The problem we have with the Pasuk in Kedoshim "ve'Ish asher Yikach es Achoso ve'Ra'ah es Ervasah ... ve'Nichresu" is - since when is a voyeur subject to Kareis?

Ula therefore learns from the Pasuk that - the accused requires warning.

Since Kareis does not require a warning - we establish the Pasuk by Malkos (to which almost every Chiyuv Kareis is automatically subject).

de'bei Chizkiyah learns the obligation to warn, from the Pasuk in Mishpatim "ve'Chi Yazid Ish al Re'ehu Le'horgo be'Ormah" - which implies warning because "Yazid" is written in the future (meaning that he remains a Meizid even after having been warned), or because how would we otherwise know that he was not a Shogeg.

de'bei Rebbi Yishmael learns it from "ha'Motz'im oso Mekoshesh Eitzim" (from the fact that it is written in the present tense). Whereas Tana de'bei Rebbi learns it from the Pasuk in Ki-Seitzei (in connection with someone who rapes a married woman) "al-D'var asher Inah es Eishes Re'eihu" - seeing as "al-D'var" always applies to words rather than actions, insinuating that a warning is required.

The Tana needs to find a source for warning in the case of murder (de'bei Chizkiyah), even though we already have one in the case of raping a sister, because we cannot learn warning (which is a leniency) with regard to death by the sword from a case of Malkos (which is more lenient). We nevertheless need the Pasuk by the Mekoshesh (de'bei Rebbi Yishmael) - because, by the same token, we cannot learn (the more stringent) Sekilah from (the more lenient) Hereg.

In spite of the fact that the punishment of a Na'arah Me'urasah is also Sekilah, the Torah adds another source for warning by Na'arah Me'urasah (Tana de'bei Rebbi), according to ...

... Rebbi Shimon (whom we quoted earlier) - as a source for warning by Sereifah (which is more stringent than Sekilah, according to him).

... the Rabbanan - based on the principle 'Milsa de'Asya be'Kal va'Chomer, Tarach ve'Kasav bah K'ra' (the Torah sometimes mentions specifically something that we already know from a Kal-va'Chomer).

Rava (or Chizkiyah) learn from the Pasuk in Shoftim (in connection with the witnesses warning) "Yumas ha'Meis" that - not only must the accused accept the warning, but that he must also declare that he is aware of the fact that he is subject to the death-penalty.

Rav Chanan exempts the witnesses of a Na'arah Me'urasah, whom they claimed, committed adultery, and who then became Zom'min, from the death-penalty - because they can claim that their testimony was intended to forbid her on her Chasan (and not to penalty her to death).

The problem we initially have with this is - the fact that when they warned her, the witnesses must have warned her that she faced the death-penalty; so how can they claim otherwise.

To solve the problem, we establish the author as Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Yehudah - who maintains that a Chaver (a Talmid-Chacham) does not require warning, and the case in hand is talking about an Ishah Chaveirah (a learned woman, or the wife of a Talmid-Chacham), whom the witnesses did not need to warn.

Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Yehudah's reasoning - is based on his premise that the purpose of warning is purely to distinguish between Shogeg and Meizid, which is unnecessary by a Talmid-Chacham or his wife, who is fully aware of the distinction anyway (see also Tosfos DH 'be'Ishah Chaverah').

We still query Rav Chanan however, on the grounds that according to him, the woman ought not to be Chayav Misah either - because of the principle 'Eidus she'I Atah Yachol le'Hazimah Lo Sh'mah Eidus' (Any testimony that is not subject to Hazamah is not valid).

So we conclude that, according to Rav Chanan - in the current, neither the witnesses nor the woman are subject to the death-penalty according to Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Yehudah ...

... and it is only in a case - where she is committing adultery for the second time (since she already became forbidden to her husband the first time) that she can become subject to the death-penalty.

Neither can the witnesses now claim that they came to forbid her on the adulterer (with the same ramifications as our original Kashya) - because he is speaking about a case where it is either the same adulterer both times, or where the second adulterer is a close relative who is forbidden to her anyway.

