1)

(a)On the assumption that each of the two men picked up the Talis on behalf of both of them (we will see later from which part of the Mishnah he derives this), Rami bar Chama extrapolates from our Mishnah the principle 'ha'Magbihah Metzi'ah la'Chavero, Kanah Chavero' (if Reuven picks up a Metzi'a for Shimon, Shimon acquires it automatically) because if that was not the case then, as far as each one is concerned, the other half of the Talis would still be lying on the ground (and how could he then acquire it?).

(b)Rava refutes Rami bar Chama's proof on the grounds that, even if we were to hold 'Lo Kanah Chavero', they would both acquire the Talis on account of the principle 'Migu de'Zachi le'Nafsheih, Zachi Nami le'Chavreih' (seeing as each one wishes to acquire half the Talis himself, he also acquires the other half on behalf of his friend).

(c)And he proves the distinction between the two principles from the fact that if Reuven stole on behalf of himself and his partner Shimon, the latter would be liable to pay half, whereas had Shimon appointed Shimon a Shali'ach to steal on his behalf, he would be Patur.

2)

(a)Rava refutes his own proof from 'Migu de'Zachi le'Nafsheih . ... ' that if a Cheresh and a Pike'ach pick up a Metzi'ah together, since the Cheresh acquires half, so does the Pike'ach on the grounds that since there is nobody picking up the other half on behalf of the Pike'ach, how can he possibly be Koneh? The Cheresh acquires his half however, because Chazal instituted that a Cheresh acquires because of Darkei Shalom.

(b)He therefore amends the 'Migu' to, which now reads that just as when two Charashin pick up an article, Chazal specifically state that they both acquire it, so too will one Cheresh acquire it if a Pike'ach picks up the other end.

(c)We refute this explanation too however, on the grounds that logically, since the Pike'ach does not acquire the article, the Cheresh cannot acquire it either ('Mitoch de'Lo Zachi le'Nafsheih, Lo Zachi Nami le'Chavreih' [see Maharam]).

(d)We are not afraid that the Cheresh will pick a quarrel if we do not give him half because the Pike'ach does not receive half either.

(e)Chazal instituted that two Charashin should be Koneh to avoid them picking a quarrel with anyone who takes the article away from them.

3)

(a)When Rami bar Chama extrapolates from our Mishnah 'ha'Magbihah Metzi'ah la'Chavero, Kanah Chavero' (and Rava 'Migu de'Zachi le'Nafsheih ... '), it cannot be from ...

1. ... the Reisha 'Shenayim Ochzin be'Talis' because that speaks when each one claims that he found the article and picked it up on his own behalf (and not on behalf of his disputant [and the Shevu'ah is a Takanas Chachamim, like Rebbi Yochanan explained earlier]).

2. ... the second case 'Zeh Omer Kulah she'Li ve'Zeh Omer Kulah she'Li' because we need this case to teach us the Din by a purchase (as we learned earlier).

(b)Neither can he be referring to the case of 'Zeh Omer Kulah she'Li, ve'Zeh Omer Chetzyah she'Li', even assuming that the Tana is speaking in a case of purchasing because he then needs to teach us that even the one who claims 'Chetzyah she'Li' is not believed (with a 'Migu' of 'Kulah she'Li') without a Shevu'ah.

(c)The reason for this is because (despite its similarity to Meishiv Aveidah) if he would be, then the swindler would always claim 'Chetzyah she'Li', in order to avoid having to swear.

(d)Nor can Rami bar Chama (and Rava) be referring to the case of 'Hayu Sheneihem Rochvin al-Gabei Beheimah ... ' either because the Tana needs that case to teach us that riding an animal acquires the animal just like pulling it.

4)

(a)So we finally learn 'ha'Magbihah Metzi'ah la'Chavero, Kanah Chavero' or 'Migu de'Zachi le'Nafsheih ... ' from the Seifa of our Mishnah 'bi'Z'man she'Hein Modin O she'Yesh Lahen Eidim, Cholkin be'Lo Shevu'ah'.

