Question: Isn't he transgressing Lifnei Iver (empowering another to sin)?

Question (cont.): This is even if the case is where he (the person actively doing the Hotza'ah) could have taken it if it wasn't in his (the person passively involved) hand, and therefore he did not transgress Lifnei Iver. The fact that this is not Lifnei Iver is evident from the Gemara in Avodah Zarah (6b) that says that if someone passes a cup of wine to a Nazir he only transgresses Lifnei Iver if the Nazir was on the other side of the river and could not have obtained it by himself.

Question (cont.): Even so, he is transgressing a Rabbinic sin, as he is obligated to stop the person from sinning.

Question (cont.): Even if the case is regarding a Nochri who is not obligated in Lifnei Iver, there is still a Rabbinic prohibition.

Proof: This is as the Beraisa states later (19a) that one may give food to a Nochri in a courtyard. If the Nochri takes it out of the courtyard, it is not necessary to stop him. This implies that it is only permitted to give him food in the courtyard, as opposed to where he is standing outside the house and he puts his hand inside the house. The implication is that it would be forbidden to give him food so that he can take it outside.

Answer: The case is where the poor person is a Nochri and it is his item, as even if he would bring it in and take it out the entire day there is no prohibition being transgressed, since the object does not belong to the homeowner.

Question: Rabeinu Tam asks, isn't there the Mishnah later (29b) that says, "If someone extinguishes a candle because he is scared...and if it is due to the sick person needing to sleep he is exempt?" The case there is regarding a person who is dangerously sick, meaning that he is exempt and it is permitted to do so, as there are no prohibitions that are upheld in a life threatening situation.

Answer: He answered that this is obvious, and therefore Shmuel did not have to teach us about this case. This as the Gemara answers later that Shmuel did not have to teach us about cases where no action is done that he is exempt and it is permitted.

Answer (cont.): The case where he captures the snake is where there is no danger, and he can save himself in another way. However, due to the pain the Rabbanan permitted this, just as they did so regarding popping a pus-filled sore.

Proof: This is also apparent from the Gemara later (107b) that a person who captures a snake is not exempt due to the danger, as this is established to be according to Rebbi Shimon who says that one is exempt (according to Torah law) for committing a Melachah she'Ainah Tzerichah l'Gufah.

Question: There is another difficulty according to the Ri. Isn't there a case in a Beraisa later (62a) where Rebbi Eliezer says that a woman is exempt for wearing an item that covers up a bad smell or wearing a container of perfume? Rebbi Eliezer clearly holds that she is exempt and it is permitted, as in a different Beraisa it states that Rebbi Eliezer says a woman can go out with this item, showing that he holds it is permitted Lechatchilah!

Answer: The Ri answers in the name of Rebbi Avraham that Shmuel only listed cases in Mishnayos where the verdict was that one is exempt. Hunting a deer is a Mishnah (106b), as is popping a pus-filled sore (Eduyos 2:5).

Observation: Some Sefarim say the text in the Gemara later (62a) is, "since Rebbi Meir said one is liable to offer a Chatas, Rebbi Eliezer said one is exempt but it is forbidden." This means that Rebbi Eliezer is telling Rebbi Meir that even according to you, admit to me that one should only be exempt but not liable to offer a sacrifice. According to this text, it is understandable (even without the Ri's answer above) why this is not counted in Shmuel's list (as he indeed means exempt but it is not permitted according to Rebbi Meir).

Question: The Bahag asked that Shmuel seemingly contradicts himself. In our Gemara, Shmuel says that one is exempt (according to Torah law) if he commits a Melachah she'Ainah Tzerichah l'Gufah, as per the opinion of Shmuel. It is therefore permitted to pop a pus-filled sore due to the physical pain.

Question (cont.): However, later (42a) we say regarding Davar she'Aino Miskaven that Shmuel holds like Rebbi Shimon, but that regarding Melachah she'Ainah Tzerichah l'Gufah he holds like Rebbi Yehudah!

