1)
In our search for the reason why the store-keeper is obligated to pay for the bottle, we cite Abaye and Rebbi Chanina, sons of Avin, who establish the case by a store-keeper who took the bottle from the child in order to measure with it. According to the Chachamim, he is liable because of Rabah's Din. What does Rabah say about a venerable man who strikes a lost animal with a stick?
Why is he not obligated to return it anyway?
How does Rabah's ruling connect with the case of the store-keeper?
On what grounds do we reject this explanation, too?
1)
In our search for the reason why the store-keeper is obligated to pay for the bottle, we cite Abaye and Rebbi Chanina, sons of Avin, who establish the case by a store-keeper who took the bottle from the child in order to measure with it. According to the Chachamim, he is liable because of Rabah, who says - that if a venerable man strikes a lost animal with a stick - he becomes obligated to return it.
He would otherwise be exempt from the Mitzvah of returning a lost article - because of the ruling 'Zakein ve'Eino l'fi Kevodo, Patur' (if returning a lost article entails doing something that is below one's dignity, one is Patur from returning it).
On the basis of Rabah's ruling - the store-keeper who took the bottle from the hand of the child - ought likewise to adopt responsibility for it.
We reject this explanation too however, on the grounds that - Rabah's ruling is restricted to animals exclusively, which once they are encouraged, will run away (making it more difficult for the owner to find and control them, but does not apply to vessels.
2)
Rabah, together with 'the lion of the group', finally explains the reason behind the store-keeper's to pay for the bottle. Who is the 'lion of the group'?
They establish the Mishnah where the store-keeper takes the bottle in order to measure oil for another customer. What is then the basis of the Machlokes between Rebbi Yehudah and the Chachamim?
Considering that a Sho'el is liable for Onsin, on what grounds is the store-keeper Patur, according to Rebbi Yehudah?
How will we now interpret the Seifa? What does the Mishnah mean when it says 'u'Modim Chachamim ... bi'Zeman she'ha'Tzeluchis be'Yad ha'Tinok ... '?
2)
Rabah, together with 'the lion of the group' - Rebbi Zeira, finally explain the reason behind the store-keeper's obligation to pay for the bottle ...
... by establishing the Mishnah where the store-keeper takes the bottle in order to measure oil for another customer. And the basis of the Machlokes between Rebbi Yehudah and the Chachamim is - whether somebody who borrows something without the owner's consent is considered a thief (the Chachamim) or a borrower (Rebbi Yehudah).
Despite the fact that a Sho'el is liable for Onsin, the store-keeper becomes Patur according to Rebbi Yehudah - the moment he returns the bottle to the location from where he took it (i.e. the child's hands).
When the Seifa of the Mishnah says 'u'Modim Chachamim ... bi'Zeman she'ha'Tzeluchis be'Yad ha'Tinok ... ' - the Tana merely means that they concede that he is Patur as long as he did not 'borrow' it.
3)
We cited Shmuel earlier, who rules that someone who takes a vessel from a craftsman in order to inspect it is liable for damages until he has returned it. On what grounds is he liable, seeing as he has not yet acquired it (and the seller generally benefits from a sale as much as the seller does)?
What happened to the piece of thigh which a customer took from the butcher to examine?
Rav Yeimar obligate the customer to pay, based on Shmuel's ruling. On what condition did he issue this ruling?
3)
We cited Shmuel earlier, who rules that someone who takes a vessel from a craftsman in order to inspect it is liable for damages until he has returned it in spite of the fact that he has not yet acquired it (and the seller generally benefits from a sale as much as the seller does) - because we are speaking here where the article is of good quality and much sought after, in which case it is the purchaser alone who benefits from the inspection (and not the seller, who is not short of potential customers), making him a Sho'el, who is Chayav for Onsin.
When a customer took a piece of thigh from the butcher to examine it - a horse-rider came and snatched it from him.