(b)The Tana must be referring to a case of Metzi'ah, and not of purchase because then it would not be teaching us anything.

5)

(a)Rav Yehudah heard two things from Shmuel concerning Rachuv and Manhig (riding the animal and leading it). He heard that one of them acquires, and the other one doesn't, and he couldn't remember which was which.

(b)We initially think that it cannot have been a question of one being Koneh independently and the other one not because since we know that Manhig (which is synonymous with Meshichah) is certainly Koneh, there would be no place for such a She'eilah.

(c)What he must therefore have heard from Shmuel was that if one of the disputants was Rachuv, and the other, Manhig, one of them is Koneh, and the other one, not. Because on the one hand ...

1. ... the Rachuv enjoys an advantage over the Manhig inasmuch as he is holding the animal, whilst on the other ...

2. ... the Manhig enjoys an advantage over the Rachuv in that the animal is moving because of him. Note that the Sugya initially speaks about a rider who is not using his legs to make the animal move.

6)

(a)Rav Yosef, quoting Rav Yehudah himself, resolves the Safek. He cites the Tana Kama in the Mishnah in Kil'ayim, who rules that both the person who is leading an ox and a donkey that are harnessed together and the one who is sitting on the wagon they are pulling, receive Malkos.

(b)Rebbi Meir exempts the latter. Shmuel reverses the two opinions because he personally holds that sitting in the wagon is not Koneh, and is therefore not a partner in any act that the animals perform. Consequently, he prefers to establish that opinion as being the majority one.

(c)Rav Yehudah extrapolated from that statement of Shmuel that even Rachuv alone is not Koneh, in which case there is nothing more to ask (see Tosfos DH 'Rachuv Lechudeih').

7)

(a)Abaye asked Rav Yosef why having often told them of this conclusion based on the Mishnah in Kil'ayim, he had said it in his own name, and not in the name of Rav Yehudah.

(b)Rav Yosef proved that he had heard it from Rav Yehudah (and presumably, having suffered a memory loss, he had forgotten to mention it to his Talmidim) from the fact that he remembered asking him how he could possibly extrapolate 'Rachuv' from 'Yoshev be'Karon', seeing as the former holds the reins, whereas the latter, doesn't.

(c)Rav Yehudah had replied by citing Rav and Shmuel who said that 'Mosirah' (holding the reins) is not Koneh (in which case there is no difference between Yoshev be'Karon and Rachuv).

(d)According to the second Lashon it was Abaye who queried Rav Yehudah's proof, and Rav Yosef who answered by citing Idi.

8)

(a)Rebbi Chelbo Amar Rav Huna corroborates the ruling regarding Mosirah though he confines it to a Metzi'ah and acquiring from a deceased Ger on the other; Mosirah is Koneh however, in the case of a sale.

(b)And Idi explained to Rava that this distinction in inherent in the very word 'Mosirah', which implies handing over from one person to another (which is the essence of the Kinyan).

9)

(a)We learned in our Mishnah that if the two disputants claimed the animal they were riding or leading, they divide it with a Shevu'ah. According to Shmuel, the author cannot be Rebbi Meir (of the Mishnah in Kil'ayim) because since we already know that he holds that Yoshev is Koneh, it is obvious that Rochev is Koneh too, and we would not need the extra Mishnah here to teach us that.

(b)Assuming then, that the author is the Rabanan, this poses a Kashya on Shmuel, who holds that Rochev is not Koneh. To answer this Kashya, Shmuel establishes the Mishnah where the rider is also 'leading the animal with his legs' (i.e. he causes it to walk, by digging his legs into its flanks).

(c)Nevertheless, in spite of having mentioned 'Manhig, the Tana finds it necessary to add 'Rachuv' (which is also a kind of Manhig) to teach us that even though the Rachuv is holding the animal as well as leading it and the Manhig is not, the latter's Chazakah establishes his ownership no less than the former's (see Tosfos DH 'Mahu').