Explanation: This does not come to exclude a case where he swore he ate or didn't eat, as the Gemara says later (21b) that it is logical that the case of the Mishnah that is dealing with the future is also coming to exclude a case regarding the future.

Additionally, in a case where he swears that he will not throw and he did throw, everybody agrees he is liable.

One also cannot say that it is coming to exclude a case of someone who swears that he will nullify a Mitzvah, as this case is stated later (27a) in the beginning of this Mishnah.

Question: How do we deduce from here that one does not receive lashes for a negative prohibition that does not entail an action? Perhaps the reason one does not receive lashes is because the warning is doubtful (as Reish Lakish stated earlier on 3b)?

Answer#1: It is possible to answer that the implication is that he is exempt even if he swore that he would eat a certain loaf and he then threw it into the sea, and they warned him when he threw it (that he would transgress his oath). [This is not a doubtful warning, as he certainly will not be able to retrieve it, and he is therefore transgressing his oath when he throws it into the sea.]

Implied Question: However, this is also considered a doubtful warning according to the opinion that when a negative prohibition is followed by a positive command to fix the negative prohibition, it is not considered that he nullified the positive command until he ensures it cannot be done. This is evident from the fact that this opinion considers it to be a doubtful warning if a person broke the wings of a (mother) bird in Makos (15b, making himself unable to send away the mother bird). [According to this opinion (as opposed to the other opinion in Makos there regarding Hasra'as Safek not being a Hasra'ah), our answer does not seem valid.]

Answer#2: Alternatively, the Gemara merely wants to find a Tana who argues on the Mishnah (the focus is on how Rebbi Yochanan can argue with a Stam Mishnah, not on Lav she'Ain Bo Ma'aseh).

Question: How do we know Rebbi Yochanan argues? Perhaps our Mishnah is discussing a case where he throws a loaf into the ocean, which is considered a definite warning (according to the first answer above). It is then possible that both the Beraisa and our Mishnah hold that one does receive lashes for a negative prohibition that does not involve an action. The Mishnah later (27b) might also be talking about a case involving a doubtful warning.

Answer: It is possible to answer that our Mishnah implies that it is discussing a case similar to the case mentioned later (27b).

This is also why the Gemara earlier understandably quoted the Mishnah regarding one who leaves over from a Korban that is pure (he does not receive lashes), despite the fact that it is possible to say he should be exempt because the warning is doubtful.

The Gemara still brought an effective proof that this Tana argues on the Tana of our Mishnah, as for the same reason that one should be exempt regarding leaving over the meat of a Korban, one should also say that he is exempt in the case of our Mishnah. [This is whether it is due to Lav she'Ain Bo Ma'aseh being exempt from lashes or because it is a doubtful warning.]

Question: The Gemara in Chulin (43a) asks that according to Rebbi Yochanan who says that the law follows the one who says that the amount (that must be left from a liver in order for the animal not to be a Treifah) is a Kzayis, doesn't he also say that the law follows a Stam Mishnah? The Mishnah says that if the liver was totally removed it is a Treifah. [This implies that if there is even a tiny piece left the animal is not a Treifah.] What is the Gemara's question? The last Stam is deemed better!

Answer#1: The discussion of what is a Treifah and what is not is one discussion, and it is not possible to say regarding these categories that one is "first" and one is "last."

Answer#2: Rabeinu Yaakov of Orleans answered that the Gemara in Chulin (ibid.) means as follows. Didn't Rebbi Yochanan say the law follows a Stam Mishnah? This shows that the Stam Mishnah regarding what is not a Treifah (if even a small piece of liver is left) is not a real Stam Mishnah. If it would be, why would Rebbi Yochanan have to rule that the Halachah is like that Mishnah? Didn't Rebbi Yochanan say already that the Halachah follows a Stam Mishnah?

