1)

(a)We query Rabah further from a Beraisa, which discusses the Pasuk in Emor (with regard to a Zar who ate Terumah b'Shogeg) "v'Nasan la'Kohen es ha'Kodesh", which rules - that the payment must consist of a commodity that is fit to become Kodesh.

(b)According to Sumchus quoting Rebbi Meir, if he ate Terumah Tehorah and paid Chulin Teme'im, ''b'Shogeg Tashlumav Tashlumin, b'Mezid, Ein Tashlumav Tashlumin'. According to the Rabanan - either way, his payment is accepted, but he remains obligated to pay Chulin Tehorim.

(c)The problem with saying 'b'Mezid, Ein Tashlumav Tashlumin' is - that if he ate Terumah Teme'ah (which the Kohen is not permitted to eat, even when he is Tamei), and he paid him Chulin Teme'im (which he is), then surely, he is merely benefiting the Kohen. Why then, should he be penalized? On what grounds then, did Chazal negate the Terumah that he gave?

(d)The statement 've'ka'Meshalem Midi d'Chazi leih bi'Yemei Tum'aso' is not fully correct - because, in fact, the Chulin that he pays becomes Terumah, and is therefore forbidden to the Kohen when he is Tamei.

(e)What we mean to ask is that, seeing as he intended to repay the Kohen something that he is able to eat when he is Tamei, why does he deserve to be penalized?

2)

(a)Rava or Kadi therefore emend Rebbi Meir, who now permits someone who ate Terumah Teme'ah to pay Terumah Teme'ah - and Rebbi Meir and the Rabanan are arguing over a case where someone ate Terumah Tehorah, and paid with Chulin Teme'im.

(b)min ha'Torah, the Chulin Teme'im that one pays for eating Terumah Tehorah is considered a good payment, as we learned on the previous Amud. The problem with Sumchus Amar Rebbi Meir's ruling, according to Rabah, therefore is - that, seeing as min ha'Torah, the Chulin Teme'im that one paid is valid and a woman that the Kohen subsequently betrothed with it would be betrothed, how can Chazal negate the Terumah, together with the betrothal (thereby permitting an Eishes Ish to get married)?

(c)We initially refute the answer that what Sumchus means is that he must give a second time, despite the fact that the first one is valid (so that any woman whom the Kohen betrothed will remain betrothed) - because that is what the Rabanan say.

(d)Rav Acha bar Yakov ultimately establishes the Machlokes between Sumchus and the Rabanan by - whether Chazal decreed Shogeg because of Mezid (the Rabanan) or not (Rebbi Meir).

3)

(a)We query Rabah once more from a Beraisa which discusses details in connection with the Tzitz (the head-band worn by the Kohen Gadol). Min ha'Torah the Tzitz atones for - the blood, the flesh or the Chelev that became Tamei, irrespective of whether the Korban was subsequently brought b'Shogeg or b'Mezid, b'Ones or b'Ratzon, b'Yachid or b'Tzibur.

(b)The problem with the Beraisa which rules that 'Dam she'Nitma, u'Zrako b'Shogeg Hurtzah; b'Mezid, Lo Hurtzah' (mid'Rabanan) is - that min ha'Torah, he has fulfilled his obligation, and Chazal decreed that the owner is obligated to bring a new Korban, thereby forcing him to bring Chulin to the Azarah, another Kashya on Rabah.

(c)So to answer the Kashya, Rebbi Yosi b'Rebbi Chanina interprets 'Lo Hurtzah' - to mean with regard to permitting the meat to be eaten (but not with regard to obligating the owner to bring another Korban, from which he is Patur).

4)

(a)We learn from the Pasuk "v'Achlu Osam Asher Kupar Bahem" - that the Kohen eating the meat of Kodshei Kodashim (e.g. a Chatas) causes the owner's atonement.

(b)Rabah will account for the fact that, when all's said and done, Chazal negated the Mitzvah of eating the meat of the Korban - by restricting this to a 'Shev v'Al Ta'aseh' (where they merely forbid the Kohanim to eat the meat of Kodshei Kodashim). It will not apply to a 'Kum Aseh' (such as negating the Terumah that one gave, and obligating him to give again) which Chazal have no authority to institute.

5)

(a)Now that Rabah differentiates between 'Kum Aseh' and 'Shev v'Al Ta'aseh', Rav Chisda (who queried Rabah from all the above Beraisos) was spared from asking him from Arel, Haza'ah, Izmel (the knife of Milah), Sadin b'Tzitzis, Kivsei Atzeres, Shofar and Lulav, all of which are Mitzvos and which Chazal negated with their decrees. The case of ...

1. ... 'Arel' is - when a Nochri converts on Erev Pesach (or within seven days of Pesach), on whose behalf we do not bring the Korban Pesach (to enable him to eat it at night), because Beis Hillel decreed that a Nochri who detaches himself from the Orlah is considered as if he had detached himself from the grave; he requires seven days of Tum'as Mes and cannot bring the Pesach (even though this is only a Tum'ah mid'Rabanan).

2. ... 'Haza'ah' is - the prohibition of a Tamei Mes whose seventh day falls on Shabbos, and whom Chazal forbade to make Haza'ah despite the fact that it would enable him to eat the Pesach.

