Question: The Mishnah later states that there is a person who eats one eating and is liable to bring four Korbanos Chatas and one Asham. One of the reasons he is liable is because he is an impure person who ate Kodshim, despite the fact that this is a prohibition that came to him by itself. The same is true regarding a person who ate the Gid ha'Nasheh of an Olah in Chulin (101a).

Answer: When the Gemara here says "a prohibition that came on its own," it means it came "to the sinner on his own." [In other words, because the person made a vow, he created a prohibition for himself. The Gemara says that one might have thought that we do not say Issur Kollel in such a situation.] However, a Korban that is forbidden from being eaten by anyone is clearly a valid prohibition.

Implied Question: Even so, the Gemara later appropriately asks, "Isn't Hekdesh an Issur that comes from itself." [Using the definition above, how is Hekdesh an Issur that is on the person himself? It is forbidden to the entire world!]

Answer: Being that the Tana is not discussing an Issur that one makes on oneself he should not have said Hekdesh, even though it is forbidden to everyone. [In other words, when the person creates the prohibition but it is on the whole world, it is misleading enough to be confused with an actual prohibition one creates specifically for themselves. Therefore, the Tana should not have given that example if he did not mean to include this topic.]

Opinion#1: Rashi implies that he is exempt even if the animal became a Neveilah on Yom Kippur.

Question: This is difficult. According to the opinion in Chulin (103a) that an animal is not considered to be alive for the purpose of eating its limbs, the prohibition of Yom Kippur should apply when it is still alive! [Being that there is no preexisting prohibition of Eiver Min ha'Chai at the start of Yom Kippur, there is no reason the prohibition of eating on Yom Kippur should not be on the animal before any other prohibition.]

Even according to the opinion that an animal is considered alive for the purpose of eating its limbs (and therefore the prohibition of Eiver Min ha'Chai preceded eating on Yom Kippur), when the animal dies there is no longer a prohibition of Eiver Min ha'Chai! The prohibition of Neveilah and Yom Kippur should arrive at the same time, and Rebbi Shimon agrees that in such a case both prohibitions apply! [Why does he say he is exempt from eating on Yom Kippur?]

Answer: It is possible to say that the prohibition against eating on Yom Kippur never goes on this animal, both when it is alive and when it is dead. This is because there is a positive prohibition against eating it because it is not slaughtered. This is as the Pasuk states, "And you will slaughter and you will eat." This teaches us that what you slaughter you may eat. What you do not slaughter, you may not eat. [Being that this prohibition is always on the animal, the prohibition of eating on Yom Kippur cannot take effect.]

Question: The Ritzba does not endorse this opinion. If so, according to the opinion that an animal is not considered as limbs when alive, how can the prohibition of Aiver Min ha'Chai override the prohibition against eating unslaughtered meat? [There should never be a prohibition of Eiver Min ha'Chai!]

In Chulin (ibid.), the Gemara says that the case is where it became a Treifah when most of it came out of its mother. In such a case, the prohibitions against Eiver Min ha'Chai, Cheilev, and Treifah all arrived together. However, how can any of them supersede the prohibition against eating unslaughtered kosher animals that even applies in the mother's womb?

For this reason, one can also ask a question according to the opinion that an animal is considered as limbs when alive. How can we ever find an Issur of Eiver Min ha'Chai? The animal is not considered for limbs when it is in the mother's womb. If so, how can this prohibition take effect when there is the preexisting prohibition against eating unslaughtered meat?

Opinion#2: Rather, it is clear that the Pasuk, "And you will slaughter" is not coming to forbid anything. In any event the animal is forbidden, when alive because of Eiver Min ha'Chai, and when it is killed because it is Neveilah. Rather, this Pasuk is coming to permit something that is forbidden (eating animals), and explains that slaughtering the animal makes it permitted, not tearing it apart in any other way.

Rather, the Pasuk is saying that the animal stays as is (during its lifetime, and does not have a prohibition of being unslaughtered meat). This is like the Pasuk, "You should slaughter" from which we learn that the shearings of Kodshim that received a permanent blemish after they became Hekdesh and were subsequently redeemed cannot be used. This is not a new positive commandment, but rather says that the original negative prohibition still applies.

Accordingly, the Ritzba holds that the case must be where it became a Neveilah on Erev Yom Kippur.

Explanation: Even through an Issur Kollel, we do not say that a prohibition should take effect to negate a Mitzvah.

