1)

(a)Rav Ada bar Ahavah cites Rami bar Chama in connection with the Beraisa 'Hini'ach lahen Avihen Ma'os shel Ribis, af-al-Pi she'Yod'in whe'Hein shel Ribis, Ein Chayavin Lehachzir', from which Rami bar Chama proves - 'Reshus Yoresh ki'Reshus Loke'ach'.

(b)Rava refutes the proof by citing the Pasuk in Behar "Al Tikach me'Ito Neshech ve'Sarbis". The Torah forbids the taking of Ribis - to ensure that the borrower 'can live with the creditor' (as the Pasuk concludes "ve'Chei Achicha Imach").

(c)Rava therefore refutes Rami's proof from there - since the Pasuk seems specifically to confine the obligation of returning Ribis to the owner to the lender (precluding the heirs from a Gezeiras ha'Kasuv, irrespective of whether they acquire the Ribis or not).

2)

(a)Rami bar Chama disagrees with Rava with regard to the Beraisa, he will certainly disagrees with him regarding our Mishnah. The reverse might not be true - because of Rava's Limud from the Pasuk (in which case he will agree with Rava, even though there has been no Yi'ush).

(b)Others reverse the above statement. According to them, Rami bar Chama might disagree with Rava regarding the Beraisa, but he will agree with him with regard to the Mishnah - because it is possible to establish the Mishnah where the heirs ate the Gezeilah (in which case they are Patur from paying anyway - as Rava explained above).

(c)The preferred version is the first one (though others maintain that it is the second).

3)

(a)Regarding the case of 'ha'Gozel u'Ma'achil es ha'Ganav', the Beraisa obligates Gedolim, but exempts Ketanim from paying - because they cannot, as a rule, be taken to court (the author of this Beraisa is Sumchus, as we shall see later).

(b)Rami bar Chama will establish the first statement - before Yi'ush.

(c)The Beraisa adds that if the Gedolim say 'Ein Anu Yod'in Cheshbonos she'Chishev Avinu Imach'. This cannot however, be taken literally - because, seeing as they admit that they received the Gezeilah, we would then apply the principle 'Bari ve'Shema, Bari Adif'.

(d)Rava therefore establishes that what they actually said was - that they do in fact, know about their father's dealings with the owner, and that nothing remains unpaid (turning it into a case of 'Bari u'Bari').

4)

(a)The problem with another Beraisa, which obligates both Gedolim and Ketanim to pay for the stolen cow which their father left them is - why Yesomim Ketanim should be any more Chayav than when their ox entered the Nizak's Chatzer and caused damage (where they are Patur, because they cannot be taken to court to claim from their property).

(b)Rav Papa therefore establishes the Beraisa - where the animal is still available to be reclaimed. Consequently, seeing as they admit that they received it, there is no reason why the owner should not take it back.

(c)The author of this Beraisa is - Sumchus, as we shall soon see.

5)

(a)Rava rules that, Yesomim whose father leaves them a borrowed cow are permitted to use it until the prescribed time expires - but they are Patur from Onsin.

(b)In a case where, believing the cow to be their father's, they Shecht it and eat it - they are obligated to pay for the Hana'ah (cheap meat, which amounts to two thirds of the market-price of what they ate).

6)

(a)If their father left them Karka, Rava concludes, they are Chayav to pay. Some learn this with regard to the Reisha (obligating them to pay Onsin) - and it goes without saying that in the Seifa, seeing as they actually ate the meat, they will be Chayav to pay for the animal in full from that field.

(b)Others learn Rava's final statement with regard to the Seifa (where they actually ate the meat). But in the Reisha - Rava would hold that they are Patur.

(c)Rava might ...

1. ... obligate the Yesomim to pay in the Reisha, on the one hand - because he holds that the Chiyuv to pay Onsin began when the father borrowed the ox.

2. ... exempt them, on the other - if he holds that the obligation only begins when the Oneis takes place, and since, in this case, that occurred under the jurisdiction of the Yesomim, the fact that their father left Karka will not obligate them to pay.

7)

(a)Rava's ruling is connected to a similar ruling of Rav Papa. Rav Papa says that someone who Shechted a cow on Shabbos ...

1. ... which he stole before Shabbos - must pay Daled ve'Hey, since the obligation to pay Keren fell due already before Shabbos, in which case his Chiyuv Misah for Shechting on Shabbos does not exempt him from paying Daled ve'Hey, which, as we know, is a K'nas.