Rav Chanan mentions specifically a Na'arah ha'Me'urasah (not because the Din would be any different in the case of a married woman, but) - to teach us that even in such case where they are not yet living together, the witnesses are believed, when they claim that it was their sole intention to forbid her to him.

Rav Chisda maintains that - although a discrepancy regarding the murder weapon is considered a discrepancy to disqualify the testimony, a discrepancy regarding the color clothes the murderer wore is not, since the clothes that the murderer wears at the time of the crime, will not affect the verdict one way of the other.

Consequently, Rav Chisda will establish the Beraisa which considers a discrepancy ...

... a difference of opinion in the color clothes the murderer was wearing no less "Eino Nachon" than a discrepancy in the murder weapon - not by ordinary clothes, but by a Sudar (a head-cloth) for example, which the murderer used to strangle his victim.

... a difference of opinion in the color shoes the murderer was wearing as "Ein Zeh Nachon" - where he kicked the victim and killed him with his shoes.

Rami bar Chama initially explains our Mishnah, where ben Zakai questioned the witnesses with regard to the fig-stalks on the fig-tree - by establishing it where the case concerns the accused picking some of those figs on Shabbos.

We reject this answer however - from the Lashon of the Mishnah 'Tachas Te'einah Hargo' (indicating that the case is one of murder, and not Chilul Shabbos).

So Rami bar Chama tries to establish the case - where the murderer burned the victim with a branch from the fig-tree underneath which the murder took place.

We reject Rami bar Chama's second explanation too, from a Beraisa, which cites ben Zakai as having asked the witnesses "Te'einah Zu ... Te'einim Shechoros, Te'einim Levanos' - and if 'Eino Nachon' is confined to the murder weapon, it is not feasible to kill someone with figs.

Rav Yosef finally reconciles Rav Chisda's ruling with our Mishnah by establishing ben Zakai as a minority opinion (whereas he holds like the Chachamim). In his opinion - ben Zakai is particularly stringent with regard to Bedikos, whose stringency he equates with that of Chakiros.

Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai lived - a hundred and twenty years, of which he spent forty years as a businessman, forty years as a Talmid and forty, teaching Torah.

The Beraisa explains how - forty years before the Churban Bayis Sheini, the Sanhedrin left the Lishkas ha'Gazis and sat in 'Chanus' (an area somewhere in Yerushalayim).

We amend the statement of Rebbi Yitzchak bar Avudimi, who, establishes the Beraisa in connection with the discontinuation of judging Dinei Kenasos - inasmuch as Dinei Kenasos do not require the Lishkas ha'Gazis. So we amend it to Dinei Nefashos, which do.

Initially, we reject the suggestion that ben Zakai is synonymous with Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai - because, as we just learned, the latter lived to the age of a hundred and twenty, and seeing as he only taught Torah during the last forty years of his life, some of which at least, took place after the Churban (as the Mishnah in Rosh Hashanah specifically states), he could not have sat on the Sanhedrin, which stopped ruling Dinei Nefashos forty years before the Churban.

What leads us ....

... to believe that this ben Zakai is not Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai the Nasi - is the fact that the Mishnah refers to him simply as ben Zakai.

... to conclude that they must be one and the same is - the fact that, on the other hand, the Beraisa refers to the same person by the name of "Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai."

To reconcile our Mishnah with the fact that Rabban Yochanan only sat on the Sanhedrin after the Churban, when Dinei Nefashos were not judged, we explain that, it was in his capacity as a Talmid that he issued the suggestion (to examine the witnesses on the stalks of the figs) which the Sanhedrin accepted (but did not actually accept as Halachah) ...

... whereas the Beraisa refers to him as Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai - based on his later status.

When we query our Mishnah (with regard to the Bedikos) 'Afilu Shenayim Omrim "Eini Yode'a"!', 'Mai Afilu', we mean to ask that - having taught that one of the witnesses does not become disqualified by not knowing the answer to one or more of the Bedikos, then why add 'Afilu Shenayim' (since there is not the least reason to differentiate between one and two witnesses in this regard).

