Opinion #1: The Ri understands that this is (not an actual derivation but rather) an Asmachta. A Pasuk is not needed to provide a derivation, as how is it possible that one would think to push aside Shabbos if we do not know if he is even obligated in the Mitzvah of Milah?! This is as we see later that the doubt is whether he was born after seven or eight months of pregnancy.

Opinion #1 (cont.): We do not need a derivation to teach regarding a baby who was born Bein Hashemashos, as it is better that the Mitzvah of Milah should be temporarily unfulfilled on the eighth day due to the doubt of when the proper time is, and one should not actively transgress Shabbos in this doubtful situation.

Opinion #1 (cont.): Rather, the Ri understands that the main derivation from the Pasuk is to teach that a Milah for an Androgynus or a baby born with a Milah does not push aside Shabbos.

Implied Question: However, this is not derived from one Pasuk of "Orlaso," as it is illogical to say that these two (Androgynus and a baby born with a Milah) are the same and that they are both derived from one Pasuk. (How, then, do we derive that the Milah of both an Androgynus and a baby born with a Milah does not push aside Shabbos?)

Answer #1: Rather, there are two Pesukim for these derivations. One is regarding a Milah in the proper time. The Pasuk says, "And on the eighth day he should do a Bris Milah to the flesh of his Orlah." Another Pasuk is regarding a Milah done after the proper time for an adult. The Pasuk says, "And a male Arel who does not have a Milah done to the flesh of his Orlah."

Answer #2: Alternatively, the Pasuk teaches that the Milah of an Androgynus does not push aside Shabbos. It is logical (without a derivation) that this is also true regarding a baby born with a Milah that we do not have to take out a small amount of blood for the Bris on Shabbos (Ri, see Maharsha who says that Beis Hillel holds (according to the Tana Kama) such a baby does not even need to have Dam Bris taken).

Answer #3: Alternatively, the Pasuk is to teach that we do not do a Bris on Shabbos to a baby who is born with a Milah. We do not require a Pasuk to teach that the Bris of an Androgynus pushes aside Shabos, as we see that Rebbi Yehudah later has to derive the fact that he requires a Milah from a Pasuk, "Kol Zachar." The Rabbanan there derive something else entirely from that Pasuk (implying he does not even need a Milah).

Observation: The Gemara currently implies that there is more reason to require taking out some blood from a baby that is born circumcised than from someone who converts when they are already circumcised. This is because when someone is born circumcised everyone agrees they need to have some blood taken, whereas when someone converts circumcised it is an argument whether this is required.

Implied Question: If so, (there is a difficulty). Later, Rav rules that the Halachah is like the Tana Kama. The Gemara later (135a) implies that the law follows Rav, as Rav Ada bar Ahava says that he deserved this (what happened to his child) because he went against Rav's opinion. Since we hold like the Tana Kama that when a child is born circumcised that blood does not have to be taken, certainly we should rule that if a person converts when already circumcised that he should not have to have blood taken.

Implied Question (cont.): The Halachos Gedolos does not rule this way. Rather, he rules that a baby born circumcised does not require blood taken whereas a person who converts circumcised does require blood to be taken. It is clear he is correct regarding a minor, as is apparent from our Gemara. (However, how can he rule that a person who converts circumcised does require having blood taken?)

Answer: Regarding a convert, it appears to the Ri that the Halachos Gedolos relied on a Gemara in Yevamos (46b). The Beraisa there states that if someone says I had a Bris but did not immerse in a Mikvah, we immerse him and there is nothing wrong with that. These are the words of Rebbi Yehudah. Rebbi Yosi says that we do not immerse him.

Answer (cont.): If you say that we do not have to have blood taken from a person who converts when circumcised according to Rebbi Yosi, why does Rebbi Yosi hold that we do not immerse him? He is clearly already circumcised! What does it matter if Beis Din did not do a Bris? He should not be worse than a circumcised Arab or Givoni! Rather, it is apparent from the opinion of Rebbi Yosi that he requires that blood be taken. This is why we do not immerse him, as he is not a convert until he first has a Bris and then he immerses.

Explanation: The Rashba explains the Gemara in Yevamos (ibid.), and why the logic presented there is more correct than the opposite logic presented in our Gemara.

Explanation (cont.): Both a baby who is born circumcised and a convert who converts while already circumcised should logically require having blood taken from them. The Gemara excludes a baby who is born circumcised from having to undergo this due to the Pasuk, "Orlaso." However, this is only because there is a Pasuk explicitly excluding him from this. Since there is no such Pasuk regarding a convert, he does require blood to be taken from him.

