Question: What is the Gemara's question? Later (37a), the Gemara asks this question from our Mishnah (31b) on Rabah. Rabah says that if someone denies knowing testimony regarding money owed with witnesses, he is exempt. Why is the first group liable? There is a second group! It must be that if someone denies knowing testimony regarding money owed with witnesses that he is liable. The Gemara concludes that Rabah's position is difficult. Accordingly, it is understandable that they are liable! (Why does our Gemara ask this as a question, if we can merely say this is understandable now that we do not rule like Rabah?)

Answer: It is possible to answer that even though someone who denies knowing testimony regarding money owed with witnesses who are not present is indeed liable, unlike the position of Rabah quoted later (37b), if the witnesses are present the Gemara originally thinks that this denial is mere words. (It therefore asks its question on this latter case.)

Implied Question: Despite the fact that without Rabah's statement Ravina still needed to answer that the case is that they were related through their wives etc., the Gemara still asked its question later specifically on Rabah.

Answer: Without Rabah's statement, it would be possible to push this aside and say that even if the witnesses are in front of us this is considered denial (for which one is liable).

Explanation: The case is that when they saw the event they were not related, as we require that both the beginning and end be when they are valid witnesses, as stated in Bava Basra (128a).

Implied Question: The Gemara in Bava Basra (43a) says that a city whose Sefer Torah was stolen should not have its judges judge the case. The Gemara asks, let two people remove themselves (i.e. pay for their portion) and judge the case! This is despite the fact that they did not start off as being objective judges.

Answer: One cannot compare being invalid because one is partial to the testimony to being invalid because one is related or otherwise an invalid witness in general.

Implied Question: One cannot explain that this teaches that most people who are deathly ill do not die. (Why not?)

Answer: This is because it is apparent in Gitin (28a) that most do indeed die.

Explanation: Rather, this means that even though most deathly ill people die, he is not currently dead.

Question: This is difficult. We should be able to answer this question from a Mishnah later (38b). The Mishnah says that if someone claims, "You have raped/seduced my daughter," and the person swears falsely that he is innocent, Rebbi Shimon says he is exempt because he does not pay a fine because of his own admission. Even the Rabbanan only say he is liable because they hold that he is still demanding money for the embarrassment and blemish.

Question(cont.): Shevuas ha'Eidus is derived from this using a Gezeirah Shaveh of "Secheta-Secheta." The fact that Shevuas ha'Eidus is regarding a monetary claim is only derived from Shevuas ha'Pikadon. (Accordingly, this Mishnah is proof that he is exempt!)

Answer: This is not a question. Later, regarding Shevuas ha'Pikadon, the reasoning is because he did not deny money that he would not have been liable to pay if he had admitted, as we say later. However, regarding Shevuas ha'Eidus, this is a fine that is like monetary payment. This is because their testimony would have caused the defendant to admit (the Rashash takes out this sentence). This is as we say later, that if they would testify the defendant would be liable to pay other monies.

Explanation: Rashi explains that some say that this is referring to the defendant's daughter. The reason he is exempt is because he is liable to be killed.

Question: This cannot be, as even if there is no liability for him to be killed, who is claiming the money? (The father is the one who would get the money. Who can claim the money if the father is accused?)

Question(cont.): If when someone else rapes her we say that her embarrassment and blemish go to her father, will we say that if her father rapes her that she receives the fine?! (See Ha'Gaos Ha'Bach.)

Answer: It seems that this is not difficult. The case could be regarding a Na'arah who was betrothed and then divorced. She receives her own fine, as stated in a Mishnah in Kesuvos (38a).

Answer(cont.): This is also how the Mishnah there must be explained. The Mishnah says that someone who has relations with his daughter is exempt from paying, because he is liable to be killed. (This implies that without this special law, he would pay his daughter a fine)

Implied Question: However, when the Gemara here says, "Or he seduced his daughter" this cannot be the case, as she waived her fine (when she did so according to her own free will, as opposed to a normal case where the fine goes to the father).

Answer: Perhaps the case involves a minor, who cannot waive her rights (as she has no knowledge). This is according to the Rabbanan in Kesuvos (ibid.) who says that a minor also makes one liable to pay a fine.

Implied Question: According to Rashi, one cannot ask why the Mishnah has to say later (35a), "Until they hear from the mouth of the plaintiff," being that the Mishnah here already tells us this. (Why not?)

