Explanation#1: Rashi explains that the oath only takes effect when the first action (i.e. in this case eating) happens. Therefore, that instant is called the time when the oath is made. If at that time he remembers his oath, the Pasuk "the man with his oath" applies. His oath is deemed valid in order to make him liable to bring a Korban on his accidental transgression of the oath. This is whether he ate the conditional loaf first or he ate the forbidden loaf first. Of course, he must accidentally eat the forbidden loaf in order to bring a Korban.

Question: This explanation is unclear. We do not find that if one eats the forbidden loaf first that he will have to bring a Korban. If he ate it accidentally, it is not deemed "a man regarding his oath" and therefore the oath does not apply. If he ate it on purpose, Rashi requires that one eat the forbidden loaf accidentally in order to bring a Korban!

Answer: One can only explain Rashi's explanation in a difficult manner. The case must be that when he ate the forbidden loaf he had not forgotten his oath. Therefore, the Pasuk of "the man with an oath" was upheld. However, the case is still accidental, as he did not realize that this was the loaf he had sworn not to eat. Even though he is allowed to eat it at this time (as he had not yet eaten the other loaf) it is considered accidental, being that he would not have wanted to eat it. This is because he either wants to eat the loaf upon which he made the condition or he must eat it, for example if he swore he would eat it or his health is in danger if he does not eat it.

Implied Question: However, all of this (while not illogical) is difficult.

Explanation#1(cont.): Additionally, Rashi explains later that "if he ate the first one etc." refers to the conditional loaf, but not because if he eats the prohibited loaf first the oath is invalid. Certainly it is valid, and he can be held liable retroactively.

Explanation#1(cont.): Rashi did not mean that the case should be the opposite of the case that Rava is discussing. The opposite case would be where he accidentally ate the prohibited loaf first because he forgot his oath. If so, his oath is clearly invalid, as this is not called "the man with an oath." Rashi also did not want to say that the case is where he ate the prohibited loaf first on purpose, as there is no accident when he ate the prohibited loaf (and it is therefore difficult to say that he should have to bring a Korban).

Explanation#1(cont.): It does not seem right to me at all that Rashi wanted to say that he should be liable to receive lashes retroactively. There is no logical reason that he should be liable to receive lashes, being that afterwards he ate the conditional loaf accidentally.

Explanation#1(cont.): Additionally, according to Rabeinu Tam the opposite would be true! He would be liable to bring a Korban if he ate the forbidden loaf first on purpose and then accidentally ate the conditional loaf afterwards. Rather, Rashi must mean as we have explained, that he ate the forbidden loaf first and remembered his oath, but he did not realize that this was the loaf regarding which he had made an oath.

Text: I later found in Tosfos Rabeinu Elchanan that he wrote that the scribes had made a mistake. Rashi should read as follows. This is not because if he did the opposite, it would take effect. It certainly would not take effect. Just as this does not take effect and he is exempt, so too this oath would not take effect. This explanation is also written in other commentaries in the name of Rashi.

Question#1: Regarding Rashi's comment, "whether he ate the prohibited loaf first etc." Rabeinu Elchanan wrote that he did not understand this.

Question#2: There is another difficulty in Rashi. Regarding a case later (28b) where he forgot about this loaf and remembered regarding the other loaf, we must explain that "he is liable" refers to the second loaf. However, the Gemara implies that he is liable for both.

Explanation#2: It appears that the explanation is that one is only exempt due to "the man with his oath" regarding eating the conditional loaf accidentally, whether he eats it first or last. However, regarding the prohibited loaf we are not concerned about this law, as at the time that the conditional loaf is eaten the oath takes effect. Therefore, we require that he should not be an "Oness" -- "victim of forced circumstances" when he eats that loaf. The conditional loaf is called the first loaf, as explained by Rashi.

Implied Question: Rava says that if he ate the first one accidentally and the second one on purpose he is exempt. (Why should it make a difference if he ate it first or last if it does not really matter when he ate it?)

Answer: He did not mean that it had to be this way. If he ate the second one on purpose first (instead of second), the law would be the same. The oath would not be valid, being that he ate the conditional loaf accidentally.

Implied Question: Rava states that if the first was on purpose and the second was accidental he is liable. (Same implied question as (j) above.)

Answer#1: He did not specifically mean that the first one was eaten on purpose. Similarly, if the second one eaten accidentally was instead eaten first, and afterwards the first one was eaten second, he would be liable. This is as long as he does not remember when he eats the first one on purpose that he already ate the second one (first). If he remembered, he is not called "returned from his mindset," (required to bring a Korban) as he would have purposely brought himself to sin.

Answer#2: Alternatively, even if he remembers he is considered to have "returned from his mindset." This is because people consider it more stringent to eat the forbidden loaf than to eat the conditional loaf. This is as stated in Nedarim (15a) that when people are not careful, they are not careful regarding the conditional loaf. However, they are careful regarding the forbidden loaf. According to this opinion we can explain our Gemara.

Explanation#3: It is also implied from the explanation of the Rach that the oath taking effect is dependent on the eating of the conditional loaf. However, he calls the prohibited loaf the first loaf. He has the opposite text. If the first one is accidental and the second is on purpose, he is liable. If the first one is on purpose and the second is accidental, he is exempt. He calls the prohibited loaf the first loaf, as this is the first loaf mentioned when he says, "I will not eat this loaf if I eat this loaf."

