We just established the Mishnah in Gitin 'Lakach min ha'Ish ve'Chazar ve'Lakchah min ha'Ishah, Mekcho Bateil' (because the woman can say 'Nachas Ru'ach Asisi le'Ba'ali'), when the husband sold one of the three fields that we just discussed. We refute the initial implication that in the case of all other fields, 'Mekcho Kayam' - because there (even more than with the three fields, which after all, her husband designated for her) it would most certainly lead to a breach in Shalom Bayis, if she would not sign her name on the sale (in order to make him happy) in which case she can claim there too 'Nachas Ru'ach Asisi le'Ba'ali'.

Rabah bar Rav Huna (the author of the previous ruling) therefore comes to exclude Nechsei Milug, where a woman is not believed to say 'Nachas Ru'ach Asisi le'Ba'ali' ...

... because it is her personal property, and she would therefore not hesitate to veto her husband's sale without fear of breaching their relationship.

Ameimar stated 'Ish ve'Ishah she'Machu be'Nechsei Milug - Lo Asu ve'Lo K'lum'.

Seeing as, according to Rabah bar Rav Huna, if a woman sells her Nechsei Milug after her husband, the sale is valid, he will explain Ameimar's ruling - to mean (not 'a man and a woman', but) 'a man or a woman'.

Other than when they both sold the Nechsei Milug, the sale is also valid - if the woman sold the field to her husband.

In the case where the woman alone sold her Nechsei Milug to a third party, the husband can re-claim the field from the purchaser because of Takanas Usha cited by Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Chanina, namely - if a woman sold her Nechsei Milug, the husband (whom they gave the Din of the first purchaser) can claim the property from all subsequent Lekuchos ...

... even if she sold the field itself (over which the husband has no rights during her lifetime), and died.

The woman's sale is nevertheless valid - in the event that her husband either dies first or divorces her (and it is only as long as they are married or in the event that she dies first that the sale is invalid).

Alternatively, when Ameimar says 'Ish ve'Ishah', he means even if both of them sold the Nechsei Milug, only he holds like Rebbi Elazar, who discusses in a Beraisa the Din of Yom O Yomayim - which absolves a master who strikes his Eved Cana'ani from the death-penalty, should he survive twenty-four hours before succumbing to his wounds.

Rebbi Elazar rules that if Reuven sold his Eved to Shimon on condition that he may still continue to use him for thirty days, and then after one of them struck him, he died after twenty-four hours - neither of them is absolved from the death-penalty, Shimon because he cannot currently use him (Kinyan Peiros), and Reuven because he does not own him (Kinyan ha'Guf).

Rava derives this from the Pasuk "Ki Kaspo hu" - since either the entire phrase is superfluous (because it is unnecessary for the Torah to give a reason why the owner is Patur from Miysah), or because it could just as well have written "Ki Kesef hu" (and the 'Vav' in "Kaspo" is redundant).

Ameimar applies the same logic to the case of a man and his wife who sold her field of Nechsei Milug - which belongs to neither of them, since he has a Kinyan Peiros, and she, a Kinyan ha'Guf. Consequently, neither of them, individually or even combined, has the power to sell it.

Ameimar now reconciles his opinion with our Mishnah, which validates a man's sale of his wife's Nechsei Milug if she substantiates the sale - by establishing the author as the Rabbanan of Rebbi Elazar (i.e. Rebbi Meir, Rebbi Yehudah or Rebbi Yossi, as we shall now see).

The reasoning of ...

... Rebbi Meir, who holds in the Beraisa of Rebbi Elazar, that the seller is subject to the Din of Yom O Yomayim, but not the buyer is - because he holds that the one who has use of the Eved (the Peiros), is considered the owner ('Kinyan Peiros ke'Kinyan ha'Guf Dami').

... Rebbi Yehudah, who holds that the buyer is subject to the Din of Yom O Yomayim, but not the seller, is - because he holds 'Kinyan Peiros La'av ke'Kinyan ha'Guf Dami' (because the one who owns the body of the Eved is considered the owner).

Rebbi Meir's opinion is based on the Pasuk "u'Meis Tachas Yado". Rebbi Yehudah's source is "ki Kaspo hu".