Answer: Rabeinu Tam answered that Shmuel is saying that according to Rebbi Shimon who says that one is exempt if he commits a Melachah she'Ainah Tzerichah l'Gufah, regarding these three cases one is exempt and it is permitted. This is as Shmuel proves later (107a) that the intent is exempt and permitted. However, Shmuel personally does not agree with Rebbi Shimon.

Opinion: However, we do rule according to the opinion of Rebbi Shimon, as Rava was a later Amora and he holds like Rebbi Shimon in the Gemara later (141b).

Observation: The Mishnah in Eduyos (2:5) says that if one pops it in order to make a "mouth" for the sore, he is liable. If he merely wants to get the pus out, he is exempt.

Question: How can one be liable for opening a "mouth" for a sore? Don't we say later (147a) that any opening that is made that is not made in order to bring in and take out is not considered an opening?

Answer: Rabeinu Tam answers that the intent here is to let air enter and to take out moisture.

Opinion #1: Rashi explains that this is referring to the act of Akirah (taking the object from its place).

Question #1: This does not seem correct to the Ri. Firstly, taking an object from its place without carrying it is merely an act of moving something, which has nothing to do with making a person liable to bring a Chatas.

Question #2: Additionally, according to Rashi the homeowner does three acts of taking out and one of bringing in, while the poor person does three acts of bringing in and one of taking out.

Question #3: Additionally, there are not two cases where one is exempt, one regarding the poor person and one regarding the homeowner, as there is in the first part of the Mishnah.

Opinion #2: The Riva explains that "coming to an obligation to bring a Chatas" refers to the person who stretches out his hand and brings the item in or takes it out. This is similar to the first case where such a person is liable to bring a Chatas, and he is only exempt here because he did not do the entire Melachah, as he left out either the Akirah or Hanachah (putting it down).

Proof: The Riva brings proof from the Yerushalmi that says that the Mishnah is only stating cases where one is exempt opposite cases where one is liable. This is why it only stated (in the second) cases where one is exempt when the second person is liable in the first case.

Proof (cont.): For example, if the poor person sticks out his hand inside etc. the Mishnah states that the poor person is liable. In the second case, it says he is exempt if he sticks his hand inside etc. The same applies with the cases of the homeowner.

Explanation: This must not be referring to the case at the end of the Mishnah, as the Gemara later (4a) asks about the case before the case where both are exempt, involving the poor person who stuck out his hand into the house (who is liable). (The Maharsha explains that the Gemara usually analyzes the first cases first. Since the Gemara later (4a) starts discussing the earlier cases of the Mishnah, it is an indicator that our Mishnah is not asking about a case in the second half of the Mishnah.)

Explanation (cont.): Rather, this is referring to the Gemara's statement that the Mishnah is only discussing cases where one is exempt but they can lead to the obligation to bring a Chatas. However, one does not bring a Chatas in these cases, and in fact both are exempt as stated in our Mishnah.

Explanation (cont.): The Gemara asks, wasn't a Melachah done amongst the two of them? It does not ask that the first person should be liable, as it is illogical to say that due to the Hanachah and the finishing of the Melachah that was done through the second person the first one should be liable! Rather, it is asking that the second person should be liable, since he caused the Melachah to be done.

Text: In all of the Sefarim the text is, "Someone who does all of it and not some of it. An individual who does this is liable, while two who do it are exempt."

Explanation: The simple understanding of the Pasuk appears to be that "when it does" refers to the soul (i.e. the person). However, the Gemara understands it is referring to the Melachah, meaning when he does the entire Melachah refers to the taking and putting down. When it says, "This takes and this puts" it is just repeating the word "this" (without needing to do so in this context).

Implied Question: One cannot say that two people doing a Melachah together refers to two people who did this Melachah at the same time. (Why not?)

Answer #1: This is evident from the fact that the Gemara (93a) implies that two different Pesukim are required for one person taking and one person putting down and the law of two people doing a Melachah at the same time.

Answer #2: Additionally, when the Gemara quotes a teaching regarding our Mishnah, it also states, "An individual and he does it etc."

Question: However, this is difficult, as the Gemara (ibid.) implies that the law regarding one taking and one placing is derived from "soul" or "from one," whereas our Gemara is deriving from "when it does."