Implied Question: One cannot say that the case is if they warned him not to enter the Beis Hamikdash and he did so anyway, or they warned him not to eat meat of Kodshim and he did anyway. [Why not?]

Answer: If so, this is in the category of "Yedios ha'Tumah" (not Maros Nega'im).

It is also not possible that the case is that they warned him not to enter the "Machaneh Leviyah" -- "camp of the Levi'im" and he did, as the Gemara says in Pesachim (67a) that such a person does not receive lashes. This is because the Pasuk attached a positive commandment of "Badad Yeishev" -- "he should sit alone" (Vayikra 13:46). [This makes it a "Lav she'Nitak l'Asei" -- "negative commandment attached to a positive commandment" for which one does not receive lashes.] However, if this is referring to a Korban it is understandable, as he must bring a Korban after he became pure from his leprosy.

Observation: The Gemara here implies that one is only liable for cutting off one of these four types of leprosy.

Question: This is difficult. In Shabbos (132b), the Gemara implies that one even receives lashes for cutting off leprosy that is pure (i.e. it got smaller etc.). This is evident from the fact that the Gemara says that the service of the Beis Hamikdash does not push aside the prohibition against cutting off leprosy (see Rashash that this is the appropriate text, as is apparent from the Gemara in Shabbos). The Gemara asks, let him cut away his leprosy and serve, as the positive commandment of doing the Avodah should push aside the negative prohibition against cutting away leprosy!

The Gemara answers that being that he is lacking dipping in a Mikvah, he still cannot serve. The Gemara asks that this is understandable regarding impure leprosy. What is the law regarding pure leprosy? This implies that one would also receive lashes if he cut off pure leprosy.

Answer: The Ritzba says that there the Gemara is also discussing the four types of leprosy. When it says pure leprosy, the case is where it did not grow on either side or become darker. This is called pure, as such a Metzora is not kept isolated and he does not lack dipping in a Mikvah, as he already dipped.

Question: This is difficult. Certainly, if Rebbi Akiva held that a negative prohibition punishable by death receives lashes, the Mishnah could indeed be according to Rebbi Akiva. There would be no question from knowing about impurity, because our Mishnah is discussing lashes. The Mishnah has to point out that its Tana holds that a negative prohibition punishable by death receives lashes. [Why does the Gemara still insist that even if this is Rebbi Akiva's position the Mishnah cannot be according to him, as the earlier question (3a) remains?]

Answer: There is still a question regarding knowing about impurity if the Mishnah is according to Rebbi Akiva, even if our Mishnah is discussing liability for receiving lashes. This is as our Gemara says later, "If so, it should not say "Yedios" -- "knowings" but rather "Hasraos" -- "warnings."

However, the Mishnah is understandable according to Rebbi Yishmael if it is discussing lashes, as it says Yedios because the Mishnah is addressing both the liability of having to bring a Korban and having to receive lashes.

Now this is understandable, as we can answer that when the Gemara asks "if so (it should say "Hasra'aos")," it is asking as follows. Why should we establish the Mishnah according to Rebbi Akiva and regarding lashes, when we can say it is according to Rebbi Yishmael and regarding lashes (and not have problem that it should have said Hasra'os), as we have explained.

Question: If so, Rebbi Akiva holds that a negative prohibition that does not entail an action makes one liable to receive lashes, as the Gemara said earlier must be the position of Rebbi Yishmael (in order for the Mishnah to be according to his opinion). How can Rebbi Akiva hold this way? This opinion is derived from Motzi Shem Ra and Eidim Zomimim, as stated in Makos (2b). Rebbi Akiva is the one who says that Eidim Zomimim is a fine, and he therefore cannot derive from Eidim Zomimim to all other Torah law that a negative prohibition without an action receives lashes!

Answer: Perhaps Rebbi Akiva holds like Rav Dimi who says later (20b) that if someone swears, "I ate" and "I didn't eat" it is a Shevuas Shav and he receives lashes based on the Pasuk, "Lo Yinakeh." [See Maharsha regarding why this makes one liable to receive lashes even without an action.]

