Explanation: This means that according to him, the Pasuk, "From all the living" is needed to exclude a Treifah.

Question: How do we exclude a Treifah from this Pasuk? The opinion that holds that a Treifah can give birth will certainly hold that a Treifah can live! Even the opinion that a Treifah does not give birth will say that it is possible that it may live. If so, how can this be excluded from the Pasuk, "From all the living?" It can live!

Answer: It is possible that the Pasuk can be explained as follows. "From all the living" means that it should be completely healthy and thriving, as opposed to being sickly. A Treifah, even though it can live, is still not considered healthy. Rather, it is sick its entire life, and it continues to become sicker. It therefore can be excluded from this Pasuk, "From all the living" even more than an animal missing a limb that is totally healthy and alive besides for the fact that it is missing one limb.

Answer(cont.): Rashi also gives this explanation later (51a, DH "v'Dilma").

Explanation: However, one cannot exclude from here both an animal that is missing a limb and an animal with a blemish (the latter which we conclude that we do not exclude at all), being that he only needed the animals to populate the world.

Question: However, this is difficult. We hold according to the opinion that a Treifah gives birth. If so, how do we exclude a Treifah?

Answer: Perhaps we can answer that the Pasuk, "From all the living" is required to exclude an animal that is missing a limb. Indeed, if the Pasuk had only said, "Itach," I would think that it is referring to an animal with a missing limb, not a Treifah. This is because it is more logical to exclude an animal with a missing limb which is disgusting than a Treifah which is not disgusting, as is does not have any part of it missing. There are many Treifos where one cannot even tell that the animal is a Treifah! (However, being that we have two Pesukim, "Itach" and "mi'Kol ha'Chai" it must be that we exclude both.)

Implied Question: The Gemara asked earlier (5b) that we require this Pasuk to exclude a Treifah (and not an animal missing a limb). If so, the Gemara implies that it is more reasonable to exclude a Treifah than an animal missing a limb. (This is unlike the reasoning we have just suggested.)

Answer: This is only regarding the exclusion of, "From all of the living," which implies an animal that is healthy and not a Treifah. However, an animal missing a limb, such as an ear, is considered totally healthy in the rest of his body, as I have explained earlier.

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that he lived for many years afterwards. (Why would we think he was a Treifah?)

Answer: Even so, as that time it was not known whether or not he was a Triefah. It is therefore unclear that he would not have brought a Treifah aboard due to the teaching that "they should be similar to you."

Question: This answer seems difficult. Hash-m clearly only warned Noach not to take Treifos that were revealed and obvious, as he could not know whether an animal was a hidden Treifah (i.e. it had a problem with its internal organs that made it a Treifah).

Answer: However, it is possible to answer that the Gemara now holds like the opinion that a Treifah lives.

Proof: This is clearly true, as the Gemara is according to the opinion that a Treifah gives birth. According to that opinion, a Treifah can also live.

Question: Why does the Gemara in Menachos (5b) require the Pasuk, "from the cattle" to exclude a Treifah from being brought as a Korban? Why shouldn't this be derived from the fact that an animal must be "Tamim" -- "complete?" (The Pasuk reads, "If his Korban is an Olah from the cattle, a male complete animal should be brought" (Vayikra 1:3). Why not derive this from "complete" instead of "from the cattle?")

Answer#1: It is logical that the Pasuk should teach that "complete" excludes an animal with a blemish. This is because it is more disgusting to bring an animal with a blemish than a Treifah.

Proof: It is clear that offering an animal with a blemish is considered very denigrating, as the Pasuk says regarding such an offering, "Offer it to your officer. Will he be pleased with you?" This is because it is obviously injured. However, there are some Treifos that are not clearly injured.

Answer#2: Additionally, the Pasuk itself clearly excludes an animal with a blemish from being called complete, as the Pasuk says, "It should be complete to be wanted, it should not have any blemish." This implies that if it has a blemish it is not called complete. (This is also a reason why I would think that "complete" excludes an animal with a blemish, but not a Treifah.)

