Implied question: He could have asked that it is forbidden due to "Lo Sashich"!

Answer #1: He asked better than this [that the orphans will be punished for this].

Answer #2: He holds that the borrower is liable for "Lo Sasich" only when also the lender is commanded. (The orphans were not commanded, for they were minors.)

Inference: Even though the investor accepts on himself decrease or increase in price, it is forbidden, for the acceptor has Achrayus, even though Achrayus is only from when it breaks.

Rather, only due to depreciation of the metal, one may take rental.

Implied question: Above (69b), also regarding a ship [Rav] permitted [charging] rent and [the user must pay for] breakage!

Answer: That is because he accepts on himself to compensate for ruin of the ship. The water ruins the wood. He pays to the owner only what breaks.

Question #1: This is difficult for Rivan, who explained above that one may give an Iska (business venture) close to profit and far from loss, since the investor accepts increase or decrease in price;

If so, why did he need to accept depreciation of the metal? He should accept only decrease in price!

Question #2: We said above (68b) that [the investor accepts] two thirds of the loss and a third of the profit. (Maharshal - this refers to a Chasid, who goes beyond the letter of the law. Maharsha - he accepts two thirds of the loss and half the profit, or half the loss and a third of the profit);

Why must he do so? The investor should accept decrease in price, and it is permitted even if the acceptor has all the Achrayus!

Implied question: Why did we say above (64a) regarding wine, if it soured, this was in your (the investor's) Reshus? We concluded that since he accepts on himself increase or decrease in price, he is close to both [profit and loss]!

Answer: There is different, for it is an absolute sale.

Question #1: How can [the claimant] take through a Siman? [The Shomer, i.e. the one in whose house it is,] can say "I bought it"!

Suggestion: We are concerned lest the Shomer admit to the claimant that it is his.

Rejection: If so, also regarding pieces of gold, we should be concerned lest the Shomer admit to him!

Suggestion: [We are not concerned about pieces of gold, for] since the claimant has no Siman, they will not believe him.

Rejection: If so, also regarding a specific matter (with a Siman), we should be concerned lest the Shomer told the claimant!

Even if the Shomer was not rich (so it is unlikely that he owns the matter), he would be believed to say that he bought it, for we could say that he found a Metziah or received a gift [and used it to buy the matter]!

Implied Question #2: It says in Yevamos (115b) regarding sesame, that the Shomer claims that the depositor took his, and [what is there now] is other [sesame]...

We say there "I can say that it just occurred [that the new sesame has the same Siman]."

Inference: If it were not common to occur, it would be considered a proper Siman, and the depositor would be believed to take it from [the Shomer]! (The Shomer should be believed to say that he bought it!)

Answer (to Question #2): There, the depositor had witnesses that he deposited this measure in a barrel, and this amount is still found in the barrel.

Even if there were not witnesses about the matter, he would be believed if it were a proper Siman, since the Shomer does not claim "I bought it" or "they were always mine, and my household told you the Siman";

However, if he admits that he deposited with him, but he says "just like your Siman occurred, so occurred that Siman in mine", even though he has a Migo (he could have said "I bought it" or "they were always mine"), he would not be believed, for this is a Migo against witnesses. (We can testify that the same Siman did not occur in his.)

Answer #1 (to Question #1): Here we are concerned lest the owner come after the Shomer dies, like it says in Kesuvos (85b) about Ploni, who [claims that he] deposited a silver cup with Chasa. Chasa died, and did not command [about the cup];

Citation (85b): Ploni came and gave a Siman. Rav Nachman said "firstly, I know that Chasa is not rich. And also, Ploni has a Siman." (Therefore, we give it to Ploni.)

Inference: (Either reason suffices by itself.) Even if Chasa were rich, since Ploni gave a Siman, he would get it.

Question: Since [Chasa] is rich, why don't we claim for the orphans that he bought it?

Answer: We could say that we claim that he bought it only regarding things that their father used in his lifetime, but things that he did not use in his lifetime, it seems that they were a deposit with him, and we return them through a Siman.

Objection #1: If so, no children of rich people can survive (keep their wealth)! Anyone who was often in their house, and knows their matters, will tell others, who were not often in their house, Simanim of their gold and silver!

Objection #2: Still, it is difficult why here we seek a man with gold pieces. Even one who has a specific matter (with a Siman, this should suffice), just he will say in front of Beis Din that it is his!

Answer #2 (to Question #1): Here in our Sugya we are concerned lest witnesses come [and say that] he deposited with him an item with this Siman;

Since he brings witnesses, Beis Din should not refrain from showing the item to the witnesses, and they will recognize whether it is it.

In Kesuvos (85b), the primary reason is because he is not rich. Since he is not rich, we should not claim for the orphans that their father bought it, for it is not common to find a Metziah or receive a gift [that would enable him to buy it];

We do not claim this for the orphans, even though their father would have been believed to say "I bought it."

