Answer #1: This is not difficult for R. Yochanan. (He learns projection of intent from Pigul. I.e. if one did an Avodah with intent to do a later Avodah outside the permitted time (or place, the Korban is Pasul, as if the first Avodah was with Pasul intent. He would not need "Zove'ach..." to teach this. Therefore, it teaches the general rule, and Hishtachava'ah does not.)

Question #1: Reish Lakish should learn like Rava suggested, and use "Zove'ach..." to teach projection of intent!

Question #2 (Rav Papa): Also R. Yochanan should use "Zove'ach..." to teach projection of intent!

R. Yochanan forbids the animal, but he did not say that the person (who slaughtered) is liable. Perhaps "Zove'ach..." comes to obligate the person!

Answer (to both questions - Rav Acha brei d'Rav Ika): Reish Lakish only permitted the animal, but he (and all the more so, R. Yochanan) obligate the person (even without "Zove'ach");

This is like one who bows to a mountain. The mountain is permitted, but he is killed.

Question (Rav Acha mi'Difti): Rava bar Rav Chanan suggested that Hishtachava'ah should teach that one is liable even for Avodah that is not Avodas Penim. If so, what would "Eichah Ya'avdu... Es Eloheihem" come to exclude? (In truth, "Eichah Ya'avdu" is our source to exempt Avodah that is not Avodas Penim (unless it is the normal Avodah of the idolatry).)

Suggestion: It excludes excreting in front of an idolatry normally served through Zevichah.

Rejection: Hishtachava'ah is honorable. We would only learn such Avodah. (There is no need to exclude Avodah of disgrace!)

Answer (Abaye): It would exclude excreting in front of Markulis;

One might have thought that since the normal Avodah of Markulis is disgraceful, one is liable for any disgraceful Avodah. The verse would teach, this is not so.

Question: R. Elazar taught that if one slaughters an animal to Markulis, he is liable (even though its normal Avodah is disgraceful) - "v'Lo Yizbechu Od... la'Se'irim."

We do not need it to teach about its normal Avodah, which we learn from "Eichah Ya'avdu..." Therefore, it teaches about something other than its normal Avodah.

Summation of question: Hishtachava'ah already teaches about honorable Avodah that is not its normal Avodah!

Answer: Hishtachava'ah teaches about when he seeks to please the idolatry. "V'Lo Yizbechu Od" forbids Avodah even to anger the idolatry.

Contradiction (Rav Hamnuna): Our Mishnah (60b; we call this Mishnah #1) teaches 'one who serves idolatry (he is Chayav Misah).' He is not liable for just saying that he will serve;

Mishnah #2 (67a) teaches 'one who says 'I will serve idolatry', or 'let us go serve idolatry' is liable.

Answer #1 (Rabah): In Mishnah #1, he does not accept it to be his god until he serves it.

Answer #2 (Rav Yosef): The Tana'im of these Mishnayos argue with each other.

(Beraisa - R. Meir): If one says 'come and worship me', he is liable;

R. Yehudah exempts. (Tosfos - the entire Sugya discusses when the Nises (the one enticed) is liable. The enticer is always liable. Alternatively, the enticer is liable only when the Nises is liable.)

All agree that he (the Nises) is liable if he served him - "Lo Sa'aseh Lecha Pesel";

They argue about whether he is liable just for speaking. R. Meir obligates, for he holds that speech is significant. R. Yehudah exempts, for he holds that it is insignificant.

Retraction (Rav Yosef): I erred. R. Yehudah admits that he is liable for speaking.

(Beraisa - R. Yehudah): He (the Nises) is not liable until he says 'I will serve', 'I will go and serve idolatry', or 'let us go and serve.'

Question: What do R. Meir and R. Yehudah argue about?

Answer: They argue about whether or not enticing to serve oneself is enticement, when others agree to serve him

R. Meir says that when others agree to serve him, they sincerely agree (so they are liable)

R. Yehudah says that they do not intend to serve him. They reason 'he is just a person, like us!'

They mock him by 'agreeing' to serve him.

Answer #3 (Rav Yosef): Mishnah #2 discusses enticing an individual. He will not reconsider, therefore he (the Nises) is liable immediately;

Mishnah #1 discusses enticing more than one person. They are likely to reconsider, therefore, they are not liable until they serve.