Question: According to the opinion that a Treifah does not give birth, and we derive Treifah from the Pasuk, "to have seed live," why do we require the Pasuk of "Itach?"

Implied Question(cont.): One cannot push aside that the Pasuk would normally have stated "Itach" anyway (and it is not meant as an extra word to use to derive laws), as regarding Moshe we derive in Sanhedrin (36b), "Itach - (this teaches) that are similar to you."

Answer: We would derive "Itach - (this teaches) that they should be secondary to you." This is similar to the derivation in Bava Metzia (62a), "And your brother should live with you - (this teaches) that your life takes priority over the life of your friend."

Answer: The Bereishis Rabah teaches, "And it will be for you and for them to eat" indicates that they should be secondary to you, and you should not be secondary to them.

Explanation: This means, if you would say that the three days stated in the Mishnah do not include the actual holiday, but their holidays are sometimes one or two days long, or eight days long like these holidays mentioned in our Gemara, this is understandable. This is because the Mishnah merely said that it is forbidden to do business with them for three days.

Explanation(cont.): However, if you say that the holiday is part of the three days, how can the next Mishnah state that their holidays are Kalanda etc.? This implies that it would only be forbidden to deal with them for three days, when in fact it is forbidden to deal with them for ten days (eight of Kalanda and two more)!

Observation: It must be that there is at least a two-day interruption between Kalanda and Satarnurya. Being that the Gemara says the Mishnah should say ten days, if so, it is clearly indicating that there are two days before Kalanda that do not involve any holiday. This is also logical, as we say later that the eight days of Kalanda are opposite the eight holidays instituted by Adam Ha'Rishon. He probably did not establish them right after the beginning of the next season, as he could not immediately tell that the days were getting longer.

Question: This is difficult. Why didn't the Gemara ask that our Mishnah also implies that the three days do not include the holiday itself? This is implied by the Tana's statement, "Three days before their holiday." If we would think the holiday is included, it should say, "Two days before their holiday."

Question(cont.): If you would say that we would still have asked whether or not the holiday was included, this is clearly incorrect, as otherwise it should have said, "One day before the holiday." (One day before the holiday cannot be mistaken as the day of the holiday, because otherwise the Mishnah would have merely stated that it is forbidden from doing business with them on their holidays.) This question is easy to understand, and requires great study (to answer).

Implied Question: Shmuel needed to say that according to Rebbi Yishmael it would always be forbidden to do business with idolaters. (Why? This is a simple calculation that we already know!)

Answer#1: This is in order that one should not say that being that it is never permitted, there is no more room to ever permit this prohibition (as it was originally instituted that it should always be forbidden).

Answer#2: Alternatively, I would think that Rebbi Yishmael holds in this matter like the Rabbanan who do not forbid the days after the holiday (meaning it would be permitted for three out of seven days of the week).

Answer#3: Alternatively, he is teaching that Sunday is considered a significant holiday that would cause the days around it to be forbidden, just like their other significant holidays.

Question: Some ask that Rashi in the Mishnah seems to have a difficulty from our Gemara. Rashi explained that "Lases v'Lases" means to buy and sell. It is understandable that selling to them could be a problem of Lifnei Iver (as they could use these items for Avodah Zarah). However, how can buying from them be Lifnei Iver?

Answer: It is possible that Rashi understands that the money given to the idolater enables him to buy what is required for him to worship/sacrifice to his idol.

Implied Question: It appears that this applies to all prohibitions. (Why, then, is the Beraisa only stated regarding a Nazir? It is understandable why Aiver Min ha'Chai is the example used for a gentile, as he generally has nothing else that he is forbidden to eat.)

Answer: Rather, the reason why the Beraisa gives the example of giving a cup of wine to a Nazir is because he probably wants to drink the wine, as this is what everyone does with wine. Perhaps he forgot he is a Nazir. However, if a Jew asks that someone should give him a piece of Neveilah, pig, or something else that is clearly prohibited, there is no reason to suspect that he will eat it and therefore refrain from handing it to him.