Explanation #1: [The Gemara there] means as follows. Firstly, I know that [Chasa] is not rich. This reason itself suffices;

Also, even if you will say that not being rich does not suffice by itself, he gave a Siman, and the two reasons help together.

Explanation #2: From the beginning, [Rav Nachman] did not mean that not being rich suffices by itself. Rather, from the beginning he meant that both reasons together help.

Implied question: In Kesuvos (13b) regarding an Arus and [his pregnant] Arusah, Rav Yosef said "what concern could we have about her [to forbid her to Kehunah]?"

Citation (13b): Firstly, he admits [that she is pregnant from him]. And also, Rav Yehudah taught in the name of Shmuel that the Halachah follows R. Gamliel [who believes her to say that the man she was with had Kosher lineage].

Citation (cont.) Question: Here, if he would not admit, would R. Gamliel be Machshir?!

Note: This shows that the latter reason should suffice by itself, i.e. whenever it says "firstly... And also..."

Answer: There, we cannot say that both reasons together help, for if the reason that he admits does not help by itself, it does not help also together with ruling like R. Gamliel...

This is because [R. Gamliel] is Machshir only when most men are Kosher to her. Here, all are Pasul to her, except for the Arus!

Therefore, we ask "if he does not admit...", i.e. if the reason of admission does not help by itself, does it help together with the reason that the Halachah follows R. Gamliel?!

Explanation #1 (Rashi): All Achrayus for the property is on the acceptor. He appraised the monetary value [and accepted it] on himself. As long as he does not return the money, they divide the profit.

Implied question: This Mishnah is redundant! We already taught (above, 68a) that one may not appoint a grocer [to sell the investor's wares] for half the profit, because he accepts half the loss. (It turns out that he works for the investor's half in exchange for the half that he borrowed);

All the more so here [it is forbidden], for the acceptor accepts all the Achrayus!

Answer: Our Mishnah taught this due to the Seifa "but we may accept Tzon Barzel from Nochrim."

Observation: According to Rashi, it is Ribis only mid'Rabanan, for he is close to profit and far from loss.

Question #1: What did the Gemara ask from our Mishnah here against the Mishnah in Bechoros (16a)? (It says that if one accepts Tzon Barzel from a Nochri, the offspring are exempt from Bechorah. This proves that it belongs to the Nochri.)

You are forced to say that the Makshan held that in the Mishnah in Bechoros, the Nochri did not accept [loss due to] Ones or decrease in price, since Rava challenged Abaye's answer "if he accepted on himself Ones and decrease in price, do you call this Tzon Barzel?!"

Consequence: You are forced to say that it is Ribis mid'Rabanan, and even so it would be fine that [the animals] are exempt from Bechorah, because since the investor did not take his coins, [the animals] are in his Reshus;

The Gemara explicitly gives this reason there before asking from our Mishnah here.

Summation of question: If so, what was difficult about our Mishnah here? (We could directly challenge that Mishnah. Since the acceptor has all the Achrayus, Bechorah should apply!)

Question #2: [Rava] asked "we should distinguish within the matter itself - however, if he accepts on himself Ones and decrease in price, one may accept (Tzon Barzel from Yisrael)";

Our Mishnah comes to teach only that one may accept from Nochrim, like Rashi explained!

There is no need at all to teach that one may accept from a Yisrael [investor] who accepted Ones and decrease in price, for we learn this from the Reisha - one may accept calves or foals...

Explanation #2: R. Tam explained that our Mishnah discusses Ribis mid'Oraisa;

He fixed a price for the Tzon, and also fixed a price for the Shevach, and [the acceptor] accepted to give a fixed amount every year, whether or not there will be Shevach. This is Ribis Ketzutzah;

It taught the case of a grocer, which is Ribis mid'Rabanan. Here it teaches this case, which is Ribis mid'Oraisa, like it says "because it is Ribis", i.e. Ribis mid'Oraisa. .

Implied question: Above (64b) it says "one may not rent for less, because it is Ribis", and it is Ribis mid'Rabanan according to R. Tam, who considered [Mashkanta with] deducting of a house like deducting of a field!

Answer: There it needs to teach that it is Ribis mid'Rabanan. It is unlike other Mashkanta with deducting, which is permitted;

However, "because it is Ribis" here, if it does not teach that it is mid'Oraisa, what does it teach?!

Support #1: The Yerushalmi connotes like R. Tam. It says "what is Tzon Barzel? If one had 100 animals, and said "they are for you 100 gold Dinarim..."

The offspring, milk and shearings are yours, and if they die, you have Achrayus, and you will give to me wages of a Sela for each one from your [money], at the end [of the time set]", it is forbidden.

Inference: He explicitly appraised the principal and the Shevach.

