In the list issued by Rava Amar Rav Nachman, both Mecha'ah and Moda'ah require two witnesses. 'Moda'ah' is - where Reuven is forced to sell or to give away his belongings against his will. Therefore, in order to negate the transaction retroactively, he first testifies in front of two witnesses that he is being forced into it, and that he is duly negating it.

When he says that in neither case, is it necessary to say 'Kesuvu', he means - that - once the owner has given his testimony, the witnesses write the relevant Sh'tar automatically (without his express consent).

The third item that belongs together with the above two is - Kinyan (if Reuven admits that he owes Shimon money, reinforcing his admission with a Kinyan Sudar (Chalipin).

Rava presented all three cases separately, as if they were three different Halachos - because he learned them independently from Rav Nachman, and as he learned each case, he added it to the list.

He also issues the ruling 'Hoda'ah bi'Fenei Shenayim ve'Tzarich Lomar Kesuvu', since Hoda'ah is a Chov (detrimental to him). Despite the fact that the debtor has admitted to owing the creditor money, writing a Sh'tar is a disadvantage for him - because as long as the debt is an oral one, he is believed when he claims to have paid, which is not the case by a written Sh'tar.

The sole case cited by Rava that requires three people and not two is Kiyum Sh'taros (corroborating a Sh'tar) which the creditor initiates - when he has reason to suspect that the witnesses who signed on the Sh'tar are either about to travel overseas, or are about to die.

He then takes them to Beis-Din, where they verify their signatures. Beis-Din then corroborate the Sh'tar in writing and add their signatures. (This is also known as 'a Henpek').

There where two Dayanim judged a case of money-matters - we normally hold that although they are termed 'a Beis-Din Chatzuf' (an impudent Beis-Din), their ruling is acceptable Bedieved.

This does not however extend to Kiyum Sh'taros - where there are already two witnesses, and another two witnesses signing resembles two witnesses testifying that they heard testimony from two other witnesses ('Eid mi'Pi Eid'), which is unacceptable.

Rava has a problem with Rav Nachman's ruling regarding Kinyan. What makes Kinyan appear to be a Ma'aseh Beis-Din is - the fact that as a result of the Kinyan, money changes hands from Reuven to Shimon.

The problem therefore is - why two people will suffice, and not three.

If it is not a Ma'aseh Beis-Din, the problem will be - that seeing as the Kinyan is to Reuven's detriment, why we write a Sh'tar without his consent.

Rava later concludes that Kinyan is not a Ma'aseh Beis-Din, and the reason that we write the Sh'tar even without Reuven's consent is because of the principle 'Stam Kinyan li'Chesivah Omed'. The logic behind this principle is - the fact that Reuven followed his admission with a Kinyan Sudar, a sign that he considers his obligation absolute (otherwise, he would have delayed finalizing the issue until Shimon acquires the Metalt'lin with Kinyan Meshichah or the Karka with a Chazakah.

If Reuven did not made a Kinyan - then the witnesses will be obligated to obtain his consent before writing the Sh'tar ...

... even if he specifically instructed them to write it.

Rabah and Rav Yosef qualified the Din of Moda'ah - confining it to there where the man who is suspected of forcing the transaction, is someone who is known not to adhere to Beis-Din's rulings.

Abaye and Rava both rule - that even against them (Abaye and Rava), one would be entitled to write a Sh'tar Moda'ah.

The basis of the Machlokes is - that Rabah and Rav Yosef rely on the fact that the claimant has the option of taking the suspect to Beis-Din, whereas Abaye and Rava counter that a Beis-Din is not always available.

According to the Neherda'i, for the Sh'tar to be valid, one has to add - 'Anan Yad'inan beih be'Unsa di'Pelanya' (we are aware that P'loni was forced).

The Neherda'i cannot be referring to Sh'tarei Gitin and Matanah, we argue, because it is only a Giluy Milsa - 'a revelation of the truth', without any personal bias. This is because since the donor or the husband does not stand to lose anything, it is obvious that his claim that he is being forced, is genuine. Otherwise, 'Mah Nafshach', if he wanted to give the Get, he would not make a Moda'ah, and if he did not, then why would he give it to her in the first place?

The Chachamim issued a Takanah - that before giving his wife a Get, a man is obligated to nullify all Moda'os.

They also ruled that any Moda'os that are not the result of an Oneis are not valid - provided the Get has not yet been written, but not if it has.

Neither can they be referring to Sh'tarei Z'vini (Mechirah) - because Rava has already taught that one does not write a Moda'ah on a Sh'tar Mechirah.

The reason for this ...

... by Sadeh S'tam is - because we rule 'Talyuhu ve'Zavin Zevineih Zevini' (if someone is suspended on a tree until he sells one of his fields, his sale is valid - because whoever sells because he needs the money is an Oneis, yet his sale is valid) and according to Rava, one only writes a a Sh'tar Moda'ah when there is a genuine Oneis).

