1) THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SLAUGHTERING A KORBAN AND OFFERING LIMBS OUTSIDE THE BEIS HA'MIKDASH
OPINIONS: The Gemara discusses the ways in which one transgresses the prohibition against slaughtering a Korban outside the Beis ha'Mikdash, and the prohibition against offering the limbs of a Korban outside the Beis ha'Mikdash. Is there a difference between the two prohibitions?
(a) The MINCHAS AVRAHAM explains that there is a fundamental difference between the two prohibitions, which is evident from the Gemara. The Gemara says that Rebbi Akiva maintains that slaughtering a bird-offering outside the Beis ha'Mikdash is included in this prohibition (a bird-offering must be killed with Melikah inside of the Beis ha'Mikdash). The BRISKER RAV writes that the opinion of Rebbi Akiva implies a fundamental difference between the prohibition against slaughtering outside the Beis ha'Mikdash and the prohibition against offering limbs outside the Beis ha'Mikdash. The Torah prohibits the offering of limbs outside the Beis ha'Mikdash because no Avodah may be done outside the Beis ha'Mikdash in the manner in which it is done in the Beis ha'Mikdash. This is apparent from the Gemara later (115b) which excludes from this prohibition anything that is not brought on the Mizbe'ach, such as the meat of a Korban which is supposed to be eaten. The verse describes the meat which is subject to the prohibition as an "Olah" (Vayikra 17:8), which implies that it must be something fit to be brought on the Mizbe'ach. However, the fact that it is forbidden to slaughter a bird outside the Beis ha'Mikdash demonstrates that the prohibition against slaughtering a Korban outside the Beis ha'Mikdash is not the same as performing Avodah outside the Beis ha'Mikdash, because a bird is never slaughtered in the Beis ha'Mikdash (rather, Melikah is done).
The KEHILOS YAKOV (#43) uses this logic to explain the position of the RA'AVAD (Hilchos Ma'aseh ha'Korbanos 18:17). The Ra'avad discusses the Gemara later (111b) that says that one who slaughters a Korban outside the Beis ha'Mikdash at night, and offers its limbs, transgresses both the prohibition against slaughtering and the prohibition against offering limbs outside the Beis ha'Mikdash. The Ra'avad understands that this Gemara refers only to a case in which the person slaughtered the animal at night, and then offered the limbs during the day. If he would have offered the limbs at night, he would not have transgressed the prohibition against offering limbs outside the Beis ha'Mikdash.
The reason for this difference is not clear. If one is prohibited to slaughter a Korban at night, but doing so outside the Beis ha'Mikdash still constitutes violation of the prohibition against slaughtering outside the Beis ha'Mikdash, then offering limbs at night also should constitute a violation when they are offered outside the Beis ha'Mikdash. On the other hand, if offering the limbs outside the Beis ha'Mikdash does not constitute a violation of the prohibition since limbs may not be offered at night, then slaughtering at night outside the Beis ha'Mikdash also should not constitute a violation of the prohibition!
The Kehilos Yakov explains that according to the explanation of the Brisker Rav, the difference between the two acts -- slaughtering at night and offering the limbs at night -- is evident. Slaughtering outside the Beis ha'Mikdash at night is a transgression because the act is forbidden, and not because one is performing an act of Avodah outside the Beis ha'Mikdash. Hence, slaughtering at night is not an exception to this Isur. In contrast, offering limbs is forbidden because it is a form of Avodah that may be done only in the Beis ha'Mikdash. Since the Avodah that is done in the Beis ha'Mikdash is done only during the day, performing such an act at night outside the Beis ha'Mikdash does not constitute a transgression of the prohibition against performing an Avodah outside the Beis ha'Mikdash!
(The Kehilos Yakov has additional difficulty with the words of the Ra'avad, because offering limbs in the Beis ha'Mikdash was done at night! Consequently, offering limbs at night outside the Beis ha'Mikdash certainly should constitute a violation of the Isur! See also OR SAME'ACH.)
(b) The RASH MI'SHANTZ (in Toras Kohanim 10:10) presents two explanations for the prohibition against slaughtering a Korban outside the Beis ha'Mikdash. The two explanations apparently depend on whether the prohibition against slaughtering differs from the prohibition against offering limbs outside the Beis ha'Mikdash. The Toras Kohanim excludes a number of forms of Avodah, including Kabalas ha'Dam and Kemitzah, from the prohibition against performing Avodah outside the Beis ha'Mikdash. It derives these exceptions from the word, "Olah" (Vayikra 17:8), which implies that the prohibition includes only acts which are called "Avodah" and which involve objects fit to be placed on the fire of the Mizbe'ach. The Gemara later (115b) similarly says that the prohibition includes things that are a "concluding Avodah," or final Avodos in the process of offering a Korban. Kabalas ha'Dam is not a final Avodah. The Avodah is finalized with the Zerikas ha'Dam.
The Rash asks why Shechitah is included in the prohibition. Shechitah is not considered an Avodah (see 14b), and yet the Torah explicitly prohibits the slaughtering of a Korban outside the Beis ha'Mikdash. The Rash gives two answers. In his first answer, he says that Shechitah is considered a "concluding Avodah" since it removes the animal from the prohibition of "Ever Min ha'Chai." In his second answer, he says that Shechitah indeed is an exception to the rule.
