Question: The Riva asks that the laws of carrying on Shabbos should have been taught where all of the Avos Melachos are taught, after the chapter of Kelal Gadol (73a).

Question (cont.): The Mishnah there states that there are thirty nine Melachos, and it lists carrying as the last Melachah. It should have started in order with the Mishnayos dealing with the laws of Erev Shabbos, such as the tailor not going out with his needle when it is close to dark, not soaking ink and dyes, not roasting meat etc.

Question (cont.): It then could have stated the chapters (2,3, and 4) of Bamah Madlikin, Kirah, and Bamah Tomnin as these are laws that apply towards nightfall. Afterwards it should state Bamah Beheimah and Bamah Ishah Yotzah (chapters 5 and 6), as these are things that apply on Shabbos itself. It could then conclude with the Avos Melachos of Shabbos.

Proof #1: It is normal for the Tana to make such a lost, just as we find that Meseches Pesachim starts on the night of the fourteenth (of Nisan), continues to discuss the (morning of the) fourteenth and the slaughtering of the Korban Pesach in the afternoon, and it then discusses eating the Pesach at night.

Proof (cont.): Similarly, Meseches Yoma starts seven days before Yom Kippur, continues to discuss Erev Yom Kippur, and finishes with the night of Yom Kippur.

Answer #1: The Riva answered that the Mishnah has a special fondness for the laws regarding carrying, since we derive many laws from this Mishnah such as taking out and bringing in by a poor or rich person. We also derive that one must uproot an item from its place and that one must settle it in its place (on Shabbos) for one to be liable for carrying. We also see that if two people carry together, they are exempt (according to Torah law).

Answer #1 (cont.): We also see that the hand of a person is considered like an area of four by four Tefachim, and that a person's hand is unlike a private or public domain.

Answer #2: Rabeinu Tam explains that it is normal for the Mishnayos to first discuss a common law.

Proof #1: Similarly, in Bava Kama (2a) the Meseches starts with an ox, pit, damage by an animal's teeth, and a fire, and it does not list the laws in accordance with how they are ordered by the Torah.

Proof #2: Rav Hai Gaon uses this logic to explain why the Mishnah in Berachos (54b) that states that four people must give special thanks to Hash-m does not follow the order in which they are implied by the Pasuk.

Answer #3: Rabeinu Tam also explains that the Mishnah started out carrying because it wanted to say that the tailor should not go out with his needle (before dark, which is in chronological order).

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that the Mishnah did not first discuss whitening just because it was going to say one should not give clothes to the launderer, or the prohibition of lighting a fire because it was going to discuss Hatmanah. (Why, then, is this a reason that it would first discuss carrying?)

Answer: It had to first state carrying as carrying is a weak Melachah, as I will explain.

Implied Question: It should have stated "Hotzaos" (and not "Yetzios"). (Why did it say "Yetzios?")

Answer: Rather, it said Yetzios to match the terminology of the Pasuk, "Al Yeitzei Ish mi'Mekomo" - "A person should not leave his place" from which we derive that one should not go out to carry his vessel to gather the Manna.

Explanation #1: It appears, as Rashi explains here, that "mi'Bifnim" means to the homeowner who is standing inside the house, and "ba'Chutz" refers to the poor person standing outside the house. "Shetayim" refers to the two cases of taking out and bringing in where one is liable, and "Shehen Daled" refers to the two additional cases of taking out and bringing in where one is exempt (according to Torah law).

Explanation #2: Rashi in Shevuos explains that "Bifnim" refers to the two cases of taking in where one is liable, one where the poor person is liable and one where the homeowner is liable, along with the two cases where they are exempt. "Bachutz" refers to the cases of taking out.

Question: This (second) explanation does not seem correct, as the Mishnah explains the cases of the poor person separately from those of the homeowner. This implies that Rashi's explanation here (in Shabbos) is correct. According to Rashi in Shevuos, the Mishnah should not have mixed the cases of taking out and bringing in with each other.

Answer: However, it is possible that it mixed the cases together because it would have had to lengthen the Mishnah in order to explain the cases of taking out and bringing in separately.

Question: However, this explanation (b) does not seem correct to Rabeinu Elchanan, as the Gemara (2b) says that there is proof that bringing in is also called Hotza'ah from the fact that the Mishnah starts "Yetzios" and immediately discusses bringing in. The Gemara does not deduce from the fact that the Mishnah states "Bifnim" (which it should have been able to do according to Rashi in Shevuos).

