swear falsely, even if his opponent is obligated only a Shevu'ah mid'Rabanan, even so, [the claimant] loses!

Answer: This is because the Shevu'ah comes due to the defendant, who was obligated a Shevu'ah mid'Oraisa. Therefore, also regarding the claimant (who must swear mid'Rabanan to collect when the defendant cannot swear) it is considered like mid'Oraisa.

Objection #1 (Ri): If so, what was the question against Rav Nachman (Shevu'os 48a), who said "if [the law of] Rav and Shmuel is correct (the Halachah follows them), it is correct. If it is not correct, it is not correct", and we asked "'if it is correct, it is correct' shows that Rav Nachman is unsure [whom the Halachah follows]. However, a case occurred, and Rav Nachman ruled that they divide!

(What was difficult?) Rav Nachman can hold like Rav and Shmuel, for [Rav Nachman] also holds that since the claimant cannot swear, he loses. Therefore, the law is that they divide when both are suspected. Also Rav and Shmuel hold like this!

Suggestion: We asked "this shows that Rav Nachman is unsure!", for surely Rav Nachman holds like Rav and Shmuel.

Rejection #1: [The question against Rav Nachman began through citing] his words "if it is correct, it is correct." This connotes unlike this. [If he surely holds like them], it should have said just the contrary, "[why did he say] if it is not correct, it is not correct?" This shows that he is unsure" (perhaps the Halachah does not follow them)!

Rejection #2: Perhaps only when both are suspected, that a Shevu'ah comes to the claimant because the defendant is obligated a Shevu'ah mid'Oraisa, Rav Nachman said that since he cannot swear, he loses, like R. Tam explained, but not in this case of Rav and Shmuel, like I explained!

Objection #2: [According to R. Tam,] how is it proven that "Raboseinu in Bavel, who say that [R. Meir means that] the Shevu'ah returns to Sinai (Beis Din does not force anyone to pay)", refers to Rav and Shmuel, due to the case of orphans from orphans?

In this case, even R. Aba and Rav Nachman can hold like Rav and Shmuel, and Rav and Shmuel can properly hold that the Shevu'ah returns to the one who was obligated to take it, or they divide, for they hold that one who cannot swear, he loses!

Inference: It was obvious to the Gemara that according to R. Aba, there is no distinction. Whether the defendant was obligated [to swear], or the claimant, since [not any] one of them cannot swear, the defendant pays...

And according to Rav and Shmuel, the defendant is always exempt. R. Aba argues with Rav Nachman, and with Rav and Shmuel.

Therefore, it is properly proven that Raboseinu who say that the Shevu'ah returns to Sinai, refers to Rav and Shmuel. The entire Sugya connotes that R. Aba argues with Rav and Shmuel.

Source #1: Rabah said "presumably, R. Aba is correct."

Source #2: It says "how do Rav and Shmuel expound "Bein Sheneihem?" This connotes that they argue.

Answer: (R. Tam): The deduction that "Raboseinu in Bavel" refers to Rav and Shmuel is primarily based on Sanhedrin (17b). We hold there that "Raboseinu in Bavel" [always] refers to Rav and Shmuel;

It means as follows. "Raboseinu in Bavel" refers to Rav and Shmuel, like we hold, and we know also that they hold that one does not bequeath a Shevu'ah to his children;

Since a litigant is obligated to swear, and he cannot swear, money stays in its place. They do not distinguish between a claimant and a defendant.

Rebuttal: This is difficult.

Explanation #1 (R. Chananel): We do not find a source elsewhere in the Gemara where Rava said these words.

Explanation #2: We received from our Rebbeyim that the primary source is in Shevuos (47a). Rava said that presumably, R. Aba is correct. Since he cannot swear, he pays.

Implied question: According to letter of the law, we should say so when he is suspected to swear falsely (since he cannot swear, he must pay, and the claimant need not swear)!

Answer: They enacted that his opponent swears and receives, for if not, it is impossible [for him to manage]. One who wants [to swindle] could lend to [one suspected] a Perutah, and claim all his property from him;

He will be Modeh b'Miktzas about how much he owes, and he will be obligated to swear, and since he cannot swear, the claimant will take everything he has, without a Shevu'ah!

Therefore, they enacted that his opponent swears. However, here, and regarding the ingot, the reason he cannot swear is not because he is suspected;

Rather, regarding this claim he cannot swear due to the episode. [In such a case, Chachamim] did not obligate his opponent to swear.