The Rash's second answer is consistent with the aforementioned principle that slaughtering is fundamentally different from offering limbs. However, the first explanation of the Rash places the act of slaughtering into the same category as the act of offering limbs, calling them both "Avodos." (See also TORAS HA'KODESH 1:15:3.) (Y. MONTROSE)
107b----------------------------------------107b
2) PERFORMING "KABALAS HA'DAM" OUTSIDE THE BEIS HA'MIKDASH
QUESTION: The Gemara discusses the source for the exemption from punishment for one who performs Kabalas ha'Dam outside the Beis ha'Mikdash. Such an act is not included in the prohibition against performing an Avodah outside the Beis ha'Mikdash. The Gemara asks, why would one have thought that a person is liable for such an act? The Gemara concludes that one would have derived through a Tzad ha'Shaveh from slaughtering a Korban and offering limbs outside the Beis ha'Mikdash that one is also Chayav for Kabalas ha'Dam outside the Beis ha'Mikdash, just as one would have derived that performing Zerikah outside the Beis ha'Mikdash is included in the Isur. However, a verse in the Torah explicitly includes Zerikah in the prohibition. (Exactly which verse includes Zerikah is the subject of a Machlokes between Rebbi Akiva and Rebbi Yishmael on 107a.) The fact that the Torah specifically includes Zerikah -- and does not rely on deriving it through a Tzad ha'Shaveh from slaughtering and offering limbs -- shows that only the specific acts that the Torah explicitly mentions are included in the prohibition. Since the Torah does not mention Kabalas ha'Dam, it is not included in the prohibition.
TOSFOS (DH l'Hachi) has difficulty with the Gemara's conclusion. Why does the Gemara assume that Kabalah would have been included in the prohibition based on a Tzad ha'Shaveh if not for the Torah's explicit inclusion of Zerikah in the prohibition? The Gemara later (115b) quotes a Beraisa that derives from the verse, "Asher Ya'aleh Olah O Zavach" -- "... who offers an Olah or a Korban" (Vayikra 17:8), that only "concluding Avodos," the final Avodos in the process of offering a Korban, are included in this prohibition. The Beraisa explicitly excludes Kabalas ha'Dam from this verse since it is not a "concluding Avodah," but rather it is a preliminary Avodah for the eventual Zerikah. Why does the Gemara here ignore the Beraisa and give a different reason for the exemption of Kabalas ha'Dam from the prohibition against performing an Avodah outside the Beis ha'Mikdash?
ANSWERS:
(a) The TZON KODASHIM prefaces his explanation with a question on the beginning of the Gemara's discussion. What prompts the Gemara's question? The Gemara was discussing the dispute between Rebbi Akiva and Rebbi Yishmael regarding the source for including Zerikah in the prohibition against performing Avodah outside the Beis ha'Mikdash. Why does the Gemara suddenly ask about the source for the exclusion of Kabalas ha'Dam from the prohibition in the middle of its discussion about the source for including Zerikah in the prohibition?
The Tzon Kodashim answers that once the Gemara establishes that Rebbi Akiva and Rebbi Yishmael each includes Zerikah in the prohibition from a different verse, it is evident that they do not agree with the teaching of the Beraisa (115b) that only "concluding Avodos" are included in the prohibition. If they would agree with that teaching, then they would not need a separate verse to include Zerikah, since Zerikah is a concluding Avodah and would be included in the prohibition without an explicit verse. Once the Gemara sees that they cite other verses and do not agree with the Beraisa's Derashah, the Gemara now inquires about their source that Kabalas ha'Dam is not included in the prohibition.
This approach also answers the question of Tosfos, and it explains why the Gemara here ignores the Beraisa later and gives a different source to exclude Kabalas ha'Dam from the prohibition against performing Avodos outside the Beis ha'Mikdash.
(b) The PANIM ME'IROS answers as follows. The Gemara here records an argument between Rebbi Avahu and Abaye, who differ with regard to the logic for why Zerikah is included in the prohibition. Rebbi Avahu says that according to Rebbi Akiva, slaughtering the Korban and performing Zerikas ha'Dam outside the Beis ha'Mikdash count as two different prohibitions. Abaye says that both are included under the prohibition against slaughtering outside the Beis ha'Mikdash.
As mentioned above, the fact that the Torah states a verse which explicitly includes Zerikah in the prohibition, instead of relying on the Tzad ha'Shaveh from slaughtering and offering limbs, teaches that only the specific Avodos that the Torah mentions are included in the prohibition (and thus Kabalas ha'Dam is not included). Rebbi Avahu does not agree with this logic. He maintains that Kabalas ha'Dam still should be included in the prohibition, and that the Torah explicitly mentions Zerikah in order to give it an additional, independent prohibition in addition to the existing prohibition against slaughtering and offering limbs outside the Beis ha'Mikdash. According to Rebbi Avahu, the Gemara's reasoning to exclude Kabalas ha'Dam from the prohibition is not correct; the fact that the Torah explicitly mentions Zerikah teaches only that there is an additional prohibition for Zerikah, and not that Kabalas ha'Dam is excluded from the other, general prohibition. The Torah does not mention Kabalas ha'Dam by itself because it is not important enough to merit its own prohibition.
According to Rebbi Avahu, the reasoning of the Beraisa later is needed to exclude Kabalas ha'Dam from the general prohibition against performing Avodos outside the Beis ha'Mikdash.
The logic of the Gemara here follows Abaye, who says that the Torah could have included Kabalas ha'Dam in the prohibition the same way it includes Zerikah. The fact that the Torah mentions only Zerikah reveals that Kabalas ha'Dam is not to be included in the prohibition. According to Abaye, the source that Kabalas ha'Dam is not included in the prohibition is the fact that Zerikah is included. (A similar answer is proposed by the SEFAS EMES.) (Y. MONTROSE)