3. ... 'Izmel' is - the Chachamim's prohibition of bringing the knife for the Milah on Shabbos via the roofs and enclosures, thereby preventing the Milah from being performed on the eighth day.

4. ... 'Sadin b'Tzitzis' is - where they decreed on fixing Techeles (the blue woolen strand that is part of the Mitzvah of Tzitzis) on a linen garment), involving as it does, the prohibition of Sha'atnez.

5. ... 'Kivsei Atzeres is - if the two lambs of Shavu'os were Shechted she'Lo Lishmah on Shavu'os that fell on Shabbos, Chazal forbade the Zerikas ha'Dam to be performed, with the result that they could also not perform the Mitzvah of burning the fat pieces and that of eating the meat.

(b)A Korban that is brought she'Lo Lishmah - is considered a Kasher Korban, but the person who brought it has not fulfilled his obligation.

6)

(a)We query Rabah yet again from another Beraisa. What does the Tana learn from the Pasuk in Shoftim "Elav Tishme'un". The Tana learnd from the Pasuk "Elav Tishma'un" - that one is obligated to obey the command of a Navi, whatever his command, even if it entails contravening something that the Torah forbids.

(b)Eliyahu contravened - both the Isur of Shechting a Korban and of sacrificing it, on a Bamah, at the time when Bamos were forbidden.

(c)Rabah reconciles this Beraisa with his previous statement, that Chazal only have the right to negate Torah law by 'Shev v'Al Ta'aseh', but not by 'Kum va'Aseh' - by adding that Chazal do have the right to go to any lengths to prevent the people from sinning (like Eliyahu, whose intention was to root out idolatry from Yisrael).

7)

(a)We query Rabah again from a Beraisa, which discusses a husband negating a Get which he has already sent to his wife via a Shali'ach, and which initially he was permitted to do in front of a Beis-Din. Raban Gamliel forbade it - because it could sometimes happen that the woman, not knowing that the Get was negated, would get married, and her children would then be Mamzerim.

(b)According to Rebbi, if a husband contravened Raban Gamliel's Takanah and negated the Get that he sent his wife through a Shali'ach, his negation is nevertheless valid. Raban Shimon ben Gamliel says that it is not - because, otherwise, it is a mockery of Beis-Din, who decreed not to do it.

(c)According to Rabah, Chazal have the right to validate the Get (despite the fact that min ha'Torah, it is negated) - because when a couple become betrothed, they do so according to the wishes of the Rabanan. Consequently, it is as if the couple themselves authorized them to nullify the Kidushin at any time, retroactively. So what happens here according to Raban Shimon ben Gamliel, is not the withdrawal of the negation of the Get, but a negation of the original Kidushin.

(d)This concession applies to ...

1. ... Kidushei Kesef - because they declared the money of Kidushin Hefker.

2. ... Kidushei Bi'ah - because they declared his Bi'ah a Bi'as Zenus.

8)

(a)There are two reasons why the text which reads that 'Kidushei Kesef is Batel because it is only mid'Rabanan, but what about Kidushei Bi'ah?' is incorrect. One of them, because it is a fallacy to refer to Kidushei Kesef as being mid'Rabanan, seeing as it is learned from a 'Gezeirah-Shavah "Kichah" Kichah", from the field of Efron'. The

1. ... Halachic reason for not being able to say so is - because how could one then put a girl who was betrothed by means of money, to death for having committed adultery?

2. ... third reason is - because, according to that text, the answer that we give 'Shavyuhah Rabanan li'Be'ilaso Be'ilas Zenus' makes no sense, seeing as Kidushei Bi'ah is d'Oraisa, like we explained in the Kashya in which case, the Kashya remains unanswered).

9)

(a)The final Kashya on Rabah is from Rebbi Eliezer ben Yakov in a Beraisa, who heard that Beis-Din have the authority to beat and to punish (using any means), even unofficially - as we find when they once killed someone for riding a horse on Shabbos (even though he had only contravened a Lav d'Rabanan), and when they delivered Malkus to someone who had relations with his wife under a fig-tree (in public view), a breach of Tzeni'us, but not a Lav that merits Malkus.

(b)Rabah explain that (despite the fact that they are both cases of 'Kum va'Aseh') Beis-Din were empowered to do that - in that they do have the authority to repair a breach (and here Shabbos and the laws of modesty needed to be reinforced), as we explained earlier.

10)

(a)We learn from the Pasuk ...

1. ... in connection with burial "Ki Im li'She'ero ha'Karov Elav" - that a man is obligated to bury his wife.

2. ... "Lo Yitamei Ba'al b'Amav l'Heichalo" - that this obligation is confined exclusively to a wife who is Kasher.

11)

(a)We learned in our Mishnah that neither man is entitled to her findings, to what she produces or to nullify her vows. They are not entitled to ...

1. ... her findings is - because the reason that a husband is normally entitled to them is in order to prevent strife between them; whereas in our case, that is precisely what we want (in order to encourage them to separate).

2. ... to what she produces is - because he receives what she produces as against his obligation to sustain her. In our case, seeing as he does not need to sustain her, he is not entitled to the work of her hands.

3. ... to nullify her vows is - because the reason that a man may generally nullifes his wife's vows is in order that he should not get to loathe her (when she takes vows such as not bathing or not adorning herself). But in our case, we want him to loathe her, in order to induce him to send her away.