Explanation: This Sugya is like R. Chiya bar Yosef, who holds in Bava Kama (107a) that the Torah wrote Eruv Parshiyos here (what is written here applies somewhere else, and not here);

"Ki Hu Zeh" (written regarding Shevu'as ha'Shomerim) refers to a loan, but [the Shevu'ah for] a deposit does not require denial and admission together with [the claim of] Ones, like R. Chiya bar Aba requires, in the name of R. Yochanan;

He argues with the Beraisa of Rami bar Chama, which obligates three cows. Rather, it suffices with two cows, with admission and denial, or admission and a claim of Ones.

R. Tam's text did not say "this is only regarding a loan, but regarding a deposit, he is very brazen."

The Ri's text says so. He explains "this is only regarding a loan, but regarding a deposit, i.e. a claim that applies to only to a deposit, i.e. Ones, he is very brazen, for his friend does not know that he is lying, and he is liable even without admission."

Explanation #1: According to Riva, here that the renter claims "it died normally, but I do not know if it was at the time of borrowing or at the time of rental..."

Granted, the Shevu'ah that it died normally, i.e. Ones, does not require admission. However, his claim "I do not know if it was borrowed or rented", i.e. denial, requires admission;

Therefore, we establish the Reisha with two cows and the Seifa with three. Now, there is one of admission, and he is obligated a Shevu'ah to swear that the rented cow died. If not for the cow of admission, this would be total denial, and he would be exempt;

He cannot make him swear through Gilgul on the Shevu'ah that it died normally, like I explained in our Mishnah (97a DH b'Yom, since it is not a Vadai claim.

Explanation #2: According to R. Tam, it is better. According to him, even the Shevu'ah that it died normally requires admission. Rami bar Chama establishes it with three cows, and like R. Chiya;

One is of admission, and one is of denial, i.e. the one he says never occurred, and one that died through Ones. This is the one that he claims "I do not know [if it was borrowed or rented]", that he claims that it died normally.

Question: It suffices with two - the one of admission, and the one of "I do not know", which has in it Ones and denial!

Answer: It is a Gezeiras ha'Kasuv that it does not count for both. "Ki Hu Zeh" connotes that there is denial and admission, aside from the one about which he claims that he was not negligent.

Inference: From here we can prove that according to Rami bar Chama, denial and admission without Ones do not suffice, unlike I explained in Bava Kama (107a) in the name of R. Tam.

If it sufficed, he would not need to add a cow of denial according to him, for it would suffice with the one of admission and I do not know, just like according to R. Chiya bar Yosef.

Question: How can R. Chiya bar Yosef argue with the Beraisa of Rami bar Chama?

Answer: He holds like our Mishnah in Shevuos (42b) in which this one says "[I deposited with you] up to the ledge", and this one says "up to the window", or "I lent to you a Sela on [this security]..." or "I handed over to you 10 laden vines...: In all of them, we require only denial and admission.

Question: How can R. Yochanan argue with our Mishnah and hold like Rami bar Chama's Beraisa? R. Yochanan said that the Halachah follows a Stam Mishnah!

Answer #1: Amora'im argue about R. Yochanan's opinion, like it says in Chulin (43a).

Answer #2: He will say that in all the Mishnayos, [the Tana] was not concerned to mention [the animals of] Ones, like we establish our Mishnah here.

Question #1: This is difficult for R. Tam, for below, when this one says "the borrowed [cow died]", and this one says "the rented one", he swears, we ask "what is the reason? What he claimed, he did not admit to!"

We ask according to Rav Huna and Rav Yehudah, for they do not require a cow of admission, and he totally denies, like Rashi explained;

If so, what was the answer that it is through Gilgul, that he said to him "swear to me that it died normally"? According to R. Tam, since there is no admission, he is not obligated to swear, even through a claim of Ones!

Question #2: Without Rashi's explanation (that the question was against Rav Yehudah), we could ask how Rav Yehudah can answer, since there is only one cow!

Answer #1: According to Riva (the renter claims that it died normally, but he is unsure if it was borrowed or rented), this is fine.

Answer #2: The Shevu'ah is mid'Rabanan. Mid'Rabanan, there is a Shevu'ah that Ones occurred, without any admission;

Above, [the Gemara] requires admission, because "I do not know" is denial, like I explained according to Riva.

Support: This is how R. Tam explains in Bava Basra (70b), it says "if he would say that Ones occurred, would he not need to swear?!", i.e. mid'Rabanan;

There is a Shevu'ah mid'Rabanan before Shevu'as Heses [was enacted], e.g. one who is Pogem her Kesuvah, or one witness testifies that it was paid, in Kesuvos (87a).