Question: The Ri has difficulty with the fact that we require a Pasuk to say that one is exempt in this case. This implies that one picking up and the other putting down indeed happened in the Mishkan.

Question (cont.): The Gemara (ibid.) also says that Rebbi Shimon rules that two people who do a Melachah together are exempt, even though this happened in the Mishkan such as when two people carried the Aron (i.e. the Ark).

Question (cont.): The Yerushalmi (11:2) discusses the Mishnah that says that two large ledges (or platforms) in the public domain...if they were both on the same side of the public domain (with space of the public domain between them lengthwise), if a person extends from one ledge to the other he is liable.

Question (cont.): Rav Chama says in the name of Rebbi Meisha, "As long as it was done by two people." The Yerushalmi asks, we always say that when two people perform a Melachah together they are exempt. Why do we say here they are liable? The Gemara answers that this is because the Levites indeed carried this way.

Question (cont.): Why should it make a difference that this was done in the Mishkan? One who extends something should still be exempt, as two people are doing the Melachah (and the Pasuk says that two people who do a Melachah together are exempt)!

Answer: The Ri understands that when one passes a beam it is not considered that one is picking up and one is putting down. Rather, the one who is passing does the picking up and putting down.

Answer (cont.): The Yerushalmi's difficulty is only regarding the fact that a person who extends something to the other ledge is only liable if his friend accepts the item he is extending. However, if the person extending the item extends it onto another private domain, he is exempt.

Answer (cont.): The difficulty therefore was that regarding other Melachos there is more reason to say one is exempt when two people are involved, yet here the only time he is liable is if his friend is involved!

Question: This is difficult, as the Gemara is bringing a proof from a statement of Amoraim to a Beraisa. In Kedushin (6a), the Gemara asks in a similar situation, "Does the Pasuk need support from a custom in Yehudah?!"

Answer #1: When the Gemara says, "it was thrown from the mouths of the people in the group" it means from a group of Tanaim.

Answer #2: The Ri answers that the Beraisa quoted earlier was not taught by Rebbi Chiya and Rebbi Oshiya (and therefore does not have the status of an authenticated Beraisa).

Opinion: The Ri understands that Rav could have asked the same question regarding placing something down, for example, if he took an item to the public domain and stood still in order to rest, but he did not put the load down. The question would be if standing still is like putting down an article or not.

Implied Question: The Mishnah that says, "or if he took from it and the poor person took out, he is liable" does not answer this question.

Answer: It is possible to say that the case is where he put it on the ground.

Question: Why doesn't he answer the question from the Mishnah later (11b) that says that a tailor should not go out with his needle, lest he forget and carry. If taking his body is not considered like picking up an object, why shouldn't he go out with it? He will never come to transgress a Torah prohibition!

Answer: The Rabbanan forbade it anyway (and therefore there is no proof).

Text #1: It appears to the Ri that the correct text is like the second version (quoted in Rashi), "His hand which is dragged after his body requires Akirah, while his body does not require Akirah."

Text #2: There is a second version quoted in Rashi that, "his hand does not rest."

Opinion #1: The Ri explains that this is because his hand follows his body.

Opinion #2: Rashi explains that his hand does not rest on the ground, implying that even if he and his hand are in the same domain and his friend puts in his hand and he subsequently carries, he is exempt.

Question: This does not seem correct. Anyway his friend put a load on him, whether by putting objects on his shoulder or in his hands, if he subsequently carried he is liable. This is evident from the Mishnah's statement, "or he took from it and carried, he is liable." This implies that putting an object in the hand of the homeowner when he and his hand are in one domain is considered placing. We see that the poor person who takes from the hand of the homeowner is considered to have done an Akirah. Since this is considered laced in the hands of the homeowner, when he uproots himself with whatever he has in his hand he is uprooting from the area where it was placed.

Explanation: The case is when he stands to rest at night, as otherwise he could not be liable.

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that uprooting his body is like uprooting an article. (Why isn't every step considered a new Akirah? Resting should not be necessary!)

Answer: The first Akirah still remains, as the Gemara later (4b) states that if someone is carrying his objects from one corner to another and he then decides to take them out of the house he is exempt, as when he originally uprooted the object it was not for the purpose of taking it out of the house (and this is necessary in order for him to be liable).