Rav Sheishes therefore amends the Tana's statement and links it to the Chakiros in the Reisha, and the Tana is speaking where there are three witnesses; and the statement now reads - 'ba'Chakiros, Afilu Shenayim Omrim Yada'nu ve'Echad Omer Eini Yode'a, Eidusan Beteilah'.

And when he establishes our Mishnah like Rebbi Akiva, he is referring to the Mishnah in Makos, where Rebbi Akiva disqualifies all three witnesses, even though only one of them says 'Eini Yode'a' - because he compares three witnesses to two (and two witnesses can only become Zom'min if both of them are declared Zom'min). Consequently, since the third witness cannot become an Eid Zomem, neither can the others, in which case their testimony is Bateil because it is 'Eidus she'I Atah Yachol Le'hazimah'.

In fact, this is the specific opinion of Rebbi Shimon, only Rebbi Akiva, who learns something else from the comparison between three witnesses and two, agrees with him in this point. And the reason that Rav Sheishes establishes our Mishnah like Rebbi Akiva rather than like Rebbi Shimon - is because of the principle that the majority of S'tam Mishnayos and Beraisos in Shas go like Rebbi Akiva.

Rava argues with Rav Sheishes on the grounds that the Tana says 'Eidusan Kayemes' and not 'Eidusan Beteilah'. According to him, the Mishnah is coming to teach us that - although if one witness says 'Eini Yode'a' by Chakiros, the entire testimony is Pasul, nevertheless, there are times when it is Kasher, namely, when there are three witnesses, and the testimony of the other two remains intact.

In that case, the author of our Mishnah is - the Chachamim who argue with Rebbi Akiva.

When Rami bar Chama met Rav Kahana and Rav Safra, they had been learning Maseches Sanhedrin - by Rabah.

When Rami bar Chama asked them that, seeing as Bedikos and Chakiros are both Min ha'Torah, why is the entire testimony disqualified should one of the witnesses say 'Eini Yode'a' by one of the Chakiros, whereas by one of the Bedikos, it is not? They replied that it is disqualified by Chakiros - because it becomes an Eidus she'I Atah Yachol le'Ha'azimah', which is not the case by Bedikos.

Rami bar Chama commented that although Rav Kahana and Rav Safra claimed to have learned only P'shat, they were conversant with the deeper meaning too. To which they responded that - it was only out of the goodness of Rami bar Chama's heart and his modesty that he said that, and that had he wanted to attack their words, they would not have known what to say.

We learned in our Mishnah that a discrepancy of one day at the beginning of the month is acceptable, since we assume one of the witnesses to have been unaware of the fact that the previous month had been pronounced a full month. Rebbi Acha bar Chanina ... Amar Rebbi Yochanan gives them only - until the majority of the month has passed to allow for this error.

Rava attempts to prove this from the Mishnah itself which does not allow a discrepancy of two days - presumably, he says, because once half the month has passed, we no longer allow the witnesses any discrepancy for the current month, in which case there can never be a discrepancy of two days.

We refute Rava's proof however, based on the theory - that although we will accept the witness' claim that he did not hear the sound of the Shofar which Beis-Din would blow each month when they announced Rosh-Chodesh, he is unlikely to have missed it twice.

Rebbi Acha bar Chanina ... Amar Rebbi Yochanan also gives the final time to say 'Kidush Levanah' as - when the missing section of the moon is filled in.

Rebbi Ya'akov bar Idi Amar Rav Yehudah explains this to mean until seven days. According to the Neherda'i - it is until the sixteenth of the month.

In fact, we conclude, both opinions hold like Rebbi Yochanan, only Rav Yehudah holds 'Ki Yisra' ...

...'like the string of the bow', meaning that, comparing the moon to a bow, one has until the time when the section of the moon up to where the string of the bow would normally be (the equivalent of half the bow) to recite Kidush Levanah, whereas the Neherda'i hold ...

'Ki Nafya', which means - like a sieve (which is round like the moon), meaning until the moon is full in the middle of the month.