Question: The Ritzba has difficulty with this. The Yerushalmi teaches that if someone swears not to eat Matzah, and he does eat Matzah on the night of Pesach, he is liable for transgressing his oath. This implies that an Issur Kollel will be valid in order to forbid doing a Mitzvah.

Answer#1: The Ritzba answers that the oath is not valid in our Gemara because he mentioned Neveilah, and swore to eat it. However, in the Yerushalmi where he did not mention Pesach (i.e. the Mitzvah of Matzah in his oath), the oath is valid. According to this, we find a possibility of doing things that are forbidden when he says that he will eat. [Just as not eating Matzah did not exclude Pesach night, so too saying, "I will eat" includes forbidden things.]

Question: There is difficulty with his explanation. The Beraisa states there (Yerushalmi) that if someone swears not to eat Matzah on Pesach night (and he eats Matzah anyway), he is exempt. Why did the Beraisa state this without making the prohibition in a general way? Even if someone swore not to eat Matzah at night and on Pesach night, being that he included Pesach night he would be exempt!

Answer: It could have said this, but only bothered saying the nights of Pesach. (It still means that this would also be the law if he said at night in general together with Pesach night).

Answer#2: The Ri explains that the oath is certainly not valid in a case where he abstains from action, as in a case where he swears to eat and does not eat. However, if he swears not to eat and eats, meaning that he must do an action to transgress his oath, the oath is valid.

Text: Rashi explains that the common text of the Gemara reads, "We find a case as per the statement of Rava." The Gemara explains that this is referring to a Neveilah that is rotten (and is not fit to be eaten).

Question: Rashi asked (on this text) that this would not be called a Neveilah.

Answer: Rabeinu Tam answers that this is not difficult, as it clearly can be called a Neveilah. This is indicated by the fact that the Gemara in Avodah Zarah (68a) states that Rebbi Shimon requires a Pasuk to exclude a rotten Neveilah. He derives that a Neveilah that is appropriate for a Ger (i.e. fit to be eaten) is a Neveilah. Rebbi Meir understands that the Pasuk is referring to a Neveilah that was always unfit (when it was alive, and therefore never became forbidden). [Without the Pasuk, we would have seemingly included a rotten Neveilah in the word Neveilah.]

Question: Rashi also asks that it would seem that there is no need to quote Rava. The Gemara should have merely said the case is when the Neveilah is rotten.

Answer: This can also be answered. The Gemara means that this is according to Rava, who holds that one can use the term "eating" even regarding a rotten Neveilah.

Being that Rava says that if someone says, "I will not eat" and he eats earth, he is exempt, he implies that if a person says, "I will not eat earth" and he does eat earth, he is liable. This means that it is possible to use the word "eat" regarding earth, and certainly regarding a rotten Neveilah.

The Gemara should have quoted Rava's question regarding someone who swears not to eat earth. Rava asked, how much does such a person have to eat in order to transgress his oath? [This clearly shows that Rava held the term "eating" can be used regarding earth.] However, it said his first statement (quoted on 22b) instead.

When the Gemara says, "We also learned this in our Mishnah," it is bringing proof that it is possible to use the term "eating" regarding a rotten Neveilah. There are many disgusting and crawling creatures that are less unfit to eat than a rotten Neveilah. We can now establish that the second part of the Mishnah is referring to a case where one explicitly stated Neveilah, as we indeed have stated. We also see a way where he did not have to and also could have eaten rotten Neveilah (as this is permitted).

Question: Being that a rotten Neveilah is included in the term "Neveilah," even without including permitted items the oath should be valid! When someone swears not to eat Neveilah, being that it is valid regarding a rotten Neveilah, it is also valid regarding a regular Neveilah.

Answer: A rotten Neveilah is not presumed to be included in the term Neveilah unless he explicitly adds permitted things. This would show that he wanted to forbid himself from eating a permitted thing.

Question#1: However, this is difficult according to the Ri. Why does Rav Mari say, "We also learned this in the Mishnah?" On the contrary, the Mishnah should serve as a question, as the case of the Mishnah was established as being when he said that he will not eat Neveilah. This is certainly a term of eating!

Question#2: One can also ask this as a question on Rava who said that if he swore not to eat and ate earth that he is exempt, because eating earth is not included in eating.

Answer: It must be as the Gemara answers that the case in the Mishnah is different, as he showed before he made the oath that it is important to him.

Regarding a case where being general is like being specific, the Gemara knew originally that "Achshaveih" -- "showing that something is important" changes status. However, if even when a person explicitly states something it does not help if it is not edible at all, we would not think that Achshaveih helps to consider it food.