Rav Yeimar obligated the customer to pay, based on Shmuel's ruling - provided the price of the thigh had been fixed.
4)
What did that man do when people began taking the pumpkins that he had brought to Pum Nahara to sell?
Why did he do that, seeing as they took them with a view to purchase them (and not to steal them)?
On what grounds did Rav Kahana invalidate his declaration?
Under what condition would he have validated it?
Why would the owner's Hekdesh be any more effective than in a case where he declares Hekdesh his object that someone stole, which is invalid because the object is not under his jurisdiction, even though it still belongs to him?
4)
When people began taking the pumpkins that that man had brought to Pum Nahara to sell - he declared them Hekdesh.
He did that, despite the fact that they took them with a view to purchase them (and not to steal them) - because so many people had helped themselves to them, that he did not know who owed him money.
Rav Kahana invalidated his declaration on the basis of - Shmuel's ruling, on account of which the pumpkins belong to the purchasers.
He would have validated it - had the price not been fixed, because then, the pumpkins would have remained his.
The owner's Hekdesh would then have been more effective than in a case where he declares Hekdesh his object that someone stole, which is invalid because the object is not under his jurisdiction, even though it still belongs to him - because, as we explained, they only took the pumpkins in order to purchase them, and now that the sale was invalidated, they were ready to return them (unlike the case of a Ganav).
5)
What does the Beraisa say regarding Ma'asros, about a 'Chaver' (who is particular about Ma'asros, and who) in the process of purchasing vegetables from an Am-ha'Aretz (who is not particular) picks those that he wants and puts them aside (even if he spends all day doing this)?
What will change, the moment he decides that he actually wants those vegetables that he put aside?
What problem do we now have? Why can he not ...
... return the vegetables?
... Ma'aser them and then return them?
Then what must he do, should he decide to retract?
5)
The Beraisa rules regarding Ma'asros, that a 'Chaver' (who is particular about Ma'asros, and who) in the process of purchasing vegetables from an Am-ha'Aretz (who is not particular) picks those that he wants and puts them aside (even if he spends all day doing this) - does not acquire them and is therefore not obligated to Ma'aser them.
The moment he decides that he actually wants those vegetables that he has put aside - he will acquire them and become obligated to Ma'aser them.
The problem with this is - what he does with them. He cannot ...
... return the vegetables - because he is obligated to Ma'aser them.
... Ma'aser them and then return them - because that will detract from their full value, whereas in fact, they still belong to the owner.
What he must therefore do (should he decide to retract) is - Ma'aser them, and return the vegetables to the owner together with the assessed value of those that he Ma'asered.
6)
Why does this ruling appear rather strange?
We therefore establish the Beraisa by someone like Rav Safra. What happened to Rav Safra once whilst he was reciting the Sh'ma?
On which Pasuk in Tehilim was his behavior based?
How will we now interpret the Beraisa accordingly?
6)
This ruling appears rather strange however - because there are no grounds for him to have acquired the vegetables.
So we establish the Beraisa by someone like Rav Safra - who once remained silent (because he was reciting the Sh'ma) when someone offered him a certain price for goods. The man, attributing his silence to his low offer, offered him significantly more. Rav Safra however, who had actually accepted his first offer, refused to accept more.
His behavior was based on the Pasuk in Tehilim - 've'Dover Emes bi'Levavo".
The Beraisa too - speaks about people like Rav Safra, who when they pick up food with the possible intention of purchasing it, acquire it, and even if they should then decide not to buy, it is as if they are re-selling it to the owner, in which case, they are obligated to Ma'aser the food and to reimburse him for his loss.
7)
We learn in our Mishnah that a Sitton must clean his measures once every thirty days. What is ...
... a 'Sitton'?
... the reason for this ruling?
How often must a private salesman clean them? Why is that?
What does Raban Shimon ben Gamliel say?