2. ... which he borrowed before Shabbos - is Patur from Keren as well as from Daled ve'Hey.

(b)The reason that, in te latter case, he is Patur from

1. ... Keren is - because he is Chayav Misah for breaking Shabbos, and Rav papa holds that the Chiyuvim of a Shomer only take effect at the time when something happens to the animal. Consequently, the obligation of the Shomer to pay and the Chiyuv Misah occurred simultaneously, and he is Patur from the former.

2. ... Kefel, Daled ve'Hey - because these Chiyuvim do not pertain to a Shomer (only to a Ganav or a To'en Ta'anas Ganav.

(c)The second Lashon of Rava follows the opinion of his Talmid, Rav Papa.

(d)We reject the text which exempts the borrower from Daled ve'Hey for Shechting the cow on Shabbos, on the grounds that wherever there is no Keren, there is no Kefel, Daled or Hey either - because the reason that we gave is more basic than this one (since, as we explained, Kefel, Daled ve'Hey do not apply to them in the first place).

8)

(a)In view of the current Sugya, the Tana of the Beraisa extrapolates from the Pasuk "ve'Heishiv es ha'Gezeilah Asher Gazal" - that the Yesomim are only required to return the stolen object that their father left, if it is still intact.

(b)The Tana adds that if on the other hand, the object is intact, both Gedolim and Ketanim are obligated to return it - Sumchus however, exempts the Ketanim from returning it.

9)

(a)Rebbi Yirmiyah's young brother-in law locked the door in front of Rebbi Yirmiyah - to prevent him from acquiring the house upon the death of his father.

(b)Rebbi Avin declined to accept Rebbi Yirmiyah's witnesses, who were ready to testify that he had already acquired the house during the lifetime of his father-in-law, who had sold or given it to him - based on the principle that one cannot accept witnesses in the absence of one's disputant (and a Katan is always considered absent).

(c)Rebbi Avin justified his ruling - according to Sumchus, who says 'Ketanim Peturin'.

(d)Rebbi Yirmiyah reacted to this with surprise - that they should rule like an individual opinion to deprive him of his rights.

10)

(a)Rebbi Avahu, who then became involved in the case, tried to support Rebbi Yirmiyah with a statement by Rav Yosef bar Chama, who said - that if a Katan takes his Avadim with him to forcibly claim a field from the current owner (or to forcibly take away the Eved), we do not wait until the Katan grows up to retrieve it from him. We do so immediately.

(b)We differentiate between the two cases however, by pointing out - that whereas Rav Yosef bar Chama is speaking where the Katan has no prior Chazakah, in our current case, Rebbi Yirmiyah's brother-in-law has the backing of a Chazakah from his father (vindicating Rebbi Avin's ruling).

11)

(a)'Amar Rav Ashi Amar Rav Shabsa'i Mekablin Eidim she'Lo bi'Fenei Ba'al-Din'. Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Chanina explains this statement when either the creditor or the witnesses are very ill - or when the witnesses are planning to go overseas (and will no longer be available when they become needed).

(b)In addition - the Beis-Din must have issued the defendant with a summons, which he ignored.

(c)Mar Ukva, quoting Shmuel himself, explained the identical statement issued by Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel - in exactly the same way (when, after opening the proceedings, the Beis-Din issued him with a summons, which he ignored).

(d)

1. This would not apply if they had not yet opened the proceedings against him - because then, he could claim that he wants to go to the Beis-Din ha'Gadol in Eretz Yisrael ...

2. ... which he cannot claim once the proceedings have begun, assuming that the local Beis-Din has a letter from the Beis-Din ha'Gadol requesting that they take the case in hand, as Ravina explains.

12)

(a)'Kiyum ha'Sh'tar' is - the substantiation of a document, which entails the witnesses verifying their signatures in front of Beis-Din and Beis-Din's adding their stamp of approval.

(b)According to Rav, should the witnesses wish to go overseas, the claimant is entitled to substantiate the Sh'tar even in the absence of the defendant. Rebbi Yochanan maintains - that it is prohibited.

(c)Rav Sheishes learns Rebbi Yochanan's opinion from the Pasuk "ve'Hu'ad bi'Ve'alav ve'Lo Yishmerenu" - which teaches us that the owner of the ox must stand beside his ox whilst it is being sentenced (in other words, without the owner being present, he cannot be implicated. By the same token, without the defendant being present, he cannot be implicated by means of the Sh'tar being substantiated).