Support #2: If not for our Mishnah here, the Mishnah in Bechoros would not be difficult why they are exempt [from Bechorah];

They are properly considered in the Nochri's Reshus, since if [the Yisrael] will not give to him coins, [the Nochri] will seize the animal, and if he does not find the animal, he will seize the child. [They are considered in the Nochri's Reshus,] even though he gives a fixed amount every year.

Therefore the children are considered in the Nochri's Reshus, since he still has a little Kinyan;

However, because our Mishnah considers it Ribis mid'Oraisa, he asks properly. If so, it totally left the owner's Reshus, like other loans.

Rava concludes that it is exempt from Bechorah is not because it is still in the original owner's Reshus, rather, because the Nochri has a stake in it, like he proceeds to explain;

Whenever the Nochri has rights in it, it is exempt, for we do not apply to it "Kol Miknecha Tizachar", which connotes that it is totally in the Yisrael's Reshus, and the Nochri has no rights in it at all.

Support #3: [Rava] properly asked "we should distinguish within the matter itself [and permit if the investor bears any decrease in value or Ones]!"

Even though we already learn this from the Reisha (68a), similarly "we accept Tzon Barzel from Nochrim" is not a Chidush. It would be better to distinguish within the matter itself!

Question: Why is this unlike an animal of Arnona (the king's tithe), which is obligated in Bechorah, according to the first version of Rava in Pesachim (6a) when the Yisrael can dispel [the collector] with money?

Also here, if he gives to him money, [the Nochri] will not take the animal, and not the children!

Answer: There, the animal was primary the Yisrael's from the beginning , just there is a lien on it for Arnona. Since he can dispel with money, it did not leave the Yisrael's Reshus, and it is not considered that the Nochri has rights in it;

However, here from the beginning it was the Nochri's animal, as long as the Nochri has these rights in it, that if the Yisrael will not give money, [the Nochri] will seize the animal, it did not leave the Nochri's Reshus, and it is considered that the Nochri has rights in it, for he is not totally removed from it.

Distinction: However, if [the verse says] "Tashuch" (you will take Ribis from a Nochri), this is fine that one may not lend to a Nochri for free (without taking Ribis), for it says "Lo Techanem" (do not give to Nochrim a free gift. Since you may charge Ribis, pardoning it is like a free gift!)

Also, the verse says to lend to them with Ribis.

Question: What was the question from this verse? It is forbidden only mid'Rabanan. This is a decree, lest he learn from his deeds, like we say below!

Answer: We ask from the verse as follows. Since the Torah said to charge Ribis to a Nochri, Chachamim should not forbid this.

Implied question: How do we expound from a verse of Shlomo [in Mishlei]? The Isur is only a decree!

Answer #1: Perhaps Shlomo decreed.

Answer #2: Shlomo discussed Ribis mid'Oraisa, and Chachamim made an Asmachta for their words on his verse.

Implied question: Why is the custom nowadays to lend to Nochrim?

Answer (R. Tam): This is because we follow the lenient opinion in mid'Rabanan laws, and we hold like the other version that teaches Rav Huna's law on Rav Yosef's Beraisa (71a), and Rav Nachman and Rav Huna never forbade Ribis of a Nochri.

Even according to the first version, we can permit, because there is on us tax of the king and the officers, and everything is needed for our livelihood.

Answer #2: We dwell among the nations, and it is impossible for us to earn anything if we will not do business with them. Therefore, we should not forbid Ribis, lest one learn from his deeds, more than other business.

Question: Since Ribis of Nochrim is permitted according to the second version, the one who lent [to Nochrim] with Ribis, why wasn't he revived among the Mesim that Yechezkel revived in the valley of Dura, like it says in the Targum Yerushalmi of "v'Hu Kad Shalach Paro"? (Daf Al ha'Daf - Rashi and Tosfos had Targum Yerushalmi on Nevi'im. What Tosfos cites is found in Pirkei d'R. Eliezer Sof Perek 22.)

Answer: Perhaps Bnei Noach were commanded about Ribis, just like they were commanded about theft. (Maharam - Yechezkel revived Bnei Efrayim who left Mitzrayim prematurely. Their law was like Bnei Noach.)

Implied question: We do not learn [Ribis] from theft (61a)!

Answer: Even so, just like we expound in Sanhedrin (56b) that Bnei Noach are commanded about theft from "mi'Kol Etz ha'Gan", and not theft, and the same applies to Ribis and Ona'ah.

Question: If so, what was the question "Tashich (you will pay Ribis to a Nochri) - must he do so?"

Perhaps it comes to teach that even though [Nochrin] about each other about Ribis, a Nochri may lend to a Yisrael with Ribis;

If it were forbidden, the Yisrael would transgress Lifnei Iver!

Answer: We learn this from "Lo Sashich l'Achicha." This implies that you may pay Ribis to a Nochri.