The Tana goes on to rule that a store-keeper must clean his measures twice a week, like the Tana Kama (since he uses them more often even, than a wholesaler). How might we establish this latter ruling even like Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel?
What makes this explanation preferable to the first one?
7)
We learn in our Mishnah that ...
... a Sitton - (a wholesaler) must clean his measures once every thirty days ...
... because some of the wine and oil that one measures stick to the surface, causing them to corrode and weigh less than their official weight.
A private salesman must clean them - once a year, because he uses them much less frequently than a wholesaler.
Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel - reverses the time-periods, because, he says, it is precisely because the Siton uses them more often that the liquids do not get a chance to affect the weights before they are washed away.
The Tana goes on to rule that a store-keeper must clean his measures twice a week, like the Tana Kama (since he uses them more often even, than a wholesaler). Nevertheless, we might establish this latter ruling even like Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel - seeing as a store-keeper is not obligated to pour out the extra three drops (which means that, each time he uses his scales, there is an accumulation of liquids that does not pertain to the other two).
This explanation is preferable to the first one - due to the principle 'Halachah ke'Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel be'Mishnaseinu')
8)
How often is one obligated to clean one's ...
... weights each week?
... scales? Why the difference?
Until now, the Tana has discussed weights that are used for liquids (incorporating meat, which has juice). What does Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel say about weights that are used for solids?
The Tana obligates a seller to tip the scales one Tefach. How much must the scales tip if he is weighing as much as ten Litros?
What is the exception to this rule? When will one not need to tip the scale a Tefach?
8)
One is obligated to clean one's ...
... weights - once a week.
... scales - each time one uses them, because the latter is made in the form of a receptacle, which means that there is more accumulation.
Until now, the Tana has discussed weights that are used for liquids (incorporating meat, which has juice). Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel rules that weights that are used for solids (such as fruit and corn) - do not need to be cleaned at all.
The Tana obligates a seller to tip the scales one Tefach - irrespective of how many Litros one is weighing.
The exception to this rule occurs - when one is weighing something that weighs less than a litra, where the scales need to tip progressively less than a Tefach.
88b----------------------------------------88b
9)
If a seller failed to tip the scales, what must he do?
Where it is customary to use ...
... a small measure (a Kav), why may one not use a large one (a Sa'ah)?
... a large measure, why may one not use a small one?
How else might we explain the reason for these rulings?
What else does the Tana forbid to switch with regard to selling in measures?
9)
If a seller failed to tip the scales, he is obligated to add a little extra (known as 'Gerumav' [as will be discussed in the Sugya]).
Where it is customary to use ...
... a small measure (a Kav), one may not use a large one (a Sa'ah) - because it means the purchaser receives only one Hechra (tipping of the scales) instead of a few.
... a large measure, one may not use a small one - because then, conversely, it is the seller who loses by having to give so many more Hechra'os.
We might also explain the reason for these rulings - because when measuring in a small vessel, one fills it more liberally (causing the seller a loss), whereas in a larger vessel, one tends to compress the contents more (causing the purchaser a loss).
When selling in measures, the Tana also forbids - heaping (when it is customary to compress the contents, or to compress them (when it is customary to heap them).
10)
How does Resh Lakish initially learn the Reisha of the Mishnah (the Din of Hachra'ah) from the Pasuk in Ki Seitzei "Even Sheleimah va'Tzedek Yih'yeh lach"?
What problem do we have with this from the Seifa of the Mishnah (the Din of Girumin)?
So how do we establish ...
... the Reisha of the Mishnah?
... the D'rashah of Resh Lakish?
How does Rebbi Aba bar Mamal Amar Rav interpret our Mishnah 'Echad la'Asarah be'Lach'?
Why is that?
10)
Resh Lakish initially learns the Reisha of the Mishnah (the Din of Hachra'ah) from the Pasuk in Ki Seitzei "Even Sheleimah va'Tzedek Yih'yeh lach" - by interpreting "va'Tzedek" (which is superfluous) to mean 'Tzadek mi'she'Lecha ve'Ten lo' (that the seller should tip the scales and give a little extra).