(d)Rava rules like Rav ...

1. ... even if the defendant vehemently objects that the Sh'tar is a forgery.

2. ... but not if he asks for time to bring witnesses who will prove the Sh'tar false, in which case we wait until his return.

13)

(a)If Monday, Thursday and Monday pass, and he has not returned, Beis-Din write a Pesicha, and ninety days later, an Adrachta.

1. A Pesicha is - a Sh'tar placing the debtor in Cherem for not paying his debts.

2. ... an Adrachta - is a Sh'tar authorizing the creditor to go and find a suitable field for assessment against his debt, which will then be sold and the proceeds handed to him.

(b)The significance of the first set of thirty days is that we assume him to be looking for a loan. The significance of ...

1. ... the second set is - that, not having found an available loan, we assume that he is looking for a purchaser to buy his property.

2. ... the third set - that the purchaser himself is looking for the cash to pay for the field.

(c)In the event that the defendant declares at the outset that he is not accepting the summons to Beis-Din - we write an Adrachata immediately.

(d)And we write an Adrachta immediately in the case of a Pikadon - because he has no excuse to delay returning it.

14)

(a)Initially, we ascribe the fact that we do not write an Adrachta on Metaltelin - to the fact that the creditor will eat up all the Metaltelin, and, should the debtor turn up with witnesses, he will be unable to retrieve his property.

(b)We will write one however - if the creditor has Karka (which the debtor will subsequently be able to claim should the need arise).

(c)We conclude however, that Beis-Din do not write an Adrachta on Metaltelin at all - because we are also afraid that, even if the creditor possesses Karka, its value may drop, and the debtor will not be able to claim the full amount that he is owed. Note, that the creditor is assured of obtaining his money, because, until he does, the debtor is in Cherem (Rosh). Also bear in mind that the moment the debtor refuses to pay, we write an Adrachta on Metaltelin, too.

(d)Beis-Din will inform the defendant when writing an Adrachta on his property - unless he lives too far away to reach (as we shall se shortly).

15)

(a)We initially think that Beis-Din will inform the defendant, even if he is overseas - if he either has relatives (whom we will inform in his place), or if there are caravans, in which case, we will give the caravan time to go and return.

(b)We initially think that Beis-Din wait a further twelve months (for the Shali'ach Beis-Din to travel by caravan to invite the defendants to a court-case and to return) before giving the Adrachta to the claimant. We conclude however - that on the assumption that the initial ruling to write an Adrachta was made at Monday's sitting of Beis-Din, we wait for the Shali'ach Beis-Din to leave on Tuesday and return on Wednesday (i.e. one day's journey), in time to hand the Adrachta to the creditor at Thursday's sitting. In the event that the debtor currently be residing further afield, we do not wait at all, but write the Adrachta immediately on Monday (since he is to blame for traveling so far at such a crucial time.

(c)The original assumption is based on an episode with Ravina, who made Mar Acha (whose debtor was in Mechuza) wait twelve months for his Adrachta, until the Shali'ach Beis-Din traveled by caravan to Mechuza and returned.

(d)We conclude however that we cannot apply that ruling to other cases - since Ravina's ruling was confined to that case, because Mar Acha was a tough guy, and the debtor would not have been able to retrieve his property, once it fell into Mar Acha's hands.

16)

(a)Ravina rules that a Shali'ach Beis-Din who informs Beis-Din that one of the litigants refuses to accept the summons is believed like two witnesses. But this only pertains to a Shamta (an oral Cherem), not to a Pesicha (a written one) - because the litigant concerned is obligated to pay the Sofer's fee, and the credibility of the Shali'ach Beis-Din does not extend to money matters.

(b)He also rules that Beis-Din will even issue a litigant who is due back in town with a summons to a Din Torah, through a woman or neighbors who happen to be going that way. This will not apply to a case where ...

1. ... the litigant is currently at home (i.e. in the same town as Beis-Din) - because they will probably not carry out their Shelichus, on the assumption that the Shali'ach Beis-Din met the litigant and informed him directly.

2. ... the litigant is due to pass the entrance to Beis-Din on his way home - because then they will think that Beis-Din are bound to inform him anyway, as he walks past.

3. ... he is not due to return that day - because they will probably forget to tell him when he does.