We learned in our Mishnah that a woman cannot establish a Chazakah on her husband's property. This is not obvious (in that everyone knows that she is simply eating the Mezonos to which she is entitled) - because the Tana is speaking where the husband designated a specific field for her Mezonos.

Nevertheless, she cannot establish a Chazakah - because he probably won't object to his wife eating a little extra from his other fields (and therefore will not bother to make a Mecha'ah).

We infer, like we did in the previous Sugya, that although there is no Chazakah on her husband's field, if the woman proves that she purchased it, we accept her proof. The problem with this is - why the husband cannot claim that he only went through the motions of selling her the field, in order to get her to reveal money that she had hidden from him.

To solve the problem, we establish the case - where he gave her the field as a gift.

Rav Nachman commented to Rav Huna about the wonderful thing they had learned the previous day in the 'T'chum', by which he meant - in the Beis-Hamedrash, which used to be outside the town but within T'chum Shabbos, to enable people from the nearby towns to learn there.

When Rav Nachman told Rav Huna that they had learned 'ha'Mocher Sadeh le'Ishto, Kansah ... ' (based on the assumption that the husband also wrote his wife a Sh'tar), in which case we will not say that he only intended to induce her to reveal her money, he retorted - that this was obvious, seeing as the Sh'tar acquires the field, even without the money.

Rav Huna does not contend with the possibility that the husband deliberately wrote the Sh'tar for fear that, if he would not, his wife would not hand over the money - because that is too far-fetched.

Rav Huna bases his ruling (that a Sh'tar Mechirah alone acquires) on the Mishnah in Kidushin, which validates a Kinyan of Karka by means of Kesef, Sh'tar or Chazakah. We refute this proof however, from a statement by Shmuel - who establishes the case of Sh'tar there by a Sh'tar Matanah, but not by a Sh'tar Mechirah (which only acquires if the purchaser has paid).

Rav Hamnuna, who initially tries to corroborate Rav Huna from the Beraisa 'bi'Sh'tar Keitzad?', which specifically rules that a Sh'tar alone acquires - finally establishes this Beraisa by someone who sells a field because of its poor quality.

Otherwise - a Sh'tar Mechirah does not acquire until the purchaser pays, to conform to Rav Nachman and Shmuel.

Rav Ashi disagrees with Rav Hamnuna, establishing the latter Beraisa by a Sh'tar Matanah, and the Tana states 'Sadi Mechurah lach, Sadi Nesunah lach' (despite the fact that he is talking exclusively about a Matanah) - because he is speaking in a case where the donor wants to give the recipient the rights of a purchaser.

By writing in the Sh'tar ...

... 'Sadi Mechurah lach' - the Nosen accepts Achrayus on the sale.

... 'Sadi Nesunah lach' - he precludes the field from Diyna de'Bar Metzra (should one of the neighbors claim that he has first rights).

The Beraisa rules that if someone borrows from his Eved, whom he subsequently sets free, or from his wife, whom he subsequently divorces, he owes them nothing - because he only borrowed the money to induce them to reveal money that they had hidden from him.

We apply this reasoning here - because (based on the principle 'The borrower to the lender') 'Anan Sahadi' (we are witnesses) that a person will not go into debt, if there is another way of interpreting his actions.

We do not however, apply it in our case (of Rav Nachman and Rav Huna) where the man sold his wife his field - because there, by selling his field, he is not placing himself into debt ...

... even if he sold her the field with Achrayus, since, until such time as someone claims the field from her, he does not owe her anything.

Rav Huna bar Avin sent to the Beis-Hamedrash that if someone sells his field to his wife, she acquires it (like Rav Nachman), whilst he eats the Peiros. But, he hastened to add, Rebbi Aba, Rebbi Avahu and all the Gedolei ha'Dor disagreed with him, because they hold that (based on the fact that a man loves his wife) - he really meant to give her a Matanah, and he only wrote a Lashon of Mecher in order to strengthen her hand (as we explained on the previous Amud).

To reconcile Rav Huna bar Avin with the Beraisa that we just cited 'Lavah min ha'Eved ve'Shichrero ... Ein lahen alav K'lum' - we differentiate between a loan and a sale (as we explained there).

Rav draws a distinction between whether one sells his wife a field - in which case he may eat the Peiros, or gives it to her as a gift - in which case he may not (like Rav Huna bar Avin).

Rebbi Elazar holds - that either way, he may not eat the Peiros (like Rebbi Aba, Rebbi Avahu and their colleagues).

When Rav Chisda ruled like Rebbi Elazar, Rabana Ukva and Rabana Nechemya - grandsons of Rav, objected.

The gist of their objection was - that Rebbi Elazar, with whose opinion Rav Chisda concurred, was not as great as Rav.

Rav Chisda did not reply that he had indeed followed the opinion of great men (i.e. Rebbi Aba, Rebbi Avahu and their colleagues) - because they too, like Rebbi Elazar, were disciples of Rebbi Yochanan (rendering them inferior to Rav).

Rav Chisda replied - that he did indeed follow the opinion of a great man, because when Ravin arrived, he quoted Rebbi Yochanan himself, who ruled like his disciples.

Rava finally rules 'ha'Mocher Sadeh le'Ishto, Lo Kansah, ve'ha'Ba'al Ochel Peiros'. On which we ask 'Tarti' - that the two statements contradict each other, because 'Lo Kansah' implies neither the field nor the Peiros, so how can he then say that the husband eats the fruits.

We reconcile the contradiction - by establishing the first statement where the woman did not hide money, and the second statement where she did (in which case the husband only sold her the field in order to induce her to reveal it).

Rava in fact, holds like Rav Yehudah, who draws the same distinction. This ruling overturns the entire Sugya - inasmuch as Rav Nachman, Rav Huna, Rav Huna bar Avin and Rav all hold that the sale is valid and that we do not ascribe any other motive to the transaction. Nor did the Amora'im who disagree with them dispute this point.

The Beraisa prohibits accepting a Pikadon from a woman, an Eved or a Katan - because we are afraid that they may have stolen them (the woman from her husband, the Eved from his master and the Katan from his father or whoever he is living with), and it is forbidden to aid and abet a Ganav.

In the event that one did accept a Pikadon from a woman or an Eved ...

... assuming that they are still alive - one returns it to them.

... assuming that they have died - one returns it to the husband or master respectively.

The Pikadon is returned to the husband - because, seeing as a husband inherits his wife, he is in fact, his wife's heir.

If the ...

... woman is already divorced at the time of her death - the Pikadon must be returned to her heirs (and not to her ex-husband).

... Eved was set free before he died - the Pikadon must nevertheless be returned to his master (and neither to his heirs, if he has any; nor to keep it, if he does not).

The difference is based on the fact - that we assume Avadim to be Ganavim (like the Mishnah in Pirkei Avos), but not women.

Someone who accepts a Pikadon from a Katan - must put it away for the Katan ('make a Segulah', which will be explained shortly).

If the Katan has already died - then he must return it to his heirs (for the same reason as one returns it to the woman's heirs, as we just explained).