The problem with this from the Seifa of the Mishnah (which discusses what the Din will be in the event that one failed do so), which is meaningless, if we are talking about a Torah obligation.
So we establish ...
... the Reisha of the Mishnah - in a place where it is customary to tip the scales (rather than adding afterwards).
... the D'rashah of Resh Lakish - where the Minhag is not to tip the scales, where giving extra afterwards is then an obligation.
Rebbi Aba bar Mamal Amar Rav interprets our Mishnah 'Echad la'Asarah be'Lach' - to mean a tenth of a tenth (a hundredth) of a Litra by liquids ...
... since the words 'Echad me'Asarah be'Litra' are clearly missing from the Mishnah (before the words 'Echad la'Asarah be'Lach', because otherwise, the Tana should have said 'Echad me'Asarah' and not 'la'Asarah).
11)
Our Mishnah continues 'Echad le'Esrim be'Yavesh'. Based on the fact that 'Echad le'Esrim be'Lach' means a tenth of a tenth, what Safek do we now have regarding how to explain the Seifa?
How do we resolve the Safek?
Either way, why is the Din so much more stringent by liquid measures than by solid ones?
11)
Our Mishnah continues 'Echad le'Esrim be'Yavesh'. Based on the fact that 'Echad le'Esrim be'Lach' means a tenth of a tenth, we are not sure - whether the Tana means 'Echad me'Esrim le'Esrim be'Yavesh' (one four hundreth) or (whether the 'me'Asarah' by Lach carries forward to read) 'Echad me'Asarah le'Esrim be'Yavesh' (one two hundreth).
The Safek - remains unresolved (since we conclude with 'Teiku').
Either way, the Din is so much more stringent by liquid measures than by solid ones - because liquids tend to stick to the measures, causing them to corrode (as we explained earlier), whereas solids do not.
12)
What does Rebbi Levi extrapolate from the fact that the Torah writes "es ha'To'avos ha'Eil" in the Parshah of Arayos in Acharei-Mos but "Kol Oseh Eileh" in that of Midos (weights and measures) in Ki Seitzei?
What do we prove from the Pasuk in Yechezkel "ve'es Eilei ha'Aretz Lakach"?
How do we reconcile Rebbi Levi with the Pasuk in Kedoshim "Ki Kol asher Ya'aseh mi'Kol ha'To'avos ha'Eileh" (where "Eileh" appears in connection with Arayos too)?
Why might we have thought otherwise?
Why could it not have been by means of ...
... a 'Gezeirah-Shavah' ("Eil" "Eileh")?
... a 'Kal va'Chomer'?
12)
Rebbi Levi extrapolates from the fact that the Torah writes "es ha'To'avos ha'Eil" in the Parshah of Arayos in Acharei-Mos but "Kol Oseh Eileh" in that of Midos (weights and measures) in Ki Seitzei - that the punishment for false weights and measures is more severe than that of Arayos.
We prove from the Pasuk in Yechezkel "ve'es Eilei ha'Aretz Lakach" - that the Lashon "Eileh" means strong (i.e. severe).
Even though "Eileh" appears in connection with Arayos too, in the Pasuk in Kedoshim "Ki Kol asher Ya'aseh mi'Kol ha'To'avos ha'Eileh", this is not a Kashya on Rebbi Levi - because "Eileh" is mentioned there in order to preclude the sin of Midos from Kareis.
We might otherwise have thought that it is automatically included - because the Torah uses the Lashon "Eil" by Midos like it does in the Parshah which obligates Kareis for Arayos.
It could not have been by means of ...
... a 'Gezeirh-Shavah' - because not even a Talmid-Chacham has the authority to Darshen a 'Gezeirah-Shavah' without a specific Kabalah from his Rebbe.