Question: The Ri finds this difficult. Why does the Mishnah have to say two cases, one involving the poor person and the other involving a homeowner?

Question (cont.): Similarly, when the Gemara in Shevuos (3a) explains the two cases of the poor person and the homeowner, how can it call it two cases? Why should it make a difference if the person doing this is poor or a homeowner?

Answer: The Ri understands that the Mishnah needs to say these cases because carrying is a weak Melachah, since it should not matter if one carries from a private domain to a public domain (a Torah prohibition) or if he carries from a private domain to another private domain (at most a Rabbinic prohibition). We therefore would not be able to derive a poor person being liable for taking out from the fact that a homeowner s liable, nor could we derive a homeowner being liable from a poor person.

Proof: This is clearly true as the Gemara requires two Pesukim to teach taking out. The Gemara later (96b) says this is derived from the Pasuk, "And the nation stopped bringing," while the Gemara in Eiruvin says it is derived from the Pasuk, "A person should not go out of his place - meaning he should not carry something out of his domain." There I explained this (See the Maharshal who removes this statement and inserts an alternate text).

Proof (cont.): This is because carrying is a weak Melachah, and therefore we require two Pesukim, one to teach regarding the poor person and one regarding the homeowner.

Observation: Similarly, regarding all Toldos of Avos Melachos, we generally do not require them to have been done in the building of the Mishkan, and only require that the Avos were done. However, regarding the Toldah of carrying, we require that it was done in the Mishkan.

Proof #1: This is as the Mishnah states later (96a) that there were two platforms (i.e. large ledges), one opposite the other (on opposite sides of a public domain). If one extends a beam from one to other or throws a beam from one to the other, he is exempt. However, if these ledges were on the same side of the public domain with an interruption of the public domain in between them, if one throws from one to the other he is exempt, but if he extends from one to the other he is liable as this was the way the Levites did their service (when taking apart the Mishkan).

Proof #2: The Gemara there (96b) asks, how do we know a person is liable for throwing something four Amos in a public domain on Shabbos? The Gemara makes a great effort to find that this was done in the service of the Mishkan, until it concludes that all of the laws regarding carrying four Amos in the public domain on Shabbos are a Halachah l'Moshe mi'Sinai.

Observation (cont.): These laws (in the aforementioned Mishnah and Gemara) are all Toldos of carrying, not Avos, as the Avos only refer to the thirty nine Melachos.

Proof #3: Similarly, regarding bringing in we say (49b) that they lifted boards from the ground to the wagon, so too you should not bring in from the public domain to the private domain.

Question: Since bringing in was done in the Mishkan, why does the Gemara later (96b) have to explain, "It is logical: What does it make a difference if one is taking out or bringing in?" The Gemara implies that if throwing four Amos in the public domain was done in the Mishkan it would be understandably prohibited, even though there is no such logic (what does it make a difference whether one is throwing etc.).

Answer: We require logic for the type of bringing in that is done by the homeowner (in our Mishnah), as this was not done in the Mishkan. The fact that the Levites used to lift boards etc. is a description of the bringing in done by the poor person, as they presumably stood on the ground of the public domain when they did this lifting.

Question: Since it is logical that bringing in should be prohibited, why does the Gemara (49b) have to say that bringing in was done in the Mishkan?

Answer: It is stated since it had to say that the Levites lowered the boards from the wagon, "and you (as opposed to what the Levites did in the building of the Mishkan) should not take out." It said it was done in the Mishkan despite the fact that carrying is derived explicitly from a Pasuk, since the beginning of the Beraisa states that one is only liable for Melachah on Shabbos if similar was done in the building of the Mishkan.

Answer (cont.): If the Gemara would not find that carrying was done in the building of the Mishkan, I would say that one is liable for all Melachos that are similar to actual Melachah even if it was not done in the building of the Mishkan, just as this is the case regarding carrying.

Implied Question: This is despite the Pasuk regarding Shabbos being next to the Melachah of the Mishkan. (Doesn't this make it clear that one is only liable on Shabbos for Melachos done in the building of the Mishkan, not any Melachah merely similar to actual Melachah?)

Answer: I would have used this derivation to teach a different lesson.