The Gemara concludes that being that he is Machshiv this it is considered edible, as he ate it first and then swore.

Question#1: The Ri has another question. The Tosefta here states that if someone swears that he will eat, and he ate forbidden foods such as Pigul, Nosar, and Tamei, he is exempt. Rebbi Shimon holds he is liable. This must be talking about a case where the forbidden foods are not rotten, as Rebbi Shimon holds he is liable because the oath is not regarding these forbidden foods at all, even though "eat" is a general term. This implies that even when the food is not rotten, the Rabbanan hold it is included automatically in the oath in a general manner (together with permitted foods).

Question#2: According to Rashi who explained that the possibility (of fulfilling the act mentioned in the oath) is permitted things, this is difficult. Even regarding forbidden things we can find such a case! The case is where he says he will eat without mentioning forbidden things, as is implied there (Tosefta).

Answer: The Ri understands that Rashi's explanation is according to Rebbi Shimon. According to him, an oath does not take effect on forbidden items, even when included in general with permitted items.

Proof: The Tosefta above is a proof to the Ritzba, as it shows that even without an action forbidden things can be included in a general manner, as long as the forbidden item is not explicitly mentioned.

Question: According to Rashi, why do we have to say later in the case where a person swore not to eat figs, that he went back and swore not to eat figs and grapes? Even if his second oath would be not to eat in general, it would also take effect!

Answer: It indeed would take effect. The Gemara does not specifically mean "figs and grapes," but rather means in general that he swore not to eat.

Proof: This appears to be correct. If it specifically meant "figs and grapes," how could the oath take effect regarding the figs? He cannot eat the figs (as he already swore not to eat them)!

Implied Question: One cannot say that it is referring to him receiving lashes, for which the possibility of negative and positive is not necessary (it is only necessary for a Korban Shevuah). [Why not?]

Answer: This is because the Gemara later (29a) implies that it is referring to a Korban Shevuah when it says, "And he ate figs and separated a Korban."

Answer (to q): However, it is possible to find a positive fulfillment in (this vow), namely disgusting figs. However, without his inclusion these disgusting figs would not be included in (his first oath when he said) the word "figs," which would be relegated to figs that are good to eat.

Explanation: This is not according to Rebbi Shimon. We clearly see that Rebbi Shimon does not hold of Issur Mosif (an added new prohibition takes effect) in Yevamos (32a). Rebbi Shimon says there that in a case where two sisters married two brothers, if the surviving brother married a sister before the deceased brother married the second sister when he was alive, the second sister is forbidden to the surviving brother solely because she is his wife's sister. The prohibition of her being his brother's former wife (without a Heter of Yibum) does not take effect, even though this prohibition added new prohibitions on his other brothers. [Rebbi Shimon holds that once the surviving brother married his wife, her unmarried sister became forbidden to him. After she then married his brother, the added prohibition of being his brother's wife is irrelevant to the first married brother, even though this prohibition now prohibited her to the other brothers (if there is no Heter of Yibum).]

Rather, it is according to other Tanaim who do not hold that an Issur Kollel takes effect, but do hold that an Issur Mosif takes effect. For example, Rebbi Yosi in Yevamos (ibid.) holds that if a married woman becomes his mother-in-law, he is judged as having had an affair with a married woman. The Gemara there still states that he admits that an Issur Mosif takes effect. [It must be he holds of Issur Mosif, but not Issur Kollel.]

Explanation: Rashi explains that Mukdashin is a prohibition that is general. Being that it is valid for the meat, it is also valid for the forbidden fat.

Implied Question: Didn't they say in Kerisus (14a) that once a person is Makdish a Korban, being that it now has a prohibition that one cannot benefit from it, there is an added prohibition ("Issur Mosif" not an "Issur Kollel") against its forbidden fats?

Answer: The Gemara there means an Issur Kollel. It only called it "Mosif" -- "added" because it is adding a stringent prohibition to a lenient prohibition.

Explanation#1: Rashi explains that he is liable for carrying on Shabbos. However, he is not liable for carrying on Yom Kippur, as he holds that there is no Eiruv and prohibition against carrying on Yom Kippur.

Implied Question: This does not seem correct, as in Kerisus the Gemara concludes that Rafram's opinion (that there is no Eiruv etc.) is a mistake.

Explanation#2: He is therefore liable both for carrying on Shabbos and on Yom Kippur. Rebbi Meir said Shabbos in order to add another prohibition (to the case which already clearly is taking place on Yom Kippur).

