QUESTION: The Mishnah states that if a person borrows an item on Shabbos, he should ask to borrow it by saying, "Hash'ileini" and not "Halveini." The difference between these two terms is that "Hash'ileini" refers to borrowing an object that will be returned exactly as it was lent. "Halveini" refers to borrowing an object that will not be returned itself, but something else of equal value will be returned in its place (for example, when one borrows money, he never returns the same coins and bills that he borrowed, but he returns other coins and bills).

Why difference does it make what term one uses to borrow an item on Shabbos?

(a) RASHI explains that one must use only a term that shows that he intends to borrow the item for a short period of time. The Rabanan were concerned that if he uses a term which shows that he intends to borrow the item for a long period of time, the lender might make a written record of the loan on Shabbos. The RITVA adds that one is not permitted even to state, "Halveini, for a short period of time."

(b) TOSFOS explains that the only reason why one must say "Hash'ileini" is in order to make a noticeable difference in the way that he normally acts (as the Gemara concludes). When one borrows wine or bread on Shabbos and says "Hash'ileini," a term not usually used in such a manner, he remembers that it is Shabbos and he will not write a record of the loan.

The RAN adds that in foreign languages in which only one term is used for the word "lend" (such as English), a person must still make some sort of change from his usual mode of expression (for example, he should say, "Please give it to me," instead of, "Please lend it to me").

(c) The RITVA and TOSFOS RID explain that one is not permitted to say even "Hash'ileini," since most people do not know the difference between "Hash'ileini" and "Halveini." Moreover, in the case of the Mishnah here, the person is not actually borrowing the item. Rather, he is buying it, and he intends to pay money in return for it.

When the Mishnah says that he should say, "Hash'ileini," it means that he may keep the item only for a short time before paying. That is, it does not mean that he must only say "Hash'ileini," but rather that he must specify that he is taking the object for a short period of time.

The Gemara says that when one sees someone else transgress a rabbinical prohibition without knowing that the act is prohibited, he should not rebuke the wrongdoer if he knows that the wrongdoer will continue to sin ("Mutav she'Yehu Shogegin v'Al Yehu Mezidin"). This principle does not apply to prohibitions written explicitly in the Torah, in which case one must rebuke the wrongdoer even if he knows that the wrongdoer will continue to sin.

The Poskim (OC 608:2) set forth the practical details of this Halachah:

(a) A person must rebuke someone who willfully sins, even if he feels certain that the sinner will not heed the rebuke. If the wrongdoer is transgressing a prohibition that is written explicitly in the Torah, it is assumed that he knows that it is forbidden and that he is sinning intentionally, and therefore one must rebuke him and tell him to stop.

(b) If one sees that the wrongdoer does not accept the rebuke, then one should continue to rebuke him until the wrongdoer gets upset and yells at him. However, this rebuke should be administered in private and not in public. (One rebukes a sinner in public only once.) Also, if the sin was committed in private, one should rebuke the sinner only in private.

The BI'UR HALACHAH (OC 608, DH Chayav) writes in the name of the SEFER CHASIDIM (#413) that one is not required to rebuke a wrongdoer until the wrongdoer yells at him, unless he feels close to the person (that is, they know each other well and there is a chance that the rebuke will be accepted).

(It is important to remember that the purpose of rebuke is exclusively to help the wrongdoer correct his ways and follow the will of Hash-m and His Mitzvos, and it is not for the sake of mere reprimand. Rebuke must be administered in different ways, depending on the level of scholarship and maturity of the person who sinned, in order to be effective.)

(c) However, if the wrongdoer's sinful act is not stated explicitly in the Torah, or it is prohibited mid'Rabanan (and it is not evident that he knows that the act is prohibited), then if one knows for certain that the wrongdoer will not heed the rebuke, he is not required to tell the wrongdoer to stop. In such a case, the rebuke will only make his sin worse by changing it from an unintentional sin to an intentional one.

If there is a possibility that he will listen to the rebuke, then one is obligated to rebuke him (as the Gemara says on 55a).

QUESTION: From the fact that the Mishnah says that one may not borrow bread on Shabbos by using the term "Halveini," the Gemara infers that one is permitted to borrow bread during the rest of the week even without assessing the value of the bread. The Gemara asserts that the Mishnah does not agree with the opinion of Hillel, who maintains that one must first assess the value of the bread in order to avoid any question of paying back with interest (lest one return a loaf of bread of greater value than the one he borrowed).

Why does the Gemara merely infer that the Mishnah maintains that one is permitted to borrow bread during the week without assessing its value? The Mishnah states explicitly that one is permitted to borrow bread on Shabbos when he uses the term "Hash'ileini," and no assessment of its value is necessary.

(a) The RASHBA answers that even Hillel agrees that one may borrow bread on Shabbos by saying "Hash'ileini" without assessing its value, because "Hash'ileini" implies a short-term loan and there is no fear that the price of wheat will rise in such a short amount of time.

(b) RAV MOSHE MORDECHAI KARP, in his notes to the Rashba (Oraisa edition), suggests two other answers. The MAGEN AVRAHAM (OC 242:2) rules that for the sake of giving honor to Shabbos, one is permitted to borrow money with a form of interest that is prohibited mid'Rabanan (such as the type that Hillel discusses). Therefore, the fact that one may borrow a loaf of bread on Shabbos (and pay back a loaf of greater value) does not show that one is also permitted to do so during the week.

(c) Rav Karp adds that TOSFOS (149b, DH Bnei) says that Hillel himself would permit one to borrow bread with the term "Hash'ileini." He only prohibits using the term "Halveini," because that term makes it look like a real loan, to which the laws of interest apply. This may also be Rashi's intent here (in DH Ha b'Chol).