Explanation: The Gemara states that he did this from the day in order to teach that uprooting one's body is like uprooting an object. If it would say that he loads himself from when it gets dark and he then stood in order to rest, it would not imply anything (of note). Even if uprooting and placing one's body is not considered uprooting and placing the object he is carrying, he would still be liable due to the first Akirah (done on Shabbos).

Explanation: The case is where he stuck his hand outside while it was full, and he then returned it, not in any other way.

Proof: This is as the Mishnah states in Eiruvin (98b) that a person can stand in the private domain and carry in the public domain.

Explanation (cont.): Rather, it is only a Karmelis regarding the domain where the body is, as it is similar to two different domains.

Text: The Ri understands that the text reads, "Did they forbid it" not "Did they give a fine."

Proof: This is evident from the Gemara later that says it is not a Karmelis, but it is forbidden to return (his hand) due to a fine.

Question: Perhaps making it like a Karmelis would also be a fine, with the difference being that it would still be forbidden even if he did this accidentally before Shabbos.

Question: It should also be permitted to take it out over ten Tefachim, as it is a Makom Petur!

Answer: The novelty is that even if he took it out originally lower than ten, he can return it when it is higher than ten and we will not give him a fine.

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that the Gemara says in Rosh Hashanah (19b) that we derive from "All Melachah you should not do etc." that this excludes blowing Shofar and taking bread out of the oven as they are things that require knowledge, but are not Melachos. (Why, then, is it even a question whether or not the dough should be taken out?)

Answer: It is still prohibited according to Rabbinic law.

Proof: This is as the Gemara states later (117b), "And he should not take it out with a special instrument used for this purpose, but rather with a knife." Similarly, it is forbidden to blow Shofar according to Rabbinic law (even on Yom Tov), as the Mishnah in Rosh Hashanah (33a) states that one does not prevent children from blowing Shofar, implying that one would prevent women from blowing Shofar.

Text #1: The Ri understands that we do not have the text, "Really you should not extrapolate."

Text #1 (cont.): Even though there is another answer that explains why the Beraisos do not contradict each other, one can still answer Rav Bibi's question from the people in the Beis Medrash. Since the people in the Beis Medrash did not answer, "On the contrary etc. (as stated earlier in the Gemara)" the implication is they did not permit this.

Text #2: The Rashba understands that this text is correct. Just because the Gemara does not answer "on the contrary etc" is not a reason to say that the people in the Beis Medrash do not permit this.

Text #2 (cont.): The reason they do not answer "on the contrary etc." is because they do not think it is logical to say that they did not give a fine when it was night, but they did when it was still day.

Text #2 (cont.): If they did not give a fine at night, there is no more reason to say that they gave a fine during the day, as this would appear to be ludicrous. This is despite the fact that the reasoning that applies at night is not applicable to the reasoning we would apply during the day.

Explanation: The Gemara earlier can be explained as follows. Since they did not give this answer because they do not think it is logical, and they therefore had to say that a person receives a fine at night but not during the day in order to be unable to answer Abaye's question, one should be able to answer Rav Bibi's question even though one could have given the first answer instead.

Explanation (cont.): Even if one will want to answer Abaye's question by giving the second answer, and yet each answer can be pushed aside etc. at least one question should be answered, as at least one of the answers is correct.

Explanation (cont.): It is now understandable why the Gemara says, "And if you want I will answer that you cannot extrapolate the answer to either Abaye or Rav Bibi's question."

Explanation: It is referring to during the day, as this does not give us the ability to answer Rav Bibi's question.

Question: We should also be able to answer Rav Bibi's question from the first answer that they did not permit, as under ten Tefachim it is forbidden to return it. Even if we will say it is referring to during the day, I already explained that if they did not permit during the day they certainly did not permit after nightfall.

Answer: One cannot answer Rav Bibi's question, as the reason they did not permit after nightfall even though one will have to bring a Chatas is because of them not permitting when it is still day, where this reason does not apply. However, I might think that they certainly permitted taking the dough out of the oven (as that can never come to causing one to bring a Chatas).