Observation: In Shevuos (3a), the Gemara explains that the "two" oaths are "I will eat" and "I will not eat," as the Pasuk explicitly states in the Pasuk, "to do bad or good," implying they are pledges to do (or not do) something in the future. "That are four" are "I ate" and "I did not eat" that are derived from the Pasuk.

Implied Question: The Gemara (ibid.) does not explain "that are four" as "I will throw" and "I will not throw," even though it could have then said the entire Mishnah is according to the opinion of Rebbi Yishmael and would not have had to establish that the Mishnah is according to two separate Tanaim. (Why didn't it give this explanation?)

Answer: This is because the Mishnah in Shevuos (19b) explicitly states "that are four" refers to "I ate" and "I did not eat."

Question: Why didn't the Mishnah say that these are "two that are eight?" It could have included "I will eat/will not eat, I ate/did not eat, I will throw/will not throw, and I threw/did not throw."

Answer #1: It seems that this is why Rashi explains in the beginning of Shevuos that the Mishnah only gives the main cases and their exact opposites.

Answer: Rebbi Yitzchak answers that it only says "I ate/did not eat" because Rebbi Yishmael argues and it is therefore more of a novel inclusion. However, since Rebbi Yishmael admits regarding the cases of "I will throw/ will not throw," there is no need to discuss these cases.

Question: Regarding Shabbos, why does the Mishnah only say "two that are four?" It should include the cases of extending from one domain to another and passing an object from one private domain to another through a public domain where one is liable, as the Gemara later (96b) states "and he throws from the private domain to the public domain and from the public domain to the private domain."

Answer: It only says bringing in similar to taking out which is from the private domain to the public domain. This excludes extending and passing over which is from the private domain to the private domain. Throwing as well is dissimilar to taking out, as one is taking (the entire distance) with one's hand while one is throwing.

Question: Why doesn't the Mishnah state that regarding forgetting about impurity there are "two times that are four?" "Two" would be if someone forgot he was impure and he ate Kodesh or entered the Mikdash, and "that are four" would be forgetting what he ate was Kodesh or that this was the Mikdash.

Observation: This would be understandable, as it could not ask this should be "that are eight" as the Gemara asks regarding knowing about impurity.

Answer #1: It says "knowing" as explained in Shevuos (14b) that the first "knowing" that is not required in the rest of the Torah is stated, as opposed to finding out afterwards which is required by other laws of the Torah as well.

Answer #2: Alternatively, finding out afterwards which causes a person to offer a sacrifice is considered important.

Observation: According to the version of the Gemara that states it was only discussing the first knowing, it could not have stated regarding Shevuos and Shabbos "Yedios Shevuos, Yedios Shabbos." (The two types of knowing are clearly different, with Shabbos being at the end.)

Observation (cont.): According to the other version that says that the Mishnah only counted finding out which causes the person to bring the sacrifice, the Mishnah does not say "Yedios" since the difference of "two that are four" is found in the prohibition itself (i.e. how Shabbos is transgressed). However, regarding impurity "two that are four" is only due to knowing.

Text: In most Sefarim the text is "Shenayim Shehen Arba" - "two that are four." Similarly, in Zevachim (88b) most of the Sefarim have the text, "Maros Nega'im: Rebbi Dosa says there are thirty six, Akavya ben Mehalalel says there are seventy two.

Proof: This is because the singular "Mareh" turns into a plural of "Maros," just as "Machaneh" turns into "Machanos." This is evident from the Pasuk, "And now I have become two Machanos (camps)" (Bereishis 32:11). Accordingly, it is understandable that it says "Maros...Shenayim."

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that the Mishnah quoted there counts many types of Negaim as opposed to this Mishnah where only "two that are four" are counted. (Why count so few here?)

Answer: The Mishnah there includes shades of colors, leprosy on people including on their head and beard (see Maharsha that our Mishnah also refers to leprosy on people), and leprosy on houses. Our Mishnah is only referring to white leprosy, as discussed by the Mishnah in Nega'im (1:1) which is quoted in Shevuos (5a) that a Baheres is strongly white like snow, and secondary to it is the white that is like the color of the plaster of the Heichal etc.

Question: Regarding Maros Negaim the Mishnah states Avos and Toldos, as explained in Shevuos that "they are four" refers to Si'eis and its Toldah, along with Baheres and its Toldah. This is despite the fact that they are not the main Nega'im (only Toldos).