Support (Rav Yosef for himself): "Lo Soveh Lo v'Lo Sishma Elav" - if he (an individual) wanted and listened, he is liable.

Objection (Abaye): We do not make this distinction between an individual and a group that is enticed!

(Beraisa): "Ki Yesisecha Achicha Ven Imecha" applies to an individual or a multitude that is enticed;

The Torah distinguished their punishments. It is stringent about the body of an individual (he is stoned), and it is lenient about his money (it passes to his heirs);

The Torah is lenient about the bodies of a multitude (if the majority of a city served idolatry, they are choked), and it is stringent about their money (it is destroyed).

Inference: These are the only differences!

Answer #4 (Abaye): Mishnah #1 discusses one who entices himself. He is likely to reconsider, so he is not liable until he serves;

Mishnah #2 discusses when others entice him. He will not reconsider, therefore he is liable immediately (once he consents);

Support (Abaye, for himself): "Lo Soveh Lo v'Lo Sishma Elav" - if he consents to another's enticement, he is liable.

Answer #5 (Rava): In both Mishnayos, others entice him;

If the enticer detailed what the idolatry eats, drinks, rewards and punishes, the Nises is liable once he agrees;

If the enticer did not give these details, the Nises is not liable until he serves.

Support (Rava, for himself): "Me'Elohei... ha'Kerovim Elecha Oh ha'Rechokim";

Question: What difference is there between idolatry nearby or far away?

Answer: From the nearby idolatries you can learn about the ones far away. An enticer normally describes what a far away idolatry eats, drinks, rewards and punishes. The Torah tells you that it is no different than the nearby idolatries, which you recognize (that they do nothing).

Answer #6 (Rav Ashi): Mishnah #2 discusses a Yisrael Mumar (he will not reconsider, so he is liable once he agrees).

Answer #7 (Ravina): Mishnah #2 teaches a bigger Chidush. Not only is one liable for serving, rather, he is liable once he agrees to serve. (Indeed, from Mishnah #2 we can infer the law of Mishnah #1.)

(Abaye): If one served idolatry due to love or fear (of a person), he is liable, for in any event he served.

(Rava): He is exempt. He is liable only if he accepted it to be his god.

Support (Abaye, for himself - Mishnah): The same applies to one who serves...

Suggestion: This means whether he serves due to love or fear!

Rejection (Rava): No. R. Yirmeyah explained that it means whether he did its normal Avodah, or served it through Avodas Penim, even if this is not its normal Avodah.

Support (Abaye, for himself - Beraisa): "Lo Sishtachaveh Lahem" (to idols), but you may bow to a person;

Suggestion: Perhaps you may bow to a person that people serve (like idolatry), like Haman!

Rejection: "V'Lo So'ovdem."

(Abaye): People served Haman because they feared Achashverosh, and the Torah considers this idolatry!

Rejection (Rava): No. The Torah forbids bowing to someone who resembles Haman in one respect, and not in all respects:

One may not bow to a person who is served, such as Haman. This is only if people truly intend to serve him, unlike Haman, who was served only out of fear.

Support (Abaye, for himself - Beraisa - Rebbi): A Kohen Gadol anointed with the Shemen ha'Mishchah brings a Korban if he served idolatry b'Shogeg;

Chachamim say, he is liable only for He'elem Davar (if he erred in Halachah);

Both agree that when he is liable, he brings a female goat, like a commoner.

They also agree that he does not bring an Asham Taluy (when in doubt whether he transgressed).

Question: What is the case of idolatry b'Shogeg?

Suggestion: He thought that he bows to a synagogue, and it really was idolatry.

Rejection: He intended to serve Hash-m! (Surely, he is exempt.)

Answer #1: Rather, he bowed to a statue in the king's image.

Rejection: If he accepted it to be his god, he was Mezid (he does not bring a Korban). If he did not accept it to be his god, he did not serve idolatry!

Answer #2: Rather, he served idolatry due to love or fear. (The Tana'im argue only about whether or not an anointed Kohen is liable if he did not err in Halachah, but all agree that serving due to love or fear is considered idolatry!)

Answer #3 (and rejection of Abaye's support - Rava): No, he thought that idolatry is permitted.

Question: That is He'elem Davar (which Chachamim agree about. The argument is about b'Shogeg. This must be a different case)!

Answer: He thought that idolatry is totally permitted. He'elem Davar is only when he remembers part of the law and forgets part.