Answer #3 (R. Tam): Rav Yehudah establishes also our Mishnah like Rav Nachman, and there is one [cow] of admission;

He asks as follows. "What he claimed, [the defendant] did not admit to!" I.e. why must he swear that the rented cow died? He should swear that the borrowed cow is intact, and this is the one that he returns to him. This answers his claim that the borrowed cow died!

We answer "through Gilgul", i.e. since he must swear about the one that died normally, Rabanan established the other Shevu'ah also on it through Gilgul, for it is better to make two Shevu'os about one cow than about two cows.

However, the case in Bava Basra (70a) we cannot establish when there is another cow of admission, for we should establish it when there is no admission, and it is fine.

Inference: If he rented it b'Ba'alim, and then rented it Lo b'Ba'alim, obviously the [first] rental keeps its status (it is still considered Lo b'Ba'alim).

Question: We say above (96b) that rental b'Ba'alim uproots rental Lo b'Ba'alim. This shows that the latter does not join with the first!

Answer: It is a Gezeiras ha'Kasuv that when it is b'Ba'alim, whether the first or second time, he is exempt.

Question: If so (this is the text), what was the fourth question "if he rented b'Ba'alim and borrowed Lo b'Ba'alim and rented again, what is the law? Does rental return to its place (b'Ba'alim), or not?"

Since the borrowing in the middle is not considered b'Ba'alim, how could rental return to its place to be considered b'Ba'alim, since "b'Ba'alim" ceased with the borrowing in the middle? This is totally unreasonable.

Suggestion: The fourth question is not according to the "if you will say" that we said, rather, according to if we would say "if you will say that we say that since it partially applies, it is as if it totally applies" (unlike we assumed in the preface to the third question);

His Safek is, since "b'Ba'alim" did not cease, it returns to its place. Or, perhaps it does not return to its place, for borrowing interrupts...

Since due to the She'elah, the last rental cannot be considered b'Ba'alim, for we do not say twice "it pertains to", also [b'Ba'alim] does not return to its place!

Rejection #1: If so, the Gemara should have specified "if you will say..." that [this suggestion] said (i.e. since it partially applies, it is as if it totally applies).

Rejection #2: If so, why did we need to say in the third question "if you will say that he did not say [...it is as if it totally applies]", since even if he said, it is a proper question, just like the fourth question returns to "if you will say that we say"!

Answer: The correct text is like it says in Seforim in the third question "if you will say that we say that since it partially applies, it is as if it totally applies..."

Support: It seems that this was in Rashi's text, but he changed it to say "we do not say."

Explanation: It is obvious to the Gemara that if we do not say, if he borrowed b'Ba'alim and rented and borrowed, borrowing does not return to its place, since it is not proper to join with rental before it;

Even if the rental itself was b'Ba'alim, the rental interrupts [the borrowings]. It does not return to its place, even though b'Ba'alim did not cease in the middle.

Distinction: However, if you will say that he asks whether the borrowing returns to its place, since it is proper to join with rental before it, if the rental itself was b'Ba'alim, also now that [the rental] was not b'Ba'alim, it is not an interruption, and the borrowing returns to its place;

Or, perhaps it does not return;

This is because the borrowing cannot join with the rental before it and be considered She'elah b'Ba'alim, because the rental itself is considered b'Ba'alim only because it pertains to the She'elah before it;

We do not say twice "it pertains", and [the rental] is an interruption, and the She'elah does not return to its place.

Explanation (cont.): The fourth question is similar. It is not dependent on the previous one, therefore it does not say "if you will say that...", and if you resolve the third question [one way], also the fourth is resolved.

Question: In Bava Kama (104a), Shmuel said that we do not send deposited money based on a letter [from the owner saying to send it], even if witnesses signed on it.

The Gemara asks what solution there is according to Shmuel, and answers like R. Aba. It helps that he writes '[when you give it to the Shali'ach, it is as if] I received it.'

Now, without "I received it", it helps if he can write "send to me", for there is no reasoning to distinguish between writing and saying face to face. Just like it helps when he says, it helps also when he writes;

What was difficult "what solution is there"? There is a great solution. The witnesses will write to him and sign that Ploni said that [the Shomer] should send!

Answer: It is obvious that he can find simple solutions according to Shmuel, just like according to R. Yochanan;

He asked "what solution is there" only because he wants to bring R. Aba's teaching, and conclude that even "I received" does not help if [the owner, who] made the Shali'ach died and the property fell to his heirs before it came to the Shali'ach, and the only solution is through Harsha'ah (power of attorney).