Answer: Nega'im cannot be compared to Shabbos (regarding Avos and Toldos), as the Toldos of Nega'im are stated in the Pasuk, as opposed to the Toldos of Shabbos.

Implied Question: The Gemara picks the example of "Maros Nega'im" over Shevuos and Yedios. (Why?)

Answer: This is because we would not know that one is liable in all of the cases of Shevuos and Yedios if it were not for them being compared to Maros Nega'im, as regarding the other topics there is indeed an argument whether they are all liable. However, there is no such argument regarding the cases of Maros Nega'im.

Implied Question: The Gemara did not have to answer that it is because the Mishnah in Shevuos is not dealing mainly with Shabbos, as it could have said that because it wanted to make it similar to Maros Nega'im where one is liable in all of the cases it also gave such cases regarding Shabbos. (Why did the Gemara give the reason that it is because it is not mainly discussing Shabbos?)

Answer: Rather, the Gemara here wanted to answer that since our Mishnah is the main place where Shabbos is discussed, it stated cases where one is liable and where one is exempt (according to Torah law). It therefore also gave the reason that Shevuos is not the main place where Shabbos is discussed.

Answer (cont.): The questioner of our Gemara did not ask that the Mishnah in Shevuos should match our Mishnah, since he knew that the Mishnah in Shevuos was stated in a way that it would be comparable to Maros Nega'im. Rather, he asked that our Mishnah should only state "two that are four."

Observation: Rashi did not explain the Gemara based on his opinion stated later that it is only mentioning the uprooting of the object.

Observation (cont.): According to his opinion, he should have explained that the two cases where he is exempt are regarding the uprooting done by the homeowner.

Observation: The Gemara's question is only on the Mishnah in Shevuos where on is liable in all of the cases, and therefore there are only two such cases. However, in our Mishnah all of the cases can be where one was taking out.

Observation (cont.): For example, if all of the cases will not result in being liable, the two cases of taking out could be where one is liable to bring a Chatas and where one is exempt but it is forbidden because one could come to have to bring a Chatas. "That are four" refers to a case where one is exempt but it is forbidden although he will not come to a Chatas, and a case where one is exempt and it is permitted regarding both a poor person and the homeowner according to the explanation of the Riva stated later.

Observation (cont.): Therefore, when the Gemara earlier answers that our Mishnah is the main place where Shabbos is discussed and therefore both the Avos and Toldos are stated, the Gemara could not have asked "Doesn't the Mishnah (only) state "the takings out?"

Observation: In Shevuos (5b), the Gemara asks, "Perhaps he is taking out from the private domain to the public domain?" The Gemara answers, "If so, it should say "one who takes out to the public domain." What does it mean when it says, "from one domain to another?" It must include even from the public domain to the private domain.

Question: Why does the Mishnah state the Toldah of Hotza'ah but it does not state Toldos of other Melachos?

Answer: The Riva answers that regarding all other Toldos, if it would want to state them it would have to give a lengthy explanation of them. However, "Hachnasah" - "bringing in" which is also called "Hotzaa'h" - "taking out" is included in short.

Question: Why doesn't the Gemara deduce this from the fact that we do not find four cases of inside and four outside without including bringing in?

Answer #1: It is possible to say the cases are as I explained previously (DH "v'Ha Yetzios").

Answer #2: Alternatively, this would not be enough to say that the Mishnah is proof. Why is this Mishnah proof anymore than the Mishnah in Shevuos that the Gemara is referencing? In Shevuos, as well, we do not find one is liable for all of the cases unless we count bringing in.

Explanation: "Two that are four" regarding domains refers to two domains, namely the public and private domain.

Question: The Riva asks that this is difficult. If so, the Mishnah should not say, "And two that are four outside" rather it should say, "two that are four inside and four outside." Why say "two etc. and two etc.?"

Answer: The Riva explains that there are two types of liabilities due to domains on Shabbos that end up being four inside, and two types of liabilities that end up being four outside.

Implied Question: The word "Yetzios" (seems difficult to understand according to Rava, as Rava is saying that the Mishnah means the Reshuyos (domains) of Shabbos are two etc. Why, then, does it say Yetzios?)

Answer: The Riva understands that Yetzios means "Totzaos," as we find domains that are called "Hotzaos," as the Pasuk states, "And its Totzaos were west." The Targum for this word is "Rishvasei" (meaning Reshuyos).