Question: This is difficult, as Rebbi Meir contradicts himself! In our Gemara he says that the worker should give him the value of his wool. This implies that change causes acquisition. However, in Bava Kama (95a) the Mishnah states that Rebbi Meir says the following. If someone steals a pregnant cow and it gave birth, or he stole a sheep that had wool on it and he sheared it, he pays its value along with its shearings and children. This implies that a change does not cause acquisition!

Answer: The Gemara there is different, as Rebbi Meir established a fine which is explained in that Gemara, due to the fact that he sinned (by stealing).

Answer(cont.): Similarly, the Gemara in Gitin (53b) says that if someone makes something impure, causes it to be mixed with Terumah, or pours wine to Avodah Zarah (and these things all belonged to someone else), Rebbi Meir fines someone who does so by accident due to one who does so on purpose. The person who must pay on purpose must do so because he damages the item with his hands.

Answer(cont.): However, here it is not possible to give a fine, as the worker intended that this should be for the good of the owner. He thinks that the owner intended that this should happen.

Question: Rebbi Yehudah still contradicts himself. Rebbi Yehudah there says that an item that is stolen is returned as is. This implies that a change causes acquisition. Here, the Mishnah states that he has the lower hand. This implies that change does not cause acquisition.

Answer: Rabeinu Tam says that in the case of theft, he has in mind to acquire the object. In this case he accidentally damaged the item, and never intended to acquire it.

Question: This is difficult. Why do we have to answer that the Halachah follows Rebbi Yehudah because we have a general Mishnah that supports his opinion? In any event, we rule in Eiruvin (46b) that when there is an argument between Rebbi Meir and Rebbi Yehudah, the law follows Rebbi Yehudah.

Question(cont.): If this is because there are Amoraim there who argue on this rule, there are Amoraim who also argue on the rule that we rule like a general Mishnah! There are even those who argue later (21a) regarding the rule that we always rule like a general Mishnah that appears after an argument in a Mishnah (about that same topic). Regarding renting houses to idolaters, Rebbi Meir and Rebbi Yosi argue. Rav Yehudah rules in the name of Shmuel that the law follows Rebbi Yosi, even though afterwards the Mishnah follows Rebbi Meir.

Answer: This is why it appears that the Gemara is not asking its question due to the general Mishnah. Rather, the Gemara asks that this is a case where there is an argument and afterwards a general Mishnah. Even the opinion that says that we do not rule like a general Mishnah in this case should still hold that this rule is considered like the rule that when the majority argues against the minority, the rule is like the majority. It should therefore be assumed the rule is like the general Mishnah. [The Maharam explains that the rule that when the majority argues against the minority the rule is like the majority is not an absolute rule. Rather, it is the assumption unless someone rules otherwise. Similarly, Rav Yehudah later (21a) who rules like Rebbi Yosi does not totally discount the rule that we rule like a general Mishnah that appears after an argument in a Mishnah. He merely cites an exception to this rule. However, he too (as does everyone) assumes that the rule follows the general Mishnah unless specified.]

Explanation: This means to say that the entire Mishnah is stated without argument, but rather as the law.

Opinion: We do not have the text, "Gabey" as Rashi explained. ["Gabey Hilchasa Psikta" indicates that it is said next to laws that nobody argues on.]

Question: This is (incorrect) because there is an opinion there that the law does not follow the Mishnah (near that Mishnah) that whoever retracts etc.

Explanation: The Ri explains that the question is, do you think that you will be able to stand with me tonight?

Question: Why doesn't he ask all of the scholars and let them discuss the issue with each other? Perhaps they will retract their words?

Answer: It is only forbidden for the questioner if he does not inform the second Rabbi that he already asked a first Rabbi and he said it was prohibited. However, if he says that he already asked a first Rabbi, it is permitted.

Answer(cont.): However, the (second) Chacham should certainly be careful not to rule leniently. This is as the Gemara stated in Nidah (20b) that a second Chacham cannot permit what a first Chacham already forbade. This is unless he can make the first Chacham retract his ruling. For example, this would apply in a case where the first Chacham made a clear mistake (in text), or even if he made a mistake in applying his logic while the Gemara implies he should rule otherwise.

Answer(cont.): In such a case we say in Sanhedrin (6a) that whatever he has done is considered done, and he (the Chacham who made a mistaken ruling) must pay from his own money if he physically enforced his ruling (i.e. took the money from Reuven and gave it to Shimon).

Observation: If the first Chacham forbade something, his colleague is not allowed to permit it. However, if the first Chacham permitted something, his colleague is allowed to forbid it.

Implied Question: The Yerushalmi says in Shabbos (17:2) that Rebbi Simon permitted something, and Rebbi Ami forbade it. Rebbi Simon was upset at Rebbi Ami for this. The Yerushalmi asks, doesn't the Beraisa say that if someone asks a Chacham who permitted, he should not as another Chacham because he might forbid it? This implies that if a Chacham was lenient, his friend is not allowed to be stringent (unlike our observation)!

Answer: The Yerushalmi means to ask why Rebbi Simon was upset. It does not say anywhere (i.e. meaning there is no Beraisa that says) that someone who asks a Chacham who rules permissively cannot ask a Chacham who will rule stringently! Chazal only forbade getting a second opinion after the first person ruled stringently!