According to what was explained earlier, that he only holds regarding a Shevuah that he receives lashes, this is understandable.

Explanation: Rashi explains that the Pasuk says, "v'Ne'elam" twice regarding impurity. Regarding a Korban Olah v'Yored the Pasuk states, "v'Ne'elam mi'Menu v'Hu Tamei...v'Ne'elam mi'Menu v'Hu Yada" -- "And it will be forgotten from him and he is impure...and it will be forgotten from him and he (then) knows" (Vayikra 5:2-3).

The first "v'Ne'elam" comes to teach that one is liable for forgetting his impurity, but not if he forgets the place of the Mikdash. The second "v'Ne'elam" is an extra Pasuk that comes to teach us something. It must be that we should place the words "v'Hu Yada" -- "And he knows" between the two times it says, "v'Ne'elam" and derive that after he knew he became impure he forgot. This teaches that we require that he originally knew. We do not need to derive that he later found out from the Pasuk, as if he does not find out that he accidentally sinned he would not be bringing a Korban. This is Rashi's explanation of the Gemara.

Question#1: There is a lot of difficulty with Rashi's explanation. First of all, why would we require "v'Ne'elam" to say that he is not liable for forgetting about the location of the Beis Hamikdash? Why would we think that we require a Pasuk to say that he is exempt in such a case?

This is evident from the fact that Rebbi requires the Pasuk "v'Ne'elam" to say that one is liable for forgetting the location of the Mikdash.

Question#2: Additionally, he explains that a Pasuk is not necessary for him knowing after the fact, as if he doesn't know, why is he bringing a Korban? If so, regarding all Korbanos Chatas regarding which the Pasuk says, "Or he knew" we should say that he requires prior knowledge (that this item, such as a piece of Cheilev, was forbidden). [However, we know that even if a person never knew that this piece of meat was forbidden Cheilev and he accidentally ate it, he still must bring a Korban.]

Question#3: Additionally, Rebbi taught "And he knew" as referring to knowing after the fact. He understands that the Pasuk is stated anyway, even though it is not needed.

Alternatively, he holds that it is necessary in order to exclude someone who separates an animal for a Korban before he knows that he accidentally sinned.

This is even according to the opinion in Kerisus (22b) that an Asham for a definite sin (as opposed to an Asham Taluy) does not require prior knowledge, and that if he separated his Asham before he knew he was obligated to bring one it is holy like a Chatas. [This is despite the fact that a Chatas cannot be separated before knowing that it is owed.] The reason that this is true regarding a Chatas is because the Pasuk says, "Or it was known to him." This opinion (that it is not required for an Asham) admits that this Pasuk requires knowing (regarding a Chatas). [Accordingly, it is clear that the Pasuk stating that a second knowing is needed is required regarding a Chatas, in order to state when the Korban can be separated. It is specifically not said regarding an Asham to show that the Korban can be separated before knowing for certain that he must bring it.]

Question#4: Additionally, the Gemara later (19b) says that Rebbi Yishmael does not require knowing first. This is apparent from the fact that he requires both Pesukim of "v'Ne'elam" to teach that this applies in a case where one forgot the location of the Mikdash and where one forgot he was impure. This implies that Rebbi Akiva, who does require knowing first, derives this from the extra "v'Ne'elam."

Explanation#2: It therefore appears according to Rabeinu Tam that Rebbi Akiva derives from the extra "v'Ne'elam" that he must have known. Rebbi understands from the first "v'Ne'elam" that he must have known the law from his teacher.

Explanation#3: Alternatively, it is possible to explain that saying "v'Ne'elam" twice teaches us to insert the words "And he knew" between the two times that it says the word "v'Ne'elam." This indicates that there must be knowledge before forgetting and afterwards.

