Explanation: They are big or they are small and have markings around them as if they were made of sections, as I explained earlier (35a).

Implied Question: We do not decree that perhaps a Jew will come to light a candle (and therefore we should forbid having benefit from the candle lit by a Nochri), even though we make a similar decree in Beitzah (3a) regarding fruit that falls off a tree on Shabbos that it cannot be used lest one climb the tree and harvest some fruit. We similarly decree regarding liquids that came out of fruit that they are forbidden, lest one come to squeeze fruit. (Why don't we also decree that a Jew will light a candle?)

Answer: This is because squeezing and harvesting are easy to do, and a person wants to do them very badly because they will allow him to eat. However, regarding everything discussed here they are not as easy to do, and people are not as interested in doing them.

Opinion: It appears that it is forbidden for any Jew to use this water on Shabbos. When the prohibition is regarding the Rabbinic Techum (boundary), the Gemara in Eiruvin (40a) and Beitzah (25a) says that if the Nochri brought it specifically for one Jew it is permitted for a different Jew. However, this does not apply in a case such as this one where the prohibition involved is a Torah prohibition.

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that a Jew who accidentally cooks on Shabbos can eat the food. (Why is this permitted even though it is a Torah prohibition?)

Answer: There is no suspicion in that case that if we permit him to eat he will come to cook on purpose on Shabbos, as one is liable to be stoned for doing so and it is known as a stringent prohibition. However, regarding a Nochri who does so for a Jew, if you permit the Jew to use it he will keep asking the Nochri to do this for him.

Implied Question: This is unlike a case earlier where if a Nochri wants to put out a fire we do not instruct him to do so or not to do so, as opposed to our Mishnah where we say that it is forbidden if he is doing so for the Jew. (Why aren't the case comparable?)

Answer: We only say that the Nochri is doing so of his own accord regarding extinguishing where the Jew is not directly benefiting from the act of the Nochri. However, in our Mishnah where the Jew is getting physical benefit from the action of the Nochri, we do not say that he is doing so of his own accord since the Nochri is doing so in order that the Jew should benefit. This was explained by Rabeinu Shimshon the Elder.

Opinion #1: Rabeinu Tam explains that since the Mishnah specifically discusses an animal and does not say the Nochri filled up his vessel with water so the Jew could drink, it implies it is specifically forbidden to give an animal this water because he could not have brought the animal inside the well.

Opinion #1 (cont.): However, he is permitted to drink this water (that a Nochri brought for either him or his animal to drink), as he can climb up and down the well and drink the water. Since he can enter the well and drink, they did not forbid him from drinking the water just because the Nochri filled up a container with it (and carried it to the private domain from the public domain or four cubits into the public domain).

Implied Question: The Gemara forbids a Jew to allow his animal to eat grass that a Nochri harvested for him on Shabbos, even though the Jew is allowed to lead his animal to grass that is still connected to the ground (when he knows his animal is going to eat it). (Why isn't this permitted like being permitted to drink from the water?)

Answer: Rabeinu Tam answers that this grass was on the other side of the river, and he would not have been able to lead his animal to it.

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that this case of the Nochri filling up water is in order to show a leniency, as stated in the Gemara. (How can we say that there is a stringency regarding the animal as stated above?)

Answer: The reason that it says a case of an animal is to be stringent regarding giving the animal a drink.

Proof: Rabeinu Eliyahu brought proof to be lenient from fruit that was brought outside the Techum that was brought back inside the Techum. It is deemed permitted just like it was before it was brought out of the Techum, as stated in Eiruvin (41b). Similarly, water that he originally could have brought to where he is now and it ended up being brought from the public domain should be permitted.

Question: This is incomparable, as in Eiruvin (ibid.) there was no Torah prohibition being transgressed. However, regarding the person himself we do not find a difference between a Torah or Rabbinic prohibition.

Opinion #2: The Ri says that it is also forbidden for drinking for the Jew himself. The reason the Mishnah focused on the animal was to teach an additional lesson that we do not decree lest the Nochri increase how much he is bringing due to the Jew, as an animal normally drinks a lot. However, if the Nochri brings it the Jew can clearly drink after the Nochri drinks, as there is not much suspicion that he will increase the amount of water he draws. If he fills up a bucket he has more than enough for himself and for the Jew.

Opinion #2 (cont.): Accordingly, if the water was drawn for the Jew it is forbidden for all Jews if getting the water involved a Torah prohibition such as being carried through the public domain or from the private to the public domain. However, if it was carried through a Karmelis it is permitted for a different Jew (other than the one it was brought for).

Opinion #3: Some want to say that it is specifically forbidden for the Jew to drink from this water, but it is permitted for him to wash his hands and feet or do other things with it.

Proof: This is as the Gemara in Yevamos (114a) states that Rebbi Yitzchak lost the keys to the Beis Medrash (in the public domain)...he said to Rebbi Pedas have boys and girls walk around there, in order that if they find the keys they will bring them. This implies that he would be able to benefit from the keys and use them on Shabbos!

Question #1: The Ri does not think this is correct at all, as there they are not doing anything on behalf of the (adult) Jew.

Question #2: Additionally, there are many things such as ramps and candles that one cannot use on Shabbos when they are made on Shabbos for a Jew. Here, too, there is no difference between drinking and other types of usage, as they are all prohibited.

Explanation: These grasses are Muktzah, as they were gathered today from grass that was connected to the ground.

Question: Why don't we say that the Beraisa is according to Rebbi Shimon who does not hold of Muktzah?

Answer #1: The Gemara wants to answer the Beraisa even according to Rebbi Yehudah.

Answer #2: Alternatively, Rebbi Shimon admits regarding Muktzah that is attached to the ground, as explained by Rashi in Beitzah (24b). Since he did not harvest them yesterday he caused them to be Muktzah just like figs and raisins in the middle of their drying process.