According to Rebbi Yossi - both owners are subject to the Din of Yom O Yomayim ...

... because he has a Safek whether 'Kinyan Peiros ke'Kinyan ha'Guf Dami' or ' ... La'av ke'Kinyan ha'Guf Dami'. Consequently, he follows the principle 'Safek Nefashos Lehakel' (whenever there is a Safek whether someone is Chayav Miysah or not, we rule leniently).

We learned in our Mishnah 've'Lo Ish Chazakah be'Nechsei Ishto'. Rav seems to clash with this - when he says 'Ishah Tzerichah Lim'chos'.

When Rav says ...

... 'Eishes Ish Tzerichah Li'mchos', he cannot be referring to a third party attempting to establish a Chazakah on the woman's property - because he holds 'Ein Machzikin be'Nechsei Eishes Ish'.

... 'Ein Machzikin be'Nechsei Eishes Ish', he cannot be referring to her husband's attempts to do so - because a. 'Ein Machzikin' (in the plural) implies the world at large, and b. he would then merely be mimicking our Mishnah.

We finally establish 'Eishes Ish Tzerichah Lim'chos' with regard to her husband, and Rava establishes Rav - where he is spoiling her field by digging pits in a field which is not designated for that.

Rav Nachman Amar Rabah bar Avuhah rules that - one cannot establish a Chazakah through damaging it.

To reconcile this with Rav - we establish it by a Din Chazakah of three years (which does not apply), though in fact, he will acquire the field immediately, unless the woman protests (since no person will stand idly by and watch someone ruin his property, even for one day).

Alternatively, even digging pits in a field is subject to a three-year Chazakah, and Rav Nachman is referring to - establishing a person's rights of usage based on the neighbor's silence. This does not, he teaches us, extend to damages, about which the neighbor may lodge a complaint at any time.

Rav Mari gives an example of Rav Nachman's ruling as producing smoke. Rav Z'vid as having established bathroom facilities in the field at ground level (not in the form of a pit), rendering it visible and therefore disgusting (as we already learned in Bava Kama).

Rav Yosef establishes Rav's statement 'Eishes Ish Tzerichah Lim'chos' with regard to a third party (other than her husband). We asked earlier from here on to Rav's other ruling 'Ein Machzikin be'Nechsei Eishes Ish'. In this latter case, the Machzik is not believed when he claims that he bought the field from the husband - since the woman can claim that she did not bother to make a Mecha'ah, either because she relied on her husband to do so, or because she assumed that her husband had sold him his own rights on the Peiros, but not the field itself (which he had no authority to sell).

To reconcile the two statements of Rav, Rav Yosef establishes Rav's statement 'Eishes Ish Tzerichah Lim'chos' - where the Machzik ate the Peiros for one year whilst the husband was still alive and for another three years after his death.

Should the woman fail to make a Mecha'ah, the man will then establish a Chazakah on the basis of a 'Migu' that he purchased the field from the man, whom he knows purchased it from his wife, since he could have claimed that - he purchased it directly from her after her husband's death.

If not for Rav's ruling, we would have compared this case to that of an Aris, who cannot establish a Chazakah on the field of Arisus - because the Machzik admits that he went down to the field on the basis of having purchased the Peiros from the husband (which is not subject to a Chazakah), just like the Aris, who cannot establish a Chazakah, because we know that he first went down to the field on the basis of Arisus.

Rav differentiates between the two cases however - based on the fact that, unlike the case of the Aris, which was not subject to change, in our case, the original contract was only due to last as long as the seller remained married to the owner of the field. Consequently, once the seller dies, it is as if he went down to the field afresh, to begin a new Chazakah.

The Daynei Golah - Shmuel and Karna, disagree with Rav.

They hold - 'Machzikin be'Nechsei Eishes Ish'.

When Rav ruled like the Daynei Golah, Rav Kahana and Rav Asi asked him whether he had retracted he replied that - he was referring specifically to the case referred to by Rav Yosef (although Rav Yosef himself lived a few generations after Rav), where the Machzik had eaten the fruits for one year during the husband's lifetime, and for three more years after his death.

The Daynei Golah, on the other hand - were referring (not specifically to Rav Yosef's case, but) even to where the Machzik established a Chazakah for three years during the husband's lifetime.