Question: In Bava Metzia (4b) regarding "Sela'im, Dinarim" (a case where the lender has a document stating that the borrower owes him "Sela'im" or "Dinarim" but it does not say how many), Rebbi Akiva says that one does not swear regarding denial of having a lien on his land.

If so, he must determine the meaning of the Pesukim using the "Klal u'Perat" -- "rule and specific" method. According to the opinion that derives using the "inclusive and exclusive" method, we only exclude (the denial of owing) documents, as is apparent from the Gemara later.

The Sefarim that have the text, "Rebbi Yaakov" in Bava Metzia (ibid.) are understandable (as there is no contradiction in Rebbi Akiva's position).

Answer#1: Even according to the opinion that derives using the "inclusive and exclusive" method, when there are two exclusive words he understands that one excludes land and one excludes documents, as implied in Bava Kama (63a).

Rebbi Akiva also holds of another exclusive term regarding Shevuos that excludes land.

Answer#2: Some say that the Gemara in Bava Metzia (58b) that excludes land from swearing from the Pasuk, "When a man will give etc." using a Klal u'Perat u'Klal is not quoting the main teaching (for excluding claims of land from obligating swearing).

Rather, from the Pasuk "On all negligent things" that excludes Keifel we similarly exclude Shevuos. There are many exclusive words there, in order to exclude (claims of) documents and land. The Pasuk of "When a man will give etc." actually teaches us something else. "When a man will give" teaches that he must give the item for deposit when he is already a man. "Silver or vessels" teaches us (see Bava Metzia 39b) that just as vessels is at least two etc.

Answer#3: It is also possible to answer that even the opinion that derives using the "inclusive and exclusive" method does not necessarily derive using the method of "exclusive, inclusive, and exclusive." Rather, he would derive these types of Pesukim using the "specific, rule, specific" method, as implied in Nazir (35a).

It is possible to say that Rebbi Akiva will derive regarding Shevuos using the "rule and exclusive" method, as he indeed derives a teaching from a Pasuk using this method in Bava Metzia (57b) regarding the Pasuk, "When a man will give to his friend a donkey etc." We similarly find in Nazir (35a) that an opinion that derives using the "inclusive and exclusive method" also derives from that Pasuk using the "specific, rule, specific" method.

Implied Question: There is an argument in Kidushin (29a) regarding a case where a person has the ability to either redeem himself or his son (who are both firstborns and have not yet had a Pidyon ha'Ben). The Tana Kama says that he comes before his son, while Rebbi Yehudah says that his son is first.

The Gemara there explains that the case is where he has five Sela'im that are free of any lien, and five Sela'im worth of possessions that have a lien (and were bought by others). According to Rebbi Yehudah, a loan written in the Torah (in this case, the obligation of the firstborn to give the Kohen five Sela'im) is as if it is written in a document. Accordingly, the Kohen can go and take away his land that was bought by the buyers (as his lien started before the sale, when the man was born). [This shows that a Kohen can accept land as the five Sela'im, unlike the position of the Chachamim in our Gemara!]

Answer: The Gemara there does not mean that the Kohen does the redemption by taking the land, but rather that the firstborn must sell the land and give the money to the Kohen.

Observation: The Gemara's implication that documents can be sold, as a Pasuk was required to exclude documents, is explained in another place (Kesuvos 85b, Kidushin 48a, and other places).

Observation: The Gemara also could have quoted from the Gemara in Menachos (28b) regarding a Menorah of wood, lead, and metal where Rebbi says it is invalid and Rabbi Yosi b'Rebbi Yehudah says it is valid. [The Gemara there explicitly says that Rebbi derives using "Klal u'Perat.]

Observation: This is stated in a manner of "these, and it does not even have to be said that these are also included." It otherwise should have stated an auger, needle, and tool used for engraving first, as Rebbi admits that they can be used as they are metal.

Explanation: This is not exact, as it also excludes an ointment (that would eat away at the skin).