... a 'Kal va'Chomer' - because of the principle 'Ein Onshin min ha'Din' (one cannot learn punishments [e.g. Malkos, to which every Kareis is subject] from a "Kal va'Chomer').
13)
In what way is the Isur of Midos then more severe than that of Arayos?
Apart from the Pasuk in Hoshei'a "Shuvu Banim Shovavim, Erpa Meshuvasam" (with reference to Arayos), from where do we know that Teshuvah is effective by Arayos?
But did Chazal not say that someone who steals from the public should atone by giving money for public undertakings?
13)
The Isur of Midos is more severe than that of Arayos - inasmuch as, whereas the latter is subject to Teshuvah, it is not (since the sinner cannot possibly know the identity of all his victims) .
Apart from the Pasuk in Hoshei'a "Shuvu Banim Shovavim, Erpa Meshuvasam" (with reference to Arayos), we know that Teshuvah is effective by Arayos - from the principle that all Chayvei Kareis who receive Malkos, are exonerated from Kareis.
Chazal did indeed say that someone who steals from the public should atone by giving money for public undertakings. What they meant however, is - that under the circumstances it is the best thing to do, but not that it attains a complete atonement for the sinner.
14)
What are the two Pesukim in Vayikra "Nefesh ki Secheta u'Ma'alah Ma'al ba'Hashem ve'Kichesh ba'Amiso", and " ... ki Sim'ol Ma'al ve'Chat'ah bi'Shegagah" referring to?
What does Rebbi Levi learn from the fact that in the former Pasuk, the Torah places 'Chet' before Me'ilah (which is basically a Lashon of sinning) whereas in the latter, it reverses the order?
And what does he comment on the fact that the B'rachos in Bechukosai begin with "Im Bechukosai ... " and end with "Komemiyus") whilst the curses begin with "ve'Im Bechukosai Tim'asu" and end with "ve'es Chukosai Ga'alah Nafsham"; whereas in the equivalent Parshah in Ki Savo, the B'rachos begin with "ve'Hayah Im Shamo'a Tishma" and end with "ve'Ein Koneh"?
What is the significance of these facts?
14)
The two Pesukim in Vayikra "Nefesh ki Secheta u'Ma'alah Ma'al ba'Hashem ve'Kichesh ba'Amiso", and " ... ki Sim'ol Ma'al ve'Chat'ah bi'Shegagah" are referring to - Gezel Hedyot and Gezel Shamayim (stealing from a private individual and from Hekdesh [otherwise known as Me'ilah]) respectively.
From the fact that in the former Pasuk, the Torah places 'Chet' before Me'ilah (which is basically a Lashon of sinning) whereas in the latter, it reverses the order, Rebbi Levi learns that - Hash-m considers stealing from a private individual worse than stealing from Him (Kevayachol).
And he comments on the fact that the B'rachos in Bechukosai begin with "Im Bechukosai ... " and end with "Komemiyus") whilst the curses begin with "ve'Im Bechuksai Tim'asu" and end with "ve'es Chukosai Ga'alah Nafsham"; whereas in the equivalent Parshah in Ki Savo, the B'rachos begin with "ve'Hayah Im Shamo'a Tishma" and end with "ve'Ein Koneh" that - whereas in the former case, the B'rachos begin with an 'Alef' and end with a 'Tav' (22 letters) whilst the K'lalos begin with a 'Vav' and end with a 'Mem' (8 letters), in the latter case, the B'rachos begin with a 'Vav' and end with a 'Mem' (8 letters) and the K'lalos begin with a 'Vav' and end with a 'Hey' (22 letters).
The significance of these facts is - that Bechukosai, which was said by Hash-m, hints at twenty-two B'rachos but only eight curses, whereas Ki Savo, which was said by Moshe, hints at only eight B'rachos, but twenty-two curses. To teach us that the extent of Hash-m's love of His people Yisrael is unparalleled.