Answer(cont.): The Yerushalmi concludes that Rav Yudan says the incident happened in an opposite manner. The person asked Rebbi Ami who forbade, and he then asked Rebbi Simon who permitted. Rebbi Ami was upset at Rebbi Simon, as the Beraisa states that if a person asked a Chacham who forbade, he should not asked another Chacham in the hopes that he will be lenient.

Implied Question: The Gemara in Chulin (49a) says regarding a needle that was found in the vena cava that Huna the son of Rav Idi declared the animal to be a Treifah. Rav Ada bar Minyumi said it was permitted. (How can he permit it after Huna ruled it was forbidden?)

Answer: In that case, they were both in the Beis Medrash when the question was asked.

Opinion#1: Rashi ruled that whenever there is a statement "there are those who say" in the Gemara (presenting a different version of the aforementioned statement in the Gemara), if the question is in Torah law we should abide by the more stringent version. If it is a question of Rabbinic law, we should abide by the latter version.

Opinion#2: The Riva says that these second version are a side point when compared to the first version, and we therefore always rule like the first version.

Opinion#3: Rabeinu Tam says that if it is a question in Torah law we rule stringently, while if it is a question in Rabbinic law we rule leniently, as we do here regarding Rebbi Yehoshua ben Korchah.

Opinion#4: Rabeinu Shimshon says that whenever we can prove from the Gemara that the main opinion is either one of these opinions, we rule like that opinion.

Opinion#1: Rashi explains this refers to thieves and Amei ha'Aretz (ignoramuses regarding the laws of purity and tithes).

Question#1: This is difficult. Should we say that an Am ha'Aretz cannot repent?

Question#2: Additionally, this term "forever" implies that they already accepted them once before.

Question#3: Additionally, the Gemara in Bechoros (30b) quotes a Beraisa that says that an Am ha'Aretz who accepted upon himself to act as a Chaver and he is suspected to act improperly in one area, he is suspected regarding the entire Torah. These are the words of Rebbi Meir. This implies that if he is not suspected, we would accept him (as a Chaver)!

Opinion#2: It therefore appears that this is referring to Amei ha'Aretz who are suspected of not tithing and not keeping Shemitah. They already accepted to be Chaveirim, and have now gone back to their old ways. The argument is whether or not to accept them as Chaveirim again (if they say they have repented).

Opinion#2(cont.): In the Tosefta in Dmai (2:8) this (the Tosefta quoted in our Gemara) is stated next to the Tosefta regarding an Am ha'Aretz who accepts upon himself to be a Chaver. (This is how the Rashash understands the intent of Tosfos.)

Opinion#2(cont.): This Tosefta means that if they accepted upon themselves being a Chaver and they went back to their old ways, we never accept them again. These are the words of Rebbi Meir. The Chachamim say that if they went back to their ways "b'Matmoniyos" means that they privately went back to their ways, but publicly still kept the practices of a Chaver, we do not accept them again. This is because they are tricking people. However, if they publicly went back to their old ways, meaning they are not tricking people, we would accept them again. If they repent, they certainly mean to repent.

Opinion#2(cont.): Some say that they made their words like "Matmoniyos" means that if they acted as a Chaver, even privately, we would take them back. Being that we see they tried so much that they even acted as a Chaver privately, we should not push them aside if they went back to their old ways. However, if the only publicly acted as a Chaver but never did so privately, we do not accept them, as perhaps they would sin in secret and mislead people.

Explanation#1: Rabeinu Elchanan explains why he says a male (old) horse during war. This is as the Yerushalmi states regarding Ben Beseira who permits selling them a horse, that he only permits it because a male horse kills his master during war.

Explanation#1(cont.): He also said an old horse because perhaps the old horse will die during the war, causing his master to die as well. Each is said with separate reason.

Explanation#2: Rebbi Eliezer from Beiham explained that the old horse is permitted to be inclusive. Even though he does work for which one is liable to bring a Chatas, as stated later (16a) that when a horse gets older he can make it grind the stones in the mill, even so it is permitted.

Explanation#2(cont.): He also said it should be a male horse for war to include that it could be sold, even though there is grounds to forbid the sale. This is as stated later (16a) that there are two reasons it should be forbidden. One is because of a weapon, and one because it is a large animal. Even so, it is permitted.

Question: This is difficult. In Berachos (26b), we say that Yitzchak instituted the Tefilah of Minchah. This is as the Pasuk says, "And Yitzchak went out to talk (i.e. pray) in the field." Talking means praying, as the Pasuk says, "I will pour before him my talk (prayer)." (Our Gemara says the opposite, that we know that the Pasuk "I will pour etc." means praying because the Pasuk says regarding Yitzchak, "And Yitzchak etc." Which is the real source?)

Answer: Both are necessary, as we learn the definition of one from the other. If the Pasuk would only state this regarding Yitzchak, I would think that he went out to the field to talk to someone, and not to pray. This is why the Pasuk said, "I will pour before him my talk," implying that this is a term used for prayer. If the Pasuk would only say "I will pour before him my talk," I would think that this implies prayer. However, this is not a permanent Tefilah. This is why the Pasuk says regarding Yitzchak, "towards evening." Towards evening implies that he did this every day towards evening, implying he established the Tefilah of Minchah.