Explanation: Rebbi Meir considers this as part of eating, as swallowing the fat is considered putting it down. This is as the Gemara states in Shabbos (80a), that if a person wrote two letters while walking he is liable, as his writing is considered his putting the letters down.

Opinion#1: Rabeinu Tam explains that there is a negative and positive side to Cheilev (enabling a Korban Shevuah, as explained above). This is because "Cheilev" implies the fat on the stomach or fat from a wild animal which is permitted. This is because he mentions together with "Cheilev" a permitted item (dates). However, if he had not mentioned a permitted item, "Cheilev" would indeed only imply forbidden fats.

Question: This is difficult. Why doesn't the Gemara also ask a question on Rebbi Yochanan (23b) from here? [This shows that a permitted item together with a forbidden item does not make a valid oath!]

Answer: This is because Rebbi Yochanan might hold that there is a Tana who holds that an Issur Kollel takes effect when it comes by itself, but not when it comes because he brought it upon himself. However, from Rava the implication is that there is no difference between the two.

Observation: This also helps us understand another point. If this were not so, what would Rava be teaching us that Rebbi Yochanan had not already taught through his statement?

Implied Question: However, it is possible to refute this by saying that Rava had to teach that even if both come by themselves it takes effect.

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that the opinion that holds that an Issur Kollel is valid admits that it does not take effect on a more stringent prohibition. This is explained by Rabeinu Tam in Yevamos (33b, DH AMAR) regarding the Torah's stating that it is forbidden to light a fire on Shabbos in order to show that this prohibition is a basic negative prohibition. [Why, then, should this lenient prohibition of an oath take effect when there is already a more severe prohibition of Cheilev present?]

Answer: Even so, the prohibition regarding an oath will take effect when there is already a prohibition against Cheilev, being that Cheilev is somewhat lenient itself. This is indicated by the Gemara's statement in Chulin (103a) that the Torah said that the prohibition against Neveilah can take effect on (Cheilev although) the already present prohibition of Cheilev (is in effect).

Observation: The Gemara could have said that we established this as being regarding a Bechor, as the Gemara answered earlier. [The Toras Chaim says that Tosfos can only be understood if the DH does not have the words "Ha Ba'inan Shaveh Perutah." The DH should in fact be on 25a, regarding the fourth line of the Gemara there (see also Tosfos Ha'Rosh).]

Opinion#1: Rashi explains that from the Pasuk, "And a non-Kohen should not eat for they are Kodesh" there is no teaching that a non-Kohen cannot eat (forbidden parts of) Kodshim, as that Pasuk is only referring to Kodshim that a Kohen is permitted to eat. Anything that can be eaten by Kohanim does not bear a prohibition of Meilah.

This is also implied in Makos (18a, regarding a non-Kohen eating from an Olah before the sprinkling of the blood, outside the walls of the Mikdash). The Gemara there asks, "Why don't we also give him lashes because of the Pasuk, "And a non-Kohen should not eat for they are Kodesh?" The Gemara answers that this is only referring to parts of Korbanos permitted to Kohanim. In this case, they are not permitted to Kohanim.

Question: This is difficult, as in Kerisus (4a) the Gemara establishes the Pasuk, "And a non-Kohen should not eat for they are Kodesh" as referring to fats of animals that are Korbanos. The Gemara there says that if someone eats fats from Korbanos he receives two sets of lashes, one for Cheilev and the second for "And a non-Kohen should not eat for they are Kodesh." This is despite the fact that Kohanim are not allowed to eat Cheilev!

Answer: It is possible to answer that even though the Cheilev cannot be eaten by the Kohanim, the Korban is still considered "And they will eat those that they have an atonement through them" meaning the (entire Korban is considered to have the same law as its meat). This teaching only excludes eating the meat of a Chatas and Asham before the sprinkling of the blood. At that early point, the Korban is not yet considered to be something that is eaten (and therefore fit for the Kohanim).

Opinion#2: According to the above answer we can indeed say that the prohibition regarding the Asham is derived from the Pasuk, "And a non-Kohen should not eat for they are Kodesh."

The fact that the prohibition is derived from this Pasuk and not from the Gezeirah Shaveh from Terumah is also implied in Kerisus (4b). The Gemara there asks, why is Cheilev different in that it has two negative prohibitions? The Gemara answers that it is because of the added prohibition of a non-Kohen (implying the Pasuk mentioned above). The Gemara asks that blood should also etc. The Gemara there requires study.