Question (Ri): We should establish the entire Beraisa to discuss other Mitzvos. "This does not apply to other Mitzvos" refers to one who slaughtered and threw blood [of a Korban] outside [the Mikdash];

He is liable only once, like Abaye says in Sanhedrin (34b) "Sham Ta'aseh" - the Torah made it one action;

Also R. Avahu who argues, agrees that according to R. Yishmael regarding Shechitah and Zerikah, and according to R. Akiva regarding Ha'alah (burning limbs) and Zerikah, he is liable only once, for both are learned from one verse.

"Shagag without intent", e.g. he intended to slaughter a Chulin animal, and he needed Chulin, and it was found to be (Bach - another, of) Kodshim;

The corresponding case of Shabbos is when he intended to cut detached, and it was found to be (other Peros, that were) attached, and he needed only the detached. He is exempt, for we require Melachah Machasheves!

Answer: We cannot explain so, for it connotes that he is exempt for Shabbos because he was Shogeg without intent;

In such a case, even if he intended for this attached [produce], and it was found to be other attached, he is exempt, for this is not Melachah Machasheves.

Implied question: Why can't we establish that [the Beraisa] discusses when his intent was fulfilled, e.g. he needed to cut what he cut, but he thought that it was detached, and it was found to be attached?

Answer: We cannot say so, for in such a case, if he is exempt for Shabbos due to "Asher Chata Bah", he is exempt also for [Shechitah and Zerikah] outside!

Question: We should establish the entire [Beraisa] to discuss other Mitzvos, e.g. [a man] who was Nirva or Rove'a (was the passive or active party in Bi'ah) to a male, or was Rove'a or Nirva to an animal;

Both according to Abaye and R. Avahu, according to R. Akiva he is liable only once!

Now "Shagag without intent" is properly established. He is exempt for Shabbos due to "Asher Chata Bah", e.g. his intent was fulfilled (so he is not exempt due to not being Melachah Machasheves). He is not exempt for Arayos, since he benefited! (Tosfos leaves this difficult. Tosfos Sanhedrin (62b DH Reisha) wanted to say that only idolatry, which is equivalent to all the Mitzvos, is called "other Mitzvos", but asks that the Gemara suggested that the Reisha discusses Chelev.) (Perhaps the Gemara preferred to give a Halachic reason why the Reisha cannot discuss Chelev. Alternatively, if the Seifa would discuss idolatry, we could say that the Reisha says "other Mitzvos" Agav the Seifa - PF.)

Question: We must explain why it explains the Shi'ur here, and regarding weaving, Potze'a (cutting off excess of frayed warp threads, or cutting them off the loom), sewing and writing, but not regarding the other Melachos! (Keren Orah suggests that these Melachos do not last when less than a Shi'ur is done, so the Torah does not forbid them due to Chetzi Shi'ur. However, he points out that this does not apply to writing (and I do not understand how it applies to Potze'a - PF).)

Question: This requires investigation, whether or not one is liable for untying not in order to tie.

Inference: Since [the Mishnah] did not teach [untying order to tie], like it taught erasing in order to write [this shows that one is liable]!

Rejection: One may not infer this, for similarly it did not teach destroying in order to build, and above (31b) we say explicitly that we require destroying in order to build!

Answer #1: According to what Rashi explained in the Gemara (74b) that if two knots happened to occur in two threads near each other, they untie one and leave the other, it connotes that one is liable without in order to tie!

Objection: "V'Katar" does not connote like he explained (that they leave the other knot)!

Answer #2: R. Chananel explained, and the Yerushalmi connotes, that when one thread snapped in two places, and it was tied, they untie both knots, discard [the thread in] the middle, and tie the two remaining ends together, and there is only one knot.

Inference: This connotes that we require untying in order to tie!

Remark: Above (31b), I explained why it was not taught regarding untying and destroying. (Regarding erasing and tearing, it needed to teach the Shi'ur, i.e. in order to write two letters or sew two stitches! Extinguishing and Soser in order to burn and build any amount is liable, so there was no need to teach "in order to..." Sha'arei David says that the same applies to untying in order to tie.)

Implied question: Why didn't we ask similarly that it taught extinguishing first, and then burning?

Answer: [We ask only here, for] the entire process to produce bread was taught in order, except for plowing.

Implied Inference: This shows that one must warn [one who does] a Toldah due to its Av!

Rejection: It does not say that he needs to warn him for Zore'a, rather, if he warned him for Zore'a, he is liable.