... by Sadeh Zu - because then his sale is invalid anyway, and all he needs to do is to bring witnesses that he was forced and Beis-Din will negate the sale (see also Ritva).

Rav Huna disagrees with Rava in the case of Sadeh S'tam. According to him - one may write a Moda'ah even when there is no genuine Oneis (see also Maharsha).

The Neherda'i must therefore referring to a case of a sale ...

... where Shimon the creditor threatens Reuven the debtor that, unless he sells him the field that he is currently holding as a Mashkon, he will hide the Sh'tar Mashkanta and claim that he bought it from him.

The reason that this case is more eligible for a Moda'ah than the case of 'Talyuhu ve'Zavin' by Sadeh S'tam is - because, due to the fear caused by Shimon's threat to claim that the field is his, which will cause him to lose it completely, he agrees to sell it only to rid himself of the threat, and not because he really wants to sell it.

Bearing in mind that the witnesses must know about the Oneis, we have a problem with the current case. The witnesses cannot know about the Oneis through having heard Shimon's threats to Reuven - because then their testimony would suffice to procure the field on behalf of Reuven, and a Moda'ah would not be necessary.

Rabeinu Chananel therefore establishes the case, starting with the fact that, after informing the witnesses of Shimon's intentions, he then asked Shimon for the return of the field in their presence, and he replied that he purchased it (and had already eaten the fruit for three years). The case continues - with Reuven approaching Shimon secretly, offering to sell him the field (as per his original request), at which the latter asked the former to write him a Sh'tar not in his presence (which is perfectly legal), which he showed to the witnesses before writing a Moda'ah on the sale.

The case ended - with Reuven once again asking for the return of his field in the presence of the witnesses, at which Shimon produced the Sh'tar Mechirah that Reuven had previously handed to him (rather than claim that he had a Chazakah going back three years).

The witnesses discovered that Reuven was an Oneis - when they saw Shimon produce the recently dated Sh'tar to counter Reuven's claim (in spite of his original claim that he had already purchased the field three years earlier).

Rav Yehudah invalidates a Matnasah Temirtah, which, according to ...

... the first Lashon, is - a Sh'tar Matanah which the benefactor asks the witnesses to hide.

... the second Lashon is - a Sh'tar Matanah which the benefactor does not ask the witnesses to write in a public place (but did not ask them to write it secretly).

The difference between the two Leshonos is - in a case where he asked the witnesses without mentioning either (which is valid according to the first Lashon, but invalid, according to the second.

We reject Rabeinu Chananel's version of the second Lashon ('a Sh'tar Matanah which the donor specifically asks the witnesses not to write in a public place'), on the grounds - that the given difference between the two Leshonos would then not make sense (since either way, if he had been silent, the Sh'tar ought to be valid).

When Rava said, with regard to the previous case, that it serves as a Moda'ah for 'its friend', he means - that should he subsequently donate the same gift to someone else, then the Sh'tar Matnasa will serve as a Moda'ah for that Matanah and negate it.

And when Rav Papa said that Rava did not really say that but that we imply it from his ruling in a case that came before him, it implies - that the implication is incorrect (as we shall now see).

When Reuven asked Sarah to marry him, she accepted only on condition - that he write her all his property.

When, after Reuven accepted and wrote her a document to that effect, his oldest son complained, he told witnesses to go and hide in Eiver Yemina and write a predated document, giving all his property to his oldest son.

When the case was brought before Rava, he granted the property to neither of them, the one, because it was a Matanah Temirta, and the other, we initially think, because a Matanah Temirta is a Moda'ah for any subsequent Matanah.

However, Rav Papa concludes that is not a general ruling that we can extrapolate from Rava to be applied in other cases. In fact, it is confined to this case - because Reuven was an Oneis, forced into making this move by the woman's stipulation.

In the case of a regular Matnasa Temirta, Rava will hold - that the first Sh'tar (the Matnasa Temirta) is not valid, whereas the second, which he gave wholeheartedly, is.

We ask what the Din will be by S'tam (in the case of Matnasa Temirta). The She'eilah cannot be whether perhaps, even though a Matnasa Temirta is not a Moda'ah for its friend, maybe a Matanah that is given S'tam, is - because according to the Lashon cited above that invalidates a Matanah S'tam, that is Matanah Temirta (and the She'eilah would then make no sense).

The She'eilah is - simply which of the two Leshonos (regarding S'tam Matanah) cited above do we accept.

When Ravina says (in connection with the previous She'eilah) 'Lo Chayshinan', he means that - it remains a Safek, and wherever the money is, it remains (i.e. the beneficiary cannot claim with the Sh'tar. In the event that he did however, the donor cannot claim it back).

Rav Ashi argues and holds - 'Chayshinan'.

The Halachah is - like Rav Ashi.

When writing a Sh'tar Matnasa one should therefore be careful - to insert in the Sh'tar that the donor gave instructions to 'write it in the main street and to sign it there'.