Opinion: Rabeinu Chananel's ruling is the exact opposite of the Halachos Gedolos.

Opinion: The Ri says that nowadays it is permitted to carry all babies, as we are not experts (in determining their age). They are all like a baby who might have been born after eight months and he might have been born after nine months. Sometimes a woman becomes pregnant soon after immersing, and sometimes she does not (become pregnant soon after immersing). One can do the Milah on Shabbos, as in any event there is no Chilul Shabbos (see top of 136a).

Opinion (cont.): This is even if he was certainly born after only eight months, for example in a case where the husband only had relations with his wife once and then separated from her, and she had a baby after eight months.

Opinion (cont.): Even so the Ri understands that one can carry such a baby and do the Bris Milah on Shabbos if there is nothing wrong with his skin or fingernails. This is as the Gemara in Yevamos states (80b) that we say that really he is a baby that was developed after seven months, and he just stayed in the womb longer than necessary.

Explanation: This refers to the danger of having too much milk in one's breasts. She can nurse him (the baby who is born after eight months), as we do not suspect she will carry him.

Question: The Rashba does not know why the Beraisa had to say this is permitted due to danger. It should even be permitted for any pain, even for her to milk herself in order to take out her milk. Even though this is a Melachah she'Ainah Tzerichah l'Gufah which is more stringent than Muktzah, it seems that it should still be permitted since it is like the case where one is allowed to pop a pus filled sore since it causes them pain.

Explanation: Rebbi Eliezer ha'Kapar and Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar are both referring to the Tana Kama. Rebbi Eliezer ha'Kapar is saying the following to Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar: You should not answer that regarding the words of the Tana Kama. Rather, you should say that they only argue etc. Now it is understandable why the Gemara deduces, "This implies that the Tana Kama holds etc." This is the explanation of the Rashba.

Question: This is difficult. How is it implied from this Beraisa that Rebbi Chama says the reason is due to impurity due to birth? It is possible to say that he holds that a boy born through Caesarian section has a Milah on the eighth day. The requirement for immersion regarding a maidservant is because in any other way she would not be considered a convert unless she immersed, as derived in Yevamos (46a).

Explanation #1: Rashi explains that the Gemara could have said that the case was where he bought a maidservant who was pregnant, and she gave birth before immersion.

Explanation #1 (cont.): Rather, the Gemara wanted to teach a novel teaching that even if she immersed first and then gave birth we find a case of "Miknas Kesef" that receives a Bris Milah at one day old.

Question: The Ri has difficulty with this. If so, the Tana Kama earlier should have said this novel teaching. Why did he say that Miknas Kesef receives a Bris etc.? This is even the case if he bought a pregnant maidservant, and one person bought the maidservant while the other bought the fetus! Rather, it must be that if one person buys the maidservant and the other buys a fetus that it is like "yours."

Text: The Ri approves of the text of the Sheiltos d'Rav Achai, "for example he bought a maidservant together with her child."

Question: However, this is difficult to the Ri. He could have taught a more novel teaching that the case is even without the child being alongside her. The case could be, for example, that he bought a pregnant maidservant and she gave birth before immersion!

Answer #1: It is better for him to say the same case as the one stated in the Beraisa regarding the words of the Tana Kama.

Answer #2: The Ri additionally answers that since the Pesukim regarding having a Bris at either one or eight days old regarding Yelid Bayis or Miknas Kesef are stated in Parshas Lech Lecha, it is better to establish a case which applies before the Torah was given before immersing was required.

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that a Yelid Bayis receiving a Bris at one day old can only be after Matah Torah according to Rebbi Chama in a case where the woman gave birth and then immersed. (This case clearly is after Matan Torah! Why can't the other cases also be after Matan Torah?)

Answer: Cases that apply before Matan Torah are preferable.

Explanation: This is as explained in Yevamos (48b) that if he buys him on condition not to convert him he can keep him for a long time.

Explanation: These cases are not the same, as the eighth day regarding an animal is like it is already after eight days.

Proof: This is as we see from the Gemara later that he made an "Igla Tilsa" (an especially delicious calf, some say it is the third calf born from its mother) on the seventh day. The Gemara says that he said, "If you would have waited until nightfall I would have eaten from it" (implying that even the night of the eighth day causes it permitted).

Explanation (cont.): However, the thirtieth day regarding a baby is considered to still be before thirty days.

Proof: This is as stated by the Mishnah in Bechoros (49a). Even Rebbi Akiva who argues only says that he is unsure whether the thirtieth day is like before or after thirty days.

Observation: Regarding Aveilus, even Rebbi Akiva admits that it is like before thirty days, since the law is always like the lenient opinion regarding Aveilus.