We just established that Rava bar Rav Chanan's Kashya (Why we should not need "Zove'ach" to teach us 'Mechashvin me'Avodah le'Avodah' by Avodah-Zarah?) is confined to Resh Lakish, but is not relevant according to Rebbi Yochanan. Rav Papa queries this - inasmuch as even Rebbi Yochanan, who learns Chutz from P'nim with regard to the animal becoming Asur, will need another source to sentence the perpetrator to death. Consequently, the Kashya will extend to Rebbi Yochanan as well.

Rav Acha b'rei de'Rav Ika queries even the Kashya on Resh Lakish from the case of someone who prostrates himself before a mountain, who (despite the fact that it does not become Asur be'Hana'ah) receives the death-sentence ...,

... though he is killed by the sword (and not by stoning).

Based on this ruling, Rav Acha b'rei de'Rav Ika asks why Rava bar Rav Chanan's asks even on Resh Lakish - in that why even he should need "Zove'ach" to sentence someone who is Mechashev me'Avodah le'Avodah to death. Seeing as Zerikah for example, without Shechitah, is meaningless, he ought to be Chayav Misah even if the animal does not become forbidden (in which case "Zove'ach" will remain superfluous (see Maharam).

From the Pasuk in Re'ei (in connection with Avodah-Zarah) "Eichah Ya'avdu ha'Goyim", we learn that - the Chiyuv Sekilah by Avodah-Zarah is confined to worshipping idols in the way that they are normally worshipped (but not if one performs acts that its adherents would not perform).

Rav Acha mi'Difti now asks on Rava bar Chanan (who learns all kinds of Avodah from 'Hishtachavayah') - why we then need "Eichah ... ", seeing as we now include even irregular forms of worship from 'Hishtachavayah'.

Neither can we learn from "Eichah ... " that someone who does the service of Pe'or (which is disgusting) before an idol that is normally served in a regular way is Patur - because we know that too from 'Hishtachavayah' (which is Derech Kavod).

Rebbi Elazar rules that someone who Shechts an animal (Derech Kavod) to Markulis (or to Pe'or), which is normally worshipped Derech Bizayon) - is Chayav.

He learns this from the Pasuk in Acharei-Mos - "ve'Lo Yizb'chu Od es Zivcheihem ... ".

Even though that Pasuk is talking about Avodah-Zarah that is worshipped in a regular way (which we already know from "Eichah)" - he learns it via the principle 'Im Eino Inyan'.

We query this however from Rava bar Rav Chanan - who already learns that from 'Hishtachavayah' (and does not therefore need the Pasuk in Acharei-Mos).

And we answer 'Hasam be'Zove'ach le'Hach'is' by which we mean that - the Pasuk of Hashtachavayah refers to someone who actually worships the idol ideologically, whereas the Pasuk in Acharei-Mos refers to someone who worships it out of spite (without believing in what he is doing). Consequently, it is an independent La'av (for which there is no Kareis).

When Rabah met Rav Hamnuna one day - the latter was searching for his lost oxen.

Rabah extrapolated from our Mishnah 'ha'Oveid Avodas-Kochavim ... - Oveid, In, Amar, Lo' (that one is not Chayav Misah until he actually worships the idol, but not for merely accepting it as a deity.

Rabah raised an apparent discrepancy, by asking him from the Mishnah later, which rules that someone who says to a Meisis 'E'evod, Eilech ve'E'evod, Neilech ve'Na'avod' is Chayav (for mere words). Rav Hamnuna replied - by establishing our Mishnah where he declared that he would only accept the idol as a deity when he actually worshipped it (which explains why e is not Chayav until then).

Rav Yosef explains (initially) - that this point is subject to a Machlokes Tana'im, as we will now see.

Rebbi Meir in a Beraisa, rules that someone who says 'Come and worship me', is guilty - of being a Meisis.

Rebbi Yehudah - declares him Patur.

Rebbi Yehudah concedes to Rebbi Meir that he is Chayav if they actually worshipped him - since the Torah writes (in the Aseres ha'Dibros) "Lo Sa'aseh l'cha Pesel", implying that one should not make oneself into an idol' ...