Inference: Below (138a) it connotes a little that he must warn for a Toldah due to the Av, for it says straining - for which [Av] Melachah do we warn him? Rabah says that we warn him for Borer. R. Zeira says that we warn him for Meraked (sifting out Pesoles).

Rejection: Also this we can reject. It means, for which Av do we warn him, and he will be liable? Rabah says, for Borer, but if we warned him for Meraked, he is exempt;

Since the warning is for something unlike the Melachah, he thinks that they jest, so he is exempt. However, if they warned him Stam "do not strain", he is liable. It seems that also R. Chananel wants to explain so.

Support (of rejection): In Bava Kama (2a), it says according to R. Eliezer, who obligates for a Toldah in place of the Av, why is one called an Av, and one is called a Toldah?;

It does not answer that it is called an Av because one must warn for a Toldah due to the Av! (This implies that one need not warn for a Toldah due to the Av.)

Implied question: It says in Sanhedrin (26a) "later, [Reish Lakish] saw a man pruning a vineyard [in Shemitah]. He said 'this must be a Kohen pruning!' [R. Chiya bar Zarnuki and R. Shimon ben Yehotzadak] told him "he can say that he needs the vines to tie the beam in his olivepress." Here we say that he is liable for planting!

Answer: There we discuss in a case that it does not improve the tree. Rather, it harms it.

Assertion: Even according to R. Yehudah, who obligates for Melachah she'Einah Tzerichah l'Gufah, we require that he needs the wood, for regarding wood it is called harvesting only in this case.

Support #1: This is like tearing, which is [a Melachah] only in order to sew, and erasing [which must be] in order to write.

Support #2: This is like R. Yochanan taught below (145a), that pickled or cooked vegetables, if one squeezed them for themselves (to remove the extra liquid, to improve them), it is permitted. If he squeezed them for their liquid, he is Chayav Chatas;

Question: Why is it permitted for themselves? This should be like Melachah she'Einah Tzerichah l'Gufah!

Answer: Rather, this is not the way of Dishah (extracting. It is not a Melachah at all.)

Explanation #1 (Rashi): He is Mefarek (unloads) the tree from its burden of fruits on it.

Explanation #2 (Rashbam, Ri): There is an outer peel on dates. When he hits the dates, he is Mefarek (removes) the peel from the dates. This is like Dash, in which he removes the grain from the sheave.

Explanation #1 (Rashi): [Mefarek] is a Toldah of Dash (extracting).

Question (R. Tam): Below (95a), it says that one who milks is liable for Mefarek;

It cannot be a Toldah of Dash, for it says below (75a) regarding wounding (or pressing) the Chilazon, that according to Rabanan, Dishah applies only to Gidulei Karka (what grows from the ground)!

Suggestion: Rabanan exempt only regarding the Chilazon, which is a fish, and it is not Gidulei Karka, but they obligate for milking, for an animal is considered Gidulei Karka, like is proven in Eruvin (27b).

Rejection: You are forced to say that Rabanan's reason is because we learn from the ingredients [for dyes] in the Mishkan that Dishah applies only to something that truly grows from the ground, so an animal is not considered Gidulei Karka;

This is like we say in Bava Metzi'a (89a) that just like Dayish is with Gidulei Karka and a worker eats while doing it, also everything... This excludes one who milks or makes cheese.

Weak defense of suggestion: It is difficult to say that that Beraisa is like R. Yehudah, who argues below with Rabanan.

Explanation #2 (R. Tam): Mefarek is liable due to Memachek (smoothing). When he milks he is Memachek the udder and smoothes it.

Rebuttal (Ri): Below (144b) we say that one may milk into a pot [with food in it], but not into an [empty] bowl. According to R. Tam, what is the difference between a pot and a bowl?

According to Rashi, this is fine. Initially, when the milk was in the udder, it is considered a food. When he milks into a pot, also now it is a food. This is unlike Dash, in which the matter changes.

Pesak: According to Rashi, the Halachah follows R. Yehudah (who says that Dishah is not limited to Gidulei Karka), for in Kesuvos (60a) R. Merinus says that a moaning child may suckle [from a goat] on Shabbos. What is the reason? It is Mefarek k'Le'acher Yad (unskillfully), and Chachamim did not decree in a situation of pain.

Rav Yosef rules there like R. Merinus. It is unreasonable to say that even Rabanan (who hold that Dishah applies only to Gidulei Karka) forbid (Dishah not with Gidulei Karka, e.g. milking) mid'Rabanan, because it looks like Mefarek...

[It is unreasonable to say that] even though it is forbidden only mid'Rabanan, they permit only when there are two reasons [to be lenient] - it is k'Le'acher Yad, and in a case of pain.