Answer: The second part of the Mishnah teaches us that this even applies in a case where he sent his servant. Even though the servant was sent by the plaintiff, he is not liable (until the plaintiff himself demands that he swear).

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that we rule in Bava Kama (70a) that he (Harsha'ah) is essentially a messenger, and the Mishnah says that if he sent this with his son or servant he is exempt. (Accordingly, why should it make a difference if he has a Harsha'ah? The defendant should still be exempt!)

Answer: This case is better, as he has the power to take away money just as the owners have that power.

Question: The Gemara should still ask, our Mishnah implies that in a case where someone owes another person money and a third person represents the plaintiff without Harsha'ah, the one denying knowing testimony should be liable, just like a case of a Kohen where Harsha'ah is not applicable!

Answer: The Ri answers that our extra Mishnah comes to teach us that specifically in these types of cases (i.e. whether or not he is a Kohen) one is exempt, as there will never be liability for someone who does not testify in this case. However, in a case where one person owes money to another, sometimes one will be liable, for example in a case where the person demanding testimony has a (Shtar) Harsha'ah.

Explanation#1: The case is that after he wrote him a Shtar Harsha'ah, he denied owing the money.

Implied Question: There is an opinion in Bava Kama (70a) that even if he did not deny owing the money, we do not allow a Harsha'ah to be written. (What is the case according to this opinion?)

Answer#1: This opinion understands that our Mishnah is discussing a case of Pikadon (deposit). The reason that we do not write a Harsha'ah is explained in Bava Kama (70a) as being that if a person stole an object, but the owners did not yet have Yiush (despair of getting it back), neither can make it Hekdesh. (Therefore, the person claiming to be the owner cannot transfer ownership to someone else to represent him, as there is no proof that he indeed owns this item!) However, one can be Makdish a Pikadon.

Proof: This is apparent from the Mishnah that the Gemara quoted earlier (69b) that says that a thief who steals from another thief does not pay Keifel. However, he does pay Keifel for a Pikadon. This is apparent from the Mishnah in Bava Metzia (33b).

Proof: This is also apparent from Bava Basra (88a), regarding a man who brought gourds to a river, and everyone came and took one (in order to buy them). He therefore said, "They are Hekdesh to Heaven!" The Gemara concludes that if not for the fact that they had a set price, the Hekdesh would be effective, as they are still deemed to be in the possession of the owner. (The potential buyers are considered borrowers.)

Explanation#2: Alternatively, it is possible to establish the case regarding land. We certainly write a Harsha'ah regarding land, as it cannot be stolen. This is like the opinion later (37b) that says that if someone has witnesses swear that they do not know anything about land that he owns (and they swear falsely that they do not), they are liable.

Implied Question: The Gemara does not answer something that is true according to all opinions. (Why not?)

Answer: This is because the Gemara does not bother to give answers according to anything other than the opinion it holds is the main opinion.

Question: However, there is a difficulty in Bechoros (48b) regarding two wives of two different men who did not yet have a firstborn. They each had a boy, and then one of them died within thirty days (and they do not know whose child died). If they used the same Kohen for Pidyon ha'Ben, he should give them back five Sela'im. The Gemara quotes Shmuel as establishing that the case is when one father writes a Harsha'ah to the other father. The case there is not one of deposit or land, as one cannot redeem with land.

Answer: However, there it is also possible to answer that the case is when all three were there together. (One father says to the Kohen to give the other father what is owed to the first father. This accomplishes what a Harsha'ah would accomplish, without having the restrictions of only making a Harsha'ah in a case of a deposit or land.)

Opinion: Rabeinu Tam rules that we write a Harsha'ah even on movable objects where he denies owing them. The reason we would not write a Harsha'ah is explained in Bava Kama (9a) because it looks like a lie. (In Gitin (26b) and Kesuvos (85a) the Gemara concludes that we do not suspect that this looks like a lie. However, we will not have a lengthy discussion about this here.)

Question: This is difficult. Being that we derive this from a case of a deposit, we should require in cases of loans and cheating a worker out of wages that a vessel should have been deposited which would cause the loan or worker to be paid! A similar question is indeed asked regarding Shevuas ha'Pikadon in Bava Metzia (48a, see there at length).

Explanation: This is because the main point of the oath is not to make her lose her Kesuvah, but rather to make her drink the Sotah waters.