Answer(cont.): However, if it is known to him that the person indeed wants to eat the Neveilah etc., it is forbidden for him to give this person the Neveilah, even if it belongs to him. This is apparent from the Gemara's question that if he will not give it to him, he will take it himself! (This implies that it should be forbidden to give it to him even if it is his.)

Opinion: Accordingly, it is forbidden to give a person who always worships idols a forbidden thing (i.e. to eat), even if it is theirs. This is because it is known that they will eat it, and it is forbidden to them, as they are still considered a Jew.

Opinion(cont.): The case is where the sinner is in a place where he cannot get to the object he will do the prohibition with unless this person hands it to him. This is as the Gemara concludes, that they are on two sides of the river (with the sinner being unable to cross to obtain the object).

Opinion: It appears to the Ri that the law follows Rebbi Yochanan, even though the Beraisa follows the opinion of Rebbi Shimon ben Lakish.

Proof: The Ri proves this from the Gemara in Yevamos (36a) which lists the case where we rule like Rebbi Shimon ben Lakish when he argues with Rebbi Yochanan, and it does not consider this as one of those cases.

Implied Question: One cannot say that the reason the argument here is not listed as one of these cases in Yevamos (ibid.) is because the Beraisa clearly supports Reish Lakish, and therefore it does not have to be listed. (Why not?)

Answer#1: This is because the Gemara lists there the argument regarding Chalitzah done to a woman who is pregnant, even though there is a Beraisa in that Gemara that supports Rebbi Shimon ben Lakish.

Answer#2: Additionally, the Gemara later (7b) concludes that the difference between them is in a case of regular business dealings. The Gemara says that the Chachamim of our Mishnah hold that it is forbidden. This matches the opinion of Rebbi Yochanan. A Mishnah is better proof than a Beraisa (and is therefore a reason why it would not be obvious (at all) that we rule like Rebbi Shimon ben Lakish, as indeed we do not).

Explanation: This specifically refers to selling. If it would be referring to buying, there is clearly more reason to forbid something that does not last more than something that does last.

Explanation(cont.): Rather, this Beraisa is clearly only talking about selling. Even so, the second part of the Mishnah calls this "Nasa v'Nasan," as per the opinion of Rabeinu Tam (see Tosfos 2a, DH "Asur").

Question: This is difficult according to Rashi (see Tosfos 2a ibid.).

Implied Question: Rabeinu Tam (see Tosfos 2a, DH "Asur") said that it is never forbidden to buy from an idolater at this time. (How does he understand the Beraisa that explicitly says one cannot take from them?)

Answer: It must be that the Beraisa means one cannot take a gift from them.

Implied Question: One cannot accepts a present that lasts as well. One cannot deduce (from the fact that the Beraisa states, "One can sell them something that does not last, but cannot take from them") that he can take something that lasts. (Why not? The Beraisa is specifically talking about things that do not last!)

Answer: This is because a new Dinar lasts (and Rebbi Yehudah did not want to take it).

Question: This is difficult. Why did Abaye say the reason is a decree? Let us say that the reason is because he is happy, as the Mishnah states that even though he is pained now he is happy after awhile!

Answer: It is possible to answer that the reason that he is happy after awhile is not a reason to make a decree, being that he will not be happy on his holiday.

Observation: However, if there was no happiness at all there would be no reason to make a decree. The reason we make a decree regarding all of these cases is because there is some aspect of happiness, as stated nearby when the Gemara explains why all of these cases are needed.

Observation(cont.): It is now understandable why all of these cases in the Mishnah are required according to Abaye, just as it is understandable according to Rava.

Opinion: This is a proof to Rabeinu Tam's explanation that this is only if the loan is without interest. Why would the Gemara say, "He is making him (the idolater) lose money" if the idolater is purposely lending with interest (to a Jew) in order to make money?