... and they argue in a case - where the people did not subsequently worship him, over whether words are considered like a deed (Rebbi Meir), or not (Rebbi Yehudah).

Rav Yosef retracted however, based on Rebbi Yehudah who rules in another Beraisa that someone who says 'E'evod, Eilech ve'E'evod or Neilech ve'Na'avod' - is Chayav.

Rebbi Meir and Rebbi Yehudah are therefore arguing in a case - where the Meisis tried to talk his listeners into worshiping him.

And their bone of contention is - whether, if the listeners respond in the affirmative, they really mean 'Yes!' (Rebbi Meir), or whether they are only pulling his leg, because, they think to themselves, that he is no more a god than they are.

To resolve the discrepancy between the Reisha (our Mishnah, 'ha'Oveid') and the Seifa (the Mishnah later, 'ha'Omer E'evod ... ') - Rav Yosef establishes the former by a Yachid and the latter, by a Rabim ...

... inasmuch as a Yachid readily accepts the Meisas' overtures, whereas a Rabim will first make inquiries before finally accepting his words.

Rav Yosef proves his opinion from the Pasuk "Lo Soveh lo ve'Lo Sishma eilav" (bearing in mind that the Pasuk is speaking in the singular - from which he extrapolates 'Ha Avah ve'Shama, Chayav').

The Beraisa, discussing the differences between a Yachid who is Nisas and a Rabim, points out that the Torah is more stringent by ...

... a Yachid - with regard to their bodies, since he is sentenced to Sekilah for Avodah-Zarah, whereas a Rabim receives only Sayaf.

... a Rabim - with regard to their property, which is destroyed, whereas that of a Yachid is not.

Abaye extrapolates from this Beraisa that - there are no other distinctions between a Yachid and a Rabim, as Rav Yosef claims there are.

He therefore establishes the Mishnah which obligates Dibur alone - where the Nisas is talked into worshipping idols by others (where his acceptance is generally final), whereas the Mishnah, which requires an act (where he is still likely to change his mind even after having made the initial decision to worship them) is speaking - where he talks himself into worshipping them.

He proves that Dibur alone is sometimes sufficient - by quoting the very same Pasuk, and drawing the same inference, as Rav Yosef did; "Lo Soveh lo ve'Lo Sishma eilav", 'Ha Avah ve'Shama, Chayav'.

According to Rava, both Mishnahs are speaking where the Nisas is talked over by a third party, yet sometimes, the Nisas is Patur with Dibur alone (until he actually worships the idol) - in a case where the Meisis failed to point out the accomplishments of the god in question ('This is what it eats, this is what it drinks, these are the good things that it does, and these are thea bad ones').

And he learns this from the Pasuk in Re'ei "me'Elohei ha'Amim Asher Sevivoseichem ha'Kerovim O ha'Rechokim", which cannot be understood literally - since what difference will the location of the idol make?

So Rava interprets the Pasuk to mean that - when he tries to "sell" you distant idols saying that they are worth something, you should realize that they are no different than the nearby idols which you already recognize as worthless.

According to Rav Ashi, the Tana generally requires an act before the Nisas can be sentenced to death - and he establishes the Seifa, which obligates him with Dibur alone by a Yisrael Mumar, who is an established sinner, and who, one assumes, will stick to his verbal decision to worship the idol.

Whereas according to Ravina, the Tana is not concerned with a Mumar, and he establishes the Seifa 'ha'Omer 'E'evod ... ', not as an independent case, but - in the form of 'Lo Zu af Zu' (meaning that the two Mishnos form a sequence, to teach us that not only is one Chayav for an act of Avodah-Zarah, but that one is even Chayav for Dibur alone.

According to Abaye, one is Chayav Miysah (be'Meizid, and a Korban be'Shogeg) for worshipping Avodah-Zarah out of love or fear - of a human being (and not because one believes in the deity concerned).

Rava rules that he is 'Patur' - because in order to be Chayav for Avodah-Zarah one has to believe in the idol that one worships.