Explanation#3(cont.): When it says, "If both of them are accidental" it is only necessary because it has to say the case, "If both of them are on purpose."

Explanation#3(cont.): When the Gemara says, "He ended up eating the conditional loaf and then eating the prohibited loaf" and it originally said the first and second one (while according to the Rach the first is the prohibited loaf and not the conditional loaf), it was not being didactic.

Explanation#4: Rabeinu Tam gives an explanation similar to that of Rashi that the oath depends on the first eating. Whether he eats the conditional loaf or forbidden loaf first, if his first eating is accidental the Pasuk "the man with an oath" does not apply.

Explanation#4(cont.): However, Rabeinu Tam explains that the loaf he eats first is called the first, whether it is conditional or forbidden. The second one is called the second loaf.

Explanation#4(cont.): It is now understandable why the Gemara has to explain, "if he ate the forbidden loaf first and then ate the conditional loaf" and why if he ate the forbidden one first on purpose and then he ate the conditional loaf accidentally he is liable. This is because we do not require that the forbidden loaf be eaten accidentally, but rather that he should be considered accidental when he is transgressing the oath.

Implied Question: One must give a difficult answer according to Rabeinu Tam to the following question. When the Gemara says that if he knew about one loaf and was accidental regarding the second loaf he is exempt, there must be a reason why he is exempt from the first loaf. This is despite the fact that this is essentially the same as the case where he ate the first one on purpose and the second accidentally (and where Rava says he is liable).

Answer#1: The case is where he ate the loaf on purpose, and intended at that time to also eat the conditional loaf. This means he is not considered "returned from his mindset" (and therefore cannot bring a Korban).

Answer#2: Alternatively, the case is where he eats the second one on purpose and the other loaf accidentally. Even though he eats this one in a permitted state, as there is no oath on this loaf, the case is where he does not know he is exempt because the Pasuk "a man with an oath" does not apply. The term "he eats it on purpose" implies that he wants to eat it on purpose, even though he will eat the conditional loaf. This is why he is not considered "returned from his mindset." However, this is difficult.

Question: This is difficult, as the Beraisa is making something that is written (Shevuah) depend on a source that is not written (Nedarim)! This is as we derive earlier (26a) that a Shevuah (that one forgets) is alluded to in the Pasuk, "the man with a Shevuah" implying that he is not liable if he is an O'ness (i.e. forgets).

Answer: The Beraisa does so because the law of Nidrei Shegagos is stated in a Mishnah in Nedarim (25b), while the derivation regarding Shevuos Shegagos is not stated in any Mishnah.

Question#1: In Nedarim (25b) the Gemara asks, what is the case of Shevuos Shegagos? The Gemara answers it is that of Rav Kahana and Rav Asi (where each swore that Rav said something else, see 26a). Why doesn't the Gemara explain that it is like the case regarding a Neder? The case would be, for example, where a person says, "Shevuah that I will not eat these fruits if I ate" and then he remembers that he ate. Alternatively, the case would be where he concludes, "if I will eat" and he forgets and eats.

Question#2: Additionally, in the case of Rav Kahana and Rav Asi it is not possible to say, "they are permitted" as they already stated their false oath. ("They are permitted" implies they can be said in the future.)

Question#3: There is another difficulty. Later (31b), the Gemara asks that we should say that the Mishnah refers to the case of Rav Kahana and Rav Asi. Why doesn't it deduce this from Nedarim (25b), which says that Nidrei Shegagos are permitted? Nidrei Shegagos themselves are only learned from Shevuos Shegagos (as explained above)!

Answer: It appears that in Nedarim (ibid.) the Gemara could certainly have explained Shevuos Shegagos like it did Nidrei Shegagos. Rather, it preferred teaching us an incident that happened, along with the novel law that even if he transgressed the oath at the same instant that he said it (as it was not true), he is exempt.

Answer(cont.): Our Gemara therefore cannot deduce from the Mishnah in Nedarim that it already stated the case of Rav Kahana and Rav Asi. Perhaps the Mishnah was specifically discussing a case where he does not immediately transgress his oath, similar to the case stated by Neder (and only gave the example of Rav Kahana and Rav Asi to teach the incident and the novel law).

Question: How do we derive Nedarim from Shevuah? A Shevuah cannot be effective on a Mitzvah as it can on a regular matter (as opposed to a Neder which is effective regarding both)!

Answer: This is not a question, as I have explained earlier (see 25a, DH MAH), that in the manner that a Shevuah does not work regarding a Mitzvah, a Neder will not even work for a regular matter.

Text#1: This is Rashi's text.

Text#2: The Sefarim stated the opposite. They stated, "That I will not eat figs" and he then said, "Shevuah that I will not eat figs and grapes."

Question: Rashi erased this text because he had the following question. If he meant figs and grapes separately, the grapes would not be considered half an amount. If he meant he will not eat them together, the second oath would not take effect at all, being that it is like swearing he will not have nine figs, and then swearing he will not have ten. If he can't eat figs, he also cannot eat figs together with grapes. He therefore is already considered sworn not to do this (before taking the second oath, which is therefore invalid).