Implied Question: In Beitzah (3a), the Gemara forbids fruit that falls off a tree because of a decree that one might come to climb a tree and harvest a fruit. However, the Gemara did not forbid using the fruit because it is Mukztah. (If it is indeed Mukztah, why did the Gemara have to say it was forbidden due to this decree?)

Answer #1: This is because the fruit is ready for ravens, as in the case in Peschim (56b). In our Gemara, the case is where the animal cannot reach what is attached, and this is why it is considered Muktzah.

Answer #2: Alternatively, grass is even forbidden according to Rebbi Shimon, as he is not sitting and waiting to gather the grass. However, regarding candles he is sitting and waiting for it to go out, as stated earlier (46b). Similarly, regarding fruit that falls off the tree, the person is sitting and waiting for it to fall down. Therefore, if it were not for the reason that we decree it is forbidden lest he climb the tree and harvest it, it would be permitted.

Source: This is based on the derivation in the Mechilta, "In order that your ox and donkey will rest etc." One might think this verse means you should not allow your animal to pick or uproot things growing from the ground. This is why the verse says, "In order that he should rest" and preventing him from doing so would not be rest but rather pain." [Rabeinu Tam.]

Explanation: The Ri understands that Abaye admits to the logic that a candle for one is like a candle for one hundred. However, he holds that if the ramp would have been made in front of Rabban Gamliel it would clearly have been done mainly for him as he was the Nasi, an officer, and the leader on this boat.

Explanation: The case is where there were at least half Jews and half Nochrim. This is because the logic of "a candle for one is a candle for one hundred" only permits Jews to use the candle when it is obvious that the Nochri is in fact lighting it for himself. This causes us not to make a decree that he might increase the amount of candles he is lighting for the Jew, even if he knows the Jew.

Text: We do not have the text, "All vessels are taken," as there are many vessels that are not taken even according to Rebbi Shimon (who does not hold of Muktzah) such as a great saw and the peg of the plow as stated later (157a). The same applies regarding a beehive of two Kur that Rabah forbade earlier (35a), Chatzotzros according to Rebbi Yehudah, and an old candleholder.

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that the Gemara later (124b) says the opposite regarding broken pieces of earthenware vessels. It says that there is more reason to permit these pieces when they break before Shabbos than when they break on Shabbos. (How can we reconcile this apparent contradiction?)

Answer: The cases are incomparable, as in our Gemara the vessel is still a vessel, as it is still fit for its original purpose and the cover can be fit back onto the vessel. However, the Gemara later (ibid.) only considers the broken pieces fit because they can be used for a purpose other than their original purpose (which they are no longer suited for). Therefore, there is more reason to say they are forbidden if they break on Shabbos due to Nolad.

Explanation #1: When they are taken off they can still be carried. When the Beraisa says that a door of a carriage, box, or closet is "Nitalin," it means it can be carried when it has been taken off.

Explanation #2: This is unlike Rashi who explains that "Nitalin" refers to the fact that they have been taken off, as if to say that when it is taken off it can be put back on.

Question: It is not possible to explain the word "Nitalin" in the second part of the Beraisa in this fashion. Rather, it must mean it can be carried, as I have explained.

Explanation: Rava asks, doesn't the Beraisa also say "Notlin?" (The Maharsha explains the "also" as meaning that the door can be taken off its hinges, and it can also be carried in general). Additionally, Rava asks, how can the Beraisa say, "however it cannot be put back?" It is not possible to discuss this regarding something that has nothing to do with what we said earlier, as the Beraisa first said, "it can be carried" meaning there is no prohibition of Muktzah. How can it contrast this by saying, "but it cannot be put back" which is regarding building vessels? What does building have to do with Muktzah that makes it an appropriate contrast?!

Implied Question: Rav Yehudah knew the second part of the Beraisa. (Why, then, didn't he realize it made his explanation difficult?)

Answer: Perhaps he understood that the case was when he set it aside for this purpose, like all of the other cases in the Beraisa.

Question: Didn't Rav Yehudah say in the name of Shmuel (113a) that it is permitted to carry a vessel of weavers on Shabbos? The purpose of this carrying is clearly to use it in a permitted fashion, even though it is mainly used for a forbidden purpose (weaving)!

Answer: One cannot say that Rav Yehudah is merely recording Shmuel's opinion but he does not hold this way. (Why not?)

Question #1: This is apparent from the fact that people asked Rav Yehudah whether this also applies regarding certain expensive tools of a weaver, and he was unsure whether or not they could be used for this purpose. This implies that this is indeed Rebbi Yehudah's opinion (and not merely a quote from Shmuel).

Question #2: Additionally, Rav Yehudah himself says earlier (46a) that one can carry an oil candleholder (after the flame has gone out).

Answer: One cannot say that the case is where he set it aside for permitted use, as Rav Yehudah indeed says regarding the cases in the Mishnah. (Why not?)

Question: The case of weaver vessels mentioned earlier implies they are used for weaving and not for a different permitted purpose, as otherwise this would also be the context of the question regarding the expensive weaving vessels there (and it clearly is not, as it was a question Rav Yehudah had difficulty resolving).

Answer: Rav Yehudah only forbade this type of usage when the permitted purpose is a weak Melachah such as cracking nuts, and the tool being used is something like a sledgehammer (or special hammer to craft metals) that is usually used for an important forbidden purpose. This is also the reason all of the cases in the Mishnah would be forbidden if the person had not set aside these vessels for these permitted purposes, as their permitted purpose is weak as opposed to their forbidden purpose which is important.

Answer (cont.): However, weaver's vessels and oil candleholders are permitted to be carried for a permitted purpose, as this purpose is more significant than something like cracking nuts.