Abaye tries to prove his opinion from our Mishnah, 'ha'Oveid Avodas-Kochavim, Echad ha'Oved ... ' - by interpreting the Reisha by someone who worships the idol out of love or fear, and the Seifa, by someone who worships it out of conviction.

Rava refutes this however, by citing Rebbi Yirmiyah - who establishes the Reisha by 'ke'Darkah' and the Seifa, by 'she'Lo ke'Darkah' (as we learned earlier in the Sugya).

Abaye makes a second attempt at proving his opinion from another Beraisa, which extrapolates from the Pasuk (in the Aseres ha'Dibros) ...

... "Lo Sishtachaveh lahem" - 'Aval Atah Mishtachaveh le'Adam' (permitting a person to prostrate himself before a human-being).

... "ve'Lo Sa'avdem" - unless he declares himself a god like Haman.

We know that Haman declared himself a god - because otherwise, there would have been no reason for Mordechai to anger Haman the way he did by refusing to prostrate himself before him.

Rava refutes Abaye's proof from there that Avodah-Zarah out of fear is Chayav - by explaining that the Beraisa gave the example of Haman, because here we have a prime example of a human being who made himself into a god, even though the people were not Chayav in that particular case (seeing as they transgressed out of fear).

Abaye makes a third attempt at proving his opinion from yet another Beraisa. Rebbi obligates a Kohen Mashi'ach (the Kohen Gadol) who serves Avodah-Zarah, to bring a Korban, on the basis of a regular Shig'gas Ma'aseh. He is normally obligated to bring his special Korban - consisting of a bull, provided he sinned following the ruling of Beis-Din, who permitted Cheilev, shall we say, and he went and ate some.

Rebbi obligates the Kohen Gadol who served Avodah-Zarah to bring a Korban, on the basis of a regular Shig'gas Ma'aseh. The Chachamim however - confine his Chiyuv Korban by Avodah-Zarah to a case of He'elam Davar, like he is by any other transgression.

The Chachamim agree however, that he brings a she-goat, because the Torah writes in Sh'lach-l'cha [in connection with Avodah-Zarah] "ve'Im Nefesh Achas" [incorporating a Kohen Gadol]), and not a bull. Whereas Rebbi concedes - that the Kohen Gadol does not bring an Asham Taluy (despite the fact that the Nasi brings a Chatas even be'Shig'gas Ma'aseh) ...

... because the Torah writes twice "Shig'gaso" by Asham Taluy, indicating that it is only someone who brings a Chatas be'Shig'gas Ma'aseh for all his sins, who brings an Asham Taluy (precluding a Kohen Gadol, who usually requires a He'elam Davar).

We have a problem ascertaining the case of Shig'gas Ma'aseh (by Avodah-Zarah) bearing in mind that there is no He'elam Davar (in which case we assume that he was aware of the Isur of Avodah-Zarah). It cannot mean that he prostrated himself before ...

... a Shul - because then, he means to serve Hash-m, and not an idol.

... the bust of a king, which he accepts as a god - because then he is a Meizid (and is Chayav Kareis or Sekilah).

... the bust of a king, which he did not accept as a god - because then he has done nothing wrong (and there is no reason why he should bring a Korban).

Abaye therefore establishes Shig'gas Ma'aseh - when he served it out of love or fear.

This is Abaye's proof that Ahavah ve'Yir'ah is considered a Shogeg. Despite the fact that he believes this to be permitted, it is not a case of He'elam Davar (to obligate even a Kohen Gadol, according to the Chachamim) - because 'He'elam Davar' constitutes specifically forgetting an intrinsic part of the Isur, such as one of the Avodos.

Rava refutes Abaye's proof by establishing it by someone who thinks that Avodah-Zarah is completely permitted (and not when he is aware of the Isur, like we thought until now) ...

... and the case of He'elam Davar (which even the Rabbanan concede the Kohen Gadol will be Chayav) is - where he thinks that some of the Avodos are permitted, but is aware that others are Asur (See Tosfos DH 've'Rava').